Conclusion 2

The Plan is inconsistent because some parts of the Armed Forces include the costs of all capabilities that the government expects them to deliver, while others only include those they can afford. The MoD’s aim is that the Plan provides a reliable assessment of the affordability of its equipment programme and demonstrates to Parliament how it will manage its funding to deliver equipment projects. The MoD headquarters provides the Front Line Commands and other budget holders with guidance on preparing their cost forecasts. However, it allows the budget holders to take different approaches to whether they include in their forecast costs all the capabilities they need to meet government’s expectations, or just those capabilities that they can afford. This flexibility has created an inconsistency of approach, which means that users of the Plan cannot compare Commands and other budget holders on a like-for-like basis. For example, the Royal Navy has included in the Plan predicted costs for all the capabilities the MoD expects it to deliver, and it has reported a deficit of £15.3 billion. In contrast, the Army has reported a deficit of £1.2 billion in the Plan, because it only includes those projects it can afford. However, its deficit would increase by around £12 billion if it had included all the capabilities the government has requested. The MoD conceded that a Plan compiled on a consistent basis would clearly be easier to interpret. 1 The date of the general election will be determined by the government, but must happen no later than 28 January 2025 according to the Electoral Commission. 6 MoD Equipment Plan 2023–2033 Recommendation 2: In future Plans, the MoD should ensure that all budget holders adopt the same approach to including forecast costs. This will help the Plan to achieve its aim of providing a reliable assessment of the affordability of its equipment programme, and improve transparency so allowing the Plan’s users, including Parliament, to compare contribu