Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Seventh Report - Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme
Public Accounts Committee
HC 259
Published 3 June 2022
Recommendations
2
Not Addressed
The Department has once again made fundamental mistakes in its planning and management of a...
Recommendation
The Department has once again made fundamental mistakes in its planning and management of a major equipment programme. Ajax’s design is based on a pre-existing vehicle, but the Department’s 1,200 capability requirements meant that, in effect, it was developed from …
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Government Response Summary
The response does not address the recommendation of writing to the Committee to set out how it will incorporate the Ajax Lessons Learned Review recommendations, and instead discusses internal performance measures and consultations with the sector.
HM Treasury
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3
The failure to escalate and address noise and vibration issues in a timely manner shows...
Recommendation
The failure to escalate and address noise and vibration issues in a timely manner shows that the Department must simplify its over-complex safety processes and change behaviours. The Department acknowledges that it has injured some soldiers, which it rightly describes …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (26)
4
Conclusion
Nearly two years after identifying injuries to soldiers, the Department still does not know how to fix the noise and vibration problems. General Dynamics must produce vehicles that are safe and has proposed modifications to reduce noise and vibration levels. The Department has commissioned trials to test the efficacy of …
5
Conclusion
We are doubtful that the Department can recover the programme within existing costs and commercial arrangements. The programme remains under significant pressure. It is more than a year behind even the revised schedule, trials involving Army crews have been suspended and noise and vibration issues remain unresolved. Despite these problems, …
6
Conclusion
The Department’s plans for using Ajax are at risk because of uncertainty about what constitutes full operating capability, when this will be achieved and how Ajax vehicles will be enhanced in the future. The Department’s original in-service date, 2017, was revised to June 2021, which has also been missed. It …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on the Ajax programme.1
7
Conclusion
At the same time, the Army is undergoing a period of significant transformation, during which it will adjust its size, shape, and capabilities. It aims to have implemented the full changes, as outlined in the Integrated Review, by 2030. The Army told us it was “cautiously optimistic” that the full …
8
Conclusion
In the meantime, the Army was bullish about managing the implications of delays to introducing Ajax and its ability to meet its NATO commitments.15 However, it has had to plan a series of operational compromises to achieve this, such as continuing to use Challenger 2 tanks and ageing Warrior armoured …
9
Conclusion
Ajax’s design was based on a pre-existing vehicle, but the Department stipulated 1,200 capability requirements which meant that, in effect, it had to be developed from scratch. The Department told us that, with hindsight, having so many detailed requirements had not helped it obtain the capability it wanted in the …
10
Conclusion
The Department told us it had reviewed its approach so that it no longer fell into the trap of setting an excessive number of requirements. It said it now only approved programmes with a reasonable number of requirements, such as the 150 to 200 for the purchase of Boxer and …
11
Conclusion
The problems on the Ajax programme were exacerbated by inadequate governance and programme management failures. The current senior responsible owner, appointed in October 2021, is the first to be full-time, although his corporate responsibilities take up about 5% of his time. The Department said that his role as head of …
12
Conclusion
The Department admitted that the programme’s reset in 2018 had been disappointing, and it recognised that the revised programme schedule had been unrealistic.24 It said it had attempted to meet the planned in-service date by accepting an incremental build-up of capability, using a series of ‘capability drops’. By this arrangement, …
13
Conclusion
The Department explained that for complex, technologically advanced programmes, it was usual to have a profile of upfront investment before the manufacture phase began.26 When the Department awarded the manufacture contract in 2014, it included some overlap of demonstration and manufacture phases, thinking this would reduce the risk of missing …
14
Conclusion
In 2021, the Department acknowledged publicly concerns about excessive levels of noise and vibration on the Ajax vehicles. The Department admitted that because of shortcomings with its safety processes, which made it complicated to raise issues, it had injured some of its own soldiers, which it rightly described as “unforgivable”.29 …
15
Conclusion
In June 2021 the Department commissioned David King, its Director Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, to assess whether correct health and safety procedures had been followed. His report, published in December 2021, concluded that collective failings enabled activity to continue when it should have been stopped or paused until stronger …
16
Conclusion
The Army told us it now placed greater emphasis on safety and looking after its personnel and that it had made “huge strides”. However, it acknowledged that it continued to be on a learning curve and that it still had more to do to improve safety. The Department said it …
17
Conclusion
The Department said that Ajax’s safety problems had highlighted broader issues around noise-induced hearing loss, which formed the largest number of claims in the armed forces compensation scheme. It has commissioned the vice-chief of the defence staff and the second permanent secretary to examine the causes of those claims to …
18
Conclusion
Under the terms of the contract, General Dynamics is responsible for ensuring that Ajax vehicles are safe by design. The Department oversees and monitors this, conducting trials to ensure the vehicles are safe to use.35 The two parties disagreed on whether the levels of noise and vibration in Ajax vehicles …
19
Conclusion
The Department told us that its contract with General Dynamics was to produce vehicles at an acceptable level of noise using existing headsets. It asserted that those headsets performed as it had assumed they would when the contract was let, something which General Dynamics disputes. However, the Department admitted that …
20
Conclusion
General Dynamics has proposed modifications to vehicles that seek to reduce the impact of noise and vibration on crews and include, for example, the damping of hand controllers and seating, and changes to improve body posture. However, the Department said it still needed to test the whole system—including the communications …
21
Conclusion
The Department accepted that it cannot be certain the programme will not encounter further technical or safety issues, stating that it is usual for engineering development on this scale to encounter challenges as it goes through the development cycle. It acknowledged that it is still testing compliance with the specifications …
22
Conclusion
The programme remains under significant pressure. When the NAO reported, the programme was more than a year behind the revised schedule, trials involving Army crews had been suspended and noise and vibration issues remained unresolved.47 General Dynamics had continued to produce Ajax vehicles despite not receiving any payment since December …
23
Conclusion
The Department said it intended to continue holding General Dynamics to the current firm-priced contract for delivery of 589 vehicles.49 Despite remaining in contractual dispute, the Department claimed that its relationship with General Dynamics was good and that both parties were working collaboratively. It was seeking to resolve the technical …
24
Conclusion
The Department told us that it had consulted the Infrastructure and Projects Authority and HM Treasury about its plan for restoring effective governance to the programme. It said it needed to resolve the current technical issues and gain approval for any changes to the schedule and definitions of capability, including …
25
Conclusion
In 2010, when the Department let the design contract, its planning assumption was that Ajax would enter service in early 2017. It extended the expected in-service date by three 44 Q 49 45 C&AG’s Report, para 15 46 Q 87 47 C&AG’s Report, para 16 48 Qq 19, 20, 26, …
26
Conclusion
The Department told us that it faced choices about the level of capability at initial and full operating capability milestones. It said it would look again at the definition of what was required, considering incremental development of the vehicles.55 The Department admitted it had already accepted concessions against the original …
27
Conclusion
Delivering the full Ajax capability depends on the Department delivering supporting programmes, including new communication systems, training facilities and infrastructure projects to store the vehicles.58 The Army will also need to transport the vehicles to military operations.59 However, the Department has encountered difficulties in delivering the enabling programmes needed to …
28
Conclusion
The Department told us it is seeking to design its new armoured vehicles, including Boxer and Challenger, to make through-life capability management easier. It recognised the need to update capabilities as new technologies emerge and keep pace with emerging military threats.61 It expected its new armoured vehicles to have a …