Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Seventeenth Report- HS2 Summer 2021
Public Accounts Committee
HC 329
Published 22 September 2021
Recommendations
2
The Department has made little progress on the design and delivery at Euston since we...
Recommendation
The Department has made little progress on the design and delivery at Euston since we last reported, and we remain concerned that time is running out. Euston station is a key element of the programme both as the London terminus …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (29)
3
Conclusion
HS2 Ltd has started planning how it will integrate its systems for Phase One to ensure the railway works, but this is an inherently risky part of the programme. We previously raised concerns that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the …
4
Conclusion
We are increasingly concerned that the Department and HS2 Ltd do not yet know how they will turn the benefits promised from High Speed 2 into a reality, including what additional investments will be needed or how these will be funded. The Department claims that High Speed 2 is a …
5
Conclusion
The Department and HS2 Ltd are not adequately engaging with the Department for Education to secure the skills required for the future of the programme and training the next generation of skilled workers. We have repeatedly raised concerns that the Department and HS2 Ltd did not have the skills or …
6
Conclusion
We are already concerned about the volume of complaints on disruption from the programme which does not bode well for the future as more communities will be impacted as construction progresses. HS2 Ltd estimates it has handled 124,000 queries over the past three years and interacted with over 76,000 people …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) on the High Speed 2 programme.1 We also took evidence from the West Midlands Combined Authority, the National Infrastructure Commission and …
7
Conclusion
Following our evidence session, HS2 Ltd wrote to us and set out the high-level schedule and associated budgets (including contingency) for Phase 1 activities discussed at the session. These are set out in the table below: Phase 1 activity Budget (including Estimated duration of contingency) (£ billion) activity Civil engineering …
8
Conclusion
The Government’s latest range of estimated costs for Phase 1 is £35–45 billion (2019 prices).12 For Phase 2a the range is £5.2–7.2 billion (2019 prices). The latest updated 6 Committee of Public Accounts, High Speed 2: Spring 2020 update, Third Report of Session 2019–21, HC 84, 17 May 2020, conclusions …
9
Conclusion
The construction of the main civil engineering components of the programme (such as tunnels and viaducts) is a major undertaking and was a major cause of delays and cost increases at the time of our last report.16 In a letter following our evidence session, HS2 Ltd informed us that it …
10
Conclusion
In our 2020 report we recommended that the Department publish regular reports on progress to Parliament, including a realistic appraisal of the programme’s likelihood of delivering to budget and schedule.18 HS2 Ltd and the Department reported £0.8 billion in cost pressures in their most recent update to Parliament in March …
11
Conclusion
Euston station is a key element of HS2 and will be an important transport hub and business area, with potential opportunities for economic regeneration at the wider site. It is intended to be the London terminus of the High Speed 2 programme, providing links to the existing railway, London Underground …
12
Conclusion
In our May 2020 report, we raised our concerns over the huge uncertainty remaining for Euston station, specifically the lack of clarity around the station build. The Department and HS2 Ltd told us at the time that although the design of Euston was ready for planning consent, they were looking …
13
Conclusion
The Department detailed some of the work it has been undertaking since early 2020 to find cost savings at Euston. This included: a review of the proposed tracks and tunnelling at Euston, which confirmed the existing approach was justified; an assessment of the station design, which might lead to a …
14
Conclusion
The Department acknowledged that Euston is a “very urgent and immediate challenge”. HS2 Ltd similarly noted that decisions on the final options are time-bound, and that it was concerned that the programme will “literally run out of time”.33 HS2 Ltd explained that it was setting up Old Oak Common as …
15
Conclusion
We asked the Department what assurances it could give that whatever happened at Euston, it would not affect the delivery of the programme overall.36 The Department provided us with details of the assurance process it follows more broadly on the High Speed 2 programme, including lines of assurance within HS2 …
16
Conclusion
The High Speed 2 programme has many interdependent elements, including stations, infrastructure and railway systems. We raised concerns in our previous report that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department does not give enough attention to managing the interdependencies within …
17
Conclusion
The Department recognised two primary risks in relation to railway systems: the physical practicalities of different contractors working on the ground together; and, systems not integrating effectively.41 We asked HS2 Ltd how it planned to avoid the issues with railway systems experienced on the Crossrail programme. HS2 Ltd told us …
18
Conclusion
HS2 Ltd recognised that the integration of railway systems would be crucial and explained that it planned to establish a collaborative alliance amongst the main railway systems contractors to encourage them to work together to deliver the integrated systems. Although HS2 Ltd’s pre-contract market engagement found suppliers to be receptive …
19
Conclusion
The Department and HS2 Ltd have repeatedly promised that High Speed 2 will bring about a wide range of benefits that go beyond the increase in capacity and reduction of journey times on routes between major cities. These promised benefits include jobs, economic growth, investment and regeneration. The Department told …
20
Conclusion
Both the Department and the West Midlands Combined Authority provided examples of how cities and regions that stand to benefit from High Speed 2 have ambitious plans for how to capitalise on the opportunity that High Speed 2 provides. For example, the development of public transport links in Birmingham and …
21
Conclusion
The creation of thousands of jobs is central to the Department and HS2 Ltd programme’s case for building the railway. The Department told us that the growth strategies of Greater Manchester and the West Midlands envisaged that the programme would bring up to 180,000 and 100,000 job respectively, plus around …
22
Conclusion
The Department and HS2 Ltd asserted that many of the jobs from the programme will go to those who live locally to construction sites. However, the West Midlands Combined Authority told us that of a high number of the jobs promised to be created from work at Delta Junction, just …
23
Conclusion
We asked the Department about the private sector investment that would be needed as part of delivering the benefits expected from the programme. The Department told us that it had started to take steps to encourage private sector investment to ensure these were delivered. For example, it was working with …
24
Conclusion
HS2 Ltd described the work it was doing to protect the environment as the “untold story” of the programme. It stated that there would be no net loss to biodiversity from phases 1 and 2a, and that there could be a net gain to biodiversity from Phase 2b. HS2 Ltd …
25
Conclusion
Ensuring that enough people with the right skills and capability are available to the High Speed 2 programme at the right time is critical to its success. In reports from 2013, 2016 and 2020, both this and our previous Committees have highlighted the importance of skills and capability, and concerns …
26
Conclusion
The Department and HS2 Ltd told our previous Committee in 2016 that the National College for High Speed Rail would be crucial in training people in the skills required to successfully construct High Speed 2 and other infrastructure projects. For example, at the time of our evidence session in 2016, …
27
Conclusion
The Department explained that it was not, and had never been, directly responsible for the college as this fell under the remit of the Department for Education. It explained that it’s detailed involvement in the college had been limited and that this had “been a bit of a challenge”. It …
28
Conclusion
HS2 Ltd told us that the nature of the High Speed 2 programme means that the work required for it will be disruptive. HS2 Ltd estimated it had handled 124,000 queries over the past three years and interacted with over 76,000 people along the route.63 The Independent Construction Commissioner HS2 …
29
Conclusion
In May 2021, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman published a report that found that HS2 Ltd had misled and failed to communicate promptly and effectively with a family whose home was being purchased to make way for the railway.68 HS2 Ltd told us that although it had not accepted …
30
Conclusion
HS2 Ltd told us that there had already been significant activity from environmental protests at various sites along the Phase One route. Most notably, protesters tunnelled beneath land owned by HS2 Ltd at Euston. HS2 Ltd told us that this disruption had cost it in the region of £75 million …