Recommendation 36

By 18 October, the NSA should write to us to answer the following questions: a) At what point did the Government give its consent to the February 2020 Doha Agreement negotiated by the United States and the Taliban? If it did not agree with this decision, why did it endorse the agreement at the UN Security Council meeting on 10 March 2020? b) Why did (some parts of) the UK Government only begin planning for the withdrawal of NATO troops and its potential consequences, including the increased likelihood of the Taliban coming to power, in April 2021? c) What was the role of the NSC and the Afghanistan NSIG in overseeing planning for the implementation of the Doha Agreement? On which dates did the NSC meet to discuss Afghanistan since April 2021? d) What action did the Government take to anticipate and prepare for the second- and third-order effects of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan? e) On which date did the NSC—or another ministerial committee—last revisit the Government’s plans for an urgent evacuation of Kabul, including the processing of asylum seekers (if, indeed, such a plan was in place)? f) Has the NSC met to discuss the strategic implications of the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban? If not, when will it do so? g) Why is there so little reference to Afghanistan in the Integrated Review? At what point will this be revisited by the NSC, and will the Government be drawing up a new strategy on Afghanistan? h) What are the implications of the United States’ approach to Afghanistan in the past two years for the future of NATO, and for the viability of the Integrated Review, which is based on assumptions of a globally engaged US? i) Do events in Afghanistan suggest a US withdrawal from intervention elsewhere (for example in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Sinai and Mali); and what are the implications for the UK’s ability to pursue its own objectives in relation to counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and conflict resolution? 68 The UK’s national security machinery j) What are the implications of the Taliban victory for the UK’s relationship with Pakistan, including the terrorist risk emanating from that country, and the attendant risks of terror attacks in the UK? The Government should use an annex to the NSA’s letter to provide information that cannot be put into the public domain.