Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Thirty-Eighth Report - COVID-19 cost tracker update
Public Accounts Committee
HC 640
Published 23 February 2022
Recommendations
15
As part of our previous examination of the cost tracker in May 2021, we concluded...
Recommendation
As part of our previous examination of the cost tracker in May 2021, we concluded that government’s ability to achieve value for money was compromised during the pandemic by poor quality impact assessments and Accounting Officer assessments.33 To address this, …
Read more
HM Treasury
View Details →
16
We therefore asked HM Treasury what it was doing to identify and address some of...
Recommendation
We therefore asked HM Treasury what it was doing to identify and address some of the issues raised by our and the NAO’s work examining the response to the pandemic, for example around the trade-offs between acting at speed and …
Read more
HM Treasury
View Details →
Conclusions (17)
2
Conclusion
We are concerned that HM Treasury does not intend to adequately monitor and update the ongoing cost of COVID-19 to the taxpayer. Monitoring the forecast costs and actual spend related to COVID-19 is crucial for Parliamentary scrutiny and for holding departments to account for their use of taxpayers’ money. The …
3
Conclusion
HM Treasury does not yet know how much money has been lost to fraud and error across government’s response to COVID-19. Our previous work on government’s response to COVID-19 has revealed that the risk of fraud and error to public finances has risen substantially during the pandemic. As a result, …
4
Conclusion
HM Treasury has not set out what lessons it has learnt from the government’s response to COVID-19 and how it will apply these in future. The pandemic required government to respond rapidly to emerging issues across all areas of society. It is essential that government learns from its response to …
1
Conclusion
Based on the fourth iteration of the COVID-19 cost tracker (the cost tracker) published by the Comptroller and Auditor General in September 2021, we took evidence from HM Treasury about the costs of government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1 In May 2021, we took evidence from HM Treasury on the …
5
Conclusion
In our evidence session on 17th November 2021, we observed that the cost tracker had supported Parliamentary scrutiny of departments and enabled us to hold government to account.9 We have found the model used in the cost tracker very useful, and it has helped in the ongoing exercise of monitoring …
6
Conclusion
We noted that the public inquiry into government’s handling of COVID-19 was due to start in the spring or summer of 2022, and that understanding how money was being spent was likely to be an important part of this inquiry. We therefore asked HM Treasury how it would ensure that …
7
Conclusion
HM Treasury told us that, during the pandemic, it had made some very significant sums of money available at short notice in conditions of great uncertainty. This funding was ring-fenced so that, if it was not needed for the intended purpose, it would not be spent on other things.13 HM …
8
Conclusion
HM Treasury told us that one element of the cost tracker it would definitely continue to monitor and report on was the cost of the various loan and grant schemes where the true cost will only be known over time.18 Government has guaranteed or issued loans worth a total of …
9
Conclusion
Across government’s response to COVID-19, there are also other substantial loan books that have no estimated write-offs as at the September 2021 update to the cost tracker, but which government will have to manage until the loans are repaid. For example, as at the September 2021 update to the cost …
10
Conclusion
In its letter to us after our evidence session, HM Treasury recognised the helpful role that the NAO cost tracker has played in improving transparency on the cost of COVID-19, as well as its role as the definitive source of information on the public expenditure costs of the pandemic. It …
11
Conclusion
We examined fraud and error across government in 2021. We found that government had introduced many vital support schemes in response to the pandemic, but that these had substantially increased the risk of fraud and error to public finances and the taxpayer was expected to lose billions of pounds as …
12
Conclusion
We asked HM Treasury what its current assessment of fraud and error across government was, given the availability of the new data. HM Treasury told us that its upfront estimates on losses due to fraud and error were broadly in line with HMRC’s most 25 Committee of Public Accounts, Fraud …
13
Conclusion
In our report in June 2021, we recommended that HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office set out how they would ensure that departments implemented a zero-tolerance approach to fraud and error following the pandemic and ensure taxpayers’ money was recovered.28 We therefore asked HM Treasury what it was doing to …
14
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic placed increased pressure on government departments to respond to a crisis while continuing to provide their business-as-usual services. The Comptroller and Auditor General told us that the NAO had now, for the most part, completed its examination of the initial schemes that were implemented at pace in …
17
Conclusion
We examined the initial lessons that can be learned from government’s response to the pandemic in June 2021 based on 20 evidence sessions on various aspects of the government’s response. In our report, we set out our views on what government can 32 Q 5 33 Committee of Public Accounts, …
18
Conclusion
HM Treasury informed us that it had conducted a lessons learned exercise with Accounting Officers and it planned to update Managing Public Money in December
19
Conclusion
We asked HM Treasury what it was doing to ensure that, if emergency support such as business support schemes or loans were needed in future, those responsible would have the information they needed to act quickly, informed by lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. HM Treasury explained that it was able …