1st Report - Technology rules? The advent of new technologies in the justice system

The government's response

What the committee recommended 38

1. 1
   We see serious risks that an individual’s right to a fair trial could be undermined... Conclusion · paragraph 26
2. 2
   The use of advanced technologies in the application of the law poses a real and... Conclusion · paragraph 30
3. 3
   We have heard no evidence that the Government has taken a cross-departmental strategic approach to... Conclusion · paragraph 41
4. 4
   We recommend that the Government rationalise the respective roles of Departments as they pertain to... Recommendation · paragraph 42
5. 5
   We recommend that the Government conduct a review to rationalise and consolidate governance structures of... Recommendation · paragraph 43

See all 38 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

• 1st Report - Technology rules? The advent of new technologies in the justice system ↗The committee's report, parliament.uk
• Government Response to the Report "Technology rules? The advent of new technologies in the justice system" ↗The government's response, 23 June 2022, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 38

1. 1
   We see serious risks that an individual’s right to a fair trial could be undermined... Conclusion · paragraph 26 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   We see serious risks that an individual’s right to a fair trial could be undermined by algorithmically manipulated evidence. We therefore favour precise documentation, evaluation by subject experts, and transparency where evidence may be subject to algorithmic manipulation.
2. 2
   The use of advanced technologies in the application of the law poses a real and... Conclusion · paragraph 30 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The use of advanced technologies in the application of the law poses a real and current risk to human rights and to the rule of law. Unless this is acknowledged and addressed, the potential benefits of using advanced technologies may be outweighed by the harm that will occur and the distrust it will create.
3. 3
   We have heard no evidence that the Government has taken a cross-departmental strategic approach to... Conclusion · paragraph 41 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   We have heard no evidence that the Government has taken a cross-departmental strategic approach to the use of new technologies in the application of the law. There appears in practical terms to be a considerable disconnect across Government, exemplified by confusing and duplicative institutional oversight arrangements and resulting in a lack of coordination. Recent attempts to harmonise have instead further complicated an already crowded institutional landscape. Thorough review across Departments is urgently required.
4. 4
   We recommend that the Government rationalise the respective roles of Departments as they pertain to... Recommendation · paragraph 42 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   We recommend that the Government rationalise the respective roles of Departments as they pertain to the use of new technologies in the application of the law.
5. 5
   We recommend that the Government conduct a review to rationalise and consolidate governance structures of... Recommendation · paragraph 43 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   We recommend that the Government conduct a review to rationalise and consolidate governance structures of the use of technologies in the application of the law.
6. 6
   As part of rationalisation, the Government should establish a single national body to govern the... Recommendation · paragraph 44 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   As part of rationalisation, the Government should establish a single national body to govern the use of new technologies for the application of the law. The new national body should be independent, established on a statutory basis, and have its own budget. The body would have several functions and responsibilities, which we detail in Chapter 5. It should draw on as wide as possible a range of expertise.
7. 7
   While they play an essential role in addressing breaches of the law, we cannot expect... Conclusion · paragraph 50 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   While they play an essential role in addressing breaches of the law, we cannot expect the Courts to set the framework for the deployment of new technologies.
8. 8
   Given the potential costs of technologies and the problems that can and do arise from... Conclusion · paragraph 61 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Given the potential costs of technologies and the problems that can and do arise from their implementation, including with respect to privacy rights, freedoms, and discrimination, we consider that a stronger legal framework is required to prevent damage to the rule of law.
9. 9
   We recommend that the Government bring forward primary legislation which embodies general principles, and which... Recommendation · paragraph 65 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   We recommend that the Government bring forward primary legislation which embodies general principles, and which is supported by detailed regulations setting minimum standards. We consider that this approach would strike the right balance between concerns that an overly prescriptive law could stifle innovation and the need to ensure safe and ethical use of technologies.
10. 10
    Along with 41 other countries, the Government has endorsed principles of Artificial Intelligence. Recommendation · paragraph 66 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Along with 41 other countries, the Government has endorsed principles of Artificial Intelligence. In response to this report, the Government should outline proposals to establish these firmly in statute.
11. 11
    Guidance, both general and specific, is urgently needed. Recommendation · paragraph 74 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Guidance, both general and specific, is urgently needed. The Government should require that national guidance for the use of advanced technological tools in policing and criminal justice is drawn up and, as part of their response to this report, should outline concrete plans for this.
12. 12
    There is a need for a ‘one-stop shop’ collating all relevant legislation, regulation and guidance... Conclusion · paragraph 75 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is a need for a ‘one-stop shop’ collating all relevant legislation, regulation and guidance and drawing together high-level principles with practical user guides. This collation should be updated by the College of Policing on an ongoing basis, and direct users to the guidance and regulation relevant to their circumstance and need.
13. 13
    There is no clear line of accountability for the misuse or failure of technological solutions... Conclusion · paragraph 84 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is no clear line of accountability for the misuse or failure of technological solutions used in the application of the law. As a result, no satisfactory recourse mechanisms exist.
14. 14
    The Government should appoint a taskforce to produce guidance to ensure that lines of accountability,... Recommendation · paragraph 85 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Government should appoint a taskforce to produce guidance to ensure that lines of accountability, which may differ depending on circumstances , are consistent across England and Wales. The taskforce should act transparently and consult with all affected parties.
15. 15
    Moratoria are important and powerful mechanisms. Recommendation · paragraph 89 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Moratoria are important and powerful mechanisms. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the circumstances in which it would be willing to deploy them in the future. The new national body we recommend should be empowered to refuse certification for a new tool under those circumstances.
16. 16
    One of the principles in the new statute we recommend should be transparency. Recommendation · paragraph 94 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    One of the principles in the new statute we recommend should be transparency.
17. 17
    There are no systematic obligations on individual departments, public bodies, and police forces to disclose... Conclusion · paragraph 98 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There are no systematic obligations on individual departments, public bodies, and police forces to disclose information on their use of advanced technological solutions. It is impossible for Parliament, press, academia, those responsible for procurement and—importantly—those subject to their use to scrutinise and challenge the use of technological solutions as they cannot know who is using what, for how long, for what purpose, or with what safeguards. This risks undermining trust in the police, the justice system, and the rule of law.
18. 18
    We urge the Government to consider what level of candour would be appropriate to require... Recommendation · paragraph 102 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We urge the Government to consider what level of candour would be appropriate to require of police forces regarding their use of advanced technologies.
19. 19
    Full participation in the Algorithmic Transparency Standard collection should become mandatory, and its scope extended... Conclusion · paragraph 112 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Full participation in the Algorithmic Transparency Standard collection should become mandatory, and its scope extended to become inclusive of all advanced algorithms used in the application of the law that have direct or indirect implications for individuals. This would have the effect of turning the collection into a register. Engaging with this register will require additional and dedicated resourcing. The central body we have recommended should have the power to review and issue penalties if entries are not completed.
20. 20
    The register should be user-friendly. Conclusion · paragraph 113 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The register should be user-friendly. Users should be able to find information about technological solutions being deployed, who is deploying them, where, on what occasions, and for what purposes. They should also be able to find detailed impact assessments and details of the certification issued by the central body we have recommended (see paragraph 189).
21. 21
    There is a significant and worrying body of evidence that the users of advanced technologies... Conclusion · paragraph 128 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is a significant and worrying body of evidence that the users of advanced technologies are in many cases failing to engage, in a meaningful way, with the output of automated processes. Outputs may be overrated or misinterpreted, and challenge smothered, with potentially significant adverse consequences for individuals and litigants.
22. 22
    The Home Office should, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice and the College of... Conclusion · paragraph 130 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Home Office should, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice and the College of Policing, undertake or commission appropriate research to determine how the use of predictive algorithms affects decision making, and under what circumstances meaningful human interaction is most likely.
23. 23
    We endorse the principles provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office regarding meaningful interaction with technologies. Conclusion · paragraph 138 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We endorse the principles provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office regarding meaningful interaction with technologies. These principles should be applied through mandatory training for officers and officials using advanced technologies. As appropriate this should include both generic data analytics and specificities of the particular technology in question. As part of continuing professional development, training should also be made available to lawyers, members of the Judiciary, and other professionals involved in the justice system. Training will need to be tailored for the specific context and delivered by the relevant professional body with the support of the central body recommended in paragraph 44.
24. 24
    At a minimum, there should be one person within every team which uses advanced technologies... Conclusion · paragraph 139 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    At a minimum, there should be one person within every team which uses advanced technologies with the expertise required to support colleagues in the use of advanced technological solutions. Enabling meaningful support and proper assessment will require substantial investment in continuing professional development and the development of leadership skills.
25. 25
    Institutional processes to enable challenge to algorithmic outcomes should be reviewed and inspected. Recommendation · paragraph 146 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Institutional processes to enable challenge to algorithmic outcomes should be reviewed and inspected. These inspections should also assess whether the users of the relevant tool(s) are appropriately trained.
26. 26
    There should be a requirement upon producers of technological products to embed explainability within the... Conclusion · paragraph 155 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There should be a requirement upon producers of technological products to embed explainability within the tools themselves. The interface of tools should be designed to facilitate the experience of users: equipping them with the necessary information to interpret outputs, and an indication of the level of surety its outputs provide. The specifics of what should be explained will vary depending upon the context . The tool should reflect that variation, and encourage users to consider and challenge results.
27. 27
    Comprehensive impact assessments should be made mandatory for each occasion an advanced technological tool is... Conclusion · paragraph 169 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Comprehensive impact assessments should be made mandatory for each occasion an advanced technological tool is implemented in a new context or for a new purpose. They should include considerations of bias; weaknesses of the specific technology and associated datasets; and discursive consideration of the wider societal and equality impacts (including explanations of public consultations). Impact assessments should be regularly updated and open to public scrutiny.
28. 28
    Minimum scientific standards should be set centrally by the new national body we have recommended... Conclusion · paragraph 173 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Minimum scientific standards should be set centrally by the new national body we have recommended in paragraph 44. They should then be transposed into regulations through secondary legislation.
29. 29
    Pre-deployment scientific evaluations of technological solutions designed for use in the application of the law... Conclusion · paragraph 183 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Pre-deployment scientific evaluations of technological solutions designed for use in the application of the law would empower public bodies and agencies to use better and more effective tools more safely.
30. 30
    Individual police forces are ill-equipped to carry out systematic evaluation of technological solutions: they have... Conclusion · paragraph 184 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Individual police forces are ill-equipped to carry out systematic evaluation of technological solutions: they have neither the resources nor the expertise. Tools are deployed when they have not been sufficiently evaluated; risking the use of tools that either cannot do the job, or that have unacceptable impacts on society.
31. 31
    The new national body recommended in Chapter 2 should systematically certify technological solutions following evaluation... Conclusion · paragraph 189 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The new national body recommended in Chapter 2 should systematically certify technological solutions following evaluation and prior to their deployment. No technological solution should be deployed until the central body has confirmed it meets the minimum standards. After a transition period, this requirement should retrospectively be applied to technological solutions already in use.
32. 32
    While technological solutions should systematically be evaluated and ‘kitemarked’ centrally, different police forces need different... Conclusion · paragraph 196 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    While technological solutions should systematically be evaluated and ‘kitemarked’ centrally, different police forces need different technological solutions, according to their local needs. Procurement should remain the prerogative of individual forces, their choice being only constrained to those technological solutions certified by the central body.
33. 33
    Police forces lack proficiency when procuring new technologies. Conclusion · paragraph 205 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Police forces lack proficiency when procuring new technologies. Existing official guidelines on the procurement of new technologies are focused on promoting uptake of AI. The Guidelines for AI Procurement are insufficient to ensure that public bodies take account of all relevant factors in procuring new technologies for the application of the law.
34. 34
    While police forces should remain free to procure the technological solutions of their choice among... Conclusion · paragraph 206 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    While police forces should remain free to procure the technological solutions of their choice among those certified by the new national body , they need extra support to become proficient customers of new technologies. Pre-deployment certification could, in itself, reassure them about the quality of the products they are procuring. Enhanced procurement guidelines are also needed.
35. 35
    Oversight mechanisms are required to complement pre-deployment scientific evaluations of new technologies used for the... Conclusion · paragraph 216 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Oversight mechanisms are required to complement pre-deployment scientific evaluations of new technologies used for the application of the law. Local specialist ethics committees are best placed to scrutinise technological solutions throughout their lifecycle and in their deployment contexts.
36. 36
    We urge the Government to continue work on the national data ethics governance body. Recommendation · paragraph 217 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We urge the Government to continue work on the national data ethics governance body. This body will need the independence, resources, and statutory underpinning to enable it to scrutinise the deployment of new technologies and act as a central resource of best practice.
37. 37
    The Home Office should encourage and facilitate the development of local or regional specialist ethics... Conclusion · paragraph 218 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Home Office should encourage and facilitate the development of local or regional specialist ethics committees. These committees should be granted independence, a statutory basis, and an independent budget. They should be transparent, and their membership should be diverse. They should scrutinise the use of new technologies by police forces throughout their lifecycle and in their deployment contexts, confirming that their proposed and actual uses are legitimate , necessary, and proportionate. These committees could be given a veto of the deployment of a particular technological solution during a mandatory trial period.
38. 38
    The new national body recommended in paragraph 44 would have distinct responsibilities to set minimum... Conclusion · paragraph 219 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The new national body recommended in paragraph 44 would have distinct responsibilities to set minimum standards for the use of new technologies in the application of the law; certify every new technological solution against these standards; and to carry out regular audits into their use. With the assurance brought by the certification process and the register of algorithms, police forces and other public bodies would remain free to procure the technological solutions of their choice, as long as the products have been certified.