Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee

Thirteenth Report: Whole of Government Response to COVID-19

Public Accounts Committee HC 404 Published 23 July 2020
Report Status
Response overdue
Conclusions & Recommendations
23 items (3 recs)

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Recommendations

3 results
2

We understand and acknowledge that the usual processes for scrutinising and approving spending decisions may...

Recommendation
We understand and acknowledge that the usual processes for scrutinising and approving spending decisions may need to be relaxed when urgent action is needed during an emergency. In the following paragraph we criticise the transparency over ministerial directions, not the … Read more
HM Treasury
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4

Effective coordination and command structures are critical for good decision making in any ongoing emergency.

Recommendation
Effective coordination and command structures are critical for good decision making in any ongoing emergency. The government set up four ministerial implementation committees to coordinate the pandemic response across government, reporting into the COVID-19 group chaired by the Prime Minister, … Read more
HM Treasury
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6

The unit cost paid by the government for PPE and medical equipment is higher than...

Recommendation
The unit cost paid by the government for PPE and medical equipment is higher than it would have liked but it considers the purchase of this equipment value for money given the alternative of not having enough equipment. However, it … Read more
HM Treasury
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Conclusions (20)

Observations and findings
3 Conclusion
We are concerned that lessons have not been learned ahead of a potential second spike of infections. It is not clear that the government is undertaking the necessary preparatory work for a second peak of infections. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy still has nothing convincing to say …
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5 Conclusion
There were fundamental flaws in the government’s central procurement and local distribution of vital goods and equipment. We recognise that the government was faced with a massive challenge to procure a huge quantity of personal protective equipment (PPE) for 58,000 separate sites including hospitals and care homes. But despite a …
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7 Conclusion
The majority of business support measures have been one-size-fits-all, but some crucial sectors of the economy need more bespoke support. The government’s grants and loans schemes to support businesses through the pandemic have directed large sums of money to affected businesses, with the Department estimating that over one million businesses …
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8 Conclusion
Central government has not given local authorities the clarity or support they need over longer-term funding. Central government promised that local authorities would have the resources they needed to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, but many local authorities are facing income shortfalls and increased demand and will not be able …
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1 Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from HM Treasury (the Treasury), the Cabinet Office, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (the Department) and the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (the Ministry).1
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9 Conclusion
Transparency about decisions taken and lessons learned from the pandemic is critical to ensuring public confidence in the government’s response. However, it is not clear that the government has fully recognised the need for open and transparent decision making, as illustrated, for example, by the delays in publishing ministerial directions …
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10 Conclusion
Ministerial directions are expected to be published as soon as possible after they are issued, as the Treasury guidance makes clear.21 However, there was a delay of several weeks before some of the COVID-19-related directions were published, and one is still not public. The Department explained that it had not …
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11 Conclusion
The Cabinet Office set out the governance and decision-making structures for the UK government’s response to COVID-19. These comprised four ministerial implementation committees representing health, international, economic and wider public services, led 16 Qq 92–93 17 Qq 105–8 18 Committee of Public Accounts, Thirty-ninth Report of Session 2015–16, Accountability to …
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12 Conclusion
The Cabinet Office acknowledged that responding to COVID-19 was a massive operation across government requiring a very high level of co-ordination.28 However, we received inadequate responses from our witnesses when we raised cross-cutting issues that are having fundamental effects on many people’s lives. For example, on the impact of lockdown …
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13 Conclusion
Another example is the gaps in support for self-employed people, given there are large numbers of self-employed people getting no financial support from the government other than Universal Credit. The Treasury recognised that the self-employment income scheme was not universal in coverage and said that it was keeping this issue …
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14 Conclusion
Robust and timely data is also crucial to support decision making and efforts to coordinate support to those most in need, for example on the part of local authorities. The Ministry told us that the importance of data, and timely access to data, had come to the fore in the …
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15 Conclusion
Many departments are having to source products and services quickly in new or emerging markets, often with complex and varied supply chains. The health and social care supply chain has had to work with pharmaceutical companies, private sector health equipment companies and manufacturing and logistics companies, and must compete with …
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16 Conclusion
The Cabinet Office acknowledged that it was taken by surprise by the need for a massive quantity of protective equipment, and by the difficulty of sourcing it from reliable UK-based suppliers.36 It said that a particular challenge was supplying PPE to care homes, hospices and community care organisations. While NHS …
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17 Conclusion
In April 2020 the Treasury committed £4 billion of funding for the UK’s PPE demand up until the end of July 2020. This was an initial estimate that may since have changed.43 We questioned the Cabinet Office on whether the national PPE contracts had been value 34 C&AG’s Report, para …
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18 Conclusion
The government has instituted a range of support measures for businesses to help them cope with the extensive economic disruption caused by COVID-19. These include payments to businesses for furloughed employees, government-backed loan schemes, cash grants and additional reliefs.45 The Department estimates that over one million businesses have benefited from …
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19 Conclusion
The largest business support measures, such as the furlough scheme and loans schemes have been broad-based: for example, the Job Retention Scheme is open to all employers across the UK and the Bounce Back loans are available to all businesses.48 The Department said that this was intentional as by creating …
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20 Conclusion
We asked the Department whether it would adopt a more bespoke, sector-based approach to supporting businesses, given some sectors and industries have said they are not receiving the support they need. The Department told us that in cases of very large companies of national strategic significance, it would discuss those …
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21 Conclusion
Local authorities play a significant role in all parts of the UK government’s response to COVID-19. They have key obligations such as to deliver social care, other parts of the emergency response and support for individuals and businesses. Central government funding to local authorities has included £3.2 billion provided in …
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22 Conclusion
Local authorities’ budgets are under more pressure than ever as a result of COVID-19, and many local authorities are concerned that they are not getting the financial support that they need from central government.55 The Local Government Association told us that without certainty of further funding and flexibility around their …
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23 Conclusion
Although the Ministry has set out the areas of local government funding that central government will refund, this does not include all of the detail needed to give local authorities clarity. For instance, on homelessness and rough sleeping it is not clear whether the whole of the homelessness and rough …
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