Select committee inquiry
Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Defence Committee announced on 10 May 2012 that it was to embark on a new inquiry into the Defence Implications of possible Scottish Independence. Terms of Reference Guidance on submitting written evidence to a Defence Committee inquiry”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What the government said
6th Report - The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence - Volume II (Volume II: Additional written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
6th Report - The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence - Volume I (Volume I: Report, together with an Appendix, formal minutes and oral evidence)
The government responded on 21 November 2013.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government welcomes the report as "a valuable contribution to the referendum debate", agrees with its conclusions that the Scottish Government must make its case on defence, and maintains that it is not planning for Scottish independence.
- It agrees with the Committee's conclusions that it is for the Scottish Government to make its case on sustaining an appropriate level of defence and security, to give details in its White Paper of a Scottish defence force and its financing, and to give more information relevant to industry.
- On contingency planning, it "note[s]" the Committee's recommendations but states its position "remains that it is not planning for Scottish independence and cannot pre-negotiate the details of independence ahead of the referendum", citing no democratic mandate to do so.
- It states that an independent Scottish state would have to apply and/or negotiate to join international organisations, and that NATO membership would require all 28 member states "to agree unanimously".
- On armed forces personnel, it states that an independent Scottish state "could not simply co-opt existing units", that any transfer option "would be a matter for negotiation", and that it will issue a Defence Notice to personnel on the referendum franchise "in the near future".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 28 June 2012 to 21 November 2013.
- Report 2 reports
- Government response 21 Nov 2013
What it recommended 8 recommendations · 178 conclusions
1Our scrutiny of the SNP’s updated Foreign, Defence and Security policy has revealed a large...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Our scrutiny of the SNP’s updated Foreign, Defence and Security policy has revealed a large number of questions which remain to be answered by the Scottish Government in advance of the referendum in 2014. Much of the detail has still to be produced and we will await the Scottish Government’s forthcoming White Paper with keen interest. This document, once published, needs to provide answers to the unanswered questions for Scottish voters. They will wish to understand better how the defence of an independent Scotland would be configured should there be a “Yes” vote in September 2014. It will be for the Scottish Government to make its case that an independent Scotland can sustain an appropriate level of defence and security.
2The SNP appears to envisage an independent Scotland which is outward looking, with a strong...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP appears to envisage an independent Scotland which is outward looking, with a strong maritime focus given its geographic position. It would be keen to collaborate closely with northern European neighbours and expects to work with and through the UN, EU and NATO. Beyond that, however, we have found it very difficult to establish how the foreign and security policy of the SNP has informed its vision for a Scottish defence force. We have seen little evidence that the Scottish Government has reached any understanding with Northern European nations regarding military co-operation. Claims by the Scottish Government that its policy development has been hampered by a lack of co-operation from the UK Government seem to us to be somewhat overplayed.
3We will look to the Scottish Government’s forthcoming White Paper to provide additional information about...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We will look to the Scottish Government’s forthcoming White Paper to provide additional information about its foreign and security policy and the role a Scottish defence force would be expected to fulfil.
4In light of the evidence of the experience of other countries, we have serious doubts...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of the evidence of the experience of other countries, we have serious doubts about the SNP’s stated intention to acquire conventional submarines. This could only be achieved by procurement from abroad at considerable cost and risk.
5As yet, the Scottish Government has given only a preliminary indication of its plans for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As yet, the Scottish Government has given only a preliminary indication of its plans for a Scottish navy. When it publishes more detailed requirements, it will be important to know the following: (Paragraph 45) • What would be the size and configuration of its surface fleet and associated rotary wing force? • What personnel, vessels and helicopters would it hope to inherit from the Royal Navy? 4 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence • What additional vessels would it procure? • How many submarines would it procure, and from where would they and the necessary qualified personnel be sourced? • What role, size and configuration would any Marine Infantry capability take? and • How many naval bases would a Scottish navy operate from, where would they be, and how many personnel would be expected to be based at each? • Finally, the Scottish Government should make clear in its White Paper the anticipated cost of acquiring, staffing, operating and maintaining these assets. A Scottish army
6The proposed retention and reinstatement of historic Scottish Regiments clearly has implications for the size...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The proposed retention and reinstatement of historic Scottish Regiments clearly has implications for the size and structure of a Scottish army. It is not apparent from the SNP’s published plans which Scottish regiments “previously abolished” it intends to restore or how that could be achieved within the overall numbers of personnel proposed.
7In light of the new British Army structures envisaged in the Army 2020 proposals, the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of the new British Army structures envisaged in the Army 2020 proposals, the Scottish Government should consider publishing a new plan for a Scottish army.
8Questions which it might wish to address include: (Paragraph 53) • What would be the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Questions which it might wish to address include: (Paragraph 53) • What would be the size and structure of a Scottish army, including the envisaged balance of regular and reserve troops? • What would be the balance between combat (infantry and armoured), combat support (artillery, aviation and engineers), combat service support (logistics) and command support (communications) troops? • Which historic Scottish regiments would be reinstated? • Where would Scottish army units be based? • What equipment and infrastructure would a Scottish army expect to inherit from the British Army? • What would be the cost of recruitment, training and retention measures? and • How would a Scottish army attract and train the necessary specialist troops such as engineers, signallers and logistic personnel? A Scottish air force
9We look forward to reading in the forthcoming White Paper the detailed proposals the Scottish...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We look forward to reading in the forthcoming White Paper the detailed proposals the Scottish Government has for the procurement and operation of a maritime The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 5 patrol squadron and how this will be financed within the overall aspirations for Scottish defence capability.
10In view of the costs associated with acquiring different air defence aircraft from those the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In view of the costs associated with acquiring different air defence aircraft from those the UK currently operates, we do not currently understand how the Scottish Government expects, within the available budget, to mount a credible air defence – let alone provide the additional transport, rotary wing and other support aircraft an air force would need. The Scottish Government will no doubt wish to set out a detailed explanation of this in its White Paper.
11Without receiving detailed answers to the questions posed elsewhere in this report, it would be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Without receiving detailed answers to the questions posed elsewhere in this report, it would be unrealistic to expect us to judge the exact running costs of the proposed Scottish defence force. However, given the information we have so far received from the Scottish Government, we are unconvinced that there is sufficient funding to support both the proposed Scottish defence force and to procure new equipment.
12We note that the process of negotiation on the division of military assets would not...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the process of negotiation on the division of military assets would not be one sided, and that the remainder of the UK would be likely to bring into the negotiations existing shared liabilities, such as decommissioning of nuclear submarines, and the additional costs it would incur by losing a proportion of the economies of scale it enjoys at present.
13We consider it unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would make available sufficient training places...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider it unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would make available sufficient training places for Scottish personnel at facilities such as Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Cranwell. The Scottish Government should therefore include in its White Paper an assessment of alternative options and cost estimates for delivery of this training.
14Before we can judge whether these ambitions could be met within a cost envelope of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Before we can judge whether these ambitions could be met within a cost envelope of £2.5 billion per annum, we require more details from the Scottish Government in its White Paper about its plans for a Scottish defence force. In particular, the plans must establish a coherent model which reflects a realistic “tooth to tail” ratio of combat troops to the personnel required to supply and support them, and clarity over the training capacity to maintain the appropriate professional standards. It is also incumbent upon Scottish Ministers to set out how they propose to finance the equipment, vessels, aircraft and associated support services a Scottish defence force would require to deliver the objectives set for it.
15We consider that, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, a safe transition of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, a safe transition of the nuclear deterrent from HM Naval Base Clyde could not be achieved quickly. Even with 6 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence political will on both sides, the replication of the facilities at Faslane and, crucially, Coulport, at another site in the UK would take several years and many billions of pounds to deliver. Options for basing the deterrent outside the UK, in the USA or France, even in the short term, may prove politically impossible or equally costly.
16The implications of Scottish independence for the rUK’s ability to provide the necessary security for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The implications of Scottish independence for the rUK’s ability to provide the necessary security for the nuclear deterrent during any transition period will need very detailed and early consideration.
17If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the Clyde the impact on levels of employment...
Concluded (the committee's words)
If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the Clyde the impact on levels of employment at Faslane and Coulport would be significant. Evidence we have received suggests that instead of an increase in people directly employed at the base to around 8,200 by 2022, as projected by the MoD, a conventional naval base and Joint Force Headquarters would employ considerably fewer people than the current workforce of 6,500.
18The change to SNP policy regarding NATO membership in October 2012 was a significant development...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The change to SNP policy regarding NATO membership in October 2012 was a significant development in the debate on the defence implications of possible Scottish independence. We welcome the subsequent acknowledgement by the Scottish Government that an independent Scotland would need to apply to join NATO rather than inheriting membership. We note the contrast between the Scottish Government’s position on this and its position on membership of the European Union. Scottish Ministers will need to make clear their rationale for this difference, and, if they wish the Scottish people to give it credence, should consider making publicly available the legal advice on which it is based.
19The process of securing NATO membership is complex and time-consuming and the response to an...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The process of securing NATO membership is complex and time-consuming and the response to an application from an independent Scotland would be influenced by the Scottish Government’s stance on nuclear weapons. NATO is a nuclear alliance and we believe that any action likely to disrupt the operation of the UK’s strategic deterrent would undoubtedly influence NATO Member countries’ attitudes towards an application from Scotland.
20We note the reported recent engagement between NATO and Scottish Government officials, facilitated by the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the reported recent engagement between NATO and Scottish Government officials, facilitated by the UK Joint Delegation to NATO. We welcome this co- operation between the two Governments and invite the UK Government to provide us with an update on the outcome of these and any subsequent discussions. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Scottish Government’s view that NATO membership could be negotiated in a period of 18 to 24 months is optimistic unless issues surrounding the nuclear deterrent were resolved through negotiation.
21The UK Government states that defence suppliers in an independent Scotland would no longer benefit...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government states that defence suppliers in an independent Scotland would no longer benefit from the application of an exemption from EU procurement law The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 7 for UK MoD orders. If the Scottish Government has legal advice to the contrary it should consider making it public.
22In the event of independence, shipbuilding in Scotland could not be sustained by domestic orders...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the event of independence, shipbuilding in Scotland could not be sustained by domestic orders alone at anything close to current levels. It is our view that the requirements of a Scottish Government for construction and maintenance of warships would barely provide enough work for a single yard. Even the addition of Scottish Government contracts for commercial ships could not compensate for the loss of future UK MoD contracts for ships such as the Type 26 Global Combat Ship. The future of Scottish shipyards would therefore rest upon whether they could diversify the type of ships they produce and reduce their cost base in order to secure orders in open competition with international competitors.
23In the event of independence, we consider that the defence industry in Scotland would face...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the event of independence, we consider that the defence industry in Scotland would face a difficult future. This impact would be felt most immediately by those companies engaged in shipbuilding, maintenance, and high end technology. The requirements of a Scottish defence force would not generate sufficient domestic demand to compensate for the loss of lucrative contracts from the UK MoD, and additional security and bureaucracy hurdles would be likely to reduce competitiveness with rUK based companies.
24Although we recognise the commercial risks associated with the potential loss of some highly skilled...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although we recognise the commercial risks associated with the potential loss of some highly skilled employees, we believe defence companies in Scotland would be forced to rapidly reassess their business strategies, with the result that relocation of operations to the remainder of the UK would be an unwelcome but necessary decision.
25From the evidence we have received and our own background knowledge of defence industrial issues...
Concluded (the committee's words)
From the evidence we have received and our own background knowledge of defence industrial issues raised frequently with us we consider that the Scottish Government will wish to provide industry with more information with regard to the following matters: (Paragraph 146) • Defence and Security relationship with the rUK, including the anticipated level of integration and collaboration; • Transition arrangements for existing UK contracts during the process of separation; • Procurement policy, including co-investment in research and development; • Export posture and potential in terms of legislation plus consular and broader government support; • Specific expectations of the current “special relationship” with the US over trade, intelligence and technology sharing; and 8 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence • Future relationship with cooperative initiatives such as NATO “Smart Defence” and European Defence Agency “Pooling and Sharing”. Government planning for Scottish independence
26We recognise that the process of negotiation following a “Yes” vote would be lengthy and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise that the process of negotiation following a “Yes” vote would be lengthy and complex. For those very reasons, it would be remiss of the UK Government not to make preparations in order to inform its negotiating position. We recommend that the UK Government begin now to prepare for the impact of possible Scottish independence. It would not be wise to begin contingency planning only after the referendum. This does not imply that we believe there should be negotiations with the Scottish Government prior to the referendum, but rather that it would be prudent for the MoD to scenario plan.
27We consider it to be highly probable that defence assets would form an integral part...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider it to be highly probable that defence assets would form an integral part of wider independence negotiations rather than a discrete strand. The UK Government should begin work to assess what its priorities would be in relation to defence assets in the event of a “Yes” vote.
28We consider that the level of security and defence presently afforded to the people of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that the level of security and defence presently afforded to the people of the United Kingdom is higher than that which could be provided by the Governments of a separate Scotland and the remainder of the UK.
29In respect of the interests of the remainder of the UK, we invite the MoD...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In respect of the interests of the remainder of the UK, we invite the MoD to explain how it would manage the loss of personnel, equipment, bases, training facilities and industrial capacity ceded to an independent Scotland.
30We consider that it is unlikely that an independent Scotland with fledgling intelligence capabilities would...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that it is unlikely that an independent Scotland with fledgling intelligence capabilities would be given access to the Five Eyes intelligence sharing community. A high degree of co-operation with rUK would therefore be crucial for Scotland especially in the early years of independence. However, such co-operation would rely on goodwill and Scotland could find itself more vulnerable to threats than it is at present.
31We recommend that the Ministry of Defence explain whether the concept of sharing facilities, including...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Ministry of Defence explain whether the concept of sharing facilities, including operational bases and training areas, by Scotland and the rUK could work in practice and to identify any significant risks arising from this proposal.
32The desire of the Scottish Government to pursue joint procurement with rUK for defence materiel...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The desire of the Scottish Government to pursue joint procurement with rUK for defence materiel and services makes absolute sense: a small country with a limited The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 9 defence budget would gain access to larger contracts offering better value for money. Whether the rUK would benefit sufficiently to enter into such an arrangement is less clear cut and would need to be examined carefully before a commitment was given.
33We welcome the evidence we received from the Secretary of State for Defence that Scots...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the evidence we received from the Secretary of State for Defence that Scots serving in the UK Armed Forces would be able to transfer to a Scottish defence force should Scotland become a separate state. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should provide a clear statement, prior to the referendum, that serving personnel would be able to choose whether to remain in the UK Armed Forces or to transfer to a Scottish defence force.
34Scottish independence would have a significant impact on the critical mass of rUK Armed Forces...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Scottish independence would have a significant impact on the critical mass of rUK Armed Forces and the financial resources available to support them. We recommend that the MoD set out, in its response to this report, whether it would seek to recruit personnel to replace the numbers lost through transfers to a Scottish defence force. Would personnel numbers be maintained at current projections or would rUK Armed Forces reduce further in size?
35Many thousands of Scots have served with distinction in UK Armed Forces over many years.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Many thousands of Scots have served with distinction in UK Armed Forces over many years. In the event of Scottish independence that long history may be brought to an end should the rUK government decide that it did not wish to recruit from Scotland. We invite the UK Government in its response to this report to make clear whether it would continue to welcome recruits from an independent Scotland.
36We invite the Ministry of Defence to set out what action it will take, in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We invite the Ministry of Defence to set out what action it will take, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission, to ensure that serving personnel are aware of their rights regarding registration and participation in the referendum.
37The possibility of Scottish independence represents a serious threat to the future operational viability of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The possibility of Scottish independence represents a serious threat to the future operational viability of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK Government must now give urgent consideration to contingency options in the event of a “Yes” vote.
38The people of Scotland and the rest of the UK deserve to be presented with...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The people of Scotland and the rest of the UK deserve to be presented with as full a picture as possible of the implications of Scottish independence for their future defence and security. To date, the information published by both the Scottish Government and UK Government falls far short of requirements.
39In its forthcoming White Paper, in addition to the specific questions asked earlier in this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its forthcoming White Paper, in addition to the specific questions asked earlier in this report, we believe the Scottish Government should provide direct answers to the following questions: • How would a sovereign Scottish Government ensure the defence and security of an independent Scotland? • For what purposes would Scottish armed forces be used? • How would Scottish armed forces be structured and trained, and where would they be based? • How much would it cost to equip, support and train an independent Scotland’s armed forces and how much of this could be procured and delivered domestically? and • How many jobs in the defence sector would be placed at risk?
40Similarly, the UK Government must set out more clearly the implications for the security of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Similarly, the UK Government must set out more clearly the implications for the security of the remainder of the United Kingdom should the people of Scotland choose the path of separation. This should include greater detail about the options for relocation of the strategic nuclear deterrent and an estimate of the associated costs. The UK Government should also outline its options for making good any defence deficit, caused by loss of personnel, equipment and bases, which might be created by Scottish independence.
41Dr Phillips O’Brien, Director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies, reached the view that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Dr Phillips O’Brien, Director of the Scottish Centre for War Studies, reached the view that in an independent Scotland, Faslane would have to be reduced to one-third of its present size (including hosting some army personnel as part of a joint facility), and a naval presence on the East Coast would be required to provide protection to the oil fields in the North Sea.38
42Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that it would require a “substantial amount of work” to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that it would require a “substantial amount of work” to convert Faslane from its current configuration and that it would require “some new and more cost-effective facilities for a conventional naval base”. For example, he pointed out that there is no dry dock at Faslane and that the cost of using and maintaining existing infrastructure, such as the shiplift, built to lift a 16,000 tonnes nuclear-armed submarine out of the water safely, would be very expensive.39
43Asked whether a naval facility on the East coast, perhaps based at Rosyth might be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked whether a naval facility on the East coast, perhaps based at Rosyth might be a better choice for the headquarters of a Scottish navy, Rear Admiral Alabaster replied: You would have to do the sums quite carefully. The facilities at Faslane are better, but they are the wrong facilities. They are expensive. It would need some very detailed work to look at the options, but building a new facility at Rosyth would certainly be one worth looking at.40
44Keith Brown MSP was asked about the numbers of personnel who would be based at...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Keith Brown MSP was asked about the numbers of personnel who would be based at Faslane under the Scottish Government’s plans. Although he would not provide specific numbers, he replied: 37 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy. The Henry Jackson Society 2013 38 Royal Society of Edinburgh,Enlightening the Constitutional Debate (Defence and International Relations), Edinburgh, 29 May 2013, Speaker Notes, www.royalsoced.org.uk/cms/files/events/programmes/2012- 13/speaker_notes/phillipsobrien.pdf 39 Qq 164-165 40 Q167 22 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence You can take from the fact that it will be a headquarters facility, and also the major naval base for Scotland, that it will be a matter of thousands of people servicing that facility.41
45As yet, the Scottish Government has given only a preliminary indication of its plans for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As yet, the Scottish Government has given only a preliminary indication of its plans for a Scottish navy. When it publishes more detailed requirements, it will be important to know the following: • What would be the size and configuration of its surface fleet and associated rotary wing force? • What personnel, vessels and helicopters would it hope to inherit from the Royal Navy? • What additional vessels would it procure? • How many submarines would it procure, and from where would they and the necessary qualified personnel be sourced? • What role, size and configuration would any Marine Infantry capability take? and • How many naval bases would a Scottish navy operate from, where would they be, and how many personnel would be expected to be based at each? Finally, the Scottish Government should make clear in its White Paper the anticipated cost of acquiring, staffing, operating and maintaining these assets. A Scottish army
46In its policy update, the SNP provides a brief description of the ground forces which...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its policy update, the SNP provides a brief description of the ground forces which would make up a Scottish army: Regular ground forces will include current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments, support units as well as Special Forces and Royal Marines, who will retain responsibility for offshore protection.42
47The policy update also envisaged a Scottish army structured around “one regular and one reserve...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The policy update also envisaged a Scottish army structured around “one regular and one reserve Multi Role Brigade”. We note that the concept of a Multi Role Brigade was envisaged in the run-up to and including the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), but following further cuts in 2011 it was clear there would be insufficient resources to implement this structure. Keith Brown MSP told us that since the adoption by the SNP of its policy update, “the goalposts have completely shifted” in terms of UK army structures. He continued: The armed forces units that we would have would make sense on a logistical level— what we thought were suitable for our purposes as an independent Scotland—but as 41 Q 311 42 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 23 to how they would relate to the current number of UK armed forces, it is hard to tell because it changes so much.43
48Keith Brown MSP confirmed that the Scottish Government intended to retain all current Scottish infantry...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Keith Brown MSP confirmed that the Scottish Government intended to retain all current Scottish infantry battalions and to “reinstate Scottish regiments previously abolished”. However, he told us that “given the numbers involved, that it would not be on the same scale as currently”, suggesting that battalions would be smaller in size.44
49Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, stated in a recent speech...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, stated in a recent speech that the current complement of the Scottish “teeth” regiments – the five battalions of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Scots Guards, and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards – is some 4,100 posts. If the King’s Own Scottish Borderers when they were amalgamated with the Royal Scots – a further 550 posts – were added, this would comprise almost a third of the entire proposed Scottish defence force. This did not take account of the support functions; the “tail”. The tooth to tail ratio in the British Army is approximately 1:2.45
50The SNP also has a stated commitment to retain all current army bases in Scotland.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP also has a stated commitment to retain all current army bases in Scotland. Keith Brown MSP confirmed that the White Paper would include detail about this: We think that we are currently well served with the bases that we have, if you look at the capacity at Leuchars, for example, and some of the changes taking place there. If you look at the capacity at Redford barracks, which is being sold off in part, and elsewhere, that capacity exists just now. There is no guarantee that it will exist at the point of independence. You will understand that we have to wait until the White Paper to see exactly what we will do about those bases.46
51The proposed retention and reinstatement of historic Scottish Regiments clearly has implications for the size...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The proposed retention and reinstatement of historic Scottish Regiments clearly has implications for the size and structure of a Scottish army. It is not apparent from the SNP’s published plans which Scottish regiments “previously abolished” it intends to restore or how that could be achieved within the overall numbers of personnel proposed.
52In light of the new British Army structures envisaged in the Army 2020 proposals, the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of the new British Army structures envisaged in the Army 2020 proposals, the Scottish Government should consider publishing a new plan for a Scottish army.
53Questions which it might wish to address include: • What would be the size and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Questions which it might wish to address include: • What would be the size and structure of a Scottish army, including the envisaged balance of regular and reserve troops? • What would be the balance between combat (infantry and armoured), combat support (artillery, aviation and engineers), combat service support (logistics) and command support (communications) troops? • Which historic Scottish regiments would be reinstated? 43 Q 285 44 Q 332 45 Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP. Stronger and Safer Together. Speech 14 March 2013 46 Q 334 24 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence • Where would Scottish army units be based? • What equipment and infrastructure would a Scottish army expect to inherit from the British Army? • What would be the cost of recruitment, training and retention measures? and • How would a Scottish army attract and train the necessary specialist troops such as engineers, signallers and logistic personnel? A Scottish air force
54According to the SNP policy update a Scottish air force would operate from two air...
Concluded (the committee's words)
According to the SNP policy update a Scottish air force would operate from two air bases at Lossiemouth and Leuchars and would be equipped with “fast jets for domestic air patrol duties, transport aircraft and helicopters” and Scotland would procure maritime patrol aircraft.47 Air defence
55We explored with witnesses what type of aircraft might prove suitable for the air defence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We explored with witnesses what type of aircraft might prove suitable for the air defence of an independent Scotland. In his proposal for a Scottish air force, Stuart Crawford suggested that the RAF’s Hawk advanced trainer aircraft might prove sufficient for the purpose. He told us: It is an option for a small nation with a limited budget to equip its air force with. The attraction is that it is, of course, dual-role as an advanced trainer, so it covers that as well. It does have a limited operational capability. It is a significant part of the RAF’s current inventory, which also makes it attractive, in that a share could be negotiated. I only offered it up as an alternative to going for something much more sophisticated and much more expensive.48
56Air Marshal McNicoll gave us his assessment of the suitability of the Hawk: On the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Air Marshal McNicoll gave us his assessment of the suitability of the Hawk: On the air defence side and the suggestion that Hawk might be able to fulfil the need, my personal view is that it could not possibly. The Hawk is a great training aircraft— a fantastic aircraft in many ways—but the idea that it could cope with the defence of what would be the Scottish air defence region is, I think, completely unrealistic. It does not have the radar capability to do so, nor would it have the speed to catch up with something that was travelling quickly. So I do not see that as a starter.49
57Asked whether Typhoons were the preferred option of the Scottish Government, Keith Brown MSP replied:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked whether Typhoons were the preferred option of the Scottish Government, Keith Brown MSP replied: 47 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 48 Q 55 49 Q 179 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 25 I do not want to prejudice what the White Paper says, but I think the Typhoons would be beyond the requirements of an independent Scotland. Obviously, we have contributed substantially to their cost, but there may be more suitable ways for us to provide air cover.50
58In relation to the Hawk aircraft, Mr Brown told us that there “could very well...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In relation to the Hawk aircraft, Mr Brown told us that there “could very well be a role for them”, for example, for training, but he accepted that they would not be suitable for air intercepts.51 He concluded that while Typhoons may be one possibility, “there are many others internationally for us to try and see whether we can use”52.
59We asked Air Marshal McNicoll how many fast jets a Scottish air force would need...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked Air Marshal McNicoll how many fast jets a Scottish air force would need in order to function effectively: You could discuss at great length whether one squadron or two squadrons might be sufficient, but you would be heading towards 15 to 30 aircraft perhaps; that sort of nature. That is total fleet size, of course. Some of them would have to be held in reserve—as attrition reserve—and some would be undergoing depth maintenance, so the total number of aircraft you have is not necessarily the total number that you have available on the front line to fly day to day. If you were to keep people current but also maintain a quick reaction alert, a squadron would be pushed to cope with that.53
60Air Marshal McNicoll noted that a proportion of the RAF Typhoon force might be available...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Air Marshal McNicoll noted that a proportion of the RAF Typhoon force might be available to a Scottish air force, but he also gave us an assessment of other options which could fulfil the air defence function. He ruled out the F-35 joint strike fighter, suggesting instead the SAAB Gripen and F-18 Super Hornet. However, he cautioned that the purchase of these aircraft would not be possible with an annual budget of under £400m per annum.54
61In 2009, the MoD announced that it would procure 40 Typhoon aircraft as part of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In 2009, the MoD announced that it would procure 40 Typhoon aircraft as part of the €9 billion production contract for a further 112 aircraft for the four partner nations: Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.55 This represented approximately €80m (£70m/$112m) per aircraft. By comparison, a Saab Gripen costs $40-60m depending on the variant and the Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet has an estimated unit cost of approximately $81m.56 On the basis of these estimates, a fleet of 30 fast jets for a Scottish air force, as suggested by Air Marshal McNicoll, could cost between $1.2bn (£780m) and $2.6bn (£1.7bn) to procure.5758 50 Q 318 51 Qq 319-320 52 Q 321 53 Q 184 54 Q 181 55 Eurofighter Typhoon, 9 billion euro contract for 112 Eurofighter Typhoons signed, www.eurofighter.com/media/news0/news-detail/article/9-billion-euro-contract-for-112-eurofighter-typhoons- signed.html 56 U.S. Department of Defense (2012). Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President's Budget Submission: Navy Justification Book Volume 1 Aircraft Procurement, Navy Budget Activities 1–4, www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/13pres/APN_BA1- 4_BOOK.pdf 57 Higher figure assumes Scottish air force inherits 7 Eurofighter Typhoons from the RAF and requires to procure 23 additional aircraft. 26 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence
62As an alternative, Professor Chalmers, RUSI, proposed a co-operative model for Scottish air defence, on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As an alternative, Professor Chalmers, RUSI, proposed a co-operative model for Scottish air defence, on the basis that Scotland became a member of NATO: I find it hard to imagine a situation in which an independent Scotland took sole responsibility for patrolling its own air space. Given its economic resources and the difficulty—the expense—of maintaining a high-level capability, some co-operative arrangement with NATO allies seems much more likely.59 He pointed to the example of the Baltic Air Patrol, in which other NATO Member States, and non-NATO states, help with air patrolling the air space of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.60 Maritime patrol
63In our report on Future Maritime Surveillance,61 we expressed our serious concerns about the capability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In our report on Future Maritime Surveillance,61 we expressed our serious concerns about the capability gap in maritime surveillance in the absence of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) following the decision in the 2010 SDSR to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft programme. We therefore understand very well the desire of the Scottish Government to fill this gap in current capabilities.
64We look forward to reading in the forthcoming White Paper the detailed proposals the Scottish...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We look forward to reading in the forthcoming White Paper the detailed proposals the Scottish Government has for the procurement and operation of a maritime patrol squadron and how this will be financed within the overall aspirations for Scottish defence capability. Air bases
65In respect of Scottish Government plans for air bases, Keith Brown MSP told us that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In respect of Scottish Government plans for air bases, Keith Brown MSP told us that one air base would be sufficient for Scotland’s needs.62 This was a significant departure from previously agreed SNP policy which envisaged a Scottish air force operating from both Lossiemouth and Leuchars. Asked whether there was a preference between the two bases, he replied: Once again, there are different options available to us. I think you have to wait and see. For example, if you have an air base or an army base that has been used for a number of years, and then is no longer used, bringing it back into use presents different logistical challenges. [...] It makes an awful lot of sense to take decisions on some of the detail as close to the decision as possible, because then you understand what the actual position is in the UK.63
66In view of the costs associated with acquiring different air defence aircraft from those the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In view of the costs associated with acquiring different air defence aircraft from those the UK currently operates, we do not currently understand how the Scottish 58 Exchange rate: 1 British Pound = 1.54 US Dollars 59 Q 62 60 Q 38 61 Defence Committee, Future Maritime Surveillance, Fifth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 110 62 Q 323 63 Q 325 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 27 Government expects, within the available budget, to mount a credible air defence – let alone provide the additional transport, rotary wing and other support aircraft an air force would need. The Scottish Government will no doubt wish to set out a detailed explanation of this in its White Paper. Associated costs
67The SNP envisages an annual defence and security budget of £2.5bn, which it asserts is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP envisages an annual defence and security budget of £2.5bn, which it asserts is “an annual increase of more than £500m on recent UK levels of defence spending in Scotland but nearly £1bn less than Scottish taxpayers currently contribute to UK defence spending”64. Given the stated ambitions for a Scottish defence force, we asked our witnesses how realistic this figure was.
68Professor Trevor Taylor told us: With a budget of that size and the economies of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Trevor Taylor told us: With a budget of that size and the economies of scale you get, it is difficult to imagine that they would have anything other than lightly armed ground forces, coastal patrols and perhaps vessels that could do something to protect the oil rigs ... The air domain would be very difficult, as would the communications domain—satellite communications, and that kind of thing. It would be a small country’s coastal, local defence force. Currently, they are part of a big country’s force that still runs a sizeable Air Force and still has an oceangoing Navy, which still has large naval vessels. For a new country, any one of those things would swallow up its money.65
69Professor Malcolm Chalmers, writing in the RUSI Journal, set out some of the capital costs...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Malcolm Chalmers, writing in the RUSI Journal, set out some of the capital costs associated with the establishment of a Scottish army and a Scottish Ministry of Defence: The British Army has several thousand soldiers, based around a brigade headquarters, in Scotland. Yet the transport aircraft and helicopters needed to carry them around, the staff colleges needed to train them, the organisations that buy and maintain their weapons, and the strategic headquarters needed to command them are all in the rest of the United Kingdom. All of these functions would have to be newly created for Scotland to have a functioning national army. A new Scottish Ministry of Defence and military headquarters would need to be established and staffed in order to organise procurement, payroll and planning. New training and exercise facilities would be needed, and probably also some new bases.66
70When he gave evidence to us, Keith Brown MSP gave an indication of the Scottish...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When he gave evidence to us, Keith Brown MSP gave an indication of the Scottish Government’s approach to the budget available to establish a Scottish defence force: We have between £7 billion and £8 billion of assets. Scotland starts from that position, and not just a position of being able to spend the £2.5 billion, and that compares favourably with many other countries.67 64 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 65 Q229 66 Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Kingdom's End?, The RUSI Journal, 157:3, 6-11 67 Q 326 28 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence
71Without receiving detailed answers to the questions posed elsewhere in this report, it would be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Without receiving detailed answers to the questions posed elsewhere in this report, it would be unrealistic to expect us to judge the exact running costs of the proposed Scottish defence force. However, given the information we have so far received from the Scottish Government, we are unconvinced that there is sufficient funding to support both the proposed Scottish defence force and to procure new equipment. Division of assets
72According to its policy, SNP expects a Scottish defence force to inherit a proportionate, population...
Concluded (the committee's words)
According to its policy, SNP expects a Scottish defence force to inherit a proportionate, population based share of existing UK defence assets on separation: some £7-8 billion according to Keith Brown MSP. Its interests are focused primarily on bases, ocean going vessels, fast jets and other aircraft and vehicles. It has no interest in negotiating a share of the Royal Navy’s fleet of nuclear submarines or the aircraft carriers.
73Asked how an independent Scotland could afford to supplement the small number of fast jets...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked how an independent Scotland could afford to supplement the small number of fast jets it might inherit from the RAF, Mr Brown explained how he believed the negotiations regarding a division of assets might proceed: It is quite possible to say, “You would not have aircraft carriers. How would we reflect your share in relation to other aspects?” You can have that discussion. It would not necessarily be the case that it would be proportionate in relation to Typhoons, for example.68
74Asked for his response to this, the Secretary of State explained how the Ministry of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked for his response to this, the Secretary of State explained how the Ministry of Defence would approach negotiations: The starting point would be an assumption of pro rata sharing and then there would obviously be a negotiation. When I made my speech in Scotland that I referred to earlier, I think we concluded that they would get 0.7 of an Astute submarine and 1.6 frigates and destroyers. There is clearly a technical problem and therefore there would have to be some negotiation about how assets were divided. It would be a mistake to assume that they could simply cherry-pick the asset register.69
75Examination of the experience of the division of military assets between the Czech Republic and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Examination of the experience of the division of military assets between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, suggested to us that an appropriate starting point for the negotiation might well be a population based share of existing assets taking into account the location of fixed assets such as military bases.
76We note that the process of negotiation on the division of military assets would not...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the process of negotiation on the division of military assets would not be one sided, and that the remainder of the UK would be likely to bring into the negotiations existing shared liabilities, such as decommissioning of nuclear submarines, and the additional costs it would incur by losing a proportion of the economies of scale it enjoys at present. 68 Q 327 69 Q 387 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 29 Training
77A Scottish defence force will, immediately upon formation, require access to training facilities and instruction...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A Scottish defence force will, immediately upon formation, require access to training facilities and instruction for its new recruits, NCOs, officers and specialists such as engineers, medics, and other trades. This would present a significant challenge as the British Army, for example, does not presently depend on any schools in Scotland within its individual and collective training regime.
78Beyond the training needs of new recruits, there would be significant costs associated with providing...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Beyond the training needs of new recruits, there would be significant costs associated with providing the career training for personnel on the equipment that a Scottish defence force had inherited or procured. For the Royal Navy and RAF, almost all of the career training is delivered south of the border on type specific training rigs and courses, which would either have to be replicated in Scotland or access negotiated. This would represent a major resource burden within a relatively small defence budget.
79Another risk associated with separation is that those service personnel transferring from UK Armed Forces...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Another risk associated with separation is that those service personnel transferring from UK Armed Forces may not have the skill sets they require depending on the equipment acquired by Scottish forces. For example, what would happen if no Typhoon aircraft technicians wished to transfer to a Scottish air force which had inherited these aircraft, or if nuclear submariners wish to join a Scottish navy equipped only with conventional submarines or none at all?
80In A’ the Blue Bonnets, Crawford and Marsh suggested that the most significant training deficit...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In A’ the Blue Bonnets, Crawford and Marsh suggested that the most significant training deficit a Scottish defence force would face would be the absence of an area for manoeuvring mechanised forces. They suggested that an arrangement to train the Scottish army’s mechanised forces outside Scotland would be one solution perhaps with a reciprocal arrangement for access to other training opportunities in Scotland.70
81In oral evidence, Stuart Crawford also pointed out that there are no officer training schools...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In oral evidence, Stuart Crawford also pointed out that there are no officer training schools in Scotland and that in the model of a Scottish defence force he had prepared he had assumed that: until such time as an independent Scotland created and built its own resources, army officers would be sent to Sandhurst, for example, or similar European officer training colleges.71
82The benefits of scale which can be achieved across the United Kingdom’s armed forces would...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The benefits of scale which can be achieved across the United Kingdom’s armed forces would be lost to Scotland should it become independent. If new schools had to be established, and the trainers trained, the result would be that an independent Scotland would be forced to invest in new training infrastructure. Both the capital and running costs would bear heavily on the ability of Scotland’s armed forces to train and deploy. The rUK would also face the impact of reduced advantages of scale in delivering these services to its own armed forces.
83Keith Brown MSP told us that although Scotland could establish its own training facilities, another...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Keith Brown MSP told us that although Scotland could establish its own training facilities, another option would be to collaborate with rUK in order to access the training 70 Royal United Services Institute, A’ the Blue Bonnets, Whitehall Report 3-12, www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Whitehall_Report_3-12.pdf 71 Q 19 30 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence places required by Scottish armed forces. In relation to officer training places at Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Cranwell, Mr Brown considered that following dialogue with the UK Government it would be possible to secure places.72
84However, the Secretary of State for Defence suggested that Scotland would have to join the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, the Secretary of State for Defence suggested that Scotland would have to join the queue of other nations who wish to access places at UK officer training academies and other training facilities. Mr Hammond told us: I have no objection in principle to the idea of having overseas students on our terms, on a full cost-recovery basis, and capped and limited in such a way that it enhances the training experience for our own cadets rather than detracts from it.73 I certainly would not want to guarantee that we could make that number of places [200] available. We would want to manage this looking at the interests of the academy [Sandhurst] and of our own cadet training programme. Of course, there are military training opportunities available in other countries—other European and NATO countries—which also accept foreign students on their training courses.74
85We consider it unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would make available sufficient training places...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider it unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would make available sufficient training places for Scottish personnel at facilities such as Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Cranwell. The Scottish Government should therefore include in its White Paper an assessment of alternative options and cost estimates for delivery of this training. Conclusion on a Scottish defence force
86The SNP set out, in general terms, its vision for the role Scottish armed forces...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP set out, in general terms, its vision for the role Scottish armed forces would be asked to perform. With the exception of its stance on nuclear weapons, the SNP appears to envisage a role which is broadly similar to that fulfilled currently by UK Armed Forces involving territorial defence, aid to the civil power and support for the international community through a commitment to contribute to international operations.
87Before we can judge whether these ambitions could be met within a cost envelope of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Before we can judge whether these ambitions could be met within a cost envelope of £2.5 billion per annum, we require more details from the Scottish Government in its White Paper about its plans for a Scottish defence force. In particular, the plans must establish a coherent model which reflects a realistic “tooth to tail” ratio of combat troops to the personnel required to supply and support them, and clarity over the training capacity to maintain the appropriate professional standards. It is also incumbent upon Scottish Ministers to set out how they propose to finance the equipment, vessels, aircraft and associated support services a Scottish defence force would require to deliver the objectives set for it. 72 Qq 282-284 73 Q391 74 Q394 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 31 4 Scotland, the nuclear deterrent and NATO membership
88The SNP has a long established policy in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP has a long established policy in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Until 2012, the SNP also had a policy that an independent Scotland should not remain as a member of NATO, essentially because it is a nuclear weapons based alliance. However, at its annual conference in October 2012, the SNP agreed a Foreign, Security and Defence policy update which included a commitment to maintain membership of NATO.75
89The Foreign, Security and Defence policy update stated: A long-standing national consensus has existed that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Foreign, Security and Defence policy update stated: A long-standing national consensus has existed that Scotland should not host nuclear weapons and a sovereign SNP government will negotiate the speediest safe transition of the nuclear fleet from Faslane which will be replaced by conventional naval forces. Security cooperation in our region functions primarily through NATO, which is regarded as the keystone defence organisation by Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the United Kingdom. The SNP wishes Scotland to fulfil its responsibilities to neighbours and allies. On independence Scotland will inherit its treaty obligations with NATO. An SNP government will maintain NATO membership subject to an agreement that Scotland will not host nuclear weapons and NATO takes all possible steps to bring about nuclear disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty of which all its members are signatories, and further that NATO continues to respect the right of members to only take part in UN-sanctioned operations. In the absence of such an agreement, Scotland will work with NATO as a member of the Partnership for Peace programme like Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland. Scotland will be a full member of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE).76
90However, in his evidence to us, Scottish Government Minister Keith Brown MSP conceded that an...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, in his evidence to us, Scottish Government Minister Keith Brown MSP conceded that an independent Scotland would need to apply to join NATO rather than inheriting membership. We consider this issue in more detail later in this section of our report.
91Following the 2012 conference decision, in a BBC interview, First Minister Alex Salmond MSP reiterated...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following the 2012 conference decision, in a BBC interview, First Minister Alex Salmond MSP reiterated his Party’s opposition to nuclear weapons: If Scotland, by majority, doesn't want nuclear weapons, the SNP proposition is to write that into the constitution of the state. So, that would make the possession of nuclear weapons illegal.77 75 “SNP members vote to ditch the party's anti-Nato policy”, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland- politics-19993694 76 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 77 “Nuclear weapons 'outlawed' in an independent Scotland, says Salmond”, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland- scotland-politics-20020839 32 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence
92In its paper Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its paper Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, the Scottish Government has proposed that a written constitution should include “a constitutional ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland”.78 Faslane and the nuclear deterrent
93Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde – commonly known as Faslane – is the Royal Navy’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde – commonly known as Faslane – is the Royal Navy’s main presence in Scotland. It is home to the core of the Submarine Service, including the nation’s nuclear deterrent, and the new generation of Astute Class attack submarines. More than 6,500 civilians and Service personnel are employed on the site at present.79
94In March 2013, we visited Faslane and the Royal Armaments Depot at nearby Coulport where...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In March 2013, we visited Faslane and the Royal Armaments Depot at nearby Coulport where key elements of the UK’s Trident missile system are stored, processed and maintained. We were impressed by the extent and sophistication of the facilities and the professionalism of the personnel working there. We were told that the number of people directly employed at the base is projected to rise to around 8,200 by 2022 as the remaining Trafalgar Class submarines transfer from their present base at Devonport and additional Astute Class submarines are brought into service. Faslane will become the UK’s Submarine Centre of Specialisation. Costs and timescale for relocation
95Professor Malcolm Chalmers told us that it would be a “very substantial venture indeed”, in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Malcolm Chalmers told us that it would be a “very substantial venture indeed”, in terms of time and money, to replicate elsewhere the facilities at Faslane and particularly those at Coulport. 80
96In its response to the Scottish Affairs Committee’s report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its response to the Scottish Affairs Committee’s report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident-Days or Decades?, the Government stated that although it was not planning for Scottish independence or to move the strategic nuclear deterrent from HMNB Clyde: If the result of the referendum on Scottish independence were to lead to the current situation being challenged, then other options would be considered. Any alternative solution would come at huge cost. It would be an enormous exercise to reproduce the facilities elsewhere. It would cost billions of pounds and take many years. It is impossible to estimate how much it would cost to replicate the infrastructure, which would depend on many factors including timescales and the precise scope of the facilities that might be required.81
97Giving evidence before us, Keith Brown MSP said: 78 The Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Giving evidence before us, Keith Brown MSP said: 78 The Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00413757.pdf 79 Royal Navy, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Naval-Bases/Clyde 80 Q 65 81 Scottish Affairs Committee. First Special Report of Session 2012-13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident-Days or Decades? Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 861 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 33 we have accepted the fact that the Trident nuclear missile system should not be removed ahead of any safe time scale for doing so [...] it is quite possible that it will be in Scotland for some time after we assume responsibility for defence forces, which will be in March 2016 [...]82
98In respect of the costs of relocating the deterrent, Mr Brown expressed the view that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In respect of the costs of relocating the deterrent, Mr Brown expressed the view that Scotland had “borne its share of the costs of the current nuclear deterrent, and borne disproportionately the risks attached to that”.83 He said that it would be “ridiculous to expect the Scottish Government and the Scottish people to bear the costs of [Trident] relocation, not least given the fact that it was the starting point of the Scottish Government that we did not want to have the weapons in the first place”.84
99By way of contrast, in relation to the decommissioning of oil and gas infrastructure in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
By way of contrast, in relation to the decommissioning of oil and gas infrastructure in the North Sea, the Scottish Government has given a commitment that it would “assume responsibility for meeting all existing and future obligations stemming from the tax relief associated with decommissioning facilities in Scottish waters and will guarantee to underwrite these costs”,85 regardless of whether a contribution from the UK Government could be negotiated.
100Asked which Government he believed should bear the costs of relocation, the Secretary of State...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked which Government he believed should bear the costs of relocation, the Secretary of State for Defence repeated his view that there would need to be a negotiation, and it would cover a vast range of subjects. He continued: If we had to include in that negotiation the dismantling of the facilities at Faslane and Coulport and their reconstruction elsewhere, clearly, the cost of that would be a factor in the overall calculation of the settlement between the parties to that negotiation.86
101In relation to the costs of decommissioning existing UK nuclear submarines, seven of which are...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In relation to the costs of decommissioning existing UK nuclear submarines, seven of which are stored at Rosyth, the Secretary of State for Defence said: Some of the words I have heard from some of our SNP colleagues have suggested that that is our problem; on the contrary, it is a UK problem, and would become a problem that, between us, we would have to work out how to resolve, as well as working out how to meet its enormous cost, in the event of a such a break-up.87
102In an earlier exchange, Keith Brown MSP accepted that this would be “a matter for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In an earlier exchange, Keith Brown MSP accepted that this would be “a matter for negotiation in discussions between the two Governments”.88 82 Q 274 83 Q 335 84 Q 335 85 The Scottish Government, Maximising the Return from Oil and Gas in an Independent Scotland, para 5.61, www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/07/5746/0 86 Q 398 87 Q 398 88 Q 343 34 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence Implications
103If a sovereign Scottish Government insisted upon the removal of submarines and warheads from its...
Concluded (the committee's words)
If a sovereign Scottish Government insisted upon the removal of submarines and warheads from its territory in a short timeframe then the UK’s continuous at sea deterrent would cease to operate.
104The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has argued that there are no viable and practical...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has argued that there are no viable and practical alternative locations, outside Scotland, for the Trident nuclear force. It argued that the Trident nuclear weapon system could be deactivated within days, removed from Scotland within a period of two years and dismantled completely within four years.89
105Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that “it would be very difficult—in fact, I would almost...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that “it would be very difficult—in fact, I would almost use the word “inconceivable”—to recreate the facilities necessary to mount the strategic deterrent, without the use of Faslane and Coulport, somewhere else in the UK”.90 He estimated that it would cost many billions to establish an alternative base elsewhere, if such a site could be found.91
106The Secretary of State told us that it would take “in the order of a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Secretary of State told us that it would take “in the order of a decade” for safe transition: Anything involving nuclear activity invariably has a long time cycle attached to it, because of the, quite properly, very stringent safety measures and the checking and certification procedures involved. The process could not begin until the negotiations across the board had been completed and until the financial arrangements for the very substantial cost of such a move had been finalised.92
107Asked whether the rUK could find an alternative place to host the nuclear deterrent, the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked whether the rUK could find an alternative place to host the nuclear deterrent, the Secretary of State replied: It would be technically possible to do. If you throw enough money at a problem, you can solve most problems. I am confident that we would be able to solve this problem, but it would cost a significant amount of money.93
108We consider that, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, a safe transition of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, a safe transition of the nuclear deterrent from HM Naval Base Clyde could not be achieved quickly. Even with political will on both sides, the replication of the facilities at Faslane and, crucially, Coulport, at another site in the UK would take several years and many billions of pounds to deliver. Options for basing the deterrent outside the UK, in the USA or France, even in the short term, may prove politically impossible or equally costly.
109The implications of Scottish independence for the rUK’s ability to provide the necessary security for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The implications of Scottish independence for the rUK’s ability to provide the necessary security for the nuclear deterrent during any transition period will need very detailed and early consideration. 89 Ev w11 90 Q 119 91 Q 121 92 Q 395 93 Q 397 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 35
110If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the Clyde the impact on levels of employment...
Concluded (the committee's words)
If the nuclear deterrent were moved from the Clyde the impact on levels of employment at Faslane and Coulport would be significant. Evidence we have received suggests that instead of an increase in people directly employed at the base to around 8,200 by 2022, as projected by the MoD, a conventional naval base and Joint Force Headquarters would employ considerably fewer people than the current workforce of 6,500. NATO membership Background
111Since it was founded in 1949, NATO’s membership has grown from 12 to 28 countries.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Since it was founded in 1949, NATO’s membership has grown from 12 to 28 countries. Most recently, Albania and Croatia became members when the accession process was completed on 1 April 2009.94 NATO membership is open to “any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” .95
112The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership. Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been participants in the MAP process since 2009 and 2010 respectively. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia commenced its MAP in 1999 but its full NATO membership has been blocked by Greece due to issues with its constitutional name.96 Application process
113In its report on foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its report on foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that while the rUK would continue to be a member of NATO, “Scotland could expect to face robust negotiations and would not necessarily be in a position unilaterally to shape its membership terms in line with its domestic political commitments on nuclear weapons”.97
114Following discussions at a Ditchley Foundation conference in June 2013, on The future of Scotland:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following discussions at a Ditchley Foundation conference in June 2013, on The future of Scotland: international implications and comparisons, Stuart Crawford reported that the view of the conference was that Scottish membership of NATO “was not inevitable”. Before supporting Scotland’s accession, prominent NATO members would “seek reassurance on the future of Trident, they would need to know that Scotland would not deny access to its ports to nuclear powered (and possibly nuclear armed) ships, and 94 NATO enlargement,www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2B0E24DA-59964641/natolive/topics_49212.htm 95 NATO, www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html 96 NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm 97 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2012-13, Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643, para 38 36 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence they would want to know where Scotland stood on the future of NATO as a global or European organisation”98.
115Stuart Crawford also reported that other NATO members “would expect Scotland to spend at least...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Stuart Crawford also reported that other NATO members “would expect Scotland to spend at least two per cent of its GDP on defence”, well above the figure presently proposed by the SNP. He concluded: In layman’s terms, should an independent Scotland continue to espouse the anti nuclear agenda then its accession to NATO would most likely be blocked or delayed.99
116The Director’s note of the Ditchley Foundation conference reflected more of the discussion regarding NATO...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Director’s note of the Ditchley Foundation conference reflected more of the discussion regarding NATO membership. Participants considered that if other Member States were happy to see Scotland join, this could happen in theory relatively quickly and easily. The note continued: There was no reason in principle why other members would not want Scotland to join, particularly if the rest of the UK also wanted her to do so. Scotland’s geographical location meant that her northern waters were important strategically. However the nuclear issue was a major complicating factor. While the question of the future basing of the current UK nuclear deterrent was essentially a matter between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK, the underlying and deep- rooted anti-nuclear policy of the current Scottish Government and the SNP in general might pose wider problems. 100
117Key questions posed by conference participants included: Would Scotland accept the protection of the NATO...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Key questions posed by conference participants included: Would Scotland accept the protection of the NATO nuclear umbrella, and could she be a full member of NATO if she did not? Would she be ready to accept the full collective defence implications of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty? Would she accept the Strategic Concept of NATO, about which there could not be negotiation? What assets would she be prepared to put at NATO’s disposal? Would an independent Scotland want to insist that no ships which were or could be carrying nuclear weapons would be allowed in her waters – or even nuclear-powered ships? Either could pose major problems for the US in particular, with its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships. The question mark which Scottish attitudes to Trident could place over the current UK deterrent could be seen as weakening NATO, which might again call into question Scotland’s commitment to NATO in some eyes. There could also be questions about how far a neutrality-inclined Scotland would help NATO play the global role which some saw as its future.101 98 Options for Scotland, Scotland: Nay or Yea to NATO? Available at: http://www.optionsforscotland.com/2013/06/25/nay-or-yay-to-nato/ 99 Ibid. 100 Ditchley Foundation. The future of Scotland: international implications and comparisons – A Note by the Director. www.ditchley.co.uk 101 Ditchley Foundation. The future of Scotland: international implications and comparisons – A Note by the Director.www.ditchley.co.uk The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 37
118When he appeared before us, Keith Brown MSP acknowledged that Scotland would need to apply...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When he appeared before us, Keith Brown MSP acknowledged that Scotland would need to apply to join NATO. He said: There are fairly substantial processes to go through, but it has been done relatively quickly in the past [...] I do not want to give the impression that this is an automatic assumption. We do not assume that. We would go through the processes. In the past it has taken between about 18 and 24 months. Bear in mind, as I have said, that we would immediately start work on many of these things, in the event of a yes vote for independence.102 We noted that this differed from the assertion in the SNP policy update that Scotland would “inherit its treaty obligations with NATO” and that an SNP Government would “maintain” NATO membership subject to “an agreement that Scotland will not host nuclear weapons”.103 We further noted that this was in contrast to the Scottish Government’s stance on EU membership which is that Scotland would continue to be a member of the European Union during the period between a yes vote and independence and that as a result, there would be no break in Scotland’s membership of the EU.104
119Asked about the likely attitude of the rUK Government to an application to join NATO...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked about the likely attitude of the rUK Government to an application to join NATO from a newly independent Scotland, the Secretary of State for Defence replied: We would want to look at the defence posture being proposed by the Scottish Government; we would want to look at how much resource they were prepared to commit to the defence of Scotland and a Scottish contribution to NATO; and we would want to look at their attitude to sharing the burden of common defence platforms, including the UK nuclear deterrent, which is 100% declared to NATO as a resource to protect the NATO alliance. We would then reach a decision as to whether having Scotland inside NATO would enhance the UK’s defence or detract from it.105
120According to media reports, talks between Scottish Government officials and NATO’s Assistant Secretary General were...
Concluded (the committee's words)
According to media reports, talks between Scottish Government officials and NATO’s Assistant Secretary General were held in Brussels in early July 2013, facilitated by the UK’s Joint Delegation to NATO. Scottish officials argued that in the event of independence, since Scotland was already within the alliance as part of the UK, it should not have to start from scratch in securing membership. However, Scottish officials were told that no new member would be allowed to join NATO if that state had unresolved military or territorial disputes with other countries.106
121The change to SNP policy regarding NATO membership in October 2012 was a significant development...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The change to SNP policy regarding NATO membership in October 2012 was a significant development in the debate on the defence implications of possible Scottish independence. We welcome the subsequent acknowledgement by the Scottish Government that an independent Scotland would need to apply to join NATO rather 102 Q 350 103 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 104 Foreign Affairs Committee. Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, Sixth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 641. Para 42. 105 Q 402 106 “Nato chiefs deal blow to SNP's anti-nuclear strategy”, The Guardian, 14 August 2013 38 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence than inheriting membership. We note the contrast between the Scottish Government’s position on this and its position on membership of the European Union. Scottish Ministers will need to make clear their rationale for this difference, and, if they wish the Scottish people to give it credence, should consider making publicly available the legal advice on which it is based.
122The process of securing NATO membership is complex and time-consuming and the response to an...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The process of securing NATO membership is complex and time-consuming and the response to an application from an independent Scotland would be influenced by the Scottish Government’s stance on nuclear weapons. NATO is a nuclear alliance and we believe that any action likely to disrupt the operation of the UK’s strategic deterrent would undoubtedly influence NATO Member countries’ attitudes towards an application from Scotland.
123We note the reported recent engagement between NATO and Scottish Government officials, facilitated by the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the reported recent engagement between NATO and Scottish Government officials, facilitated by the UK Joint Delegation to NATO. We welcome this co-operation between the two Governments and invite the UK Government to provide us with an update on the outcome of these and any subsequent discussions. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Scottish Government’s view that NATO membership could be negotiated in a period of 18 to 24 months is optimistic unless issues surrounding the nuclear deterrent were resolved through negotiation. The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 39 5 The implications for the defence industry in Scotland Background
124The aerospace, defence, and security sectors are significant contributors to the Scottish and wider UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The aerospace, defence, and security sectors are significant contributors to the Scottish and wider UK economies. Each year they contribute billions of pounds in sales, millions of investment in research and development, and many thousands of jobs.
125According to a Scottish Affairs Select Committee report, in 2008 the defence industry, along with...
Concluded (the committee's words)
According to a Scottish Affairs Select Committee report, in 2008 the defence industry, along with the Ministry of Defence, supported almost 50,000 jobs in Scotland with wages around a third higher than the Scottish national average.107 A more recent report by that Committee suggests that the defence industry currently supports more than 15,000 jobs throughout Scotland.108
126Professor Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI, told us that figures published by industry groups suggested that Scotland...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI, told us that figures published by industry groups suggested that Scotland had a share of around 10 percent of defence spending.109 His colleague, Professor Trevor Taylor, told us that, in common with the UK as a whole, approximately 60 percent of defence products were sold domestically, the principal customer being the MoD.110
127The SNP’s policy update states that a “Scottish defence industrial strategy and procurement plan will...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SNP’s policy update states that a “Scottish defence industrial strategy and procurement plan will fill UK capability gaps in Scotland, addressing the lack of new frigates, conventional submarines and maritime patrol aircraft”. It also suggests that “joint procurement will be pursued with the rest of the UK and other allies”111 An industry perspective
128We asked defence and security industry representatives to comment on the implications of independence, but...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked defence and security industry representatives to comment on the implications of independence, but for commercial reasons companies declined to do so publicly. Informally, companies in the sector told us that, with negotiations around the process for the referendum largely settled, they would hope to see a greater focus and clarity on the public policy, procurement and regulatory aspects of the independence debate from all parties concerned. Matters such as the anticipated fiscal strategy, taxation structure, commercial regulation and labour law in an independent Scotland are of considerable interest to companies in all sectors, not just defence related.
129Asked about the likelihood of defence contractors moving their operations out of an independent Scotland...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked about the likelihood of defence contractors moving their operations out of an independent Scotland to the rUK, Professor Taylor replied: 107 Scottish Affairs Committee. Employment and Skills for the Defence Industry in Scotland, Sixth Report 2007-08. HC 305 108 Scottish Affairs Committee The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How would Separation affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry?, Eighth Report 2012-13. HC 957 109 Q 24 110 Qq 208-210 111 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence policy update, October 2012 40 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence If it is easy to do, I think they would do it very quickly. If it is expensive and difficult to do, obviously it is a more challenging question for them. The new Scotland will not be a major market for defence equipment. Currently, the Scottish defence industry serves the high-end defence market of a pretty large player [...] The new Scotland would be a small country with a small country’s defence needs. The domestic market for defence goods would be radically different from what it is now. Generally speaking, companies like to produce in a country where there is a good home market.112 European Union procurement law
130Under the terms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Under the terms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the UK is required to act fairly, transparently, and openly by competing public procurement requirements at a European Union (EU) level. An exception can be applied under Article 346 TFEU in respect of the “production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material” where a Member State considers it necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its national security. In those circumstances the UK can, like all Member States, derogate from the Treaty to the extent necessary to protect those interests by invoking Article 346.113 Article 346 TFEU
131In light of the Article 346 TFEU exemption, as currently applied, we were keen to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of the Article 346 TFEU exemption, as currently applied, we were keen to establish whether Scottish suppliers would cease to be eligible to bid for MoD contracts if Scotland was to become independent. We noted that the Scottish Affairs Committee had received evidence that in these circumstances the exemption would not apply.114
132Keith Brown MSP expressed the opinion that “the rest of the UK would procure from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Keith Brown MSP expressed the opinion that “the rest of the UK would procure from Scotland without going through the competitive tendering process that the European Union sets down”.115
133The Secretary of State, however, took the opposite view: I think that the Scottish defence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Secretary of State, however, took the opposite view: I think that the Scottish defence industry would find itself in the position of being able, and being limited, to bidding for contracts that were open to EU competition— in other words, the contracts that we had decided did not form part of our essential sovereign industrial capability. There are a number of significant UK defence contractors in Scotland who would be affected by this, quite apart from those in the shipbuilding business—Selex, for example, a major provider of radars and electronic systems.116 112 Q 222 113 Ministry of Defence. National Security Through Technology, Cm 8278, February 2012, paras 73-75 114 Scottish Affairs Committee. Eighth Report of Session 2012-13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How would Separation affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry?, HC 957, para 40 115 Q 370 116 Q 412 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 41 The Secretary of State confirmed that he had sought legal advice on this point from the MoD’s internal legal services, who had, in turn, taken advice from external procurement lawyers.117
134The UK Government states that defence suppliers in an independent Scotland would no longer benefit...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government states that defence suppliers in an independent Scotland would no longer benefit from the application of an exemption from EU procurement law for UK MoD orders. If the Scottish Government has legal advice to the contrary it should consider making it public. Shipbuilding and maintenance
135In its report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Separation shuts shipyards, the Scottish Affairs...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Separation shuts shipyards, the Scottish Affairs Committee concluded that, if Scotland separated from the UK, shipyards on the Clyde were “doomed” as they would not be eligible for UK-restricted orders and would have little prospect of winning export work. A similar fate awaited Rosyth as there would be no Royal Navy refit work and a Scottish navy would be based at Faslane.118
136Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that given the world-class shipbuilding industry, particularly on the Clyde,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rear Admiral Alabaster told us that given the world-class shipbuilding industry, particularly on the Clyde, he thought all the surface ships required by a Scottish navy could be procured from within Scotland. However, he acknowledged that “building two frigates for a Scottish navy from time to time” would not begin to approach the work load generated by construction of Type 26 frigates on the Clyde or the assembly of aircraft carriers at Rosyth”.119
137In light of this, we asked Keith Brown MSP whether orders for a Scottish navy...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of this, we asked Keith Brown MSP whether orders for a Scottish navy would ensure the viability of Scottish shipbuilding. He told us: I have never been of the view that the Clyde would rely solely on orders from an independent Scottish Government for their armed forces. The point I have made is that it has world-leading technology there. I have seen some reference in this Committee to the fact that the rest of the UK would have no intention or eagerness to procure from Scottish yards. We talked about the F-35 earlier, and given the massive procurement that the UK undertakes with the United States, I do not agree with the idea that you could not trust an independent Scotland. All the defence equipment at the point of independence, all the defence personnel, all the joint working that goes on and all the history in NATO should lead to a substantial level of trust. I do not see this as a bar to the rest of the UK or other countries wanting to tap into that world-class expertise. For that reason, I think we have a very bright future.120 117 Q 413 118 Scottish Affairs Committee. Seventh Report of Session 2012-13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Separation Shuts Shipyards, HC 892, summary 119 Qq 150, 152 120 Q 359 42 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence
138Asked why he was confident that the UK Government would award the contract to build...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked why he was confident that the UK Government would award the contract to build the Type 26 Global Combat Ship to Clyde yards, Mr Brown replied that “the Clyde is best for carrying out that contract”. He continued: We are more than willing to speak to the UK Government and to the contractor to provide the reassurances that they want, if they want reassurances, about being able to place that contract in the full and certain knowledge that it would be delivered in an independent Scotland. I am sure that the UK Government, when they take this decision, will take it based on the need to get the best equipment for their Navy. If that is their decision, we want to try to help them make that decision. I think that the balance of probability lies in favour of awarding that contract to the Clyde, and we will try to make sure that that happens.121 Sovereign capability
139The maintenance of a sovereign capability in complex warship building has for many years been...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The maintenance of a sovereign capability in complex warship building has for many years been a strategic priority for the UK. In fact, as the Secretary of State for Defence reminded us, except during the two world wars, the UK has never bought complex warships built abroad.122 He explained the current rationale for doing so: We have chosen to source our warships in the UK, even though the cost of shipbuilding in the UK is very significantly higher than in countries outside, including other NATO countries. We could buy complex warships built in Spain or Italy at significantly lower cost than we can buy them in the UK, but we choose not to do that because we think it is strategically important to maintain a sovereign capability in this area. Clearly, if Scotland were independent, that capability would no longer be sovereign; it would be subject to the whims of a foreign Government, and we could no longer, in my judgment, justify paying the premium that we do, over and above the base cost of a complex warship, for the sovereign capability to build and maintain it. I should make the point that it is not just about building the ship; it is about having the capability to refit and maintain it over its expected lifetime.123
140In relation to maintenance, the Secretary of State told us that it would be unlikely...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In relation to maintenance, the Secretary of State told us that it would be unlikely that the rUK would choose to maintain the Royal Navy surface fleet in an independent Scotland.124
141In the event of independence, shipbuilding in Scotland could not be sustained by domestic orders...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the event of independence, shipbuilding in Scotland could not be sustained by domestic orders alone at anything close to current levels. It is our view that the requirements of a Scottish Government for construction and maintenance of warships would barely provide enough work for a single yard. Even the addition of Scottish Government contracts for commercial ships could not compensate for the loss of future UK MoD contracts for ships such as the Type 26 Global Combat Ship. The future of Scottish shipyards would therefore rest upon whether they could diversify the type of 121 Q 362 122 Q 407 123 Q 407 124 Q 410 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 43 ships they produce and reduce their cost base in order to secure orders in open competition with international competitors. Security clearance
142A further challenge for defence contractors based in an independent Scotland would be the ability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A further challenge for defence contractors based in an independent Scotland would be the ability to obtain and retain List X status—the security clearance required to hold UK Government protectively marked information.
143The UK Government, in its response to the Scottish Affairs Committee Report The Referendum on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government, in its response to the Scottish Affairs Committee Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How would Separation affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry?, stated that there are currently 50 companies that hold List X status in Scotland. It explained the issues which would arise: This is required for companies to undertake classified defence work on their premises at Confidential level. An independent Scotland would be required to develop its own national security regulations or continue to apply the Security Policy Framework and to develop the required and appropriate security infrastructures to perform the necessary security activities. Further complications may arise in the context of current MOD procurement and access to material classified for 'UK Eyes Only'. This material cannot be shared with a foreign country or its nationals.125
144In the event of independence, we consider that the defence industry in Scotland would face...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the event of independence, we consider that the defence industry in Scotland would face a difficult future. This impact would be felt most immediately by those companies engaged in shipbuilding, maintenance, and high end technology. The requirements of a Scottish defence force would not generate sufficient domestic demand to compensate for the loss of lucrative contracts from the UK MoD, and additional security and bureaucracy hurdles would be likely to reduce competitiveness with rUK based companies.
145Although we recognise the commercial risks associated with the potential loss of some highly skilled...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although we recognise the commercial risks associated with the potential loss of some highly skilled employees, we believe defence companies in Scotland would be forced to rapidly reassess their business strategies, with the result that relocation of operations to the remainder of the UK would be an unwelcome but necessary decision.
146From the evidence we have received and our own background knowledge of defence industrial issues...
Concluded (the committee's words)
From the evidence we have received and our own background knowledge of defence industrial issues raised frequently with us we consider that the Scottish Government will wish to provide industry with more information with regard to the following matters: • Defence and Security relationship with the rUK, including the anticipated level of integration and collaboration; • Transition arrangements for existing UK contracts during the process of separation; 125 Scottish Affairs Committee,First Special Report of Session 2013-14, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How would Separation affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry?: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 257 44 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence • Procurement policy, including co-investment in research and development; • Export posture and potential in terms of legislation plus consular and broader government support; • Specific expectations of the current “special relationship” with the US over trade, intelligence and technology sharing; and • Future relationship with cooperative initiatives such as NATO “Smart Defence” and European Defence Agency “Pooling and Sharing”. The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 45 6 Implications for the United Kingdom Government planning for Scottish independence
147A “Yes” vote by the Scottish people in the referendum in September 2014 would have...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A “Yes” vote by the Scottish people in the referendum in September 2014 would have significant and long-lasting consequences not just for Scotland, but for the remainder of the United Kingdom (rUK) too. Yet, the UK Government has stated on many occasions that it is making no contingency plans at present, preferring instead to await the outcome of the referendum.
148In its memorandum to us, the MoD stated: The UK Government’s position is clear: Scotland...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its memorandum to us, the MoD stated: The UK Government’s position is clear: Scotland benefits from being part of the UK and the UK benefits from having Scotland within the UK. The UK Government is confident that the people of Scotland will choose to remain part of the UK, and is not planning for any other outcome. It is for those advocating independence to explain the nature and implications of an independent Scotland; it is the policy of the UK Government to maintain the integrity of the existing UK and we are supporting that position with evidence and analysis.126
149When he gave oral evidence, the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed this position.
Concluded (the committee's words)
When he gave oral evidence, the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed this position. Asked whether this was a high risk strategy, he replied: A yes vote, in the unlikely event that it were to happen, would simply be the starting bell for what would be a long and complex process of negotiation between the Scottish Government and the representatives of the remainder of the United Kingdom. Looking at the hugely complicated issues that would be involved in trying to partition a country that has functioned as an integrated and very effective whole for 300 years, the process would take a significant time. Of course, during that period, appropriate contingency planning would take place. If the situation arose, until we saw the opening negotiating position of a Scottish Government, as opposed to the posture it had taken up during a referendum campaign, we would not actually be clear on what contingency planning we would need to be doing.127
150We recognise that the process of negotiation following a “Yes” vote would be lengthy and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise that the process of negotiation following a “Yes” vote would be lengthy and complex. For those very reasons, it would be remiss of the UK Government not to make preparations in order to inform its negotiating position. We recommend that the UK Government begin now to prepare for the impact of possible Scottish independence. It would not be wise to begin contingency planning only after the referendum. This does not imply that we believe there should be negotiations with the Scottish Government prior to the referendum, but rather that it would be prudent for the MoD to scenario plan. 126 Ev w1 127 Q 382 46 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence Defence interests as part of independence negotiations
151Earlier in our report we considered how the two Governments might approach negotiations regarding defence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Earlier in our report we considered how the two Governments might approach negotiations regarding defence assets should the Scottish people vote for independence and the manner by which current defence assets might be divided between Scotland and the remainder of the UK.
152The Secretary of State for Defence told us that although this had not been discussed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Secretary of State for Defence told us that although this had not been discussed within Government, he could “see no reason why the defence discussion would be ring- fenced from all the other complex areas that would have to be discussed”.128
153We consider it to be highly probable that defence assets would form an integral part...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider it to be highly probable that defence assets would form an integral part of wider independence negotiations rather than a discrete strand. The UK Government should begin work to assess what its priorities would be in relation to defence assets in the event of a “Yes” vote. Implications for the security of the remainder of the United Kingdom
154From a defence perspective, setting aside the serious questions which would arise regarding the future...
Concluded (the committee's words)
From a defence perspective, setting aside the serious questions which would arise regarding the future of the nuclear deterrent, Scottish independence would also result in the remainder of the UK facing the loss of vital personnel, bases and equipment, representing as much one twelfth of current assets. There would be a consequent loss of capability, particularly in the short term. The rUK Government would face a difficult decision about how to manage this shortfall when the financial resources available to do so would be reduced to a similar degree. This raises the very real prospect that the rUK would face the same level of threats to its defence and security as the UK faces today, but with Armed Forces which were less capable and resilient.
155If an independent Scotland was perceived by the rUK to have weakened defence and security...
Concluded (the committee's words)
If an independent Scotland was perceived by the rUK to have weakened defence and security capabilities because, for example, it was not a member of NATO and had decided to reduce its level of air defences, how might the rUK respond? Air Marshal McNicoll told us that from an air policing perspective, most interceptions were to the north of Scotland “so there would be an impact if the remainder of the UK only had bases south of the border”.129
156We consider that the level of security and defence presently afforded to the people of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that the level of security and defence presently afforded to the people of the United Kingdom is higher than that which could be provided by the Governments of a separate Scotland and the remainder of the UK.
157In respect of the interests of the remainder of the UK, we invite the MoD...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In respect of the interests of the remainder of the UK, we invite the MoD to explain how it would manage the loss of personnel, equipment, bases, training facilities and industrial capacity ceded to an independent Scotland. 128 Q 385 129 Q 114 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 47 Future co-operation
158Following independence, the SNP desires a high degree of co-operation with the remainder of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following independence, the SNP desires a high degree of co-operation with the remainder of the UK as well as other allies. Areas in which co-operation would be sought include “shared conventional basing, training and logistics arrangements” and “joint procurement”.130 Intelligence sharing
159At present, the annual budget for the UK's security and intelligence agencies is £2.0bn.131 In...
Concluded (the committee's words)
At present, the annual budget for the UK's security and intelligence agencies is £2.0bn.131 In the event of independence, the Scottish Government envisages Scotland having independent domestic and external intelligence services.132
160Professor Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI anticipated that in the event of independence “some of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Professor Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI anticipated that in the event of independence “some of the most difficult issues in a negotiation would be on the intelligence services and counter-terrorism co-operation”.133 He told us that there would also be issues about Scotland’s “operational competence and ability to co-operate and share intelligence that may have come from quite sensitive sources on the UK side”. He said: The UK, due to its unique intelligence-sharing arrangements with the US, gets access to intelligence that not every European country gets, and that enhances our own security and counter-terrorist capabilities. As you rightly point out, there will still be an open border, presumably, between Scotland and the rest of the UK. There will still be a lot of movement of people. People in the UK will want assurance that Scotland is not a weak link in their counter-terrorism capability.134
161Asked whether the Five Eyes intelligence sharing community (comprising the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked whether the Five Eyes intelligence sharing community (comprising the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) would automatically become Six Eyes with the addition of an independent Scotland, the Secretary of State for Defence said: Any expansion of the Five Eyes community could only be achieved if it was agreed by all five members of that community, and there is a very strong view among certain members of that community that it is a something-for-something arrangement. An applicant seeking to join the Five Eyes group would have to show that it could add significant intelligence or analysis value to what the group already had. Bearing in mind who the members of the group are, that might be challenging for a fledgling state that had no great tradition of intelligence gathering or analysis.135
162Asked about the potential for bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements between rUK and Scotland, Mr Hammond...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked about the potential for bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements between rUK and Scotland, Mr Hammond confirmed that there were certain things that could be shared on a bilateral basis if rUK chose to do so, although sharing of other intelligence would 130 SNP. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 131 HM Treasury, Government Spending Review 2010, Cm 7942, Single Intelligence Account, page 10-11, Tables 1 and 2 132 Foreign Affairs Committee. Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, Sixth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 641, Para 131 133 Q 38 134 Q 38 135 Q 420 48 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence require agreement from the Five Eyes allies, because it had been obtained through Five Eyes arrangements.136
163We consider that it is unlikely that an independent Scotland with fledgling intelligence capabilities would...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that it is unlikely that an independent Scotland with fledgling intelligence capabilities would be given access to the Five Eyes intelligence sharing community. A high degree of co-operation with rUK would therefore be crucial for Scotland especially in the early years of independence. However, such co-operation would rely on goodwill and Scotland could find itself more vulnerable to threats than it is at present. Shared facilities
164Should separation occur, the rUK would need to consider what level of defence and security...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Should separation occur, the rUK would need to consider what level of defence and security co-operation with an independent Scotland would be in its own interests. Scotland would have a strong interest in maintaining access to training facilities such as the defence academies at Sandhurst, Cranwell and Dartmouth. Additionally, in a similar manner to NATO air policing in the Baltic, the sharing of air bases with the RAF, possibly with pooled forces, might provide Scotland with one solution to its need for fast jets to provide Quick Reaction Alert cover in Scottish airspace.
165Following separation, the rUK would also face the prospect of losing access to a number...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following separation, the rUK would also face the prospect of losing access to a number of important training areas and weapons ranges including those facilities operated by QinietiQ at West Freugh in Wigtownshire and Benbecula in the Western Isles. Although alternative facilities could be identified elsewhere this might prove disruptive and significantly more expensive.
166We recommend that the Ministry of Defence explain whether the concept of sharing facilities, including...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Ministry of Defence explain whether the concept of sharing facilities, including operational bases and training areas, by Scotland and the rUK could work in practice and to identify any significant risks arising from this proposal. Joint procurement
167In relation to the potential for joint procurement between an independent Scotland and rUK, the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In relation to the potential for joint procurement between an independent Scotland and rUK, the Secretary of State for Defence told us that the MoD was “not opposed in principle to co-operation on defence procurement”. However, he did not think that this would result in the rUK procuring warships from yards in an independent Scotland.137
168The desire of the Scottish Government to pursue joint procurement with rUK for defence materiel...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The desire of the Scottish Government to pursue joint procurement with rUK for defence materiel and services makes absolute sense: a small country with a limited defence budget would gain access to larger contracts offering better value for money. Whether the rUK would benefit sufficiently to enter into such an arrangement is less clear cut and would need to be examined carefully before a commitment was given. 136 Q 421 137 Q 408 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 49 Interests of serving UK military personnel
169One of the most significant interest groups in the debate about the defence implications of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
One of the most significant interest groups in the debate about the defence implications of possible Scottish independence is serving military personnel, particularly those from Scotland, serving in Scottish regiments, or based in Scotland.
170Air Marshal McNicoll expressed doubts about whether sufficient personnel would wish to transfer to a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Air Marshal McNicoll expressed doubts about whether sufficient personnel would wish to transfer to a Scottish defence force. If the process was voluntary he envisaged problems associated with having too many or too few personnel on either side of the border, particularly in specialist areas. In his estimation, “Scotland, most likely, would be short of people”.138
171Rear Admiral Alabaster questioned what would happen to Scots serving in the Royal Navy, such...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rear Admiral Alabaster questioned what would happen to Scots serving in the Royal Navy, such as nuclear submarine specialists: what jobs would they do in a Scottish defence force if that were non-nuclear, and, if there was some kind of co-operation, would they still be allowed to serve in those nuclear-armed submarines in the future? There are lots and lots of questions to be thought about. We have a lot of Scots in all sorts of specialist areas of the Navy that would not necessarily be replicated in a Scottish navy.139
172Asked whether Scots serving in the UK Armed Forces would continue to be able to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked whether Scots serving in the UK Armed Forces would continue to be able to do so if Scotland became a separate country, the Secretary of State confirmed that they would.140 In relation to the ability of serving personnel to transfer to a Scottish defence force, Mr Hammond said: It does not seem an unreasonable assumption that people who had a connection with Scotland and wanted to be released from their commitment to service in the UK armed forces in order to join some putative Scottish defence force might expect to be allowed to do so. But it would be part of the negotiation.141
173We welcome the evidence we received from the Secretary of State for Defence that Scots...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the evidence we received from the Secretary of State for Defence that Scots serving in the UK Armed Forces would be able to transfer to a Scottish defence force should Scotland become a separate state. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should provide a clear statement, prior to the referendum, that serving personnel would be able to choose whether to remain in the UK Armed Forces or to transfer to a Scottish defence force.
174Scottish independence would have a significant impact on the critical mass of rUK Armed Forces...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Scottish independence would have a significant impact on the critical mass of rUK Armed Forces and the financial resources available to support them. We recommend that the MoD set out, in its response to this report, whether it would seek to recruit personnel to replace the numbers lost through transfers to a Scottish defence force. Would personnel numbers be maintained at current projections or would rUK Armed Forces reduce further in size? 138 Q 200 139 Q 200 140 Q 388 141 Q 389 50 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence Future recruitment
175In light of the doubts expressed about the likelihood of serving UK personnel deciding to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In light of the doubts expressed about the likelihood of serving UK personnel deciding to transfer to a Scottish defence force, we were keen to explore whether, given a choice, potential new recruits would be attracted to join the larger Armed Forces of the rUK or a smaller Scottish force.
176When he gave a speech in Edinburgh on March 2013, the Secretary of State for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When he gave a speech in Edinburgh on March 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence described as a key challenge for Armed Forces around the world the attraction and retention of high quality recruits. He linked the ability to do so to “the quality of the offer you are able to make to potential recruits”. He considered that the UK Armed Forces were able to attract some of the highest calibre recruits because: they are able to offer exciting and demanding career opportunities, with the chance to deploy overseas on operations and training and with the cachet of being among the best and most widely-respected Armed Forces in the world.142
177We sought from the Secretary of State clarity about whether rUK Armed Forces would continue...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We sought from the Secretary of State clarity about whether rUK Armed Forces would continue to welcome recruits from an independent Scotland. He replied: Scots make a tremendous contribution to the UK armed forces—probably a disproportionately important contribution. I can see many reasons why the UK armed forces would wish to continue recruiting in Scotland, as we do in the Republic of Ireland, but we would make that decision based on our perception of our national interest at the time.143
178Keith Brown MSP expressed the view that a Scottish defence force could make a more...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Keith Brown MSP expressed the view that a Scottish defence force could make a more attractive employment proposition by, for example, implementing “an agreement whereby there were no compulsory redundancies on people serving in the armed forces during the term of their contract” and creating enhanced career prospects for serving personnel.144
179Many thousands of Scots have served with distinction in UK Armed Forces over many years.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Many thousands of Scots have served with distinction in UK Armed Forces over many years. In the event of Scottish independence that long history may be brought to an end should the rUK government decide that it did not wish to recruit from Scotland. We invite the UK Government in its response to this report to make clear whether it would continue to welcome recruits from an independent Scotland. Participation in the referendum
180During our visit to Scotland in March 2013, we spoke to many personnel serving in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During our visit to Scotland in March 2013, we spoke to many personnel serving in the Royal Navy, Army and RAF about their experiences of being based in Scotland. The feedback was overwhelmingly positive. When we engaged in conversation about the forthcoming referendum it became clear that many were unaware that if registered to vote in Scotland they would have an entitlement to participate. We were therefore keen to 142 Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Stronger and Safer Together, Speech, 14 March 2013 143 Q 390 144 Q 280 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 51 understand what action the Scottish and UK Governments would take to publicise this fact. Keith Brown MSP told us: We are keen to make sure that as many people as possible are entitled to vote. Anybody who is not currently registered, of course, has the ability, between now and then, to register, given the due processes. Yes, everything we can do to help maximise that, but primarily it is the responsibility—for very good reason—of the Electoral Commission.145
181We invite the Ministry of Defence to set out what action it will take, in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We invite the Ministry of Defence to set out what action it will take, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission, to ensure that serving personnel are aware of their rights regarding registration and participation in the referendum. The nuclear deterrent
182Few if any alternative options appear to exist currently within the remainder of the UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Few if any alternative options appear to exist currently within the remainder of the UK should a sovereign Scottish Government insist upon removal of the UK’s nuclear submarines from Faslane. Given the enormous costs associated with establishing a new base elsewhere, we consider that other areas of potential co-operation between Scotland and rUK would be very difficult to achieve if no agreement could be reached regarding Trident basing.
183The possibility of Scottish independence represents a serious threat to the future operational viability of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The possibility of Scottish independence represents a serious threat to the future operational viability of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK Government must now give urgent consideration to contingency options in the event of a “Yes” vote. 145 Q 378 52 The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 7 Conclusion
184The people of Scotland and the rest of the UK deserve to be presented with...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The people of Scotland and the rest of the UK deserve to be presented with as full a picture as possible of the implications of Scottish independence for their future defence and security. To date, the information published by both the Scottish Government and UK Government falls far short of requirements.
185In its forthcoming White Paper, in addition to the specific questions asked earlier in this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its forthcoming White Paper, in addition to the specific questions asked earlier in this report, we believe the Scottish Government should provide direct answers to the following questions: • How would a sovereign Scottish Government ensure the defence and security of an independent Scotland? • For what purposes would Scottish armed forces be used? • How would Scottish armed forces be structured and trained, and where would they be based? • How much would it cost to equip, support and train an independent Scotland’s armed forces and how much of this could be procured and delivered domestically? and • How many jobs in the defence sector would be placed at risk?
186Similarly, the UK Government must set out more clearly the implications for the security of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Similarly, the UK Government must set out more clearly the implications for the security of the remainder of the United Kingdom should the people of Scotland choose the path of separation. This should include greater detail about the options for relocation of the strategic nuclear deterrent and an estimate of the associated costs. The UK Government should also outline its options for making good any defence deficit, caused by loss of personnel, equipment and bases, which might be created by Scottish independence. The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence 53