Select committee inquiry
Future Army 2020
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“This inquiry looks into the future of the Army as envisaged in the Ministry of Defence’s plans for Future Army 2020. The inquiry examines the rationale behind the plans, the resources required and the achievability of Army 2020. It will not examine decisions on individual regiments and units or specific basing decisions.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What the government said
9th Report - Future Army 2020 - Volume II (Volume II: additional written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
9th Report - Future Army 2020 - Volume I (Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes and oral evidence)
The government responded on 12 September 2014.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The Government's response to the Defence Committee's Future Army 2020 report defends the Army 2020 plan, saying it "does not accept the Committee's points" on its principal concerns while welcoming support for greater Reserve and public engagement roles.
- On the Committee's concern that the rationale for the plan was not communicated, the Department says it "has been communicated clearly" through Parliament, media engagement and internal briefings, while accepting "some risks involved in manning and recruiting".
- On Reserve recruitment, the Government says it is "confident that the plan will be delivered" and cites measures already implemented to reach 30,000 trained Army Reservists by April 2019.
- On a regular annual report on the Army's Fighting Power, the Government says it will "explore the method" and whether a measure is "both feasible and useful", but "there are no current plans to publish any such analysis".
- On recruiting under-18s, the Secretary of State's letter concludes the scheme is "highly valuable" and states "I intend for the scheme to continue".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 25 April 2013 to its close on 12 September 2014.
- Report 2 reports
- Government response 12 Sep 2014
What it recommended 37 recommendations · 108 conclusions
1At the beginning of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to Army personnel, including...
Concluded (the committee's words)
At the beginning of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to Army personnel, including those who have left the Services, for their bravery, dedication to duty and their contribution to the nation’s security. This has been an uncertain and worrying time for the Armed Forces as they undergo major changes to their structure and role while continuing to undertake operations in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. We also recognise the valuable role that their families play in supporting them as they carry out their duties.
2We are surprised that such a radical change to the Army’s structure, reflecting a reduction...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are surprised that such a radical change to the Army’s structure, reflecting a reduction of 12,000 personnel from that announced in SDSR 2010, was not discussed at the National Security Council (NSC). Even if the overall strategic vision had not changed, as the Government claims, the military ways and means of that strategy were considerably altered under Army 2020. We are firmly of the view that the NSC should have considered the Army 2020 plan. We recommend that the NSC should be involved in the evolution and development of Future Force 2020 in the run-up to the next SDSR in 2015.
3We have received no definitive evidence of an active experimentation programme in the development and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We have received no definitive evidence of an active experimentation programme in the development and implementation of Army 2020. Furthermore we note with concern that the Chief of the General Staff’s update on the implementation of Army 2020, published in July 2013, provided no detail on experimentation. The MoD should set out in more detail, with specific examples, how the plans for Army 2020 were, and are, being tested and challenged.
4We note that the Secretary of State for Defence accepts that Army 2020 was designed...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note that the Secretary of State for Defence accepts that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope. We are concerned that this consideration took primacy over the country’s abilities to respond to the threats, risks and uncertainties contained in the National Security Strategy. We were also concerned to hear that it was the Ministry of Defence’s Permanent Secretary who told the Chief of the General Staff the future size of the Army under the Army 2020 plan. We call on the MoD to explain the apparent lack of consultation and involvement of the Chief of the General Staff in the decision-making process that has affected his Service so fundamentally.
5In its response to this Report, we recommend that the MoD provide us with an...
Recommended (the committee's words)
In its response to this Report, we recommend that the MoD provide us with an assessment of how the Army 2020 plans will affect the “Fighting Power” of the Army providing comparable assessments of both current fighting power and projected fighting power following the completion of the Army 2020 plans.
6We agree with the Chief of the General Staff’s assessment that the security threats that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with the Chief of the General Staff’s assessment that the security threats that the UK will face in future are uncertain. We remain to be convinced that the Army 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept which will 6 Future Army 2020 allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these threats. We ask the MoD to clarify if the proposals were fully considered by the Defence Board before the decision was made.
7We repeat our previous recommendation that the Government should further develop a concept of “critical...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We repeat our previous recommendation that the Government should further develop a concept of “critical mass” for the Armed Forces. We note that this is a concept not only used by the Army General Staff, but also one that the new Chief of the Defence Staff used in a recent speech. The development of a concept of “critical mass” for the Armed Forces, coupled with an assessment of the Army 2020 plan against the MoD’s “Fighting Power” doctrine, would enable a much better informed understanding of whether Army 2020 will enable the Army to fulfil its obligations and how it will contribute to Future Force 2020.
8We note the acknowledgement by senior Army officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the acknowledgement by senior Army officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan and the current high level of change in the Army will compromise its ability to respond to unexpected events to some degree. We also note that one of the drivers for the Army 2020 plan was the recognition that the Army could not match in resource-terms the five Multi-Role Brigade enduring operation envisaged in the Defence Planning Assumptions. In an ever changing world, with uncertain and ever changing threats, and continuing uncertainty about the resources available, we are concerned that the Defence Planning Assumptions are adequate to ensure the UK’s national security. In its response to our Report, the MoD should explain what account was taken of the possibility of changes to the Defence Planning Assumptions during the development of Army 2020 and how it has ensured that there is sufficient flexibility in the plan and resources available to meet any such changes. The MoD must ensure that this is taken into account as part of the work on the 2015 SDSR and that contingency plans are in place to deal urgently with this eventuality.
9Despite the current lack of public appetite, we consider it to be a question of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Despite the current lack of public appetite, we consider it to be a question of when, not if, UK Armed Forces will have to undertake an expeditionary operation in the future. In this context, it is essential that the Army maintains its ability to undertake such operations at short notice. Any loss of such capability would have serious implications for the UK’s national security. Given that, on most occasions, these operations will be carried out in cooperation with the UK’s Allies, in its response to this Report we call on the Government to set out the current status of the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. We also call on the MoD to provide us with an update on progress on the development of the new UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), including how it will train and operate and the extent to which appropriate multi-national partners have proved willing to participate in JEF planning and activity.
10The smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the ways it...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the ways it works with the other Services. We call on the MoD to set out in its response to our Report how Army 2020 will improve this joint working and how it has tested, or intends to test, the proposals. We also note Lieutenant General Bradshaw’s evidence Future Army 2020 7 regarding the Army’s greater integrated activity with other Government Departments and call on the Government to set out details of this in its response to our Report.
11It is disappointing that there was a year’s gap between the announcements of the Army...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is disappointing that there was a year’s gap between the announcements of the Army 2020 plan and the outcome of the Reserves consultation and the Reserves basing plan. This raised the potential for a lack of coordination and hampered communications regarding the plans for the Regular and Reserve Forces. Even though the generation of Reserve Forces is complex, the number of Reservists required for Army 2020 and the challenge to recruit them was well known. We consider that the intervening time between announcements could have been utilised in making progress in recruiting the required number of Reservists.
12We note, but remain to be convinced by, the Secretary of State’s explanation as to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note, but remain to be convinced by, the Secretary of State’s explanation as to why the reduction in the Regular Army should not be dependent on the recruitment of the necessary number of Reservists. The financially driven reduction in the number of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel in key supporting capabilities until sufficient Reserves are recruited and trained. In its response to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out in detail its planning assumptions for the transition, over the next five years, to a new Army structure including specific examples of the different types of capability which will fall within the domain of the Reserves and Regulars in future. This would assist with gaining support for the Army 2020 plan among the Regular Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament and the public. The Government must also set out its contingency plans for the rapid recruitment of Regular Army personnel should there be a need for the rapid expansion of UK Armed Forces.
13While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists in the Army might not appear a large...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists in the Army might not appear a large number based on historic levels, the current recruitment drive takes place against a backdrop of falling recruitment levels over several years. We note the scepticism of some of our witnesses that it will be possible to recruit the required number of Reservists in the timescale envisaged. The urgent challenge for the MoD is to ensure that it now employs effective measures and sufficient incentives to recruit and maintain 30,000 trained Reservists by 2018. Otherwise there is a danger of a gap emerging in the Army’s required capabilities and real fighting power. In its response to this Report, we also call on the MoD to outline the different approaches it envisages if the data shows that the plan is not on course to be delivered.
14We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical Services Agency, data on the trained strength and recruitment levels of Reservists. We also welcome the recruitment targets that the Secretary of State has published. We look forward to seeing the additional data that the National Statistician has agreed to publish. This information is vital to reassure all interested parties, the Army itself, Parliament and the public, that the plan is on schedule. We hope that each of these data sets will develop over time to include performance against targets and such information as gender, age and place of recruitment. We will 8 Future Army 2020 continue to monitor this data to assess whether it provides sufficient information. It is important that Parliament is provided with regular updates on progress towards recruitment targets.
15Despite the assurances we received from the Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Despite the assurances we received from the Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the Army recruitment process, we remain concerned that the targets for recruiting both Regular and Reserve soldiers may not be met. We are not convinced that the MoD’s contract with Capita was properly and thoroughly considered before its implementation. For example, we were given no evidence that any trialling of it had taken place. There would appear to have been a serious break- down in the supervision of the contract process, for which no one has been held accountable.
16We are concerned at the IT problems encountered at this early stage in the recruitment...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned at the IT problems encountered at this early stage in the recruitment campaign. We call on the MoD and Capita to take urgent steps to rectify these problems and the MoD should give a detailed account of the measures taken, including detailing the number of servicemen and women diverted from their normal duties in order to sustain the recruiting effort, in its response to our Report.
17We note the difficulties encountered by the Army in obtaining the medical data of potential...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the difficulties encountered by the Army in obtaining the medical data of potential Reservists due to their failure to comply with data protection regulations. Although this difficulty has at last been resolved, the Army and the MoD should have foreseen this problem and must learn lessons for the future.
18We commend the MoD for employing a range of media to attract and recruit both...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We commend the MoD for employing a range of media to attract and recruit both Regulars and Reserves but it is no help when the technology does not work or applications are lost in the system. Lessons need to be learned from the initial failure of the contract with Capita, and the respective accountabilities and responsibilities of both the contractor and the Army clearly established.
19We welcome the measures in the Reserves White Paper and the related clauses in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the measures in the Reserves White Paper and the related clauses in the Defence Reform Bill. We particularly welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s agreement during the passage of the Bill to the principle of making it a statutory requirement for the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association to report annually on the state of the Reserves. We will continue to pay close attention to progress on this and look forward to receiving more details on how this will be implemented and what the report will cover.
20We recognise the support many employers have given to the Reserve Forces over many years.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise the support many employers have given to the Reserve Forces over many years. We commend the Government’s intention to give greater recognition, building on the current SaBRE scheme and the new Corporate Covenant, to leading supportive employers of Reservists and look forward to receiving more information on this proposal. We recommend that as part of the recognition scheme the Government should publish additional information about supportive employers, building on the information already published by SaBRE on its website, highlighting good practice, and providing examples of the ways individual employers support Reservists.
21It is too early to say whether the measures in the White Paper and the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
It is too early to say whether the measures in the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill will prove sufficient and be effective in encouraging the recruitment of Reservists and ensuring the support of businesses of all sizes to achieve Army 2020. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to review these measures if recruitment falls behind target. In response to this Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess the effectiveness of the measures and the timescale for making a decision on whether further action and incentives are necessary.
22We welcome the Government’s intention that in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s intention that in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to undertake the same tasks as Regulars. However we note the concerns expressed by some employers regarding the potential for negative effects on their businesses arising from the increased use of Reservists. The MoD should continue to engage with the business community to address employers’ concerns as failure to do so will impact on the Army’s ability to generate and sustain the necessary capabilities. The MoD should include in its reports to Parliament on Reserves recruitment details of how many are employed by SMEs (small and medium enterprises employing under 250 employees) and any difficulties encountered in recruiting from this sector.
23We note the Army’s intention to deploy formed units and sub-units of Reserves.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the Army’s intention to deploy formed units and sub-units of Reserves. We ask the MoD to provide greater detail on how this will be implemented, particularly given the differing timescales for the reduction in Regular strength and the increase in the size of the Reserves, and how it will ensure that these changes deliver the required level of capability.
24We welcome the increase in the number of training days for Reservists as this is...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the increase in the number of training days for Reservists as this is vital to their greater integration with Regulars. In its response to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out what further practical measures will be implemented to enable Regulars and Reservists to train together. We are concerned that this should not involve closing well-recruited units, or those with a large number of potential new recruits to the Reserves, to match Regular basing and welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment in the House of Commons on 14 January 2014 to be flexible on the closure of such units.
25The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable to the Army and the UK’s Armed Forces...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable to the Army and the UK’s Armed Forces as a whole: we welcome the commitment to them in the Reserves White Paper. We welcome the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserve which is of particular interest to us given our previous inquiry work on Defence and cyber-security. The potential recruits, with the required skills, may not be those who would usually consider a career in the Armed Forces. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the MoD which will require a flexible approach if they are to be integrated effectively. We ask the MoD to report to the Committee in six months on progress on the establishment and the recruitment of the Joint Cyber Reserve.
26We support the Government’s intention to recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the Government’s intention to recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as part of the recruitment of 30,000 trained Reservists under the Army 2020 plan. We note the £5,000 commitment bonus, payable over four years, offered by the Army to Service leavers and ex-Regulars to incentivise their 10 Future Army 2020 transfer to the volunteer Army Reserve. We call on the Government to review effectiveness of its efforts and the measures introduced to attract more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve in six months and to share its findings with us. We also note the Army’s work on the Regular Reserve and call for an update on this work in the Government’s response to our Report.
27We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced role for the Army in civil...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced role for the Army in civil engagement. Although there is great admiration and respect for UK Armed Forces, we recognise that there is currently a disconnect between the Armed Forces and public understanding of the operations they have been asked to undertake. This must be addressed. We call on the Government to take steps to ensure that the Armed Forces, particularly Reservists, play a more active role in public engagement. In response to our Report, we recommend that the Government outline the communication strategy and practical steps it will implement to take forward its plans for public engagement.
28We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to provide us with a breakdown of how it plans to spend this money. We note the concerns expressed as to whether this funding will be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes for the Reserves Forces. We note that Reservists are cheaper to employ so long as they are not called up. This will only prove to be a cost saving so long as future governments are not required to undertake operations. This will need to be closely monitored. It would be unacceptable if the UK decided not to take part in any action because of the cost of deploying Reservists. We recommend that the Government set out in detail how it will assess and report on the cost effectiveness of, and the value for money achieved by, its plans and how these outcomes will be independently examined and verified. We would welcome the involvement of the National Audit Office in this evaluation.
29We note the evidence we have received on the recruitment age for the Armed Forces.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note the evidence we have received on the recruitment age for the Armed Forces. We commented on this in our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel and in response the Government agreed that the Armed Forces would undertake a cost benefit analysis of the recruitment of under-18s. We note that the Army is undertaking this analysis on a tri-service basis and that the work is continuing. However, we are disappointed by the lack of clarity regarding the study’s terms of reference and the slow progress with the study. We call on the Government to provide us with the terms of reference for the study and an estimation of when it will be completed. We expect the Army and MoD’s cost benefit analysis to be thorough and robust and call on the Government to set out how it might be independently scrutinised and verified. This would ensure confidence in the outcomes of the analysis. We also call on the Government to respond in detail to the argument that the Army could phase out the recruitment of minors without detriment to the Army 2020 plans.
30The plans resulting from the basing review and the return from Germany are intricate and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The plans resulting from the basing review and the return from Germany are intricate and interdependent and affect all three Services. The MoD must ensure this process is managed appropriately so that it does not unravel. We call on the MoD to keep us informed on its negotiations regarding training opportunities in Germany, Canada and Kenya, and how the historically close working relations with the Future Army 2020 11 German authorities are going to be maintained during the drawdown period.
31We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any further MoD budget reductions or further reductions in Army personnel. It is essential that the MoD’s budget settlement allows for the delivery of Army 2020. If this is not the case, it must be accepted that the Army will be capable of doing less than envisaged under Army 2020 and the UK’s vision of its place in the world and the Defence Planning Assumptions will have to be revised accordingly. We are also concerned about the Army’s capability to expand its numbers rapidly, both Regulars and Reserves, should a national emergency require it to do so. Any plans for the structure of the Armed Forces must be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. For the reasons already set out in this Report we have little confidence in the Government’s capacity to rapidly expand Army numbers should the need arise. The Government must set out its contingency plan for doing so.
32Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK’s national security. The evidence presented to date has been far from convincing. Our principal concerns are twofold: First, the MoD has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the public. Second, we remain concerned that the financially driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained.
33The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan B. The Government owe it to the Army to ensure it does work, but, crucially, if the situation changes, then the Government must be prepared to respond decisively by providing additional resources in order to guarantee the nation’s security. Although we have concerns about the Army 2020 plan, we recognise that it also provides opportunities, for example in addressing the role of Reservists and developing the public defence engagement role of UK Armed Forces which will help to resolve the current disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public.
34While we welcome the Government’s commitment to publish more data on the Reserves and to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
While we welcome the Government’s commitment to publish more data on the Reserves and to put into statute a requirement on the Reserves Forces and Cadets Association to produce an annual report on the state of the Reserve Forces, we believe the Government should go further and give a commitment to provide regular updates to Parliament on progress on all aspects of the Army 2020 plan. Oral and written statements while helpful are not sufficient; a detailed annual report on the Army’s Fighting Power should be laid before Parliament setting out progress and 12 Future Army 2020 setbacks in implementing the Army 2020 plan. The first of these reports should be laid before Parliament in January 2015 to allow consideration and debate before the 2015 General Election and to inform the 2015 SDSR.
35Our 2011 Report on the SDSR and the NSS recommended that the MoD should develop...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Our 2011 Report on the SDSR and the NSS recommended that the MoD should develop further the concept of a “critical mass” (that is the minimum threshold of 75 Q 270 76 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, para 31 77 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 4th Edition, November 2011 78 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, para 33 Future Army 2020 27 operational effectiveness) for the Armed Forces and establish a clearer measurable statement of what constitutes "critical mass" to allow verification and monitoring by Parliament.79 In its response to our Report the Government stated that it did not agree “that developing the concept of “critical mass” for our Armed Forces would be valuable”. However the Government did concede that: as the Regular Armed Forces and the Department grow smaller in the next few years, we will need to understand better the full base [all those factors that contribute to military capability, for example Regulars and Reservists, MoD civilians, contractors] on which military capability depends, both within and outside Defence.80
36Although the MoD had not accepted the value of developing a concept of “critical mass”...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although the MoD had not accepted the value of developing a concept of “critical mass” for the Armed Forces, during our inquiry we explored whether Army 2020 represented the “critical mass” of the Army or was simply the most that could be afforded. We asked General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of the General Staff, whether the UK could still deal with the security challenges that it faced or whether the Army had been reduced too much for it to be able to do so: That is a difficult question to answer because we do not know what sort of risks are going to present themselves and we don’t know what stance the Government will take, but it has been made very clear in the strategic space that we really value our partnerships. We see ourselves doing very few operations independently. We would be working as part of a coalition. It has been stated clearly that that is very likely to be with close allies that we have been working with for the past few decades, but we also sit firmly with emphasis in the NATO envelope and so on. There is also a clear acceptance that there are ways in which we can mitigate threats by other forms of investment, such as international development and upstream capacity building in the military space. They are funded separately, but play in the same dimension of trying to nip threats in the bud, stop potential failing states going that way and so on. If you look across the whole waterfront of upstream activity, the forces we can bring to bear and the way in which we can produce quite a resilient force for a protracted period, given notice, I think that we ought to be capable of dealing with these issues, as long as they are in the sort of envelope that has been envisaged from the SDSR.81
37Professor Theo Farrell, Head of the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, thought it...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Theo Farrell, Head of the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, thought it was clear that in most future scenarios the UK was likely to encounter, deployment of military force alone would not be the solution.82 In his view Army 2020 was a clever design in that although the plan had a focus on defence engagement activities, such 79 Our Report added that this should include not just the roles and structures of Regular and Reserve Forces but should be expanded to encompass enablers such as DSTL, industry, academia, the scientific and research community and the development of the defence knowledge base especially amongst the military and civil servants (Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, HC 761, para 173). 80 Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, pp 23-24 81 Q 8 82 Q 213 28 Future Army 2020 as peacekeeping and capacity building, it also maintained the capability to intervene to defend UK interests or deployed UK Armed Forces.83 He added: That seems entirely logical. Otherwise, the only other solution is: deploy forces for defence engagement, such as peacekeeping, and if the situation goes pear-shaped, you have to pull them out as fast as you can, because you cannot defend them—or you have to call on the Americans or somebody else to do it.84
38However, Brigadier (retired) Ben Barry told us that “the Government decided to do less by...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, Brigadier (retired) Ben Barry told us that “the Government decided to do less by having less and spending less”.85 He cited events since the SDSR, such as the war in Libya, the Arab upheavals and the conflict in Syria, as demonstrating that “the risk that a very turbulent and rapidly changing world could pose to UK national security has gone up since 2010, rather than gone down”.86 He concluded that: Although the Strategic Defence [and] Security Review is very opaque about the DPA [Defence Planning Assumptions] in terms of readiness, my understanding is that readiness has been reduced, so we have fewer forces able to react very quickly, whereas world events suggest to me that we actually need forces that can react more quickly than before the SDSR, rather than less.87
39Major General David Cullen told us that the Chief of the General Staff thought that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Major General David Cullen told us that the Chief of the General Staff thought that the Army was at “critical mass for the circumstances and the tasks that have been set and proposed [for the Army] as of today”. However, he added that if those circumstances or parameters changed, or the risks altered “then that critical mass can go up and down, dependent on the requirement”.88
40General Sir Nicholas Houghton, the new Chief of the Defence Staff, said in his December...
Concluded (the committee's words)
General Sir Nicholas Houghton, the new Chief of the Defence Staff, said in his December 2013 speech at the Royal United Services Institute: Indeed, the one bit of Defence’s future funding that has political commitment to real growth is the equipment programme. But the dawning reality is that, even if we maintain the non-equipment budget in real terms, rising manpower costs raise the prospect of further manpower and activity cuts. Unattended our current course leads to a strategically incoherent force structure: exquisite equipment, but insufficient resources to man that equipment or train on it. [...] We are not there yet; but across Defence I would identify the Royal Navy as being perilously close to its critical mass in man-power terms.89
41We agree with the Chief of the General Staff’s assessment that the security threats that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with the Chief of the General Staff’s assessment that the security threats that the UK will face in future are uncertain. We remain to be convinced that the Army 83 Q 214 84 Q 214 85 Q 213 86 Q 213 87 Q 213 88 Q 105 89 2013 Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture at the Royal United Services Institute. Available at: http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E5284A3D06EFFD/ Future Army 2020 29 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept which will allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these threats. We ask the MoD to clarify if the proposals were fully considered by the Defence Board before the decision was made.
42We repeat our previous recommendation that the Government should further develop a concept of “critical...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We repeat our previous recommendation that the Government should further develop a concept of “critical mass” for the Armed Forces. We note that this is a concept not only used by the Army General Staff, but also one that the new Chief of the Defence Staff used in a recent speech. The development of a concept of “critical mass” for the Armed Forces, coupled with an assessment of the Army 2020 plan against the MoD’s “Fighting Power” doctrine, would enable a much better informed understanding of whether Army 2020 will enable the Army to fulfil its obligations and how it will contribute to Future Force 2020. Defence Planning Assumptions
43The 2010 SDSR set out Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) for the Armed Forces: to be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The 2010 SDSR set out Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) for the Armed Forces: to be able to conduct “an enduring stabilisation operation” of “up to 6,500 personnel”, “one non-enduring complex intervention” of “up to 2,000 personnel”, and “one non-enduring simple intervention” of “up to 1,000 personnel” at the same time.90
44We were concerned to establish whether Army 2020 enabled the Army to meet the current...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were concerned to establish whether Army 2020 enabled the Army to meet the current Defence Planning Assumptions. While Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Commander Land Forces, confirmed to us that the Army was confident that under Army 2020 it would be able to meet these assumptions, he did acknowledge that the Army was in a period of flux. He told us: We are finishing very demanding operations in Afghanistan, and my focus and my first priority is correctly to resource those operations while they are still ongoing. We are going through a huge programme of change, which involves bringing a fifth of the Army back from Germany, reducing the size of the Army by a fifth, reorganising formations into new constructs and rebasing, so clearly our ability to respond to contingencies during all of that is to some degree compromised. However, we are confident that we will get back onto a contingency footing against the requirements laid on us by Defence.91
45Major General Cullen added that this highlighted “the challenges that were placed on [the Army]...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Major General Cullen added that this highlighted “the challenges that were placed on [the Army] post the SDSR, where [...] the Army solution to the enduring operation part of the defence planning assumptions was the ability to put five MRB [Multi-Role Brigade]- type brigades into the field that could roll on a six and 24-month cycle to maintain that operation”. He told us following the SDSR and the MoD internal three-month review, the Army was not able to match that in resource terms. This was one of the drivers for the Army 2020 plan in “seeking to be more adaptable and agile in meeting [the enduring 90 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 19 91 Q 119 30 Future Army 2020 operation part of the defence planning assumptions].” He thought the Army 2020 construct of the reaction force provided the first three of those [MRB] capabilities while the adaptable force gave the range of capabilities that the Army would need to work to and adjust at readiness, at notice, to fill the fourth and fifth roles.92
46In our Report, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, we concluded that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In our Report, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, we concluded that the imminent end of operations in Afghanistan provided an opportunity for the Government to think more strategically about the UK’s place in the world in shaping the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Defence and Security Review.93 The articulation of the UK’s place in the world should also inform development of the Defence Planning Assumptions in the 2015 SDSR and identification of the appropriate level of resources to meet these assumptions.
47Given the large scale changes that the Army is undertaking, we were concerned about the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Given the large scale changes that the Army is undertaking, we were concerned about the possible impact of any alteration to the defence planning assumptions by the 2015 SDSR. Lieutenant General Bradshaw confirmed that if the assumptions were revised upwards “the Army 2020 plan would not meet those new assumptions, and we would require an extension of capability to meet those new assumptions”.94 Major General Cullen pointed out that “of course, the opposite is true. If you change those assumptions downwards, you would revisit assumptions made across defence in the defence review equally”.95
48We note the acknowledgement by senior Army officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the acknowledgement by senior Army officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan and the current high level of change in the Army will compromise its ability to respond to unexpected events to some degree. We also note that one of the drivers for the Army 2020 plan was the recognition that the Army could not match in resource-terms the five Multi-Role Brigade enduring operation envisaged in the Defence Planning Assumptions. In an ever changing world, with uncertain and ever changing threats, and continuing uncertainty about the resources available, we are concerned that the Defence Planning Assumptions are adequate to ensure the UK’s national security. In its response to our Report, the MoD should explain what account was taken of the possibility of changes to the Defence Planning Assumptions during the development of Army 2020 and how it has ensured that there is sufficient flexibility in the plan and resources available to meet any such changes. The MoD must ensure that this is taken into account as part of the work on the 2015 SDSR and that contingency plans are in place to deal urgently with this eventuality. Expeditionary warfare
49An essential requirement for the UK’s military force has been the ability to undertake expeditionary...
Concluded (the committee's words)
An essential requirement for the UK’s military force has been the ability to undertake expeditionary operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of State for Defence recently acknowledged that there was currently no public appetite for 92 Q 119 93 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, para 32 94 Q 120 95 Q 120 Future Army 2020 31 expeditionary operations such as that in Afghanistan, but noted that events can change public opinion in an instant.96 The Army 2020 plan envisages the maintenance of this expeditionary capability: The change in emphasis to a more adaptable and flexible Army, capable of undertaking a broader range of military tasks has required a significant change to the current structure of the Army which has most recently been optimized for enduring operations in Afghanistan. The need to maintain an Army which is structured and trained for an enduring operation is shifting to that of one held at graduated readiness for use in extremis on contingent operations,97 but persistently engaged at home with UK society [for example homeland resilience] and especially overseas, to deliver the full spectrum of upstream (conflict prevention) and downstream (post- conflict) engagement.98
50In the July 2013 Army 2020 update, Lieutenant General Jacko Page, Commander Force Development and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the July 2013 Army 2020 update, Lieutenant General Jacko Page, Commander Force Development and Training said: Training for more contingent operations will require a different mindset and approach. The uncertainty of contingency will require us to re-master the skills of self-generated and delivered training. We will train as we intend to fight, as a fully integrated force prepared to operate in austere and challenging environments. The result will be a tough expeditionary Army, prepared for complexity, acting lawfully, and comfortable taking risk to exploit opportunities.99
51The MoD acknowledged in the SDSR that the UK is likely to undertake expeditionary operations,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD acknowledged in the SDSR that the UK is likely to undertake expeditionary operations, with few exceptions, in collaboration with allies.100 This was illustrated by the Government’s plans to develop the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, established under the 2010 UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty, which is planned as an early entry force capable of facing multiple threats up to the highest intensity, and available for bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations.101 A 5-year exercise framework has been put in place to achieve full operating capability in
52Despite the current lack of public appetite, we consider it to be a question of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Despite the current lack of public appetite, we consider it to be a question of when, not if, UK Armed Forces will have to undertake an expeditionary operation in the future. In this context, it is essential that the Army maintains its ability to undertake such operations at short notice. Any loss of such capability would have serious implications for the UK’s national security. Given that, on most occasions, these operations will be carried out in cooperation with the UK’s Allies, in its response to this Report we call on the Government to set out the current status of the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. We also call on the MoD to provide us with an update on progress on the development of the new UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), including how it will train and operate and the extent to which appropriate multi- national partners have proved willing to participate in JEF planning and activity. Joint working with the other Services
53The debate on Army 2020 has focused mostly on the role of Reservists, the reduction...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The debate on Army 2020 has focused mostly on the role of Reservists, the reduction in Regular personnel and the loss of units and regiments. However, an important element to be considered is how Army 2020 would affect joint working with the other Services. Lieutenant General Bradshaw told us that the plans had elements that would make both joint activity and work with coalition partners easier. He added: Firstly, the divisional headquarters will have an improved plug-in point for air representation, so we expect air-land integration to work more effectively. [...] I would say also that, as an Army, we are on a path towards not only more joint activity—actually we are already there: Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade has thoroughly got us into that space—but more integrated activity with other Government Departments and Ministries. That is the requirement where we need to make more ground. Clearly, it is a cross-governmental activity.103
54The smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the ways it...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the ways it works with the other Services. We call on the MoD to set out in its response to our Report how Army 2020 will improve this joint working and how it has tested, or intends to test, the proposals. We also note Lieutenant General Bradshaw’s evidence regarding the Army’s greater integrated activity with other Government Departments and call on the Government to set out details of this in its response to our Report. 103 Q 98 Future Army 2020 33 3 Implementation of Army 2020
55The Army 2020 plan envisaged that the changes to the Regular Army structure would be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Army 2020 plan envisaged that the changes to the Regular Army structure would be in place by 2015.104 At the time of publication of the Army 2020 plan, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, pledged an additional £1.8 billion in spending on the Reserves over the next ten years and announced an ambitious plan to grow the trained strength of the Reserves to 30,000 by 2018.105 However there was still work to be undertaken to implement the Army 2020 plan and further announcements to be made, particularly on the role, use and recruitment of Reservists and both the Regular and Reserve basing plans (see paragraph 2 (timeline of announcements) and paragraphs 7–10).
56The MoD published its proposals for the Reserve Forces, Reserves in the Future Force 2020:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD published its proposals for the Reserve Forces, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, in July 2013.106 Its central theme was the new relationship Defence would seek to build with Reservists and their families, employers and society. Specifically, the MoD is seeking to make serving as, and employing, a Reservist more appealing, challenging and financially rewarding. At the same time as publication of the White Paper, the MoD announced its Reserve basing plan,107 the Regular Army basing plan having been announced in March 2013.108 Recruitment of Reserves
57Given that the Reservists element, particularly recruitment of the required numbers, of Army 2020 has...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Given that the Reservists element, particularly recruitment of the required numbers, of Army 2020 has been the biggest area of contention on the Army 2020 plan, we explored whether the delays between the announcements on Regulars and Reserves, had impacted on the implementation of the plan. In July 2013, Major General David Cullen, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, told us that there were two reasons for the delays between the announcements: The first and most fundamental was that, following the production of the Future Reserve 2020 proposition, which was done separately, the Secretary of State agreed that there was a need for consultation and the production of the Green Paper to map a journey; that was inevitably going to take a certain amount of time longer than the Regular component’s proposition, which was easier in many ways to come to, not least because the manner of the generation of our Reserves over time is complex, so the detail required was very much greater to go through. All of which came together, as you well understand, with the White Paper announcement on the Reserves last week.109
58In July 2013, we asked Lieutenant General Bradshaw, Commander Land Forces, what progress had been...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In July 2013, we asked Lieutenant General Bradshaw, Commander Land Forces, what progress had been made on the recruitment of Reservists since the announcement of Army 104 Q 200, Q271 and Ev w4 105 Ministry of Defence Announcement, Future Reserve Forces 2020, 5 July 2012 106 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013 107 HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 49-53WS 108 HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 109 Q 97 34 Future Army 2020
59It is disappointing that there was a year’s gap between the announcements of the Army...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is disappointing that there was a year’s gap between the announcements of the Army 2020 plan and the outcome of the Reserves consultation and the Reserves basing plan. This raised the potential for a lack of coordination and hampered communications regarding the plans for the Regular and Reserve Forces. Even though the generation of Reserve Forces is complex, the number of Reservists required for Army 2020 and the challenge to recruit them was well known. We consider that the intervening time between announcements could have been utilised in making progress in recruiting the required number of Reservists. Relationship between the reduction in Regulars and the increase in Reservists
60It has been suggested by the former Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Liam...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It has been suggested by the former Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Liam Fox MP,111 and others, including those contributing to our forum on the Army Rumour Service website, that the reduction in the Army’s Regular strength should be contingent on the recruitment of the required number of Reserves by 2018.112 In the House on 10 October 2011, the then Secretary of State, Rt Hon Liam Fox MP, said: Perhaps the biggest challenge is the fact that we are pouring £400 million into the reserves over this Parliament [...]. There will be challenges in absorbing that amount of money and, of course, the rate at which we are able to build up the Reserves will determine the rate at which we are able to change the ratio with the Regulars.113
61When the Army 2020 plan was announced in July 2012, the link between the Regular...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When the Army 2020 plan was announced in July 2012, the link between the Regular reductions and the increase in Reserves had been removed. The reductions in Regular Forces were to be completed by 2015 while the target date for the recruitment of the Reservists was 2018. Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, told us why: We have available to us a fixed envelope of resources, and making the decision to proceed with the draw-down of Regular force numbers to the target of about 82,000 and to build the Reserve over a period of five years allows us to take the dividend 110 Q 150 111 BBC News website, Liam Fox raises doubts over regular Army cuts, 25 October 2013 112 For example see HC Deb, 20 November 2013,col 1273 [John Baron MP] and Lord Bramall, The Telegraph, We’re fighting bean counters now, says man who helped beat Nazis, 26 October 2013 113 HC Deb, 10 October 2011, col 9 Future Army 2020 35 from the reduced size of the Regular force and invest in the recruitment, training and equipment provision of the Reserve forces. Within the Army’s budget [...] it simply would not have been deliverable or sustainable to propose retaining a larger Regular force and investing in the build-up of Reserve forces in the way we are now doing.114 Asked whether it would not be better to retain a contingent link between the increase in the Reserves and the reduction in the Regular Army, the Secretary of State replied: I recognise the line of questioning, but I am afraid that I do not see the logic of suggesting that we should hold the Regular forces that we have decided to draw down and restructure in their old configuration at their old numbers, rather than getting on with the job of reconfiguring them for their future role—a contingent posture, post 2014.115
62The Secretary of State argued that it was critical to understand that the Army was...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Secretary of State argued that it was critical to understand that the Army was “not simply replacing Regulars with Reservists”.116 Army 2020 was about changing the structure of the Army so that “more of the supporting capabilities are held in the Reserves”. In future the Army would have different types of capability in the Reserve and Regulars.117
63We note, but remain to be convinced by, the Secretary of State’s explanation as to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note, but remain to be convinced by, the Secretary of State’s explanation as to why the reduction in the Regular Army should not be dependent on the recruitment of the necessary number of Reservists. The financially driven reduction in the number of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel in key supporting capabilities until sufficient Reserves are recruited and trained. In its response to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out in detail its planning assumptions for the transition, over the next five years, to a new Army structure including specific examples of the different types of capability which will fall within the domain of the Reserves and Regulars in future. This would assist with gaining support for the Army 2020 plan among the Regular Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament and the public. The Government must also set out its contingency plans for the rapid recruitment of Regular Army personnel should there be a need for the rapid expansion of UK Armed Forces. Reservist recruitment challenge
64Historically the size of the Territorial Army has been larger than that envisaged by Army...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Historically the size of the Territorial Army has been larger than that envisaged by Army 2020, as illustrated in the graph below: 114 Q 270 115 Qq 270-271 116 Q 278 117 Q278 36 Future Army 2020 Territorial Army Strength 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 Territorial Army Strength 20,000 10,000 0 1980[1] 1990 2000 Current Total Trained strength strength target for target by 2020[2] 2020[3] Source: Ministry of Defence: Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security Together: A Consultation Paper, Cm 8475 Annex B, p 45 Notes: (1) Trained and untrained (2) Total strength of trained and untrained Reserves (3) Reservists who have completed their Phase 1 (initial) and Phase 2 (specialist) training
65However, although a trained Territorial Army of 30,000 would not appear large in historic terms,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, although a trained Territorial Army of 30,000 would not appear large in historic terms, the biggest challenge identified during our inquiry was the recruitment of the required number of Reservists to fulfil the Army 2020 plan. Several witnesses expressed doubts as to whether this could be achieved. Professor Theo Farrell identified it as the one flaw in the plan: the whole thing is predicated on the ability to raise 30,000 Reserves and then progressively integrate them in a deployable force, starting from individual augmentees to whole units. And while, for instance, the Americans have been able to use Reserve forces in this way, in recent history the British have not been able to deploy whole units into the field. More to the point, as we know they are encountering very significant problems with Operation Fortify—the operation to raise the Reserve force. So that’s the flaw: if you cannot raise the size of the Reserve force that you require and you cannot get the flexible contracts you need to use them in a certain way, the whole of Army 2020 is crashing.118
66When they gave evidence, Rt Hon Phillip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When they gave evidence, Rt Hon Phillip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, and General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of the General Staff, expressed confidence that the required number of Reservists could be achieved, highlighting that the number of trained Reservists envisaged was significantly lower compared with historic and many international comparisons. The Secretary of State said: The number of trained Reserves that we are targeting is significantly smaller than the number we have traditionally held in this country. We will have 30,000 trained Army 118 Q 200 Future Army 2020 37 Reservists by 2018, which compares with around 72,000 trained Army Reservists as recently as 1990. It is a significantly lower proportion of our Armed Forces than our English-speaking allies typically expect to hold as Reservists in their mix, and we are confident that we will be able to deliver it.119 General Wall told us: [...] in recent memory we have had a much more significant Reserve force than we aspire to grow in this period. [...] I am not suggesting it is like for like. In terms of the sheer size of it, we have been there before [...].120
67Lieutenant General (retired) Brims, Chair, Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group, agreed that the target...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Lieutenant General (retired) Brims, Chair, Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group, agreed that the target was achievable but said that it would be helpful to have metrics for the plan that allowed progress to be measured and if necessary mitigating action to be taken if recruitment fell behind schedule: In view of the timescale challenge, we said in our report that there was a need to be more metric, so that you could measure how the build-up was going. If you have some way points, you can take mitigating action to get things to a better end. I have no doubt that this is an achievable plan. The question is whether it is achievable in the timescale given.121
68The Secretary of State acknowledged that if the measures did not deliver the required number...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Secretary of State acknowledged that if the measures did not deliver the required number of Reservists then the plan would need to be revisited: If there is a persistent significant discrepancy [between targets and delivery], clearly the plan will have to be revised. The plan will not be delivering. However, I would not like the Committee to get the impression that there is a single set of possibilities for delivering this target output. There are many strands to the recruiting programme. The CGS and I have discussed with each other and with many other people the things that we might introduce if we find that elements of the current plan are not delivering what we expect them to deliver. There will be pilots of different approaches to see what works and what does not work. The introduction of Capita as our recruiting partner will deliver us far more analysis of the process. Because of the commercial environment in which it operates, it is used to analysing the results delivered by different approaches. We do not have, in the Department at the moment, what I would call “proper data” showing what the response to difference types of marketing approach and pitch to potential recruits is. We do not know what we are good at doing, or what we are not good at doing.122
69While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists in the Army might not appear a large...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists in the Army might not appear a large number based on historic levels, the current recruitment drive takes place against a backdrop of falling recruitment levels over several years. We note the scepticism of 119 Q 271 120 Q 312 121 Q 230 122 Q 309 38 Future Army 2020 some of our witnesses that it will be possible to recruit the required number of Reservists in the timescale envisaged. The urgent challenge for the MoD is to ensure that it now employs effective measures and sufficient incentives to recruit and maintain 30,000 trained Reservists by 2018. Otherwise there is a danger of a gap emerging in the Army’s required capabilities and real fighting power. In its response to this Report, we also call on the MoD to outline the different approaches it envisages if the data shows that the plan is not on course to be delivered. Recruitment and Target Data
70The MoD acknowledges that the recruitment of the required number of Reservists is a challenge.123...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD acknowledges that the recruitment of the required number of Reservists is a challenge.123 Since the Army 2020 announcement there have been calls for the MoD to publish recruitment figures and its recruitment targets for Reserves to assess progress of the Army plan. The Secretary of State for Defence has committed to publish statistical data on Reservists.124 The first data set was published by the Defence Analytical Services Agency on 14 November 2013.125 During the debate on the Defence Reform Bill on 20 November 2013, the Secretary of State committed to make more data available including the MoD’s targets: The statistics that were published last week were on trained strength and on recruitment into the Reserves. Those are the statistics for which the National Statistician is responsible. She has indicated on her website that she intends to publish further data series once she is confident of their robustness. Separately, I have undertaken to publish for the House the targets to which we are working and I will do so before the end of the year.126
71On 19 December 2013, the Secretary of State published the target recruitment figures for Reservists...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On 19 December 2013, the Secretary of State published the target recruitment figures for Reservists and the target strength of Reservists for each Service.127 The Army targets were as follows: Table 1: Trained strength targets for the Army Reserve up to end of Financial Year 2018 End End End End End End Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Target Year Year Year Year Year Year 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 Army Trained Reserve Strength 18,800 19,900 20,200 22,900 26,100 30,100 123 Q 152 124 HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 934 and HC Deb, 16 July 2013, col 958 125 Defence Analytical Services Agency, Ministry of Defence UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report 1 October 2013, 14 November 2013 126 HC Deb, 20 November 2013, col 1286 127 HC Deb, 19 December 2013, col 124WS; Paper deposited in the House of Commons Library by the Ministry of Defence Future Reserves 2020, 19 December 2013 (Ref: DEP2013-2063), available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/business-papers/commons/deposited-papers/ Future Army 2020 39 Table 2: Recruitment targets for the Army Reserve up to end of Financial Year 2018128 Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Target Year Year Year Year Year 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 Trained 1,300 1,270 1,270 940 910 Entrants Army New 3,600 6,000 8,000 8,000 7,000 Reserve Recruits Total 4,900 7,270 9,270 8,940 7,910
72We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical Services Agency, data on the trained strength and recruitment levels of Reservists. We also welcome the recruitment targets that the Secretary of State has published. We look forward to seeing the additional data that the National Statistician has agreed to publish. This information is vital to reassure all interested parties, the Army itself, Parliament and the public, that the plan is on schedule. We hope that each of these data sets will develop over time to include performance against targets and such information as gender, age and place of recruitment. We will continue to monitor this data to assess whether it provides sufficient information. It is important that Parliament is provided with regular updates on progress towards recruitment targets. Army recruitment contract
73As part of our examination of the Reserves recruitment challenge, in December 2013 we visited...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As part of our examination of the Reserves recruitment challenge, in December 2013 we visited the Army National Recruiting Centre at Upavon in Wiltshire. The purpose of the visit was to examine concerns surrounding the system of recruitment to both the Regular and Territorial Army since the signing in March 2012 of a 10 year contract with Capita plc to work in a partnering arrangement to deliver recruitment services for the Army. We had received reports that monthly recruitment targets for Reserves were being missed by a considerable margin. The MoD confirmed this when it published its target data in December 2013. It said: As anticipated, recruitment in FY2013 has been well below historic levels. We currently expect 2,500 enlistments this year made up of circa 1,750 untrained recruits and 750 former Regulars. Our estimates for this year are informed by the difficulties experienced in the recruiting organisation as the Army moves to a new recruiting structure in partnership with Capita and, in particular, the problems with the IT system supporting the application and enlistment process. These issues are being addressed with a range of initiatives that will make it progressively easier and quicker for an applicant to enlist. In 2014 these include: the introduction in January 2014 of a new Army recruitment web application; 128 It also provides a breakdown between trained entrants (who immediately count against the trained strength–largely former Regulars) and new recruits. 40 Future Army 2020 a simplified on-line application form; more streamlined medical clearance processes; and greater mentoring of recruits by local Reserve units through the application, enlistment and training process. From early 2015, the management of the recruitment process will be further improved with the introduction of the advanced IT system currently being developed in partnership with Capita.129
74Throughout our inquiry we have heard concerns regarding the performance of Capita and the Army...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Throughout our inquiry we have heard concerns regarding the performance of Capita and the Army Recruiting Group while operating the contract. These have centred around IT problems, difficulties with medical data and data protection compliance, time delays, loss of paperwork, opening hours of recruiting centres and reports of the redeployment of Regular personnel into recruiting posts.
75During our visit, Senior Army leaders and Capita executives admitted that neither party was content...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During our visit, Senior Army leaders and Capita executives admitted that neither party was content with contract performance since it became operational in March 2013. An IT system which had not proved fit for purpose was the principal reason given for the difficulties which had been experienced with the processing of applications. We were told that Capita was now going to take responsibility for the IT infrastructure with a view to introducing a fully capable system in April 2015. In the meantime, a plan was in place to improve the performance of existing systems through process changes and an increase in staffing. However concerns have continued to be raised about the IT systems since our visit. In response to an Urgent Question regarding problems with the IT system in the House on 14 January 2014, the Secretary of State for Defence informed the House: As we move forward, we are looking at further ways of improving the management of the recruiting process in the intervening period before the introduction of the advanced IT system now being developed in partnership with Capita, which is expected to be deployed in February 2015. We have just launched a new recruitment drive for the Army, both Regular and Reserve, which will remind the House and the public that the Army is always recruiting and continues to offer exciting and rewarding careers in both the Regular and Reserve forces.130
76In terms of other contact methods for potential applicants, the Army National Recruiting Centre also...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In terms of other contact methods for potential applicants, the Army National Recruiting Centre also handles telephone inquiries, email and web chat. We were told that as recently as October 2013, of the 5,000 telephone calls made to the Centre each week, 40 per cent were not answered by staff. By December this situation had improved with close to 90 per cent of calls answered.
77Unfortunately, we were not provided with detailed figures for the number of applications received in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Unfortunately, we were not provided with detailed figures for the number of applications received in recent months, but we were told that recruitment is still below 129 HC Deb, 19 December 2013, col 124WS; Paper deposited in the House of Commons Library by the Ministry of Defence Future Reserves 2020, 19 December 2013 (Ref: DEP2013-2063), available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/business-papers/commons/deposited-papers/ 130 HC Deb 14 January 2014, col 715 Future Army 2020 41 target. We were told that a multi-channel marketing campaign will run from January to March 2014 in an effort to drive up applications.
78Despite the assurances we received from the Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Despite the assurances we received from the Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the Army recruitment process, we remain concerned that the targets for recruiting both Regular and Reserve soldiers may not be met. We are not convinced that the MoD’s contract with Capita was properly and thoroughly considered before its implementation. For example, we were given no evidence that any trialling of it had taken place. There would appear to have been a serious break-down in the supervision of the contract process, for which no one has been held accountable.
79We are concerned at the IT problems encountered at this early stage in the recruitment...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned at the IT problems encountered at this early stage in the recruitment campaign. We call on the MoD and Capita to take urgent steps to rectify these problems and the MoD should give a detailed account of the measures taken, including detailing the number of servicemen and women diverted from their normal duties in order to sustain the recruiting effort, in its response to our Report.
80We note the difficulties encountered by the Army in obtaining the medical data of potential...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the difficulties encountered by the Army in obtaining the medical data of potential Reservists due to their failure to comply with data protection regulations. Although this difficulty has at last been resolved, the Army and the MoD should have foreseen this problem and must learn lessons for the future.
81We commend the MoD for employing a range of media to attract and recruit both...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We commend the MoD for employing a range of media to attract and recruit both Regulars and Reserves but it is no help when the technology does not work or applications are lost in the system. Lessons need to be learned from the initial failure of the contract with Capita, and the respective accountabilities and responsibilities of both the contractor and the Army clearly established. Reserves White Paper
82The July 2013 Reserves White Paper acknowledged that the institutional integrity of the Reserves, particularly...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The July 2013 Reserves White Paper acknowledged that the institutional integrity of the Reserves, particularly in the Army, had been damaged due to the focusing of resources on individuals about to deploy to augment Regular Forces on operations primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.131 The White Paper said this needed to change. The Reserves needed to have a meaningful role as in future Reservists would be involved in almost all military operations, sometimes as formed sub-units or units. However to achieve this new role, the MoD accepted that further measures would be required to achieve the Reserves element of Army 2020, particularly the required number of Reservists for Army 2020. The White Paper set out the measures and incentives to be implemented.132 These included: better collective training; access to similar equipment to that used by their Regular counterparts; the introduction of MoD paid annual leave when undertaking Army training as well as when on operations; 131 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 132 Ministry of Defence Announcement, Plans for future Reserve Forces unveiled, 3 July 2013 42 Future Army 2020 for the first time, generous Armed Forces pension entitlements, when training and on operations, under the Armed Forces Pension Scheme, are to be introduced in April 2015; access to key defence health services when training and on operations; transferable skills and academic qualifications; an Army Reserve training commitment of around 40 days per year, up from a current average of 35; and legislation to ensure access to employment tribunals in unfair dismissal cases against Reservists, without a qualifying employment period.
83In addition to these measures, the White Paper also included incentives for employers to allow...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In addition to these measures, the White Paper also included incentives for employers to allow their employees to be Reservists: a £500 per month, per Reservist, financial award targeted at small and medium enterprises on top of the allowances that are already available when their Reservist employees are mobilised [i.e. preparing for, or on, operations] ; more notice so employers are able to plan for the absences of their Reservist employees; greater recognition for leading supportive employers; and a national relationship management scheme to strengthen the MoD’s relationships with larger employers.133
84Lieutenant General Bradshaw, giving evidence shortly after the publication of the White Paper, said that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Lieutenant General Bradshaw, giving evidence shortly after the publication of the White Paper, said that the chain of command’s reaction to it had been positive, but thought it was too early to gauge reaction from employers. Giving evidence a few months after its publication, Lieutenant General (retired) Brims, Chair of the Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group, thought the White Paper set out a model which could be commonly adopted across all Services: One of the things that we majored on in [the Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group annual] report was the need for a narrative as to what the Government’s plan is. We have seen that narrative on the day that the White Paper was announced, within the White Paper and within the announcements of the Army on its pairing and basing. Pull those together and there is the start of a narrative. That is beginning to seep out. It has to get to today’s Reservist, today’s Regular, tomorrow’s Reservist, tomorrow’s Regular, employers and commentators.134 133 Ibid 134 Q 251 Future Army 2020 43 Defence Reform Bill
85A few of the Reserves White Paper’s measures require legislation.
Concluded (the committee's words)
A few of the Reserves White Paper’s measures require legislation. These were included in the Defence Reform Bill introduced in the House of Commons in July 2013. The four measures included in the Bill were: Changing the name of the Territorial Army to the Army Reserve and the name of the Army’s ex-Regular Reserve Force from the Army Reserve to the Regular Reserve; Expanding the powers in the 1996 Reserve Forces Act so that members of the Reserve Forces may be called out for any purpose for which Regular Forces may be used (although the Bill provides for current Reservists to opt to remain under the call out obligations of the 1996 Act); Introducing new financial incentives to the employers of Reservists; and Exempting Reservists from the statutory two-year qualifying period required to bring an unfair dismissal case to an Employment Tribunal. The Bill’s measures would affect the Reserve Forces of each of the Services, although the greatest impact is expected to be on the Territorial Army due to the plans for greater integration with the Regular Army announced under the MoD’s plans for Army 2020.
86The passage of the Bill in the House of Commons saw a variety of views...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The passage of the Bill in the House of Commons saw a variety of views expressed on the viability and cost-effectiveness of the plan to increase the size of the Reserves. The Government did accept the principle of an amendment that the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association (RFCA) should report annually to the House on the state of the Reserves and the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, confirmed his intention that this obligation should be placed on a statutory basis: We have already made arrangements to receive independent reports from the RFCAs on an annual basis; my hon. Friend [Julian Brazier] is suggesting placing that requirement in statute. On reflection, we consider that to be a sensible idea that will strengthen the programme for the growth and reinvigoration of our Reserves.135
87The MoD noted that the Armed Forces Bill in 2015 would provide an opportunity to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD noted that the Armed Forces Bill in 2015 would provide an opportunity to legislate further if required, particularly in respect of discrimination against Reservists in their workplace.136 Recognition for employers
88In the Secretary of State for Defence’s introduction to the Reserves White Paper, he said...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the Secretary of State for Defence’s introduction to the Reserves White Paper, he said that the results of the November 2012 Reserves consultation “showed a lack of awareness about Reservists among many employers or of the potential benefits Reserve service can offer them” and that “feedback showed that Defence needs to articulate a more balanced 135 HC Deb 20 November 2013, col 1263 136 HC Deb, 16 July 2013, col 966 44 Future Army 2020 business case on the impact of Reserve service on employers”.137 While the Government acknowledged the historic contribution of employers in supporting Reservists, the White Paper outlined steps to achieve a better relationship and understanding between Government, employers, employers’ organisations and trade unions in respect of Reservists. As part of this, the Government plan, by March 2014, to develop a system to give greater recognition to supportive employers which would build on the existing recognition given by the SaBRE organisation.138 Employers are currently recognised by the award of a SaBRE certificate with additional material available to support in house publications and websites. Information is also published on the SaBRE website about the ways individual employers have supported Reservists.139
89The Government’s proposed approach will use the new Corporate Covenant140 as an initial step for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government’s proposed approach will use the new Corporate Covenant140 as an initial step for employers to indicate their support for Reservists. The second step will be to give proper recognition to employers who demonstrate levels of commitment which will “reinforce the established SaBRE approach in order to provide proper and appropriate recognition for employers at the organisational level”.141 This would include the continuation of the issuing of certificates to employers and updated material for employers to use on their websites and company letterheads. A third level of recognition will be for employers “who are able and willing to take a more proactive approach to encourage Reserve service amongst their employees”.142 Response from employers
90Employers’ organisations were keen to emphasise their historic and continuing support for the Reserve Forces.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Employers’ organisations were keen to emphasise their historic and continuing support for the Reserve Forces. Mike Cherry, National Policy Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses did not see the Government’s plans as radical. He told us: I do not personally feel that it is radical in terms of employers supporting their Reserves. I think it needs to be recognised that they need adequate training, adequate kit and everything else to make this work. In that respect, we have gone through these feast and famine cycles over time with the Reserve forces, and there needs to be 137 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 7 138 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, pp 47-48. Supporting Britain's Reservists and Employers (SaBRE) is an organisation that aims to build support for members of the Reserve Forces from employers. It seeks to explain to employers the benefits, rights and obligations associated with the employment of a Reservist, as well as promoting the transferable skills that Reservists receive through their military training and take back to their workplace. SaBRE is funded by the Ministry of Defence and acts as a means for relaying employers’ views to the Department on the employment of Reservists. 139 SaBRE list employers’ support under the following categories: HR Policy (employers who have a written HR policy on the employment of Reservists); Time off policy: additional time off (paid, unpaid, or considered on a case by case basis for Reservists to attend 2-week annual training session); Employee mobilised (employers who have previously released a Reservist for mobilisation). Available at: http://www.sabre.mod.uk/Employers/Supportive- Employers/Employers-who-have-publicly-pledged-their-support . 140 Announced by the Government in June 2013, the Corporate Covenant is a written and publicised voluntary pledge from businesses and charitable organisations who wish to demonstrate their concrete support for the armed forces community. 141 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 48 142 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, pp 47-48 Future Army 2020 45 a strong recognition that the support has to be there, and the right kit and everything else has to be in place to make this happen.143
91However Mr Cherry emphasised the importance of the connection between the MoD and wider society...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However Mr Cherry emphasised the importance of the connection between the MoD and wider society which was crucial “if we are to get this underpinned by society at large and to get most employers to support it as the MoD would wish”.144
92Alexander Ehmann, Head of Government, Parliamentary and Regulatory Affairs at the Institute of Directors, thought...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Alexander Ehmann, Head of Government, Parliamentary and Regulatory Affairs at the Institute of Directors, thought that the plans were radical in respect of the expectations on employers and on workplaces in general. He pointed to the changing nature of employment habits, for example working for more than one employer and the possible impact this might have: if you are working two or three jobs, you probably have two or three employers. That means that there are more employers now who, in the instance of one individual, are effectively employers of Reservists, or will be employers of Reservists. That does mean that the ramifications of the policy as set out here will be greater than they have been in the past.145
93Mike Cherry acknowledged that the £500 per month, per reservist, financial award to small and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Mike Cherry acknowledged that the £500 per month, per reservist, financial award to small and medium enterprises was higher than expected by employers.146 Although Mr Cherry welcomed this, he pointed out another concern: It is the support that the business needs to find and recruit a replacement that is pretty critical to our members, particularly the smallest micro-businesses. [...] Part of the parcel that is offered to employers is the benefits that the Reservist brings back into civilian employment as a result of the service they undertake. We have to make absolutely certain that whatever accreditation is given to skills in the military is well understood and equal to what is needed in civilian employment. I think that is not the case at this moment in time, but it has to happen if you are to have that general overall package. That is fundamental to how we see things helping and benefiting small businesses going forwards.147
94We welcome the measures in the Reserves White Paper and the related clauses in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the measures in the Reserves White Paper and the related clauses in the Defence Reform Bill. We particularly welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s agreement during the passage of the Bill to the principle of making it a statutory requirement for the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association to report annually on the state of the Reserves. We will continue to pay close attention to progress on this and look forward to receiving more details on how this will be implemented and what the report will cover. 143 Q 224 144 Q 224 145 Q 234 146 Q 260 147 Q 260 46 Future Army 2020
95We recognise the support many employers have given to the Reserve Forces over many years.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise the support many employers have given to the Reserve Forces over many years. We commend the Government’s intention to give greater recognition, building on the current SaBRE scheme and the new Corporate Covenant, to leading supportive employers of Reservists and look forward to receiving more information on this proposal. We recommend that as part of the recognition scheme the Government should publish additional information about supportive employers, building on the information already published by SaBRE on its website, highlighting good practice, and providing examples of the ways individual employers support Reservists.
96It is too early to say whether the measures in the White Paper and the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
It is too early to say whether the measures in the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill will prove sufficient and be effective in encouraging the recruitment of Reservists and ensuring the support of businesses of all sizes to achieve Army 2020. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence’s commitment to review these measures if recruitment falls behind target. In response to this Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess the effectiveness of the measures and the timescale for making a decision on whether further action and incentives are necessary. Role of Reservists
97The Reserve Forces Act 1996 limits the reasons for which Reservists can be mobilised, for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Reserve Forces Act 1996 limits the reasons for which Reservists can be mobilised, for example in response to imminent national danger, if warlike operations are in preparation or progress, or for the protection of life and property outside the UK.148 The Defence Reform Bill provides that in future Reservists would be able to be used for any purpose for which the Regular Armed Forces are used.
98The greater use of the Reserve Forces was one of the Future Reserves 2020 Independent...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The greater use of the Reserve Forces was one of the Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission’s main recommendations. According to the Reserves White Paper, over the last decade, resources have been focused on those Reservists about to deploy to augment Regular Forces on operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. The White Paper argued that “while this ensured that the right numbers of Reservists were available to support current operations, it [had] damaged the institutional integrity of the Reserves, particularly in the Army”.149 The MoD’s intention is that this will change. Reservists will be required for almost all military operations, often as small numbers of individuals but also, principally in the Army’s case and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or units. Reservists will now be deployed on a far wider range of military operations, including homeland resilience and standing commitments abroad. Table 3 below summarises the range of roles that the White Paper says Reservists could be expected to fulfil. 148 Reserve Forces Act 1996, sections 52, 54 and 56. Section 56 was amended by the Armed Forces Act 2011 to enable Reservists to be mobilised in the UK in circumstances short of a great emergency or an actual or apprehended attack to allow mobilisation in the event of “work national importance.”. 149 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 Future Army 2020 47 Table 3: Tasks that the Reserves will be required to undertake Abroad: At Home in the UK: Short term operations such as the Playing a general role in homeland evacuation of UK citizens from Lebanon security, including activities such as in 2006 and the 2011 Libya operation. support to the Olympics and Paralympics, or specialist roles such as Longer term stabilisation operations cyber. such as in the Balkans, UN missions, Iraq and Afghanistan. Delivering national resilience such as responding to the foot and mouth crisis, Standing commitments abroad such as flood relief, and communications the Cyprus garrison and the defence of support to crisis management. the Falkland Islands. Standing national commitments, such as Deployments overseas aimed at Defence defence of the UK’s airspace. engagement, conflict prevention, security sector reform and capability building in priority countries, such as the British Peace Support mission in East Africa and the EU operation in Mali. Source: Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, Box 3, p 17
99The three Services use Reservists differently and the mobilisation changes will have less of an...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The three Services use Reservists differently and the mobilisation changes will have less of an effect on the RAF and the Royal Navy than for the Army. Army Reservists can expect one six month deployment in any five year period. This could amount to a maximum of 12 months when pre- and post-deployment training and leave are taken into account.150 Army Reserves will move through a training and readiness cycle to try and give both Reservists and their employers greater clarity on when these mobilisation periods are likely to occur.151 The MoD’s intention would be to give at least a year’s notice of when an Army Reservist was entering their minimum warning period (when they are liable for mobilisation).152
100For an enduring operation the White Paper commits to giving nine months’ notice for Army...
Concluded (the committee's words)
For an enduring operation the White Paper commits to giving nine months’ notice for Army Reservists and three months notice for Maritime and Royal Air Force Reservists. 28 days’ notice will be given for unplanned contingency operations, if possible.153
101Prior to the publication of the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill, ADS expressed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Prior to the publication of the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill, ADS expressed some concerns to us about the greater use of Reservists: 2.1. The proposal would oblige employers to be prepared to release employees who are members of the Reserve Forces for one year in every five. Any negative incentive for employers to employ Reservists can be mitigated by improving the communication links between Government employer and civilian employer. The emphasis must be on building a transparent and mutually beneficial relationship between the two stakeholders. 150 These periods may be exceeded in times of national emergency or outbreak of war. 151 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 19, p 21 and p 51 152 Ibid, p 51 153 Ibid, p 51 48 Future Army 2020 2.2. Under the proposals, Reservists will continue to back-fill Regular units on a planned basis. There must be a robust, transparent and rapid appeal process in place for employers faced with losing an employee to Reserve mobilisation at a time when the employee is critical to the company.154
102After publication of the White Paper, the Federation of Small Businesses told us: The FSB...
Concluded (the committee's words)
After publication of the White Paper, the Federation of Small Businesses told us: The FSB has had concerns regarding the intention to extend the call-out powers in the Reserve Forces Act 1996 so that members of the Reserve forces may be called out for any purpose for which Regular forces may be used. On average FSB members employ approximately 7 employees, so if one is a member of the Reserve forces and called out, instantly a significant proportion of the workforce becomes absent. There are mixed views from the small business community with regard to the likely impact on businesses of the proposed changes to increase the commitment of Reserve forces; two in five of those open to employing Reservists believe the proposed changes will negatively impact on their business and reasons for this focus upon the difficulties in planning and arranging suitable cover for the extended training periods or deployments, whereas 43 per cent claim there will be no impact.155
103We welcome the Government’s intention that in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s intention that in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to undertake the same tasks as Regulars. However we note the concerns expressed by some employers regarding the potential for negative effects on their businesses arising from the increased use of Reservists. The MoD should continue to engage with the business community to address employers’ concerns as failure to do so will impact on the Army’s ability to generate and sustain the necessary capabilities. The MoD should include in its reports to Parliament on Reserves recruitment details of how many are employed by SMEs (small and medium enterprises employing under 250 employees) and any difficulties encountered in recruiting from this sector. Formed units and sub-units of Reservists and partnering with Regular units
104As an integral part of the Armed Forces, Reservists could be required for almost all...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As an integral part of the Armed Forces, Reservists could be required for almost all military operations, often as small numbers of individuals but also, principally in the Army’s case and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or units.156 The Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission Report was in favour of the idea of the deployment of formed units or sub-units of Reserves.157 Lieutenant General Bradshaw expanded on how this might work: [...] I will give you an example of one of the combat arms that will very definitely be employing people in formed sub-units: the support squadrons for the Army Air Corps. [...] They will deploy and be employed collectively, and that is absolutely our intent.158 154 Ev w18 155 Ev w39 156 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 157 The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Future Reserves 2020, July 2011, p 7 158 Q 159 Future Army 2020 49 Lieutenant General Bradshaw pointed out that the plan for the future deployment of Reservists remained to be tested in order to prove that it was deliverable.159
105Professor Theo Farrell, Kings College London, supported the deployment of formed units or sub-units of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Theo Farrell, Kings College London, supported the deployment of formed units or sub-units of Reservists which, under Army 2020, would be on a sliding scale dependent on the risk and complexity of the operation. He cited the experience of the US which had deployed National Guard units to replace Regular units in Iraq and Afghanistan. He told us their performance varied depending on a number of factors: Sometimes they perform better, actually, than the Regular unit, although it depends on how permissive the environment is. If there is a lot of combat, sometimes they do not perform so well. So it is certainly possible to imagine whole units going in, depending on the complexity and how much combat is involved, and Army 2020 allows the time for the Army to prepare a Reserve unit for such a tour. It is in the designs. It is a perfectly reasonable, clever design, actually.160
106The Army’s intention is that “Reserves will be paired with Regular units for training during...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Army’s intention is that “Reserves will be paired with Regular units for training during peacetime in order to prepare to form an integral element of the paired Regular unit when required to deploy on operations. To enable this integrated capability, Reserve units will undertake training which is aligned with the three-year operational readiness mechanism of their Regular counterparts”.161 The training requirement for Army Reservists will increase from around 35 to 40 days per year, while the training commitment for the maritime and RAF Reserves will largely stay the same.162 Army Reserves will be required to attend certain core training events to help achieve the collective capabilities for Regulars and Reservists envisaged under the Army 2020 plan.163 To assist with the realisation of better integration between Regulars and Reservists, as part of the July 2013 announcements on the Reserves structure and basing, the MoD said: This restructuring will require changes to the current basing laydown of the Army Reserve. The Army has taken the opportunity to review the laydown not only to reflect the structural changes, but also to address the need to optimise recruitment and to facilitate effective training in the future.164
107Concerns have been expressed to the Secretary of State for Defence that this restructuring could...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Concerns have been expressed to the Secretary of State for Defence that this restructuring could potentially damage units in areas with a good potential level of recruits for the Reserves.165 In response to these concerns, the Secretary of State told the House of Commons on 14 January 2014 that although the plans for Reserve basing had been 159 Q 159 160 Q 221 161 Ev w4 162 An increase from approximately 35 to 40 days per year for Army Reserves; Training commitments for the Royal Navy Reserve are 24 days , 34 days for the Royal Marines Reserve and 35 for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013. P 11). 163 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013,p 11 164 HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 52WS 165 For example, see Parliamentary Question from Sarah Newton MP to the Secretary of State for Defence, HC Deb, 14 January 2014, col 721. 50 Future Army 2020 announced, he acknowledged the need for flexibility in the plan to assist with recruitment.166
108We note the Army’s intention to deploy formed units and sub-units of Reserves.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the Army’s intention to deploy formed units and sub-units of Reserves. We ask the MoD to provide greater detail on how this will be implemented, particularly given the differing timescales for the reduction in Regular strength and the increase in the size of the Reserves, and how it will ensure that these changes deliver the required level of capability.
109We welcome the increase in the number of training days for Reservists as this is...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the increase in the number of training days for Reservists as this is vital to their greater integration with Regulars. In its response to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out what further practical measures will be implemented to enable Regulars and Reservists to train together. We are concerned that this should not involve closing well-recruited units, or those with a large number of potential new recruits to the Reserves, to match Regular basing and welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment in the House of Commons on 14 January 2014 to be flexible on the closure of such units. Specialist Reserves
110The 2010 SDSR stated that the Reserve Forces should be an integral part of Future...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The 2010 SDSR stated that the Reserve Forces should be an integral part of Future Force 2020, providing additional capacity as well as certain specialisms which it would not be practical or cost effective to maintain as Regular capability.167 The Reserves White Paper reflected on specialist Reserves capabilities, especially medical and cyber. Medical Reservists are an essential and fully integrated component of the Defence Medical Services (DMS), representing 38% (5,170) of the total 13,530 DMS manpower requirement.168 The White Paper set out the future operations on which medical Reserves might be deployed: humanitarian relief response, health sector reform in fragile states, UK resilience response, hazardous area response teams, public and environmental health, and medical command and control.169
111The Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission Report said that better use should be made within...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission Report said that better use should be made within the Reserve Forces of individuals’ skills gained from their civilian experience, with cyber named as one area where this might be achieved.170 The White Paper also highlighted Cyber Reserves as a key requirement.171 In September 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence announced the creation of a Joint Cyber Reserve which would be a combined unit across the Services with Reservists working with Regulars. He said 166 HC Deb, 14 January 2014, col 721 167 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 20; see also Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 11. 168 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 73 169 Ibid, pp 75-76 170 Ibid, p 76 171 Ibid p 76 Future Army 2020 51 In response to the growing cyber threat, we are developing a full-spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike capability, to enhance the UK’s range of military capabilities. Increasingly, our defence budget is being invested in high-end capabilities such as cyber and intelligence and surveillance assets to ensure we can keep the country safe. The Cyber Reserves will be an essential part of ensuring we defend our national security in cyberspace. This is an exciting opportunity for internet experts in industry to put their skills to good use for the nation, protecting our vital computer systems and capabilities.172 In evidence to us in November 2013, the Secretary of State told us 800 expressions of interest in working for the unit had already been received.173
112The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable to the Army and the UK’s Armed Forces...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable to the Army and the UK’s Armed Forces as a whole: we welcome the commitment to them in the Reserves White Paper. We welcome the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserve which is of particular interest to us given our previous inquiry work on Defence and cyber-security. The potential recruits, with the required skills, may not be those who would usually consider a career in the Armed Forces. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the MoD which will require a flexible approach if they are to be integrated effectively. We ask the MoD to report to the Committee in six months on progress on the establishment and the recruitment of the Joint Cyber Reserve. Ex-Regular Reserves
113In its written evidence, the MoD told us that “in line with the requirement to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its written evidence, the MoD told us that “in line with the requirement to increase the trained strength of the Reserve, policy and processes have been reviewed to make it easier for Regular Army personnel to join the Reserves”. Early indications of the level of take-up were encouraging. The MoD added that as part of this review, those transferring from the Regular Army into the Reserves may choose between two incentive schemes that potentially impact on TA mobilisation liability: a Reduced Commitment Scheme where individuals are offered a reduced call out liability, which remains extant for three years following their last day of Regular Service and a Commitment Bonus Scheme which is a financial incentive. Personnel choosing this option are subject to the usual call out liability, stipulated under Reserve Forces Act 1996.174
114The July 2013 Reserves White Paper noted that former Regular service personnel in the volunteer...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The July 2013 Reserves White Paper noted that former Regular service personnel in the volunteer Reserve brought their experience and training to improve and sustain the capability of the Reserve Forces. They also improved the institutional robustness of the Reserves and contribute directly to capability. The transfer of service leavers and ex- Regulars also reduced the initial training cost of the volunteer reserves. The White Paper stated that: 172 Ministry of Defence Announcement, New cyber Reserve unit created, 29 September 2013 173 Q 303 174 Ev w5 52 Future Army 2020 The Army is therefore incentivising the transfer of service leavers and ex-Regular soldiers and officers by offering a £5,000 taxable commitment bonus on top of their other pay and allowances, payable over a four year period of service in the Army Reserve.
115Although the White Paper focussed mainly on the volunteer Reserve, it did outline some plans...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although the White Paper focussed mainly on the volunteer Reserve, it did outline some plans for the ex-Regular Reserve. Ex-Regular Reserves are former members of the Regular Forces who retain a liability to be called up for service.175 The Reserves White Paper acknowledged the value, contribution, skills and utility of ex-Regular Reserves and noted that they have been used, and continue to be used, on operations, principally for specific operational requirements. The consultation process prior to the White Paper indicated the need for “Defence better to explain the requirement and role for ex-Regular reservists as part of the Whole Force”. In addition, with the move towards an integrated force, the MoD would consider the arrangements that would enable its maintenance and the conditions under which ex-Regular Reservists would be called out in support of operations. In respect of the Army, given the reduction in its overall size and the transfer of capacity and some capabilities from the Regular to the Reserve components, the White Paper highlighted that “assured access to ex-Regulars in certain areas to support front-line services has become more important. This is particularly true for a range of complex military systems and equipment (such as armoured infantry crews)”.176 The White Paper identified a requirement to retain the Regular Reserve as a distinct Reserve Force.177 Work is under way in the Army to determine how to facilitate better access to ex-Regular Reservists.178 As part of this work, given the MoD’s aspiration to increase the number of ex- Regulars in the volunteer Reserves, the MoD is considering “removing further liability for recall for an ex-Regular Reservist who undertakes a fixed length of limited liability service in the Army Reserve”.179 In a further piece of work, to assist with the rebalancing of the Army as an integrated force of Regular and Reservist, the Army is: scoping how better to secure Regular service leavers in pinch-point trades, niche capabilities or operating complex equipment. This work is considering how to recruit, train and equip ex-Regular officers and soldiers into a discrete and active element of the Regular Reserve, enabled by appropriate legislation and terms and conditions of service.180
116We support the Government’s intention to recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the Government’s intention to recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as part of the recruitment of 30,000 trained Reservists under the Army 2020 plan. We note the £5,000 commitment bonus, payable over four years, offered by the Army to Service leavers and ex-Regulars to incentivise their transfer to the volunteer Army Reserve. We call on the Government to review effectiveness of its 175 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 65; On completion of the period of liability for recall, all become members of the Long-Term Reserve up to the age of 55, or on completion of 18 years in the Regular Reserve. The Long-Term reserve may only be recalled for national danger, great emergency or attack in the UK. 176 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 65 177 Ibid 178 Ibid 179 Ibid 180 Ibid Future Army 2020 53 efforts and the measures introduced to attract more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve in six months and to share its findings with us. We also note the Army’s work on the Regular Reserve and call for an update on this work in the Government’s response to our Report. Role of Reservists in reconnecting the Armed Forces and the public
117During our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One, we examined public...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One, we examined public support for defence spending and for expeditionary operations.181 While we recognised great public respect for Armed Forces, we concluded that there was a disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public “caused by a lack of understanding of the utility of military force in the contemporary strategic environment” and that “without a proactive communications strategy, there was a serious risk of a lack of support for defence amongst the public”.182 The future role of Reservists is seen by the MoD as part of meeting this challenge. In evidence to our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One, the Secretary of State for Defence told us: Our Reserves agenda is partly—not primarily, but partly—about building the links between the military and civil society in a way that perhaps has been lost to some extent since the end of the cold war.183
118The July 2013 Army 2020 update outlined a “firm base”184 concept and one of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The July 2013 Army 2020 update outlined a “firm base”184 concept and one of the main parts in delivering this is civil engagement. The update said: This includes all activities with the wider public that generate mutual understanding, focus support to the Army community (current, future and past) and by which the Army community fulfils its responsibilities to society. Civil engagement activities provide the critical link between the Army community and society, and includes the Army Cadet movement. The outcome of successful Civil Engagement is public support, better recruitment for both Regulars and Reserves, and the contribution to National Resilience by providing support to the nation in times of need.185
119We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced role for the Army in civil...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced role for the Army in civil engagement. Although there is great admiration and respect for UK Armed Forces, we recognise that there is currently a disconnect between the Armed Forces and public understanding of the operations they have been asked to undertake. This must be addressed. We call on the Government to take steps to ensure that the Armed Forces, particularly Reservists, play a more active role in public engagement. In response to our Report, we recommend that the Government outline the communication strategy and practical steps it will implement to take forward its plans for public engagement. 181 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras 19-24 182 Ibid, para 24 183Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q 158 184 The Army 2020 July 2013 update defines “Firm Base” as “A secure home front that sustains the Army, enables training for and deployment on operations, and ensures the support of the public” (British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013, p 22) 185 British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013, p 22 54 Future Army 2020 Cost and budget for Reservists
120When announcing the outcome of the Reserves consultation in July 2013, the Secretary of State...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When announcing the outcome of the Reserves consultation in July 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed the additional £1.8bn investment in Reserve Forces announced in 2011: In 2011, the Future Reserves 2020 Commission reported that our Reserves were in serious decline. This Government responded by committing to revitalise our Reserve Forces as part of Future Force 2020 [...] growing their trained strength to 35,000 by 2018 and investing an additional £1.8bn in them over 10 years.186
121A central part of the debate on Army 2020 has been on the cost effectiveness...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A central part of the debate on Army 2020 has been on the cost effectiveness and value for money of the plan centred particularly around the comparative costs of Regulars and Reservists. The MoD does not produce statistical data on the whole life costs of Service personnel and pointed out to us that this, coupled with the differing terms and conditions of Regulars and Reservists plus different training regimes, made cost comparisons complex.187 With these caveats, the MoD told us the following cost information was available: Annual Cost. The difference in per diem cost for Regular and Reserves differs only in the X Factor element188 of the military salary which is currently 14.5% for Regulars and 5% for Reserves;189 Recruitment. The cost per recruit is broadly similar for the recruitment of Regular Officer, Reserve Officers and other ranks (both Regular and Reserve). Basic Training. Training for commissioning in the Regulars and Reserves differs in delivery, intensity and duration. The same is the case for soldiers basic (Phase 1) and subsequent (Phase 2) training. For these reasons, and as Regular training is residential, comparison of cost is of limited meaning. Collective Training. The Army has assessed the cost of training both Regular and Reserve infantry company and, if manpower is excluded, the costs are broadly the same for a like for like comparison of training activity levels to achieve the established Collective Training Competence Levels 1, 2 and 3.190
122Comparison is complicated; Reserves get paid only for the days they train, or are recovering...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Comparison is complicated; Reserves get paid only for the days they train, or are recovering from injuries sustained on operations or training, plus in future a 10% leave 186 HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 921 187 Ev w6 188 The pay section of the British Army website explains the X Factor as: “The main reward package is called the X Factor. It’s an adjustment to your pay that makes sure you’re getting a fair deal .It compares your Army job to a similar civilian job and weighs up the extra challenges you face as a soldier, such as time away from your family and working under pressure. It also considers the perks of Army life, such as job security and 38 days’ paid leave every year. The X Factor normally means soldiers take home an extra 14.5% compared to the closest civilian job”. 189 The MoD provided the following additional information: Presently only Regular pay attracts a Superannuation Charge Attributable to Experience (SCAPE – the cost of pension) which is 42.8% for officers and 30.8% for soldiers. The FR20 proposition will see Reserve salary becoming pensionable leading to a SCAPE levy in the order of 25% while the application of Working Time Directives will see an additional payment, in the order of 10.2%, to Reserves. That said, not all Reserve attendance based pay will attract Employers National Insurance Contributions. 190 Ev w6 Future Army 2020 55 allowance, whereas Regulars get paid 365 days a year including weekends, on leave and during periods of sickness and injury (whether related to their duties or not). In addition, most Regulars receive subsidised accommodation, all accumulate an entitlement to terminal payments and pensions. Reservists qualify for a bounty subject to attendance and passing various annual tests. A new pension scheme is planned for Reservists related to actual days spent training.
123In oral evidence to us, Lieutenant General Bradshaw commented on the costs of employing Reserves:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In oral evidence to us, Lieutenant General Bradshaw commented on the costs of employing Reserves: They are cheaper to employ on a long-term basis. They are more expensive to employ for particular requirements. If we call them up, we end up paying for their man training days and for their employment. So, overall, the restructuring of the Army represents a considerable saving, but in order to realise that saving it is very important to understand that we must be prepared to resource the employment of Reservists in circumstances where we would not normally have employed them in the past.191 He added that “overall, of course, the reduction in the regular manpower represents a very significant saving for defence”.192
124Some of our witnesses have expressed doubt as to the cost effectiveness of Reserves against...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Some of our witnesses have expressed doubt as to the cost effectiveness of Reserves against Regulars. In a detailed submission, John Baron MP commented that “the extent of the financial savings generated by the proposals [was] also unclear”. While he accepted that there would be an overall cost reduction, he argued it was unlikely to be as great as the Government expected. He stated that “if the savings prove marginal, then the subsequent loss of capability may beg serious questions about value for money”.193
125We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to provide us with a breakdown of how it plans to spend this money. We note the concerns expressed as to whether this funding will be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes for the Reserves Forces. We note that Reservists are cheaper to employ so long as they are not called up. This will only prove to be a cost saving so long as future governments are not required to undertake operations. This will need to be closely monitored. It would be unacceptable if the UK decided not to take part in any action because of the cost of deploying Reservists. We recommend that the Government set out in detail how it will assess and report on the cost effectiveness of, and the value for money achieved by, its plans and how these outcomes will be independently examined and verified. We would welcome the involvement of the National Audit Office in this evaluation. Recruitment age
126As part of our inquiry, we received evidence from Child Soldiers International and others regarding...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As part of our inquiry, we received evidence from Child Soldiers International and others regarding the recruitment of persons under the age of 18 into the Armed Forces and 191 Q 176 192 Q 176 193 Ev w38 56 Future Army 2020 its cost effectiveness.194 Child Soldiers International argued that the phasing out of the recruitment of minors would: Save approximately £94 million per year on training and recruitment; Increase operational effectiveness, including improving the ratio of deployable personnel; Have a positive effect on recruits’ education and long-term career prospects; Reduce incidence of mental health problems amongst soldiers and veterans; and Ensure “the best interests of the child” are prioritised, in line with international legal obligations.195
127Child Soldiers International argued that the recruitment of minors could be phased out without a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Child Soldiers International argued that the recruitment of minors could be phased out without a detrimental effect on the Army 2020 plan.196 First, they said that as Reserve Forces became more integrated with Regular Forces, the difficulties of ensuring effective age screening in units deploying under time pressure would be alleviated as Reserves already have a minimum recruitment age of 18 years. Secondly, they contested that the Army 2020 plans would see a large number of Regular personnel replaced with Reservists and that assuming the rates of adult recruitment remained at current levels, Army 2020 would eliminate the need to recruit minors.197
128In our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel we asked the Government for...
Recommended (the committee's words)
In our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel we asked the Government for “further information on why the Army is so dependent on recruiting personnel under the age of 18 years compared to the other two Services, and whether steps are being taken to reduce this dependency”. We recommended that the Government should “carry out a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the policy of recruiting Armed Forces personnel under the age of 18 years old” and provide us with this cost-benefit analysis. In response to these parts of our Report the Government said: In offering challenging and constructive education and employment opportunities to those who have reached the school leaving age (16), the Armed Forces are mindful of the requirement to provide a supportive environment which takes account of the care and welfare needs of young people whilst offering them the opportunity to discharge up to the age of 18 years. Intake into the Armed Forces is spread across the eligible age range, however the Government agrees that the Armed Forces should undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the recruitment of U18s and work has been set in hand with the Army to look at this.
129In November 2013, in answer to a parliamentary question, the MoD told the House of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In November 2013, in answer to a parliamentary question, the MoD told the House of Commons that the Army had been tasked to carry out the cost-benefit analysis study on a tri-service basis and to provide an interim report early in 2014.198 In a further answer in 194 Ev w24; see also Ev w20 [Peace Pledge Union] and Ev w34 [Forces Watch] 195 Ev w24 196 Ev w24 197 Ev w28 198 HC Deb, 18 November 2013, col 696W Future Army 2020 57 December 2013, the MoD gave more information about the study. Anna Soubry MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, said: As recruitment is an activity where the cost of recruiting junior entrant (JE) or standard entrant (SE) individuals is the same, the scope of the study is focused on the costs of additional training provided to under-18s on the JE scheme. As a result of scoping carried out by the Army, the timetable for this study is now becoming clearer but it is too soon to set a publication date for the report. It is also apparent that the detailed terms of reference will require more development and a decision has yet to be taken on publication.199
130We note the evidence we have received on the recruitment age for the Armed Forces.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note the evidence we have received on the recruitment age for the Armed Forces. We commented on this in our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel and in response the Government agreed that the Armed Forces would undertake a cost benefit analysis of the recruitment of under-18s. We note that the Army is undertaking this analysis on a tri-service basis and that the work is continuing. However, we are disappointed by the lack of clarity regarding the study’s terms of reference and the slow progress with the study. We call on the Government to provide us with the terms of reference for the study and an estimation of when it will be completed. We expect the Army and MoD’s cost benefit analysis to be thorough and robust and call on the Government to set out how it might be independently scrutinised and verified. This would ensure confidence in the outcomes of the analysis. We also call on the Government to respond in detail to the argument that the Army could phase out the recruitment of minors without detriment to the Army 2020 plans. Basing and Germany
131As well as announcing decisions on the structure and manning of the Army, SDSR 2010...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As well as announcing decisions on the structure and manning of the Army, SDSR 2010 also included a commitment to an Armed Forces basing review and the redeployment of British forces personnel from Germany to the UK.200 The MoD announced the outcome of an initial Basing Review in July 2011, based on the decisions made in the SDSR.201 Its decisions included the transfer of a number of RAF stations to the Army, the locations of the five Multi-Role Brigades and the expectation that approximately 6,500-7,000 personnel returning from Germany would be based in Scotland. This announcement also included further reductions in personnel numbers. The Army 2020 announcement in July 2012 identified the units that were to be disbanded or merged to establish the Army 2020 configuration based on three distinct elements: a Reaction Force, an Adaptable Force and Force Troops.202
132The outcomes of the Army Basing Review were announced on 5 March 2013.203 Two key...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The outcomes of the Army Basing Review were announced on 5 March 2013.203 Two key principles guided the Review: that the armoured infantry brigades should be centred 199 HC Deb, 18 December 2013, col 633-634W 200 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 28 and pp 32-33 201 HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 645-646 202 HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 1085-1088 203 HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 58 Future Army 2020 round a single location, and the Army should retain a UK-wide presence. The Basing Review envisages an Army increasingly consolidated around seven centres in the UK with the closure of a number of bases, a faster withdrawal from Germany and an end to the culture of routine rotation in the UK. The Government has committed £1.8 billion to the new basing plan, of which £1 billion would be spent on new accommodation. The seven centres around which the Army will be consolidated will be: Salisbury Plain Training Area (Tidworth, Bulford, Larkhill, Warminster, Perham Down and Upavon) – 15,000 personnel. North East – centred on Catterick but also including York, Dishforth, Topcliffe and Harlow Hill. 7,500 personnel. Aldershot – 4,200 personnel. Edinburgh and Leuchars – 4,000 personnel. East of England – Colchester and Swanton Morley – 3,500 personnel. West Midlands – Stafford and Donnington – 3,200 personnel East Midlands – Cottesmore and North Luffenham – 5,800 personnel.
133A presence will also be maintained in other parts of the UK, including Wales and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A presence will also be maintained in other parts of the UK, including Wales and Northern Ireland where overall personnel numbers are expected to reduce by 400.204 It is intended that consolidation around a small number of locations will end the culture of routine rotation in the UK and provide greater stability to Service personnel and their families, with benefits for children’s education, spousal employment and increased home ownership.
134In July 2013 alongside publication of the Reserves White Paper, the MoD announced the outcomes...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In July 2013 alongside publication of the Reserves White Paper, the MoD announced the outcomes of the Reserves basing review which it said would result in the net vacation of 26 Army Reserve sites across the UK and that there would be an overall reduction of three major units in the future structure.205 Withdrawal from Germany
135Central to the basing review is the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces from Germany.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Central to the basing review is the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces from Germany. UK Armed Forces have been stationed in Germany since 1945. Consideration has been given to withdrawing UK Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War and the process has been underway for several years. For example 4th Armoured Brigade moved from Osnabrück to Catterick in 2008. Project Borona, commissioned by the previous Government in 2006, resulted in the move of Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps to Innsworth, Gloucestershire in 2010. In the 2010 SDSR, the new Government announced that all 20,000 personnel remaining in Germany would be withdrawn by 2020 with half 204 A significant proportion of those reductions in Wales and Northern Ireland will be the result, however, of the civilianisation of search and rescue from 2015-2016 onwards. 205 HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 922-925, HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 49-53WS and HC Deb, 4 July 2013, cols 61-62WS Future Army 2020 59 returning by 2015.206 The Government argued that “there is no longer any operational requirement for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements impose financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and their families and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence.”207 This also meant that the Army would be almost completely UK-based for the first time in many years. The Regular Army basing review of March 2013 announced that the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces from Germany would be accelerated. It is now intended that only 4,400 personnel will remain in Germany by 2016, with the withdrawal being completed by 2018-19.208
136The implementation of the basing review and the completion of the withdrawal of UK Armed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The implementation of the basing review and the completion of the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces from Germany are a vital and complex part of the implementation of Army 2020 and will require a high level of planning and coordination between all of the Services. Lieutenant General Bradshaw acknowledged that financial considerations were the rationale behind the withdrawal from Germany.209 The MoD would have to spend £1.8 billion on infrastructure to facilitate the returning forces. However, the MoD asserted that alongside the costs of rebasing from Germany, there were savings to be gained. In respect of Army Basing Programme Savings, the Department estimated that “operating savings of £100m per year would be generated by 2015-16 and this would rise to £240m net benefit per annum by 2022-23”.210 Lieutenant General Bradshaw also saw other benefits from the plan such as having the “three combat brigades of the reaction force around their main training area on Salisbury Plain” which would enable “a very cohesive arrangement in terms of command and control and [which would be] much easier to administer than having a large part of the Army in Germany.” However he also acknowledged that the training estate in the UK would be “stretched”.211 In an attempt to alleviate this shortage, the MoD was studying the continued use of training sites in Germany, Canada and Kenya.212 At our final evidence session General Wall confirmed that the dialogue with the German and Canadian authorities was continuing.213
137The plans resulting from the basing review and the return from Germany are intricate and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The plans resulting from the basing review and the return from Germany are intricate and interdependent and affect all three Services. The MoD must ensure this process is managed appropriately so that it does not unravel. We call on the MoD to keep us informed on its negotiations regarding training opportunities in Germany, Canada and Kenya, and how the historically close working relations with the German authorities are going to be maintained during the drawdown period. 206 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 28 and p 32 207 Ibid 208 HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 209 Q 185 210 Ev w10 211 Q 185 212 Qq 185-189 213 Q 338 and Q 341 60 Future Army 2020 SDSR 2015 and beyond
138During our inquiry, we heard concerns regarding the impact of the 2015 SDSR on the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During our inquiry, we heard concerns regarding the impact of the 2015 SDSR on the realisation of Army 2020, for example concerns were expressed by Professor Theo Farrell and contributors to our Army Rumour Service forum regarding the possibility of further reductions in the size of the Regular Army.214 Some media reports suggested reductions to a level of 60,000 personnel. General Wall told us that a reduction to 60,000 Regular Army personnel “would not have been a feasible way of achieving the defence planning assumptions that underpin the work we had done”.215
139Another area of concern was the potential impact of any possible changes to the MoD...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Another area of concern was the potential impact of any possible changes to the MoD budget. The Secretary of State for Defence told us during our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One, that: Based on SDSR 2010 and based on the budget that we have at the moment, and on the assumption we have made of flat real [terms increases] into the future—that is our budgeting assumption inside the Department—plus 1% real-terms increase per annum on the equipment plan from 2015 through to 2020, we are confident and the Armed Forces Chiefs are confident that we can deliver the required output.216 However the Secretary of State did acknowledge that, if funding decreased in the next Parliament, post-2015, serious questions would need to be addressed regarding the type of force that could be maintained: In my judgment, if the amount of money available for the defence budget decreased significantly, we would reach the end of the process by which we can simply take salami slices off. We would have to ask some serious structural questions about the type of forces that we were able to maintain.217
140A further impact on the MoD’s budget would be the movement of Urgent Operational Requirement...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A further impact on the MoD’s budget would be the movement of Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) commitments, funded by the Treasury, into the MoD core budget after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Secretary of State was confident that this would not impact on the Army 2020 plan: UORs provide support for equipment that is delivered for a specific operation. They do not provide us funding to hold that equipment in core, so where we are bringing equipment that was delivered as a UOR into Afghanistan back into core at the end of the campaign, we have to provide from within our core budget a funding line to support that equipment once it is returned to core. Our planning assumptions absolutely do not include provision of UOR equipment for our standing capability in the future.218 214 Q 221 215 Q 300 216 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q 183 217 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q 185 218 Q 329 Future Army 2020 61
141We also explored with senior Army officers what might happen to the Army after
Concluded (the committee's words)
We also explored with senior Army officers what might happen to the Army after
142We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any further MoD budget reductions or further reductions in Army personnel. It is essential that the MoD’s budget settlement allows for the delivery of Army 2020. If this is not the case, it must be accepted that the Army will be capable of doing less than envisaged under Army 2020 and the UK’s vision of its place in the world and the Defence Planning Assumptions will have to be revised accordingly. We are also concerned about the Army’s capability to expand its numbers rapidly, both Regulars and Reserves, should a national emergency require it to do so. Any plans for the structure of the Armed Forces must be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. For the reasons already set out in this Report we have little confidence in the Government’s capacity to rapidly expand Army numbers should the need arise. The Government must set out its contingency plan for doing so. 219 Q 194 220 Q 195 62 Future Army 2020 4 Conclusion
143Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK’s national security. The evidence presented to date has been far from convincing. Our principal concerns are twofold: First, the MoD has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the public. Second, we remain concerned that the financially driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained.
144The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan B. The Government owe it to the Army to ensure it does work, but, crucially, if the situation changes, then the Government must be prepared to respond decisively by providing additional resources in order to guarantee the nation’s security. Although we have concerns about the Army 2020 plan, we recognise that it also provides opportunities, for example in addressing the role of Reservists and developing the public defence engagement role of UK Armed Forces which will help to resolve the current disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public.
145While we welcome the Government’s commitment to publish more data on the Reserves and to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
While we welcome the Government’s commitment to publish more data on the Reserves and to put into statute a requirement on the Reserves Forces and Cadets Association to produce an annual report on the state of the Reserve Forces, we believe the Government should go further and give a commitment to provide regular updates to Parliament on progress on all aspects of the Army 2020 plan. Oral and written statements while helpful are not sufficient; a detailed annual report on the Army’s Fighting Power should be laid before Parliament setting out progress and setbacks in implementing the Army 2020 plan. The first of these reports should be laid before Parliament in January 2015 to allow consideration and debate before the 2015 General Election and to inform the 2015 SDSR. Future Army 2020 63