Select committee inquiry
Future Maritime Surveillance
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Defence Committee announces a major new inquiry into the contribution of the MoD and UK Armed Forces to the UK's future requirement for maritime surveillance. Terms of reference: Future Maritime Surveillance Report: Future Maritime Surveillance”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What the government said
5th Report - Future Maritime Surveillance - Volume II (1.20 MB) (Volume II: additional written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
5th Report - Future Maritime Surveillance (781 KB) (Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence)
The government responded on 18 December 2012.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government welcomes the inquiry and responds point by point, accepting a capability gap from deleting Nimrod but assessing that risk "remains within tolerable levels", while disagreeing that the Joint Forces Command should be responsible for maritime surveillance.
- On Joint Forces Command, the government "does not consider this a weakness" that no single individual is responsible, and says JFC "is not responsible for routine maritime surveillance".
- It says the department "currently has no defined requirement for an MPA capability". The Air ISTAR Optimisation Study will report initial findings to the Military Capability Board in April 2013, before CSR15/SDSR15.
- It commits to updating the Committee on the study's initial findings and other developments in summer 2013, with a further update in summer 2014 once the study has completed its work.
- On cross-government work, the Home Office-led maritime risk assessment is expected to be completed in December 2012. It will, "on current plans", inform a National Strategy for Maritime Security "by next summer".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 13 April 2012 to its close on 30 March 2015.
- Report 2 reports
- Government response 18 Dec 2012
What it recommended 18 recommendations · 101 conclusions
1The UK has a strategic requirement for maritime surveillance as an important enabler to operations...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The UK has a strategic requirement for maritime surveillance as an important enabler to operations to protect UK home waters and UK global interests and commitments in both the military and non-military arenas. This requirement has developed to meet the evolution of greater non-military threats such as counter- terrorism, border control and non-state threats. This evolution is illustrated by events such as the terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 which was launched from the sea. We note witnesses’ suggestions that the difficulty of restricting movements at sea had not gone unnoticed by the UK’s potential enemies. The Government must ensure that the requirement for maritime surveillance is an integral part of the assessment of progress on the National Security Tasks in the National Security Strategy and the Military Tasks in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This continuous assessment is essential as UK Armed Forces evolve towards Future Force 2020.
2We note that due to the broadness of the areas covered by maritime surveillance there...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note that due to the broadness of the areas covered by maritime surveillance there is currently no one individual within the MoD who is responsible for this capability. We feel that this is a weakness which should be rectified. The new Joint Forces Command (JFC) has been established to strengthen the focus on joint enablers and on joint warfare development with a key role of being responsible for Information, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and for Command, Control, Communications and Computers which are key elements of maritime surveillance. The JFC should play an important role in coordinating, strengthening and delivering maritime surveillance capabilities. We welcome the intent of this improved focus that the JFC is intended to bring, but will seek assurance as the JFC develops that it is delivering the necessary coordinated output and that appropriate safeguards are in place. In response to our Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess the progress of the JFC in delivering the tasks set for it, particularly in terms of maritime surveillance.
3The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in an ideal world it would have preferred to acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. We repeat the serious concerns raised in our Report on the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) regarding the capability gaps that the Nimrod MRA4 decision has created in the UK’s ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged in the SDSR and remain unconvinced that UK Armed Forces can manage this capability gap within existing resources. The MoD told us that its intention was to mitigate the impact of the Nimrod cancellation by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis, but acknowledged that there was currently no single asset or collection of assets that offset the resulting capability gap. We agree with the National Audit Office’s (NAO) assessment that using other existing assets would provide a reduced capability and diverting 4 Future Maritime Surveillance resources from other tasks would have wider implications for defence. Indeed in the MoD’s own assessment in the NAO Report there would be significant shortfalls without significant investment, and the coordination of such assets at the right place and the right time might prove very risky.
4We note that no option appears to have been considered for either a sponsored or...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that no option appears to have been considered for either a sponsored or a volunteer reserve element within the crews for the new commercial arrangement [for search and rescue provision], despite the fact, that at least initially, it is widely expected that most of the pilots will be ex-Armed Forces.
5We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on the UK search and rescue...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on the UK search and rescue capability. While we accept that the UK remains committed to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and that no bilateral arrangements are required, we are surprised that the Government has not discussed the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision with European neighbours. It would seem prudent to do so to ensure that cooperation is maximised.
6We will monitor the planned changes in the provision of UK search and rescue to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We will monitor the planned changes in the provision of UK search and rescue to a new civilian-led capability and expect Ministers to play a central role in its delivery, settling disputes and ensuring coordination between departments. The Government should guard against the loss of the valuable experience that exists within the Armed Forces and we request that the Government detail the measures it has taken to prevent this. We believe that this should include considering options for retaining expertise through some form of reserve service for the pilots employed. Another concern is the impact on the provision of search and rescue for the Falkland Islands. We may wish to return to this in future years.
7We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal Navy’s ability to continue to deliver the required high levels of standing maritime commitments with fewer platforms. It is likely that risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented and the smaller number of available assets is stretched more thinly. We note that the Minister asserted that the Royal Navy was not abandoning any of its tasks. However he also accepted that the Navy is undergoing a “lean period”, being heavily used and accepting a degree of risk. Maritime surveillance assets are an essential component of maritime security and these additional requirements such as Libya and the Olympics pose a potential risk to maritime security due to this overstretch and possible competing demands for those assets. This is illustrated by the UK not contributing any vessels this year to the international counter-piracy missions and the necessity to use assets and personnel between operations in the Gulf or Afghanistan for the London Olympics.
8We note that the MoD asserted it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the MoD asserted it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation in the maritime surveillance area. However, in practice the robustness of these procedures cannot be proven until such risks materialise and are identified and dealt with or are missed with potentially disastrous consequences. We are also less sanguine than the Minister that if an Future Maritime Surveillance 5 urgent need to regenerate the maritime surveillance capability arose this could be achieved quickly. We accept that regenerating the complex capabilities of the Nimrod MRA4 would be more difficult and take longer than purchasing a platform off the shelf or putting something together that could perform an urgent maritime surveillance function. However, as the MoD has admitted in evidence that it is not currently considering the rapid regeneration of any maritime patrol aircraft platform and that it is not in discussion with industry about the regeneration of specific maritime surveillance capabilities, and given the complexities and testing required of maritime patrol aircraft platforms, we require further evidence that a sufficient level of capability could be regenerated as quickly as the Minister suggests.
9The provision of maritime surveillance should be considered as a whole taking into account the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The provision of maritime surveillance should be considered as a whole taking into account the different, competing requirements and the risks associated with gaps and non-provision in the capability. Capability and platform decisions must be coherent and informed. We are aware that the capability gaps that exist in maritime surveillance are not limited to a maritime patrol aircraft, and include, for example, the withdrawal of Sentinel and the loss of the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates’ information and intelligence gathering capabilities and towed array sonar. We also note that there is the potential for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by Project CROWSNEST operating from the Merlin Mk 2. In response to our Report, the MoD should set out how it intends to deal with the increased risk caused by these emerging capability gaps.
10We remain concerned about the MoD’s capacity to manage the risk created by the capability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We remain concerned about the MoD’s capacity to manage the risk created by the capability gap in maritime surveillance and about its ability to react to demand in the short and medium term.
11While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies that will help inform future decisions on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies that will help inform future decisions on the provision of maritime surveillance, we believe it would have been beneficial if these studies had been undertaken before or as part of the SDSR especially given that the MoD has admitted that the Nimrod MRA4 decision was primarily financially driven and in the short to medium term a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution for maritime surveillance requirements.
12Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the SDSR, it is unacceptable that the MoD did not think it appropriate to inform us that it was undertaking long term capability investigations into areas directly related to the UK’s maritime surveillance capabilities whilst we were undertaking our inquiry into the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Our concerns were not limited to what the MoD was currently doing to mitigate the capability gap as we asked the Government to outline its plans for the regeneration of this capability. These studies would have been relevant to that. Indeed, the MoD told us in evidence that when responding to the concerns on Nimrod in our SDSR and NSS Report it would have been helpful if it had thought more broadly about that particular topic. Parliamentary scrutiny is not an optional extra. We are concerned that had parliamentary questions not revealed the existence of the Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) study we could have 6 Future Maritime Surveillance remained in ignorance of it. We expect the MoD to be more proactive and forthcoming in its provision of information to us.
13We note the 2010 SDSR’s acknowledgement of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note the 2010 SDSR’s acknowledgement of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on network-enabled warships, submarines and aircraft. The capability studies already undertaken by the MoD are a good starting point and we welcome the commitment to an ISTAR work stream for the next SDSR. However, given the Secretary of State for Defence’s statement that there will be a decision to be made in the next SDSR about the capability gap in maritime patrol aircraft, we recommend that work on the next SDSR should include a specific maritime surveillance work stream, involving all those, military and non-military, who make use of these assets.
14We are encouraged by the rigour expected to be applied to the spending of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are encouraged by the rigour expected to be applied to the spending of the £8 billion unallocated reserve that was announced by the Secretary of State on 14 May
15We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular ISTAR provided under Urgent Operational Requirements, and how this will be incorporated into the core programme. We recommend that the MoD consider this matter urgently and, in response to our Report, provide details of the investment decisions on the unallocated £8 billion announced by the Secretary of State for Defence that were due to be made in July.
16We note that the Minister does not think it is an essential prerequisite for maritime...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note that the Minister does not think it is an essential prerequisite for maritime surveillance and the attack prosecution capability to be delivered by the same asset. In response to our Report the MoD should set out the supporting evidence and likely costs of this split assets approach.
17We support the principle of the MoD’s Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the principle of the MoD’s Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain both the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol aircraft and the skills of its crews. This is an important initiative given the MoD’s statement that in the medium term another model of maritime patrol aircraft will be required to fill the capability gap left by the Nimrod MRA4. However, we doubt that the Seedcorn initiative is sustainable as far as 2019, let alone to 2030, given the continued uncertainty over the long term plans for a fixed-wing MPA. The MoD should explain what work it has done to identify the point at which this initiative will no longer be effective in sustaining the ability to regenerate the capability. We recommend that the MoD undertake a lessons learned exercise for sustaining the ability to regenerate other capabilities in the future.
18We welcome the Minister’s statement that the MoD intends to explore fully all options and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Minister’s statement that the MoD intends to explore fully all options and alternatives for providing maritime surveillance. We agree that in the longer term unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and lighter-than- air vehicles may well be a way forward, but also note the reported concerns regarding the limitations of using satellite technology. There are several obstacles to overcome and the MoD should keep us informed of progress on this.
19We note the MoD’s confirmation that the requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the MoD’s confirmation that the requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into account prior to the decision to revert to a STOVL system on the new carriers and that the capability to undertake maritime surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from carriers would not be affected by this decision. We also note the concerns expressed to us on the limited number of UAVs that can operate in a STOVL manner and expect the MoD to keep this under review particularly if it becomes a requirement for future carrier launched UAVs undertaking maritime surveillance to have a weapons capability. We expect the MoD to keep us informed on progress of the possible use of carrier based UAVs for maritime surveillance.
20We note the MoD’s acceptance that since the SDSR the Department’s reliance on allies to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the MoD’s acceptance that since the SDSR the Department’s reliance on allies to provide maritime surveillance has increased, though because of the range of capabilities and sources of information still available to the Department it had not done so markedly, and that the withdrawal of Nimrod had required greater reliance on other nations to provide maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) cover. We are concerned that the Government has not thought it necessary to try to secure any additional agreements to ensure the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. Part of the MoD’s examination of future maritime surveillance requirements should include an examination of those areas where a sovereign capability would be desirable and this should feed into the Department’s consideration of a new MPA and the investigation of other options such as UAVs. We support the UK’s participation in the NATO Tier Two proposal for maritime surveillance and expect to be regularly updated on its progress.
21We commend the Government for the establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We commend the Government for the establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which have improved cross-government cooperation on maritime surveillance issues. The MSOG’s work on the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security is an important piece of work that should be prioritised across Government. In response to our Report the Government should provide us with an update on this work and its planned timetable for it being brought to a conclusion. It must not become a stop-start endeavour. We endorse the work of NMIC as a valuable element in enhancing the national security of the UK. We will take a close interest in its work and how it develops in the future. We are not currently persuaded by the suggestion that NMIC could evolve to become a decision making centre. This would represent a considerable change in the way Government undertakes maritime security and safety operations particularly at a time of major change in the defence arena.
22We believe that there is room for further improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We believe that there is room for further improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters. We are not convinced that an “informal group of Ministers” is the appropriate forum for taking forward the debate on maritime surveillance issues. Although decisions may ultimately be made in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we recommend that there should be a greater level of ministerial involvement in maritime surveillance as an issue particularly given the number of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time. In response to our Report the Government should also provide us with an update on progress on the Maritime Security Oversight Group’s work towards a single air surveillance contract. This should include the alternative options that the Government is considering as a potential model for the UK in this area.
23We agree with our witnesses that there is a risk associated with the capability gap...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with our witnesses that there is a risk associated with the capability gap in maritime surveillance. We acknowledge that the Government accept this and we welcome the work being undertaken to investigate how to mitigate the risks inherent in the gap and ensure the longer term provision of maritime surveillance. The MoD asserts that it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation in the maritime surveillance arena, but we remain unconvinced it has the capacity to respond to any sudden escalation in that risk. Furthermore we believe the risk is likely to worsen in the medium term as further maritime surveillance capabilities are withdrawn or not yet filled. The UK’s maritime flank is likely to be increasingly exposed: this risk must be kept under close and continuous review, and we will continue to take a close interest in the MoD’s work in this area.
24The MoD has acknowledged that there is a strategic and national security requirement for maritime...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD has acknowledged that there is a strategic and national security requirement for maritime surveillance. We are concerned that the MoD is sending mixed messages in respect of the need for a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). On one hand it says that there is no requirement for such an aircraft and that it is not funded or in the programme but on the other hand it acknowledges that its absence is a risk and something may need to be done. The MoD must explain why it is satisfactory to wait until 2015 or beyond before deciding how to close the capability gap in maritime surveillance particularly as the MoD acknowledge that a MPA is the solution in the short to medium term. We commend the work that the MoD is undertaking to explore the wide range of possibilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, lighter-than-air vehicles and space technology, for the future long-term provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. This work must not be allowed to lose momentum, particularly as no one individual is responsible for maritime surveillance in the MoD.
25There is a wide demand across Government departments and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities.
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is a wide demand across Government departments and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities. The establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group and the National Maritime Information Centre are welcome first steps towards a more strategic and coordinated output and as a way of mitigating some of Future Maritime Surveillance 9 the capability gaps. The challenge is to develop these further and we are keen to see a more prominent ministerial role particularly given the number of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time.
26The MoD accepted that there were capability gaps in maritime surveillance, resulting most notably from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD accepted that there were capability gaps in maritime surveillance, resulting most notably from the withdrawal of the Type 22 Frigate and the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4.37 The MoD also acknowledged that the need for a “so-called “persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)” capability had been identified by a number of recent operational lessons identified exercises”. While this requirement may not in practice translate into a single system or platform, the MoD judged that a “significant improvement in maritime surveillance capability (both wide area and targeted) might be provided through the use of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) deployable from the Maritime Force”.38 Type 22 Frigate
27The Type 22 Frigate was originally designed as a specialist anti-submarine platform.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Type 22 Frigate was originally designed as a specialist anti-submarine platform. It evolved into a powerful surface combatant with substantial anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft weapons systems. In addition to their armaments the vessels also possessed command and control and communications facilities and useful sensor equipment. The MoD explained that the Type 22 Frigates provided the Royal Navy’s only combination of systems enabling wide ranging monitoring of the frequencies and wavelengths of the Electromagnetic Spectrum from the sea. The MoD added that “this capability supported Indicators and Warnings, Force Protection and Situational Awareness”. 39 Dr Willett told us “with the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates being withdrawn [...] the UK would lose the full spectrum Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) installed on these ships as well as four towed-array sonar platforms”.40 When we asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, about a replacement for the Type 22 Frigates, he confirmed that there would be no funding before 2015.41 Maritime patrol aircraft
28Most of the concern expressed to us related to the capability gaps caused by the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Most of the concern expressed to us related to the capability gaps caused by the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft capability.42 We have already expressed our worries about the 35 Ev 57 36 Ev 57 37 Ev 40 38 Ev 40 39 Ev 40 40 Ev 57 41 Q 162 42 For example see Q 8 and Q 11 [Dr Willett], Ev w2 [Rear Admiral Japp], Ev w18–19 [Air Vice-Marshal Roberts], Ev w35 [Dr Robertson] and Ev w43-44 [Airbus Military] Future Maritime Surveillance 21 deletion of the MRA4 programme in our Report on the SDSR and the NSS.43 These were acknowledged by the Government in its response: We regret that we had to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme. It was a capability that we would, in an ideal world, have preferred to acquire. [...] It is true that there is currently no single asset or collection of assets that fully mitigate the resulting capability gap. This is an unwelcome consequence of the Nation’s financial position and the Department’s obligations to contribute to deficit reduction, but we continue to maximise the use of other assets such as Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and C-130 to contribute to Anti-Submarine Warfare, Search and Rescue and Maritime Counter-Terrorism where possible. In the longer term, if the Government were to conclude that it needed to close the gaps completely because future threats were to mature in a way that we can no longer manage this risk in the way we are today, some additional funding or reprioritisation would be required.44
29The National Audit Office’s (NAO) Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2011 considered the capability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The National Audit Office’s (NAO) Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2011 considered the capability gaps left by the Nimrod MRA4 decision. The NAO Report said that according to the MoD, the Nimrod contributed to eight out of the 15 security priority risks set out in the National Security Strategy. It added that the Nimrod was uniquely able to rapidly search large maritime areas, a capability relevant to long range search and rescue, maritime counter-terrorism, gathering strategic intelligence and protecting the nuclear deterrent. The NAO Report further said that the MoD had carried out studies in the lead up to the SDSR to assess the capability gap from cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 and the MoD “assessed that cancelling Nimrod would have consequences for the military tasks that the aircraft was expected to undertake, some of them severe”.45 The Report also outlined the capability gaps resulting from the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 and some possible mitigation strategies for covering these. The NAO Report said: Some limited analysis was carried out on how specific military tasks could be covered by a combination of Sentry surveillance aircraft, Hercules transport aircraft and the Merlin maritime helicopters. However, the Department noted that there would be ‘significant shortfalls without significant investment, and the co-ordination of such assets at the right place and the right time might prove to be very risky’. [Figure 1 below] summarises the military tasks, the capability gap and an explanation of the possible mitigation strategies currently being assessed by the Department.46 The Report also asserted that there were risks in diverting other assets to cover the gaps: 43 Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010–12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, HC 761, para 137 44 Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010–12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1639, p 19 45 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 2011, HC (2010–12) 1520–I, paras 3.21–3.22 46 Ibid., para 3.23 22 Future Maritime Surveillance Using other existing assets would provide a reduced capability compared with Nimrod, and diverting resources from existing tasks would have wider implications for defence. The Sentry surveillance aircraft is already at minimum crew and aircraft numbers to cover NATO commitments. Using helicopters, such as the Merlin or Lynx, would affect national commitments or training of crews for other tasks. Other alternatives are fully committed to current operations.47 Figure 1 Capability gaps from cancelling the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft with possible mitigation strategies Task Capability gap with no mitigation Possible mitigation strategy Strategic intelligence Department would be unable to conduct an Very limited capability could be provided by the tasks element of rapid maritime strategic intelligence Sentry surveillance aircraft but with no ability to gathering, as only Nimrod has the required speed gather underwater intelligence on submarines. and geographical range. Long range anti- Extent to which a capability gap is acceptable Gap could be partially mitigated by funding submarine warfare depends on assumptions made about future additional, or redeploying existing, maritime threats, which could be affected by the decision helicopters, ships and submarines to provide to cancel Nimrod. This includes protection of the appropriate geographical coverage. nuclear deterrent. Support to long-range Only Nimrod offered speed of response, The Hercules transport aircraft can cover the area search and rescue and reach, life raft deployment and long-range to the 30oW line, but does so more slowly with maritime security communications capability for long-range search limited endurance, and has inferior search capability. and rescue and security operations. The United Merlin, Lynx, and Sea King airborne surveillance Kingdom will find it more difficult to meets its and control helicopters, type 23 frigates and type international commitments under the Chicago 45 destroyers could also be used. In all cases, the Convention to cover the area to the 30oW line of Department judges the mitigation would be ‘sub- longitude. Also impacts on search and rescue optimal’ because none have the range, speed and for military opeartyions, excercises, submarines in surveillance capabilities of Nimrod. distress, assisting helicopter search and rescue operations and other security tasks. Power projection Nimrod provided a unique ability to rapidly search The Merlin Mk1 and the Sea King airborne large maritime areas, including anti-saubmarine surveillance and control helicopters could provide and anti-surface warfare. Could deploy worldwide similar capabilities, but speed and range are at short notice and with minimal initial support. restricted as the helicopter can only deploy as fast as the ship it is based on. NOTES 1 Search and rescue is the responsibity of the maritime Coastguard Agency. 2 The Sentry E-3D surveillance aircraft was primarily procured as an airborne early warning aircraft but has been extensively employed in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) role. 3 The Hercules C130J transport aircraft are used primarily to carry troops, passengers or freight. 4 Sea King helicopters are currently used for short range search and rescue in both the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands. 5 Type 23 frigates were originally designed for the principal task of anti-submarine warfare but also undertake embargo operations using boarding teams inserted from the ship’s boats or helicopter, disaster relief work and surveillance opeartions. They are to be replaced by the Type 26 Global Combat Ship. 6 Type 45 Destroyer, Lynx Wildcat and Merlin helicopters are described in detail in the project summary sheets in Volume II. Source: National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 2011, HC 1520–I
30The MoD acknowledged in its evidence that due to cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD acknowledged in its evidence that due to cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 the UK had “reduced our ability to conduct Strategic Intelligence gathering tasks, long range Anti-Submarine warfare [ASW], provide support to Search and Rescue, Maritime Security and power projection tasks”.48 It was their intention “to mitigate the impact of Nimrod cancellation by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis. In relation to ASW operations, these assets include Type 23 Frigates and Merlin Mk1 helicopters. 47 Ibid., para 3.24 48 Ev 40 Future Maritime Surveillance 23 Additionally, Hercules C-130 and Sentry could offer a limited element of the maritime patrol capability that MRA4 would have provided. There is currently no single asset or collection of assets that offsets the resulting capability gap”.49
31The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in an ideal world it would have preferred to acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. We repeat the serious concerns raised in our Report on the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) regarding the capability gaps that the Nimrod MRA4 decision has created in the UK’s ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged in the SDSR and remain unconvinced that UK Armed Forces can manage this capability gap within existing resources. The MoD told us that its intention was to mitigate the impact of the Nimrod cancellation by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis, but acknowledged that there was currently no single asset or collection of assets that offset the resulting capability gap. We agree with the National Audit Office’s (NAO) assessment that using other existing assets would provide a reduced capability and diverting resources from other tasks would have wider implications for defence. Indeed in the MoD’s own assessment in the NAO Report there would be significant shortfalls without significant investment, and the coordination of such assets at the right place and the right time might prove very risky. Long-range search and rescue
32The NAO’s assessment of a capability gap in respect of long-range search and rescue (see...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NAO’s assessment of a capability gap in respect of long-range search and rescue (see Figure 1 above) was reinforced by the evidence we received. This is a major area of cross-departmental cooperation. Rod Johnson, the Chief Coastguard, outlined to us the extent of the UK’s search and rescue region and his assessment of “home waters”: [It] extends out to 30° west. It is approximately 1 million square miles of the eastern Atlantic. It is a very interesting question that you asked about our home waters. I think that it is probably easier to consider that concept in terms of time. At an average steaming speed of 15 knots per surface ship, where is home waters? Our area of operation extends out to 30° west to just short of the Arctic circle in the north, and down to an area just north of Cape Finisterre and then down the North Sea, English Channel meridian line.50 However although this was the UK’s area of responsibility, he added: We do not have situational awareness out to 30° west. In other words, we do not know what is there all the time, right now—only the compliant targets [ships which readily identify themselves]. But it is an area that we look at and, of course, from a search and rescue point of view any British interests anywhere can be involved or can involve us. Some examples of that would be the searches that we do routinely in the 49 Ev 40 50 Q 6 24 Future Maritime Surveillance Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area. If we get the distress alert through our satellite-based technology, we will deal with it [...].51
33The Chief Coastguard said that in the absence of the Nimrod MRA4 operations in respect...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Chief Coastguard said that in the absence of the Nimrod MRA4 operations in respect of civil maritime search and rescue, counter-pollution and traffic monitoring would have to be “simply restructured around not having it”.52 The Scottish National Party, however, expressed concerns about the UK’s adherence to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue: Included in those obligations is to provide a list of assets available to undertake certain missions and also where the various co-ordination centres are located. However PQs that since the retirement of Nimrod [MR2] show that only shorter range helicopters and light aircraft are listed as being available now. They do not list the C130 Hercules—which means that the UK has no long range military fixed wing SAR aircraft listed under section 2.1.11.4 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, raising serious questions about the UK’s ability to effectively meet this obligation. Indeed from 2005 until the retirement of the MR2 in early 2010 the aircraft provided help to neighbouring countries 23 times.It appears that since its retirement the UK has not provided fixed wing RAF top cover to any neighbouring states.53
34The Chief Coastguard did not share these concerns.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Chief Coastguard did not share these concerns. Although he accepted that the UK inventory once included Nimrod MR2 as a maritime patrol aircraft, which, in the context of search and rescue, was capable of providing a systematic search over a wide area and locating a potentially non-compliant target, there were other means at his disposal to provide that capability if it was required. The existing long-standing arrangements regarding the obtaining of assets from other Atlantic region states would continue.54 Air Vice-Marshal Green added: when the Chief Coastguard gave evidence, he wrapped this sort of issue up very well. When something happens, it is effectively within his authority—the coastguard’s authority—to start to react to that incident, and he will use whatever assets are available at the time and are nearest to the point of the concern in order to alleviate the situation or the risk. In that example, those assets were available. There is no reason to suspect that if a Nimrod had been available, it would have been able to react any faster to [a particular incident] than those that were actually closer to the incident in question.55
35There does not appear to have been any discussion of the impact of the Nimrod...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There does not appear to have been any discussion of the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on search and rescue provision with European neighbours. Nor has there been any attempt to negotiate with France or with Luxembourg (a small landlocked country which has three MPAs) to provide support for the UK search and rescue capability. Tom 51 Q 6 52 Q 10 53 Ev w26 54 Q 12 55 Q 146 Future Maritime Surveillance 25 McKane, Director General for Security Policy, MoD, said “there is no specific new agreement under the UK-France defence treaty that addresses search and rescue [...]” and he was unaware of any discussions with Luxembourg.56 When we tried to establish why no such negotiations or discussions had taken place, Air Vice-Marshal Green told us “long- range search and rescue is a responsibility that we have all signed up to through previous conventions. Consequently, it is the standard protocol that if you are in that region, you will react to that particular incident. There does not need to be a bilateral arrangement with a particularly nation to satisfy a search and rescue need; the arrangements are already in place within a broader arrangement”.57
36In addition to the Nimrod MRA4 decision another major change to the provision of search...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In addition to the Nimrod MRA4 decision another major change to the provision of search and rescue was announced to the House of Commons on 28 November 2011.58 The then Secretary of State for Transport announced that a new civilian-led UK-wide search and rescue capability would be established and that military involvement in search and rescue would cease once that capability was fully operational. We note that no option appears to have been considered for either a sponsored or a volunteer reserve element within the crews for the new commercial arrangement, despite the fact, that at least initially, it is widely expected that most of the pilots will be ex-Armed Forces.
37We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on the UK search and rescue...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on the UK search and rescue capability. While we accept that the UK remains committed to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and that no bilateral arrangements are required, we are surprised that the Government has not discussed the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision with European neighbours. It would seem prudent to do so to ensure that cooperation is maximised.
38We will monitor the planned changes in the provision of UK search and rescue to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We will monitor the planned changes in the provision of UK search and rescue to a new civilian-led capability and expect Ministers to play a central role in its delivery, settling disputes and ensuring coordination between departments. The Government should guard against the loss of the valuable experience that exists within the Armed Forces and we request that the Government detail the measures it has taken to prevent this. We believe that this should include considering options for retaining expertise through some form of reserve service for the pilots employed. Another concern is the impact on the provision of search and rescue for the Falkland Islands. We may wish to return to this in future years. The capability gap and standing maritime tasks
39The Royal Navy has a number of standing maritime tasks.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Royal Navy has a number of standing maritime tasks. These include the Response Force Task Group (the core of the UK’s maritime contingent capability held at high readiness to respond to unexpected global events), the Fleet Ready Escort, maintained at high readiness around the UK for short-notice global deployment), a nuclear ballistic submarine (to provide the UK’s continuous at sea nuclear deterrent), geographical 56 Qq 147–148 57 Q 149 58 HC Deb, 28 November 2011, cols 52–53WS 26 Future Maritime Surveillance deployments, Task Forces, Mine Countermeasures Forces and the Fishery Protection Squadron. In our report on the operation in Libya, we noted that important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and counter-drugs operations, were not able to be carried out due to meeting the Libya commitment, and concluded that: Given the continued high levels of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. This will be a significant challenge for the Royal Navy and the MoD who should outline their plans to meet this challenge in response to our Report.59
40In its response to our Report, the MoD said that although it recognised that UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its response to our Report, the MoD said that although it recognised that UK Armed Forces were only able to undertake so many tasks at the same time, it did not expect “that after 2015 our Armed Forces will be operating routinely at the level of intensity they have sustained in recent years”. It assured us that if UK Armed Forces were required to undertake specific operations rigorous planning procedures were in place to generate the capabilities required and identify risks and that careful examination would take place on the prioritisation of other tasks depending on the strategic context and priorities at the time.60
41Concerns regarding the UK’s ability to meet its standing maritime tasks were also expressed to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Concerns regarding the UK’s ability to meet its standing maritime tasks were also expressed to us during this inquiry. Dr Willett thought that the Libya operation provided examples of the challenges that would be faced in the future in meeting these tasks as, although the operation had been in the UK’s national interest, the Royal Navy had been required to withdraw assets from other tasks, such the South Atlantic patrols and counter- piracy activities. He suggested that gaps were appearing in the UK’s maritime surveillance capability: You have a web of a number of capabilities—a number of systems—doing different things that come together, but as you are stretching that capability ever tighter, you are drawing out holes that are gaps. You can fill some of those with new systems, and some with alliance contributions, but the question is: from a policy level, do we understand the importance of maritime surveillance for maritime security as a whole, and are we prepared to underwrite the capabilities required to ensure that we have sufficient coverage for what we want to do?61
42When we asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, whether he was prepared...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When we asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, whether he was prepared to underwrite the capabilities required to ensure that there was sufficient coverage for what the UK wanted to do, he did not do so. He assured us, however, that the MoD took the entire maritime situation very seriously and recognised “the importance of maritime surveillance for maritime security as a whole”. He asserted that the national financial situation had caused difficulties for the SDSR and that with limited resources there would be an element of risk and that in respect of maritime surveillance the decision 59 Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010–12, Operations in Libya, HC 950, para 114 60 Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010–12, Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1952, p 12 61 Q 16 [Dr Willett] Future Maritime Surveillance 27 taken was “what we thought to be the least bad option [..] and that it was a tolerable level of risk to carry”.62 However the Minister acknowledged: in the wider sense [...] the Navy is going through a very difficult patch while older platforms are working their way out and until newer ones work their way in. I think that we recognised from the outset that the Navy would go through a lean period before the up-curve came back through. That is what we have seen, but so far, despite the tests presented, for example by Libya last year, it has managed, and we believe that the risk we are carrying is acceptable, if regrettable.63
43Despite the end of the Libya operation concerns were still being raised about the effects...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Despite the end of the Libya operation concerns were still being raised about the effects on the standing maritime tasks of events such as the London Olympic Games. On 9 May 2012, The Telegraph reported that the “Royal Navy no longer had enough warships to dedicate one to fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia all year round”.64 It added that the “difficulties had been compounded by the need to commit ships and personnel to the Olympic security effort”. We put these concerns to the Minister, who did not accept that the Royal Navy had in any way abandoned any of its tasks. He told us: Although I acknowledge and do not shy away from the fact that the Navy’s assets are being heavily used at the moment and that we are taking a degree of risk, I do not think that I accept the proposition that you were putting to me that they have actually had to abandon any of their tasks altogether. They have just had to find other ways of completing them.65
44Despite this denial, when we asked the Minister whether counter-piracy operations had been affected by...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Despite this denial, when we asked the Minister whether counter-piracy operations had been affected by the 2012 London Olympics he confirmed that: during the course of this year the UK is not contributing any vessels to the various international counter-piracy missions. We continue, of course, to exercise command of the EU operation from Northwood, but I do not see why we would, in principle, at all times contribute vessels to those missions. We certainly expect to do so again as time progresses, in rotation with the other partner nations involved.66
45Following our evidence session with the Minister, we requested further information from the MoD regarding...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following our evidence session with the Minister, we requested further information from the MoD regarding the pressures on maritime surveillance assets due to other demands on the Royal Navy such as the Olympics. The MoD told us that maritime surveillance assets were currently undertaking standing commitments: • Sea King helicopters in Afghanistan (Operation HERRICK); • Merlin Mk 1 helicopters in Oman (Operation CHOBDAHAR); • assets undertaking a range of the Military Tasks listed in the SDSR; 62 Q 132 63 Q 132 64 The Telegraph, 9 May 2012, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9253764/Navy-forced-to- drop-year-round-Somalia-piracy-patrols.html (accessed 11 September 2012) 65 Q 133 66 Q 134 28 Future Maritime Surveillance MT2, providing nuclear deterrence; MT3, defending the UK and overseas territories; and MT4, supporting civil emergency organisations in times of crisis.67 This was in addition to maintaining a requirement for contingency through the Ready Force Task group (RFTG), part of which is forward deployed to the Gulf under Operation KIPION. Operation OLYMPICS was an added responsibility which was being undertaken using assets in their regeneration (training and maintenance) periods, between either Gulf or Operation HERRICK tasks, prior to deployment on roles related to maritime surveillance, and this reduced the ability to utilise assets flexibly to mitigate capability gaps in other areas. There were also implications for the defence of the UK home base or any of its Permanent Joint Operating Bases overseas as it was necessary to “make greater use of surface platforms such as the River Class patrol vessels and frigates / destroyers for short notice tasking, often to deploy at range to locate and track any incursions”. In addition to all this, the Merlin helicopter force was being upgraded from Mk1 to Mk 2 which would see a dip in the number of craft available until the middle of 2013 when only 9 would be available of a force of 28.68
46We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal Navy’s ability to continue to deliver the required high levels of standing maritime commitments with fewer platforms. It is likely that risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented and the smaller number of available assets is stretched more thinly. We note that the Minister asserted that the Royal Navy was not abandoning any of its tasks. However he also accepted that the Navy is undergoing a “lean period”, being heavily used and accepting a degree of risk. Maritime surveillance assets are an essential component of maritime security and these additional requirements such as Libya and the Olympics pose a potential risk to maritime security due to this overstretch and possible competing demands for those assets. This is illustrated by the UK not contributing any vessels this year to the international counter-piracy missions and the necessity to use assets and personnel between operations in the Gulf or Afghanistan for the London Olympics. 67 Ev 49 68 Ev 49 Future Maritime Surveillance 29 4 Future maritime surveillance and regeneration Rapid regeneration of a maritime patrol aircraft capability
47We explored how quickly the MoD and the Armed Forces could regenerate a maritime patrol...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We explored how quickly the MoD and the Armed Forces could regenerate a maritime patrol aircraft capability in the event of a sudden risk escalation. Nick Harvey MP, the Minister for the Armed Forces, thought that it would “require the security assessment to deteriorate very quickly” for there to be a need to consider an urgent replacement.69 He thought it much more likely that any deterioration in the security picture would be gradual. The next opportunity for the Government to make a fundamental assessment of this would be presented by the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The MoD confirmed that were currently no plans to regenerate specific capabilities although “as with any military capability, if current assumptions about the strategic environment and threats change significantly then consideration will be given to enhancement options”.70 When we asked the Minister if the MoD were currently looking at the possible rapid regeneration of a MPA, he told us “we are not looking at that issue now because we do not perceive any urgent need to do so”.71
48However, even accepting that a decision is unlikely to be required before the next SDSR,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, even accepting that a decision is unlikely to be required before the next SDSR, we were concerned about the lack of work being undertaken on ways rapidly to regenerate this capability, and by the Minister’s willingness to postpone a decision until
49We note that the MoD asserted it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the MoD asserted it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation in the maritime surveillance area. However, in practice the robustness of these procedures cannot be proven until such risks materialise and are identified and dealt with or are missed with potentially disastrous consequences. We are also less sanguine than the Minister that if an urgent need to regenerate the maritime surveillance capability arose this could be achieved quickly. We accept that regenerating the complex capabilities of the Nimrod MRA4 would be more difficult and take longer than purchasing a platform off the shelf or putting something together that could perform an urgent maritime surveillance function. However, as the MoD has admitted in evidence that it is not currently considering the rapid regeneration of any maritime patrol aircraft platform and that it is not in discussion with industry about the regeneration of specific maritime surveillance capabilities, and given the complexities and testing required of maritime patrol aircraft platforms, we require further evidence that a sufficient level of capability could be regenerated as quickly as the Minister suggests. Tolerable risk or gamble?
50While the MoD acknowledged that there is a maritime surveillance capability gap, it regarded it...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While the MoD acknowledged that there is a maritime surveillance capability gap, it regarded it as a tolerable risk. However other witnesses considered it a gamble.79 Rear Admiral Tony Rix (retd.), former Chief of Staff to the NATO Maritime Headquarters in Naples, told us: 75 Q 206 76 Central to the regeneration of this capability will be the maintenance and availability of skilled personnel. The MoD has programmes, such as the Seedcorn initiative, in place for this purpose (see paras 80–83 below). 77 Q 206 78 Q 216 79 For example see Ev w 16 [Air Vice-Marshal Roberts] and Ev w24 [Scottish National Party]. Future Maritime Surveillance 31 My personal assessment is that it is [a] gamble. It is a risk that we should not be taking for a number of reasons. First, we do not have the surveillance coverage that we used to have. Indeed, trying to regenerate that surveillance capability—the broad surveillance, particularly the wider-area persistent surveillance capability—at short notice would be very difficult. There are some initiatives within the MoD to do that, but for reasons that we have gone into so far, surveillance—wider-area persistent surveillance—is an essential part, from my perspective, of the military world, enabling military operations. It is a gap that we should not tolerate.80 Senior UK Armed Forces personnel disagreed with Rear-Admiral Rix. Air Vice-Marshal Green said “I think that the situation that we have today is a tolerable risk”.81 Rear Admiral Ian Corder, Commander Operations Maritime, MoD, added “as the person who wears that risk most of the time, I would firmly say that it is within the bounds of tolerable risk at the moment”.82
51General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, thought that the risk created by...
Concluded (the committee's words)
General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, thought that the risk created by the Nimrod decision was not in the gamble category and warned that it should not be allowed to become so. He told us, in November 2010, “we must work very hard to ensure that that is the case, but it is another risk that we now have to manage. [...] The professional military now need to work actively with allies to see how we mitigate that risk”.83 Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, thought that the capability gap was a continued acknowledged risk. However he asserted that Ministers and policy makers in the MoD were kept aware of the levels of risk through established risk management processes which also covered the “longer-term strategic risk”.84 Tom McKane thought that “risk management [was] something that imbues almost everything that the Department does, and so in relation to specific operations or specific activities, there will be an examination of the risks associated with that and a plan put in place to manage that, but clearly they are not risks that one would go into in public”.85
52It is essential that the MoD’s risk management procedures are robust enough to identify and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is essential that the MoD’s risk management procedures are robust enough to identify and deal with potential future capability gaps. For example the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter which has the primary roles of wide area surveillance and battlespace management across land, air and maritime domains is due to be retired from service in 2016 and replaced by Project CROWSNEST hosted by the Merlin Mk 2 aircraft.86 These procedures should also consider the opportunities to adapt existing assets to provide a 80 Q 9 81 Q 46 82 Q 46 83 Defence Committee, Oral and Written Evidence, The appointment of the new Chief of the Defence Staff, HC 600–i, Session 2010–12, Q 38 84 Qq 135–140 85 Q 139 86 The MoD provided the following description of Project CROWSNEST: Project CROWSNEST will satisfy the requirement for an assured Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) capability to provide long range surveillance and battlespace management to Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre task groups. Project CROWSNEST is to replace SKASaC. The mission system solution will be hosted on the existing Merlin Mk2 aircraft, affording that platform a true multi-role capability across the air, maritime, land, surface and sub-surface environments. This will exploit the flexibility inherent in having a bolt-on sensor package that could allow either Anti-Submarine Warfare or ASaC role to be discharged dependent on the Commander’s requirements (although to note the two roles may be mutually exclusive for concurrent or simultaneous operations). 32 Future Maritime Surveillance maritime surveillance capability although this is not their current role. For example the Sentinel aircraft is due to be retired from service in 2015 subject to Operation HERRICK conditions but witnesses including the MoD have identified its potential to be adapted to a maritime surveillance role.87
53The provision of maritime surveillance should be considered as a whole taking into account the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The provision of maritime surveillance should be considered as a whole taking into account the different, competing requirements and the risks associated with gaps and non-provision in the capability. Capability and platform decisions must be coherent and informed. We are aware that the capability gaps that exist in maritime surveillance are not limited to a maritime patrol aircraft, and include, for example, the withdrawal of Sentinel and the loss of the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates’ information and intelligence gathering capabilities and towed array sonar. We also note that there is the potential for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by Project CROWSNEST operating from the Merlin Mk 2. In response to our Report, the MoD should set out how it intends to deal with the increased risk caused by these emerging capability gaps.
54We remain concerned about the MoD’s capacity to manage the risk created by the capability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We remain concerned about the MoD’s capacity to manage the risk created by the capability gap in maritime surveillance and about its ability to react to demand in the short and medium term. Future maritime surveillance requirements MoD capability investigations
55We have already discussed the possibilities for filling the immediate maritime surveillance gap.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We have already discussed the possibilities for filling the immediate maritime surveillance gap. In January 2011, the Ministry of Defence began a capability investigation into its long term requirements for a Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) capability. This was completed in October 2011, but the MoD has not made its findings public.88 During 2011, the MoD also undertook similar studies into other areas relevant to maritime surveillance.89 All of these studies would be expected to contribute to the debate on the future provision of maritime surveillance. Air Vice-Marshal Green described the WAMUS study to us: The issue was related to: noting the decision to withdraw the Nimrod out of service, and if the MoD decided that there was indeed a requirement to fill that capability gap in the future, what sort of platforms would be required in order to satisfy it? There are lots of ifs and buts in there, but it presumed that there was going to be a requirement that was yet to be decided. If you assume that there was, what could you use? Could you use unmanned aerial platforms; could you used manned platforms? Could you use hybrid air vehicles and so on? We have already provided details of the conclusion to that. What that work has done is provide us with a level of underpinning research already, which we will then wrap into our capability 87 Ev 39 and Ev w30–31 88 HC Deb, 22 March 2011, cols 946-7W and HC Deb, 1 February 2012, cols 653-4 89 Ev 49 Future Maritime Surveillance 33 investigations as we go forward to the Strategic Defence Review 2015. It was a fundamental piece of analysis to support our future direction.90
56We were concerned that the WAMUS study had not been undertaken as part of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were concerned that the WAMUS study had not been undertaken as part of the work on the 2010 SDSR. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded : We were faced in the SDSR with trying to cut our cloth according to our means, and there is no doubt that we had to make some very difficult decisions. An analysis of all the options available to us was done, and at that stage, the analysis was that deleting the MPA aircraft was the least worst option. Analysis was completed that looked at the capability gaps that we would create by deleting that capability. Afterwards, the study allowed us to look at what options there would be in future and whether we needed to fill the capability that we had just deleted, the timeline and the likely platforms. It was primarily financially driven, against a context of the current threat that we faced at the time in the SDSR and our funding priorities. It was a difficult decision that was the least worst at the time.91
57Air Vice-Marshal Green told us that the WAMUS study had caused the MoD to conclude...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Air Vice-Marshal Green told us that the WAMUS study had caused the MoD to conclude that in the medium term an aircraft was likely to be the solution should it be necessary to fill the gap when Nimrod MRA4 was cancelled. In the longer term, about 20 years, technology was likely to provide the opportunity for the use of unmanned systems, especially underwater.92 The Air Vice-Marshal confirmed to us that the WAMUS study would not have been required if the Nimrod MRA4 had been retained.93
58While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies that will help inform future decisions on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies that will help inform future decisions on the provision of maritime surveillance, we believe it would have been beneficial if these studies had been undertaken before or as part of the SDSR especially given that the MoD has admitted that the Nimrod MRA4 decision was primarily financially driven and in the short to medium term a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution for maritime surveillance requirements.
59Although these studies were taking place at the same time as our inquiry into the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although these studies were taking place at the same time as our inquiry into the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS), the MoD did not tell us about the studies in its oral and written evidence or in the Government’s response to our Report. We asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, and MoD officials why we had not been informed of the WAMUS study. He replied: But you were inquiring into the SDSR. With respect, this piece of work was not anything to do with the SDSR. It was considering the future and the sort of capabilities that we might develop in the future. It was not about the SDSR.94 [...] 90 Q 119 91 Q 47 92 Qq 41–43 93 Q128 94 Q 123 34 Future Maritime Surveillance With respect, everything that the Ministry has been doing after the SDSR process was complete is looking to the future—Future Force 2020, the sort of strategic decisions that we will have to make in 2015 at the next SDSR, and at micro-scale the annual budget cycles. I am not clear how it would have assisted your study of the SDSR during the spring of 2011 to have described every piece of work that we were doing looking to the future capabilities that we hoped to generate. The scope of your inquiry would have been endless if we had viewed it in quite that way.95
60We asked the Minister and MoD witnesses whether it would not have been helpful to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Minister and MoD witnesses whether it would not have been helpful to mention the WAMUS study when addressing our concerns about the Nimrod MRA4 decision in the Government response to our report on the SDSR and NSS. Air Vice- Marshal Green replied “Yes, I think it probably would have been helpful if we had thought more broadly about that particular topic”.96 In written evidence, following our evidence session the MoD told us: Following Mrs Moon’s Parliamentary Question which was answered by Minister(DEST) on 22 March 2011, Nimrod was discussed three times by MoD and Government witnesses in the course of the open session examination of witnesses in the House of Commons Defence Committee Inquiry into The Strategic Defence and Spending Review and National Security Strategy. In each of the three cases, the focus of the discussion was the impact of the loss of Nimrod and ways that the Department has sought to mitigate the resulting capability gap. In the Department’s view, discussion of WAMUS Capability Investigation, with its aim ‘to establish the nature and size of any ‘wide area’ ASW capability risk, over time, and to identify and test options for mitigating demonstrable risk’ would not have furthered the discussion as the Committee was focused on what the Department was currently doing to mitigate the gap, rather than the long-term implications or requirements. As the answer of 22 March indicates, there was no intention on the Department’s part to conceal this study, though its classification, and the fact that it was still ongoing, would have made it hard for us to provide details at that time. As the results of the WAMUS CI were not published until 31 October 2011, so all that MoD and Government witnesses could have done was reiterate Minister(DEST)’s answer to Mrs Moon’s Parliamentary Question.97
61Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the SDSR, it is unacceptable that the MoD did not think it appropriate to inform us that it was undertaking long term capability investigations into areas directly related to the UK’s maritime surveillance capabilities whilst we were undertaking our inquiry into the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Our concerns were not limited to what the MoD was currently doing to mitigate the capability gap as we asked the Government to outline its plans for the regeneration of this capability. These studies would have been relevant to that. Indeed, the MoD told us in evidence that when responding to the concerns on Nimrod in our SDSR and NSS 95 Q 125 96 Q 130 97 Ev 53 Future Maritime Surveillance 35 Report it would have been helpful if it had thought more broadly about that particular topic. Parliamentary scrutiny is not an optional extra. We are concerned that had parliamentary questions not revealed the existence of the Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) study we could have remained in ignorance of it. We expect the MoD to be more proactive and forthcoming in its provision of information to us. The next SDSR
62Looking ahead to the next SDSR, expected in 2015, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Looking ahead to the next SDSR, expected in 2015, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, told us “we will have a big decision to make about the capability gap that we have accepted on maritime patrol aircraft”.98 In its written evidence the MoD identified the maritime surveillance challenges it expected to face in the next SDSR as including: • the identification and assessment of future risk across the Department’s primary and secondary roles;99 • planning for an ever increasing need for timely surveillance and targeted information through technological advancement; and • in consultation with the UK Civil Authorities, provision for the increased responsibility of the forthcoming Exclusive Economic Zone.100
63Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, told us there would be a maritime...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, told us there would be a maritime work stream for the next SDSR, but was uncertain whether there would be one specifically about surveillance. Air Vice-Marshal Green added: There certainly will be a work strand that relates to our future ISTAR capabilities. That will be led through my post, which, at that point, will be lodged within the Joint Forces Command. We have already discussed ownership of the issue, as part of our broader transformation, and where that issue will sit. The commander of the joint forces will be the defence authority for information. It fits within his portfolio extremely well. He looks across all environments—land, air and maritime—and it is part of that debate. The work that we have done since the SDSR, with the WAMUS study and with seedcorn, allows us to provide the right intellectual horsepower for that debate to ensure it is kept live as a component within the overall ISTAR capabilities.101
64We note the 2010 SDSR’s acknowledgement of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note the 2010 SDSR’s acknowledgement of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and 98 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 12 July 2012 HC (2012–13) 525-i, Q11 99 The MoD told us that these are the seven Military Tasks in the SDSR. 100 Ev 42; The proposed Exclusive Economic Zone covers the extent of the UK Marine Area. The MoD advised that “It is worth noting that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prescribe EEZ and settle disputes between nations. The UK EEZ is awaiting confirmation following negotiations with other nations such as France and Denmark”. 101 Q214 36 Future Maritime Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on network-enabled warships, submarines and aircraft. The capability studies already undertaken by the MoD are a good starting point and we welcome the commitment to an ISTAR work stream for the next SDSR. However, given the Secretary of State for Defence’s statement that there will be a decision to be made in the next SDSR about the capability gap on maritime patrol aircraft, we recommend that work on the next SDSR should include a specific maritime surveillance work stream, involving all those, military and non-military, who make use of these assets. Funding
65On 14 May 2012, the Secretary of State made a statement to the House of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On 14 May 2012, the Secretary of State made a statement to the House of Commons on the Defence Budget and Transformation in which he asserted that he had balanced the MoD budget. He provided information on the value of the core programme, investment decisions and an unallocated contingency. He told the House: Balancing the budget allows me to include within that £152 billion core programme a £4 billion-plus investment in intelligence, surveillance, communications and reconnaissance assets across the Cipher, Solomon, Crowsnest, Defence Core Network Services and Falcon projects; the outright purchase of three offshore patrol vessels that are currently leased; capability enhancements to the Typhoon; and a range of simulators, basing and support equipment for the new helicopters and aircraft that we are introducing. That programme represents the collective priorities of the armed forces, set out by the armed forces committee on which all the service chiefs sit. They confirm that the committed core equipment programme, together with the £8 billion of available unallocated headroom, will fund the capabilities that they require to deliver Future Force 2020 as set out in the strategic defence and security review. That £8 billion will be allocated to projects not yet in the committed core programme only at the point when they need to be committed in order to be delivered on time, and only in accordance with the military assessment of priority at the time.102
66During questioning on his statement the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that there was...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During questioning on his statement the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that there was no money for maritime surveillance from conventional aircraft in the equipment programme: Maritime surveillance from conventional aircraft is not currently funded in the programme. That is one of the capability gaps that my predecessor chose to accept, and a risk that we have chosen to manage. A number of different technologies will be available to deal with it as we approach the end of the decade. That is one of the decisions that the armed forces committee will have to make when it considers the prioritisation for the head room in the planned equipment budget.103 102 HC Deb, 14 May 2012, col 264 103 HC Deb, 14 May 2012, col 271 Future Maritime Surveillance 37
67We pursued the implications of the Secretary of State’s statement on funding for future maritime...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We pursued the implications of the Secretary of State’s statement on funding for future maritime surveillance and ISTAR in general. We asked our witnesses whether commitments in Afghanistan had led to surveillance capabilities being too land-focused and whether this was reflected in the allocation of funding for surveillance capabilities. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded that: it must be remembered that the investment in ISTAR for Afghanistan has been through NACMO [Net Additional Cost of Military Operations], so it is additional money— [...] If you took away the urgent operational requirements out of Afghanistan, there has been no additional investment from the MoD into providing the information required to conduct operations. Indeed, we have actually found strengths in some of our platforms that we probably did not know were there. The Sea King has been a great asset in pursuing insurgent operations in Afghanistan [...]. So Afghanistan has provided us with a focus, but it has not actually skewed the balance of investment.104
68As investment in ISTAR for Afghanistan has been funded by the Treasury through NACMO, this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As investment in ISTAR for Afghanistan has been funded by the Treasury through NACMO, this would cease when combat operations in Afghanistan ended at the end of
69We were concerned that this would mean that the funding would be taken from elsewhere...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were concerned that this would mean that the funding would be taken from elsewhere in the core equipment programme or that the MoD was already using the unallocated contingency funding announced in the Secretary of State’s statement. Air Vice- Marshal Green responded: The Secretary of State has announced a core programme, which is fully funded. We talk about the urgent operational requirements and whether we bring them into core. They are all for consideration in the unallocated provision that the Secretary of State spoke about in his previous announcement. As we move forward, we must prioritise those equipments that are not part of the core programme, and the debate for us is in deciding where they fit on that priority list and which ones we are going to fund. 104 Q 41 105 Q 152 38 Future Maritime Surveillance Clearly, that will be done against risk that we are carrying in current ops, and our contingent ops.106
70We explored the criteria for spending the unallocated £8 billion included in the Secretary of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We explored the criteria for spending the unallocated £8 billion included in the Secretary of State’s announcement. The MoD told us that its intention was to look at areas waiting to be incorporated into the core programme and the available resources and to use a single prioritisation methodology. Funding would be assigned quarterly. The first decision point for investment decisions expected in July 2012, but would only include areas where a decision was required to be made. If there was no requirement to make a decision or more information was required the matter would be reconsidered three months later. Money would only be committed when it was necessary and in accordance with military advice and if it could be demonstrated “it could be afforded—both the capital purchase and the support—over the 10 years of the programme”.107
71We were keen to establish what the military advice was in relation to ISTAR.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were keen to establish what the military advice was in relation to ISTAR. Air Vice- Marshal Green told us “there is a planning assumption at the moment that we will allocate some of that unallocated provision, which is sufficiently high up the priority order as we sit here today, to ISTAR capability”.108 However the MoD were unable to tell us which of the ISTAR capabilities in Afghanistan it would ideally wish to bring into the core programme and how much this would cost. It added that “it is too early to define the cost of the capabilities as this is an ongoing activity as part of Annual Budget Cycle 13”.109
72We are encouraged by the rigour expected to be applied to the spending of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are encouraged by the rigour expected to be applied to the spending of the £8 billion unallocated reserve that was announced by the Secretary of State on 14 May
73We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular ISTAR provided under Urgent Operational Requirements, and how this will be incorporated into the core programme. We recommend that the MoD consider this matter urgently and, in response to our Report, provide details of the investment decisions on the unallocated £8 billion announced by the Secretary of State for Defence that were due to be made in July. Possible options for future maritime surveillance
74It is important to examine the options offered by the advance of technology, such as...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is important to examine the options offered by the advance of technology, such as unmanned systems, for providing a comprehensive range of maritime surveillance 106 Q 154 107 Q 156 108 Q 157 109 Ev 50 Future Maritime Surveillance 39 capabilities in the future. The MoD’s view is that in the longer term technology would offer other solutions to the provision of maritime surveillance.110
75In her written evidence, Dr Sue Robertson, a former MoD consultant in this area, considered...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In her written evidence, Dr Sue Robertson, a former MoD consultant in this area, considered possible ways of providing a UK maritime patrol capability: • Continued use of Merlin Helicopters and Type 23 Frigates • Procurement of a new fleet of large manned [maritime patrol] aircraft, such as P-8 or CN-235 • Purchase of second-hand P-3 [aircraft] and upgrading them to an acceptable standard • Procurement of smaller dedicated MPA aircraft that have been derived from commercial airframes such as DASH-8 or Gulfstream • Use of [unmanned aerial vehicles] UAVs, such as Heron or Global Hawk • The installation of sensors on other aircraft such as A400 and A330 so that maritime reconnaissance can be carried out as a secondary role • Use of lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles • Satellite Surveillance • Use of alternative sources of information such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) data received from ships coupled with data from land-based electronic surveillance systems • Collaborative programmes with allies to make use of their platforms in our territorial waters.111
76Dr Robertson went on to give a comparative analysis of the ability of each of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Dr Robertson went on to give a comparative analysis of the ability of each of these to carry out tasks equivalent to those of a maritime patrol aircraft capable of wide area surveillance.112 110 Q 41 111 Ev w32 112 Ev w32 40 Future Maritime Surveillance Table 1 Asset Merlin New Upgraded New UAV A400 LTA Satellite Long- P-3 Short- /A330 Task range range MPA MPA Submarine Yes Yes Yes possibly No No No No Detection Shipping Limited Yes Yes Limited Limited Yes Yes Yes Surveillance Sensors Range Sensors Fleet Protection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No ISTAR No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes ELINT data No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes gathering Counter-terrorism / No Yes Yes Yes No Yes? No No Border Protection Weapons Yes Yes Yes No No Yes? No No deployment Search & Rescue Limited Yes Yes Limited No Search No No Range Range only Emergency Comms No Yes Yes No Possible Yes No No Overseas Maritime No Yes Yes No No No No No Patrol Counter-pirate No Yes Yes No No No No No operations Protection of Limited Yes Yes Limited Yes No No No Trident Submarines Range Range
77We asked Air Vice-Marshal Green whether purchasing alternative maritime patrol aircraft such as P8s, CN-235s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked Air Vice-Marshal Green whether purchasing alternative maritime patrol aircraft such as P8s, CN-235s or second hand P-3s and upgrading them to the required standard was being considered: They are not actively being considered, because we have not decided whether we have a requirement. There is no requirement to buy an MPA at the moment. There is not a genesis option. All the work that has been done to date has said that if the MoD decides to fill the gap, it would need to buy an aircraft. The question of whether the MoD actually wants to fill that gap has not been answered, and we see that as being part of the SDSR 2015 time frame decision. The challenge for my staff and my colleagues at the table is to make sure that we have the information available as we run into the 2015 SDSR, so that we can have a structured debate about whether we want to fill the gap and what the options are out there in the near term to fill it. We can then have a balance-of-investment decision about where the MoD decides to go post-2015.113
78We asked the Minister whether it was important, and if so how much so, for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Minister whether it was important, and if so how much so, for maritime surveillance assets to also have an attack prosecution capability, he told us: I do not think that it is essential that the attack capability has to come from exactly the same platforms. It wouldn’t be a bad idea, because it would make things faster, but I don’t think it’s an absolutely essential prerequisite that it must.114 113 Q 64 114 Q 177 Future Maritime Surveillance 41
79We note that the Minister does not think it is an essential prerequisite for maritime...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note that the Minister does not think it is an essential prerequisite for maritime surveillance and the attack prosecution capability to be delivered by the same asset. In response to our Report the MoD should set out the supporting evidence and likely costs of this split assets approach. Seedcorn initiative
80As part of our inquiry we looked at the measures the MoD had in place...
Concluded (the committee's words)
As part of our inquiry we looked at the measures the MoD had in place to ensure UK Armed Forces personnel maintained the necessary skills to provide maritime surveillance capabilities. The MoD described to us the individual and collective training that was undertaken. In an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol aircraft and the skills of personnel, the MoD has also implemented the Seedcorn initiative, sending RAF personnel to train with allied Air Forces to maintain and develop their skills. Similar initiatives were in place for the Royal Navy.115
81Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, explained that the Seedcorn initiative was “currently...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, explained that the Seedcorn initiative was “currently planned out to 2019, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that it will end in 2019. That is just as far ahead as we have planned”.116 We pressed the Minister on whether the initiative would be extended further than 2019. He responded: I would say that the 2015 SDSR seems to me to be highly likely to come back to look at this issue. It is much too early to anticipate what decisions will be reached. I could imagine circumstances in which they might take certain decisions, but a further series of decisions would be needed in 2020. I would certainly think it is well within the realms of possibility that the Seedcorn initiative will be sustained through to a point where a 2020 SDSR takes decisions in this field.117 When we asked the Minister if it would be sustainable until then, he responded “Yes”.118
82When we pressed our MoD witnesses on whether realistically the Seedcorn initiative would have to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When we pressed our MoD witnesses on whether realistically the Seedcorn initiative would have to continue for a long period beyond 2020. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded: It depends on the decisions made. At the moment, it is a funding assumption until that time and we think that it is very low risk maintaining it until that time. As we get to SDSR 2015, as the Minister said, and we shape our way forward, we will relook at that initiative on the back of what has happened with NATO’s smart initiatives and so on to see where we need to go. We have the ultimate flexibility in shaping that as we move forward.119 115 Ev 44 116 Q 164 117 Q 165 118 Q 166 119 Q 173 42 Future Maritime Surveillance The Minister added “that as well as the flying skills, what are being sustained are the analytical skills and the intellectual firepower to make use of the sort of information that these operations elicit”.120
83We support the principle of the MoD’s Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We support the principle of the MoD’s Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain both the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol aircraft and the skills of its crews. This is an important initiative given the MoD’s statement that in the medium term another model of maritime patrol aircraft will be required to fill the capability gap left by the Nimrod MRA4. However, we doubt that the Seedcorn initiative is sustainable as far as 2019, let alone to 2030, given the continued uncertainty over the long term plans for a fixed-wing MPA. The MoD should explain what work it has done to identify the point at which this initiative will no longer be effective in sustaining the ability to regenerate the capability. We recommend that the MoD undertake a lessons learned exercise for sustaining the ability to regenerate other capabilities in the future. Unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles and satellites
84The use of unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles (LTA) and satellite technology systems has been proposed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The use of unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles (LTA) and satellite technology systems has been proposed as alternative or complementary platforms to manned maritime patrol aircraft. In respect of its current use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), space technology and other technology assets for maritime surveillance, the MoD told us that the UK has no unmanned aircraft system employed specifically for maritime surveillance. However it did use US satellite products and some commercial satellite services.121 In respect of the future use of such assets for maritime surveillance the MoD added: The Flexibly Deployable UAS Capability Concept Demonstration (CCD) aims to investigate the utility of an air vehicle with sufficient precision and persistence to provide a high quality ISTAR feed to deployed commanders where airfield support is not available or cannot be assured; the most demanding scenario envisaged being launch and recovery from an FF/DD sized vessel at sea.122 The MoD is also seeking to improve its unmanned maritime vehicle capability to assist in anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering and the provision of surveillance. DSTL is leading on the development of this programme.123
85Northrop Grumman told us that UAVs played an important role in maritime surveillance and ISTAR...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Northrop Grumman told us that UAVs played an important role in maritime surveillance and ISTAR in the US and Europe, offering an essential persistent capability for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. UAVs had transformed operations in 120 Q 173 121 Ev 41 122 Ev 42 123 Further information is available at: http://www.science.mod.uk/events/event_detail.aspx?eventid=176 (accessed 11 September 2012) Future Maritime Surveillance 43 Afghanistan and Iraq and future conflicts would see their roles expanded dramatically.124 Northrop Grumman added: In war-fighting situations, they offer near real-time target identification, engagement and assessment; timescales many times faster than for conventional platforms. While UAVs can fulfil their missions using a standalone approach, full exploitation of the operational benefits of UAVs is only possible in a joint integrated and network- enabled system. Within the US Armed Forces their use is already widespread, while, in the UK, the MoD has made ISTAR capability and UAVs a strategic priority.125
86Northrop Grumman also thought that lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles [balloons and airships] would “bring a revolutionary...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Northrop Grumman also thought that lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles [balloons and airships] would “bring a revolutionary capability to persistent ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] with the capability to be truly multi-mission with the inherent flexible, reconfigurable mission payloads”.126 LTAs are able to stay airborne for extended periods and have very low fuel consumption. They can provide multi-intelligence capabilities and have lower total ownership costs than traditional ISR systems. Northrop Grumman added “in addition to its persistent ISR, the LTA system can provide overland persistent ISR and also effectively support the UK’s maritime operational needs with offshore surveillance or fleet support as an airborne communications node along with the traditional fleet mission needs”.127
87However we also heard concerns about the use of UAVs for maritime surveillance.
Concluded (the committee's words)
However we also heard concerns about the use of UAVs for maritime surveillance. In his written evidence Dr Willett doubted the extent to which UAVs or commercial manned aircraft could provide the aerial capability for the UK’s maritime surveillance needs: The use of commercial aircraft for such tasks is becoming increasingly popular as a procurement option, for example to meet Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs). A cheaper alternative to UAVs, these aircraft can be leased off-the-shelf. However, they do not have the persistence of a UAV. Future technologies may include blimps. One issue to address is whether future UK aerial maritime surveillance requirements can be met by one asset only, or whether a combination of assets will be required.128 In his written evidence, Air Vice-Marshal Alan Roberts (retd.) was also sceptical of UAVs as a standalone alternative to a maritime patrol aircraft because of technical and cost considerations.129
88On the use of space and other technology, Squadron Leader Forbes (retd.), also had concerns:...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the use of space and other technology, Squadron Leader Forbes (retd.), also had concerns: There are a number of other space and airborne based intelligence systems which can give Indications and Warnings (IAW) of a threatening maritime environment. 124 Ev w40 125 Ev w40 126 Ev w43 127 Ev w43 128 Ev 56 129 Ev w19 44 Future Maritime Surveillance These should not be necessarily be ignored but they cannot carry the sensor capability to cover the range of skill sets needed to meet the disparate demands of ASW and ASuW.130 Rear Admiral Tony Rix (retd.), former Chief of Staff to the NATO Maritime Headquarters in Naples, was also cautious regarding the use of satellites: “the trouble with the satellite is that it cannot respond—it is less responsive than other surveillance assets—but it is all part of the mix”.131 Dr Willett added: “on satellites, it has obviously been the subject of much discussion that the UK does not have much capability of its own—the US and Europe have significantly greater capability—but we have, through Surrey Satellites, Novostar commercial satellite arrangement. As I understand it, that gives us limited time and access to that information, which limits capability, and also [...] it is very specific, but again, it reinforces the point about a wider layer.132
89Air Vice-Marshal Green saw unmanned vehicles as possible long term alternatives but said a maritime...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Air Vice-Marshal Green saw unmanned vehicles as possible long term alternatives but said a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution in the medium term: I look at the rest of this decade and the 2020s, and 2030 and beyond. I can well see that unmanned systems could provide us with capability in the underwater space. The previous witnesses talked about hybrid air vehicles and indeed that is part of our broader information, surveillance, reconnaissance-type debate that we are having about the future, because we have a number of assets that provide surveillance. Clearly, this debate is about maritime surveillance, but we look at surveillance across the complete environment—across the land environment and across the maritime environment. And there are platforms that are not that far away that are unconventional, if you like, to our inventory, but that could help us with that debate. However, they will not provide us with the full cross-section of capability that an aircraft would provide in the next 15 to 20 years.133
90We welcome the Minister’s statement that the MoD intends to explore fully all options and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Minister’s statement that the MoD intends to explore fully all options and alternatives for providing maritime surveillance. We agree that in the longer term unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and lighter-than-air vehicles may well be a way forward, but also note the reported concerns regarding the limitations of using satellite technology. There are several obstacles to overcome and the MoD should keep us informed of progress on this.
91The 2010 SDSR and subsequent related decisions may affect the possibility of using UAVs from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The 2010 SDSR and subsequent related decisions may affect the possibility of using UAVs from aircraft carriers. In the 2010 SDSR, the Government announced that one of the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers would be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’) to enable it to operate the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.134 On 10 130 Ev w22 131 Q 32 132 Q 32 133 Q 43 134 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 23 Future Maritime Surveillance 45 May 2012, the Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons that the Government had decided not to proceed with this decision, instead reverting to the pre- SDSR decision to purchase the STOVL (short take off and vertical landing) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.135 This decision may affect the practicability of the use of UAVs.
92Admiral Rix thought that in future UAVs might be flown from aircraft carriers in a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Admiral Rix thought that in future UAVs might be flown from aircraft carriers in a maritime surveillance role. He was unsure about the timescale for delivering this capability but thought that unmanned aerial vehicles from aircraft carriers could provide a level of wide area surveillance and assistance at the operational and tactical level.136 Dr Willett expressed concern that although there were a number of UAV programmes being considered, not many operated in a STOVL way which could have implications for the use of UAVs from aircraft carriers.137
93We asked the Minister and MoD officials what the implications of the carrier decision were...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Minister and MoD officials what the implications of the carrier decision were for the use of UAVs in a maritime surveillance role, particularly given the concerns we had heard about the limited number of UAVs that could operate in a STOVL way. The Minister told us that it should not be difficult to fly surveillance UAVs off aircraft carriers without cats and traps, but would be more difficult if the UAVs carried weapons.138 Air Vice-Marshal Green added that a demonstration programme was being looked at which involved flying a UAV off the back of a frigate.139 The Minister told us that while there was a good chance that the new aircraft carriers would have a maritime surveillance capability this would be unlikely to happen until the next decade.140 Following our evidence session, the MoD told us in supplementary written evidence that there was virtually no difference in the surveillance capability of the Joint Combat Aircraft STOVL variant and the carrier version and they could be employed with similar mission responsibilities.141
94We note the MoD’s confirmation that the requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the MoD’s confirmation that the requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into account prior to the decision to revert to a STOVL system on the new carriers and that the capability to undertake maritime surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from carriers would not be affected by this decision. We also note the concerns expressed to us on the limited number of UAVs that can operate in a STOVL manner and expect the MoD to keep this under review particularly if it becomes a requirement for future carrier launched UAVs undertaking maritime surveillance to have a weapons capability. We expect the MoD to keep us informed on progress of the possible use of carrier based UAVs for maritime surveillance. 135 HC Deb, 10 May 2012, cols 140–142 136 Q 31 137 Q 32 138 Q 178 139 Q 179 140 Q 183 141 Ev 50–51 46 Future Maritime Surveillance Cooperation with allies
95We explored current and future collaboration with allies on maritime surveillance, particularly through NATO.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We explored current and future collaboration with allies on maritime surveillance, particularly through NATO. The MoD emphasised that following the SDSR “strengthening our key defence alliances and partnerships has been critical in managing these changes” and also described current maritime surveillance initiatives under the 2010 UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty, the NATO Naval Armaments Working Group and the European Defence Agency.142 The MoD said that the withdrawal of Nimrod had increased to a limited extent the department’s reliance on other nations but there were “no formal, agreed criteria” for using allies’ maritime surveillance capabilities.143 The MoD added: for training, allies will bid into the planning of an exercise in order that surveillance capabilities from that nation can be considered and used. There are several international agreements that allow Allies to contribute directly to UK surveillance tasks in support of deterrent protection and intelligence gathering. During the planning of an operation there are a number of factors that will be considered, including the capability itself; timeliness; and our ability to use the product of that capability. This interoperability and ability to use the surveillance capability of allies may be governed by MOUs.144
96Allies had never refused the use of their assets, but they were not always available.145...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Allies had never refused the use of their assets, but they were not always available.145 Admiral Rix thought it was not desirable to rely on allies, either because they might have other priorities or for security reasons.146 However the Minister did not think maritime surveillance had to be a sovereign capability: There is a great deal we can do in cooperation with our allies and partners. There is a great deal that we do do in the way of cooperation and information sharing, and there are various new initiatives being undertaken in NATO and in the EU that would assist international cooperation in this field in the future. I would certainly accept that there will be elements that we want to keep sovereign, but the proposition that the whole piece must, of necessity, be sovereign is not an analysis I would share. [...] We do a lot in cooperation with our allies already. This is a cooperative effort in which we work with several partners. To point to some obvious ones, the US, Canada and Norway are partners with whom we work all the time on this sort of piece. The idea that we—or, frankly, anybody—could afford to do this entirely on our own is one that I just do not think is realistic.147 142 Ev 47 143 Ev 47 144 Ev 47 145 Ev 48 146 Q 19 147 Qq 141–142 Future Maritime Surveillance 47 However the Minister did confirm to us that no new arrangements or additional agreements had been established to cover the capability gap following the Nimrod MRA4 decision.148 NATO Smart Defence Initiatives
97We also explored the NATO Smart Defence Initiatives in respect of maritime surveillance.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We also explored the NATO Smart Defence Initiatives in respect of maritime surveillance. The MoD told us that there were two initiatives: • A Tier One proposal: led by the Germans to pool and share MPA assets that could be offset or recompensed by the UK providing C130, C17 and tanker hours. The UK is not interested in this proposal because it does not have MPA assets to pool; the nations involved (Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) that are able to provide MPA will offer aging aircraft such as the P3 Orion that does not have the requisite level of avionics or reliability to support our Deterrent and would not offer value for money in exchange for the pooling of higher grade UK capabilities. Additionally there are concerns over sovereignty (related to the Deterrent in particular) and guaranteed assurance. • A Tier Two proposal: The NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) investigation, led by the Canadians, to provide a long term solution by means of MPA procurement; this would provide a NATO capability akin to the AWACS model. The UK supports this proposal because it overcomes the sovereignty and assurance issues whilst providing a multi-national procurement option based on economy of scale.149
98When we asked our MoD witnesses what was the projected timescale for the Tier Two...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When we asked our MoD witnesses what was the projected timescale for the Tier Two proposal, Tom McKane, Director General for Security Policy, MoD, told us it was a longer term project: It is looking at a longer-term solution, so it is not something that would come to fruition in the next year or so; it would be a longer-term project. As to exactly when the study work will complete, I do not know.150
99We note the MoD’s acceptance that since the SDSR the Department’s reliance on allies to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note the MoD’s acceptance that since the SDSR the Department’s reliance on allies to provide maritime surveillance has increased, though because of the range of capabilities and sources of information still available to the Department it had not done so markedly, and that the withdrawal of Nimrod had required greater reliance on other nations to provide MPA cover. We are concerned that the Government has not thought it necessary to try to secure any additional agreements to ensure the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. Part of the MoD’s examination of future maritime surveillance requirements should include an examination of those areas where a sovereign capability would be desirable and this should feed into the Department’s consideration of a new MPA and the investigation of other options such 148 Qq 143–145 149 Ev 48 150 Q 168 48 Future Maritime Surveillance as UAVs. We support the UK’s participation in the NATO Tier Two proposal for maritime surveillance and expect to be regularly updated on its progress. Future Maritime Surveillance 49 5 Cross-Government cooperation
100The UK’s requirement for maritime surveillance goes far wider than the needs of UK Armed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s requirement for maritime surveillance goes far wider than the needs of UK Armed Forces. Other Government Departments and agencies also make use of the MoD’s maritime surveillance capabilities and platforms in a number of areas and therefore we examined the cross-government cooperation between departments and agencies in determining the strategic requirements for maritime surveillance and their translation into operational requirements. We have discussed earlier defence-specific processes for establishing and setting the military requirements for maritime surveillance (see paragraphs 9–19). As a result of the 2009 update to the 2008 National Security Strategy, a Cabinet Office-led Maritime Security Review made two recommendations which would run in parallel to the defence-specific processes: • Strengthened strategic oversight of Maritime Security through a set of strategic objectives and changes to the central oversight of strategic policy mechanisms. • Improved Situational Awareness for Maritime Security through the establishment of a new national multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) at Northwood to address current vulnerabilities.151 Maritime Security Oversight Group
101In 2010, the Government sought to provide “strengthened strategic oversight” by establishing the Maritime Security...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In 2010, the Government sought to provide “strengthened strategic oversight” by establishing the Maritime Security and Oversight Group (MSOG) whose membership is made up of “key representatives of core departments, agencies and the Cabinet Office, and is the senior-level decision making group for maritime issues”. The MoD described the role of the group as providing “strategic oversight and direction of all cross-cutting maritime security issues and programmes, including aspects of maritime surveillance [and] is responsible for the Maritime Security vision, strategic objectives and risks, reviewing them as circumstances require, and allocating priorities in order to use a framework to drive and coordinate day-to-day policy on cross government programmes of work”.152 National Maritime Information Centre
102The 2010 SDSR acknowledged that no single department or body had the capacity or capability...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The 2010 SDSR acknowledged that no single department or body had the capacity or capability to deliver what is required to monitor the maritime environment and counter threats the UK faces both in territorial waters and internationally. The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) was established in Northwood on 1 April 2011 “to ensure information was disseminated, analysed and acted upon in a coordinated manner”. NMIC brings together government departments and agencies with responsibility for maritime safety, security and environment in one place and is accountable to the Home Office. Its intention is to develop a single picture of maritime activity similar to that used by air traffic controllers so that threats and risks can be recognised and countered as early as possible.153 151 Ev 34–35 152 Ev 35 153 Ev 35 50 Future Maritime Surveillance MSOG and NMIC: achievement of their roles
103The creation of the MSOG and NMIC are intended to lead to a more strategic...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The creation of the MSOG and NMIC are intended to lead to a more strategic and coordinated approach on maritime issues. Although both organisations are relatively new we were interested to assess their progress in achieving the roles set out for them by the Government and whether there was scope for further improvements. Edward Ferguson, Head, Defence Strategies and Priorities, who is the MoD’s representative on the MSOG, told us that there had been “considerable progress over the past couple of years” with the creation of the MSOG and NMIC. He added “there [had] been real progress at the operational level, and NMIC is the flagship programme. That greater interaction at the policy level is also really helpful”.154 Captain Russell Pegg, Head of NMIC, thought that the recognition that no one department or agency could fully understand what was occurring in the maritime domain and bringing together the “good work” going on within the “stovepipes” of departments had “brought immediate value to the bigger picture”.155
104Although NMIC was only established in April 2011, the MoD thought that it had already...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although NMIC was only established in April 2011, the MoD thought that it had already brought significant benefits by assisting greater coordination between UK Government agencies and departments and also international cooperation with allies. Provision had also been made for NMIC to report directly to the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) in the event of crisis.156
105Our witnesses widely supported the establishment of NMIC and thought that it had been an...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Our witnesses widely supported the establishment of NMIC and thought that it had been an important and successful development. Rear Admiral Tony Rix (retd.) described NMIC as “a fantastic organisation [which] will enable us to provide a single picture for maritime activity, with input from numerous agencies. The principle of it is superb”.157 Rod Johnson, the Chief Coastguard, commented “the principle is extremely sound in that what may in the normal pattern of life make perfect sense to my organisation will be of interest for a completely different reason to another”.158 Dr Willett was also supportive of NMIC but pointed out that political will and focus was required for its continued development: The point is that when you have something such as NMIC, which is a new idea that is working very well, but which requires political support and resources, do you have the sustainable political focus on maritime issues to ensure that it and other activities like it are enabled to continue to develop?159 Further improvements to cross-departmental working
106The establishment of the MSOG and NMIC is a useful first step to providing a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The establishment of the MSOG and NMIC is a useful first step to providing a more strategic and coordinated approach by Government to maritime issues. However we were keen to explore the scope for improvements in cross-government working and also to consider where the lines of demarcation should lie between departments. During our 154 Q 78 155 Q 76 156 Ev 35 157 Q 33 158 Q 33 159 Q 33 Future Maritime Surveillance 51 inquiry we heard that there had been an intermittent debate over recent years about the need for the UK to have a National Maritime Security Strategy.160 In November 2011, the MSOG instructed that work should commence on a cross-government National Strategy for Maritime Security. The MoD said that this strategy would: set coherent, resource aware, and pragmatic objectives and actions, with maritime surveillance a key tenet. From a maritime surveillance perspective, the strategy aims to achieve greater coordination of homeland aerial maritime surveillance requirements; and fully utilise NMIC to co-ordinate an integrated maritime surveillance and interdiction capability through well-defined coordinated protocols between the key stakeholders in response to threats”.161 In oral evidence, Edward Ferguson, MoD, said that this would be difficult because of the number of agencies involved, but added that there were well-worked out procedures for coordination and deconfliction between them.162
107When considering the lines of demarcation between departmental responsibilities we heard that although there are...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When considering the lines of demarcation between departmental responsibilities we heard that although there are some tasks that are clearly defined as civil and others that are clearly military, there were some that were a mixture of the two. For example military maritime assets which are operating out at sea on a daily basis can provide a degree of surveillance that is non-military although this is not their primary focus.163 Admiral Rix (retd.) supported examining the sharing of capabilities but warned against practical difficulties: I think the sharing of capabilities is clearly a way ahead that needs to be looked at, but there will be all sorts of problems in sorting out priorities. One day, we might want surveillance of the fisheries and at the same time the Ministry of Defence might want surveillance of the Mediterranean. It is a very sensible way ahead, but I suggest that one should not underestimate the practical difficulties of achieving something that is effective for all the stakeholders.164
108The Government agreed that more could be done to develop cross-departmental working and that there...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government agreed that more could be done to develop cross-departmental working and that there were other areas where cooperation should be explored. Edward Ferguson gave the example of aerial surveillance where “there are currently three departmental agencies—the UK Border Agency, the Marine Management Organisation and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency—that have individual aerial surveillance contracts to do different functions”. The Government was interested in looking at whether these could be brought together into a single contract, which would be a more efficient use of taxpayer money and should provide a more coherent product. However Mr Ferguson also pointed out that in a more coordinated approach the appropriate governance and oversight arrangements to manage those more coherent and single contracts would be critical.165 Rear Admiral James Rapp (retd.), was supportive of possible moves towards a 160 Q 7 and Ev 56 161 Ev 35 162 Q 78 163 Q 34 [Dr Willett] 164 Q 34 [Rear Admiral Rix] 165 Q 78 52 Future Maritime Surveillance single air surveillance contract and suggested the Australian ‘Coastwatch’ Organisation as a potential model for the UK to follow as many of the characteristics of the UK situation were similar to those experienced by Australia before it adopted this model.166
109Rod Johnson, the Chief Coastguard, said that although the Maritime and Coastguard Agency had no...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Rod Johnson, the Chief Coastguard, said that although the Maritime and Coastguard Agency had no direct experience of the Australian model he thought it an example that could be considered and lessons learned from it.167 Admiral Rix warned that the Australian model only covered the Exclusive Economic Zone and that the military requirements for surveillance are much more extensive, as were search and rescue requirements.168 We understand that although the Maritime Security Oversight Group has agreed in principle to move forward on work towards a single air surveillance contract there was first a need to undertake further work, in particular to consider how governance and oversight of a single contract could be undertaken.169
110It is important that cross-departmental cooperation should exist at ministerial as well as at official...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is important that cross-departmental cooperation should exist at ministerial as well as at official and operations level. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, told us there was a “sort of informal network of Ministers under James Brokenshire [Home Office Parliamentary Under Secretary for crime and security] that look at these things as well. He has the lead responsibility for that, but as this work goes forward and the officials begin to distil options and explore the scope for cooperation, Ministers will come together to look at the work they are producing”.170 He thought that such an informal forum was the right one for taking forward the debate on maritime surveillance issues and settling issues of differing requirements, though ultimately decisions would be taken by the Cabinet or the National Security Council.171
111Asked how much other Government Departments influenced the MoD’s thinking or drove its posture on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Asked how much other Government Departments influenced the MoD’s thinking or drove its posture on maritime surveillance, the Minister responded that although other departments had active interests and there was scope for better coordination, he could not really see circumstances: in which the requirements of those other Government Departments would lever the MoD against its judgment as to the military requirement into providing a service that it did not otherwise think that it needed to provide. However, if the MoD was moving to a position where it was looking at expanding what it does in this area and if the opportunity to cooperate with other Government Departments to avoid duplication, to multitask and to get better value for taxpayers’ money was to present itself, I could imagine it happening.172 166 Ev w1–2 167 Q 35 168 Q 35 169 Q 78, Q 192 and Ev 46 170 Q 195 171 Q 195 172 Q 194 Future Maritime Surveillance 53 Future role of NMIC
112NMIC is currently an information-gathering organisation.
Concluded (the committee's words)
NMIC is currently an information-gathering organisation. During our inquiry it was suggested that given its closeness to the maritime information, it might be appropriate for it to evolve into a decision making body rather than for that decision making to be detached.173 The Chief Coastguard, was cautious about this proposal, thinking that, although NMIC worked very well as a means of sharing information, if it were to become a decision making body as it would be “reorganising the way that the Government currently do their security and safety operations for all things maritime”.174 He said that each agency was interested in different things and alerted by different developments: The participating agencies and stakeholders already have mature and well rehearsed practices for dealing with their particular issues and the value-add is, as I have said, recognising that what might be perfectly normal or appear perfectly normal within the pattern of life for one agency may be a trigger for something else. However, turning that into a decision-making cell would require the reorganisation of Government in relation to maritime. That needs to be carefully thought through.175
113While acknowledging these concerns, Captain Russell Pegg, Head of NMIC, did not dismiss the possibility...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While acknowledging these concerns, Captain Russell Pegg, Head of NMIC, did not dismiss the possibility of such a development. He told us: We should not change if it is the right thing to do, and we should certainly look at that as a next piece of work [...] The value we have seen added is just through conversation of having all those people together—those eureka moments have happened. The intellectual argument is over; it is really now, “What is the national appetite to go to the next step if that is what the nation requires to safeguard its maritime interests?176
114The Minister was sceptical about such a big change: If [NMIC] were to move [...]...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Minister was sceptical about such a big change: If [NMIC] were to move [...] into a sort of command and control function for the whole of Government, that would be almost unique in terms of the way Government operates. I am not sure I am convinced by that. Individual Departments retain responsibility and individual agencies do form different parts of the work. It is entirely right that we try and get as common an understanding as we possibly can of the threats and the challenges, but [...] the need for the constituent Departments and agencies to retain their responsibilities would be likely to override pooling of the decision making.177
115We commend the Government for the establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We commend the Government for the establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which have improved cross government cooperation on maritime surveillance issues. The MSOG’s work on the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security is 173 Q 33 [Dr Willett] 174 Q 173 175 Q 34 176 Q 77 177 Q 199 54 Future Maritime Surveillance an important piece of work that should be prioritised across Government. In response to our Report the Government should provide us with an update on this work and its planned timetable for it being brought to a conclusion. It must not become a stop-start endeavour. We endorse the work of NMIC as a valuable element in enhancing the national security of the UK. We will take a close interest in its work and how it develops in the future. We are not currently persuaded by the suggestion that NMIC could evolve to become a decision making centre. This would represent a considerable change in the way Government undertakes maritime security and safety operations particularly at a time of major change in the defence arena.
116We believe that there is room for further improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We believe that there is room for further improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters. We are not convinced that an “informal group of Ministers” is the appropriate forum for taking forward the debate on maritime surveillance issues. Although decisions may ultimately be made in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we recommend that there should be a greater level of ministerial involvement in maritime surveillance as an issue particularly given the number of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time. In response to our Report the Government should also provide us with an update on progress on the Maritime Security Oversight Group’s work towards a single air surveillance contract. This should include the alternative options that the Government is considering as a potential model for the UK in this area. Future Maritime Surveillance 55 6 Conclusions
117We agree with our witnesses that there is a risk associated with the capability gap...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with our witnesses that there is a risk associated with the capability gap in maritime surveillance. We acknowledge that the Government accept this and we welcome the work being undertaken to investigate how to mitigate the risks inherent in the gap and ensure the longer term provision of maritime surveillance. The MoD asserts that it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation in the maritime surveillance arena, but we remain unconvinced it has the capacity to respond to any sudden escalation in that risk. Furthermore we believe the risk is likely to worsen in the medium term as further maritime surveillance capabilities are withdrawn or not yet filled. The UK’s maritime flank is likely to be increasingly exposed: this risk must be kept under close and continuous review, and we will continue to take a close interest in the MoD’s work in this area.
118The MoD has acknowledged that there is a strategic and national security requirement for maritime...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The MoD has acknowledged that there is a strategic and national security requirement for maritime surveillance. We are concerned that the MoD is sending mixed messages in respect of the need for a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). On one hand it says that there is no requirement for such an aircraft and that it is not funded or in the programme but on the other hand it acknowledges that its absence is a risk and something may need to be done. The MoD must explain why it is satisfactory to wait until 2015 or beyond before deciding how to close the capability gap in maritime surveillance particularly as the MoD acknowledge that a MPA is the solution in the short to medium term. We commend the work that the MoD is undertaking to explore the wide range of possibilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, lighter-than-air vehicles and space technology, for the future long-term provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. This work must not be allowed to lose momentum, particularly as no one individual is responsible for maritime surveillance in the MoD.
119There is a wide demand across Government departments and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities.
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is a wide demand across Government departments and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities. The establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group and the National Maritime Information Centre are welcome first steps towards a more strategic and coordinated output and as a way of mitigating some of the capability gaps. The challenge is to develop these further and we are keen to see a more prominent ministerial role particularly given the number of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time. 56 Future Maritime Surveillance