Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

Second Report - The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) HC 1389 Published 20 September 2023
Source-linked government response
First Special Report - The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2022–23 · published 6 Dec 2023
Read the government response ↗ Response on the Index

Recommendations & Conclusions

4 items
1 Conclusion
Para 13

The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was established to deliver a cross- Government response...

Conclusion
The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was established to deliver a cross- Government response to challenges overseas which threaten UK national security, using both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funding. ODA programmes within the CSSF have suffered significant cuts, shifting the emphasis of the Fund away from peacebuilding and conflict prevention and creating a de facto de-prioritisation of development work within the Fund. We are concerned that the cuts to ODA-funded programmes within the CSSF are likely to impair the ability of the UK Government to anticipate conflict, prevent escalation, and respond effectively to areas of known instability across the world, which may be a false economy. In addition, these cuts may have impaired the Government’s ability to respond effectively to recent crises in the Middle East and Sudan.

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Cabinet Office
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2 Conclusion
Para 19

The CSSF has developed a distinct identity as an agile fund, under control from the...

Conclusion
The CSSF has developed a distinct identity as an agile fund, under control from the centre, undertaking work to prevent conflict and promote stability overseas, including projects that other funders would often deem too high-risk. In the transition to the Integrated Security Fund (ISF), there is a risk that this identity will be diluted amongst other more disparate policy aims, and that domestic political pressures will take priority.

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Cabinet Office
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3 Conclusion
Para 21

We are concerned about the lack of clarity surrounding core practical points relating to the...

Conclusion
We are concerned about the lack of clarity surrounding core practical points relating to the ISF transition period, and the impact of this uncertainty upon organisations currently implementing CSSF programmes. It is also unknown to what extent the current commitments to transparency, monitoring and evaluation of activities will continue.

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Cabinet Office
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4 Recommendation

We recommend that the Government should: (Paragraph 22) • Write to the Committee on a...

Recommendation
We recommend that the Government should: (Paragraph 22) • Write to the Committee on a quarterly basis during the transition period for the Fund, providing details of timelines and progress made, and sharing examples of how the bidding process is clarified with NGOs during this period; • Commit to ensuring that the Integrated Security Fund maintains the CSSF’s current levels of transparency in the publication of information on programme activity, spend and performance (for ODA-eligible ISF programmes, documents should demonstrate mapping against relevant Sustainable Development Goals); and • Commit to ensuring that the Integrated Security Fund maintains the CSSF’s current level of monitoring and evaluation of activities. The Confict, Stability and Security Fund 13

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Cabinet Office
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Report Status
Response document linked

Recorded deadline: 20 Nov 2023

Missing links do not establish that no response was published. A linked document does not verify responses to individual findings.

Conclusions & Recommendations
4 items (1 rec)

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