Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
First Report - Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21
Public Accounts Committee
HC 59
Published 18 May 2022
Recommendations
2
Not Addressed
The Department does not have a good enough assessment of the levels of fraud and...
Recommendation
The Department does not have a good enough assessment of the levels of fraud and error in local authority administered business support grants. During 2020– 21 and 2021–22 the Department has provided funds to local authorities to distribute to local …
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Government Response Summary
The government response discusses Électricité de France’s (EDF) strategies, plans, and the estimated costs of decommissioning, and doesn't address the recommendation to calculate fraud estimates.
HM Treasury
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Conclusions (19)
3
Conclusion
The Department does not know whether grants distributed by local authorities on its behalf have benefited businesses, including those most in need of that funding. Although the Department set the eligibility criteria for grant schemes administered by local authorities, it delegated most grant decisions to them. The Department told us …
4
Conclusion
The Department was aware of heightened fraud risks within its COVID-19 business support schemes from the outset but did not make full use of all the tools at its disposal to prevent and detect fraud. The Department expected that some potential recipients of funding for its COVID-19 business support schemes …
5
Conclusion
The Department has yet to set out how it is learning lessons from managing its COVID-19 business support schemes to better protect taxpayers’ money Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21 7 in future. The Department now has two years’ worth of experience designing, implementing, …
6
Conclusion
The Post Office’s mismanagement of its Horizon programme has had devastating consequences for individuals wrongly accused of fraud. The financial cost of compensating these individuals will largely fall to the public purse. The Horizon accounting system erroneously recorded shortfalls of cash in local Post Office branches over its more than …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General we took evidence from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (the Department) on its performance in 2020–21.1
7
Conclusion
Not Addressed
In addition to its guaranteed loan schemes, the Department provided £21.8 billion in grant funding to local authorities to distribute to businesses in their areas. The Department set the eligibility criteria and provided guidance on grant making to local authorities.20 In the first three grant schemes, which account for £11.5 …
Government Response Summary
The government response discusses the Programme, committing to meet the indicative timeframe and recruit/retain skills, and manages short-term risks to value for money; it doesn't address the conclusion about grant funding.
8
Conclusion
Of the £21.8 billion grant funding the Department provided to local authorities to distribute in their areas in 2020–21, the Department has so far attempted to assess the extent of fraud and error in only £11.5 billion of this funding, and through a sample of only 476 grants. This very …
9
Conclusion
The success of these larger samples relies on the capacity and cooperation of local authorities to respond to the Department’s requests for information.34 The Department considers that it has not yet given local authorities the opportunity to do the necessary reconciliations, as it has been asking so much of them …
10
Conclusion
Despite recognising these limitations and uncertainty in its current estimates, the Department does not believe that its grant funding has been subject to significant fraud.40 It suggests that fraud will ultimately range between 1% and 2%, which it would consider as ‘normal’ and consistent with its expectations.41 Conversely, it suggests …
11
Conclusion
Although the Department set eligibility criteria for grant schemes administered by local authorities, it delegated most grant decisions to them. The Department told us that it provided clear guidance to local authorities on recordkeeping requirements and the need to be able to reconcile payments for the purposes of audit.43 However, …
12
Conclusion
Having sampled only 476 grants distributed by local authorities out of circa one million grants made, the Department therefore has very little visibility of which businesses have benefited from these schemes.45 It cannot say whether many businesses in receipt of grants were eligible, and whether those that were both eligible …
13
Conclusion
The Department was responsible for a substantial component of government’s overall financial response to the pandemic, resulting in the third-largest estimated lifetime costs of any department, as reported by the National Audit Office’s COVID-19 cost tracker.46 We have previously reported that government prioritised speed when designing and implementing measures to …
14
Conclusion
Registrations of new companies on Companies House increased sharply during 2020–21. During the period 2015–16 to 2019–20, annual new company registrations averaged 640,000. By comparison, in 2020–21 there were more than 810,000, making new company registrations in that year more than 20% higher than in any of the preceding five.51 …
15
Conclusion
The Department launched its first COVID-19 business support scheme shortly after the first lockdown was announced on 23 March 2020. Since then, the Department has launched many more, and now has around two years’ worth of experience of designing, implementing, and managing its COVID-19 business support schemes.56 It has taken …
16
Conclusion
As some COVID-19 business support schemes have increasingly become part of business as usual, the Department told us that, for example in relation to grants distributed by local authorities, its systems and methods are now approaching maturity. It considers it has improved its guidance to local authorities and refined its …
17
Conclusion
The Department has commissioned evaluation of its business support schemes; however, it cautioned that it is proving challenging to separate the impact of various aspects of government’s overall support package which also included, for example the furlough scheme.61 Several of the Department’s major areas of expenditure in the coming years, …
18
Conclusion
Between 1997 and 2000 the Post Office implemented a new IT system called Horizon. This system is now known to be responsible for accounting discrepancies that suggested, for example, shortfalls of cash in Post Office branches.62 At the time, the Post Office considered some of these shortfalls to be caused …
19
Conclusion
In December 2020 the Department wrote to the Post Office, noting that the number of applications to the Scheme was ‘…materially higher than expected resulting in a corresponding increase in possible scheme claims and costs…’ and that the Post Office considered ‘…any amount in excess of the original budget will …
20
Conclusion
The Department currently estimates that the scheme is likely to cost £153 million, of which £89 million is from the Post Office and £65 million is from the Department.65 The Department noted that its contribution was its current best estimate, and did not represent a hard and fast limit: should …