Recommendation 29

In May 2024, we reported our concern at the Home Office failing to engage effectively with local authorities about the impact on local areas of its efforts to house asylum seekers.40 In discussing homelessness, we asked MHCLG what was being done to stop situations where local authorities are looking for a hotel to house homeless households, but they are outbid by the Home Office. MHCLG accepted that, in the past, the quality of co-ordination between the Home Office and local government had fallen short of what it should be. It stated that work was ongoing to improve that coordination and a new locally-led approach was being developed which aimed to reduce competition. For example, the Home Office had decided not to use accommodation in a particular area if local government was already using it. But MHCLG also emphasised that this is a situation where there are two conflicting sets of statutory duties: local government housing people to whom it owes a homelessness duty; and the Home Office accommodating asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, towards whom it also has a duty. It suggested that, where there is a scarcity of accommodation, some issues are inevitable.41 A week later we took evidence from the Home Office about its accommodation arrangements for asylum seekers. We raised again the issue of it competing for accommodation with the local authority, and driving up rents. The Home Office told us that one purpose of its joint work with MHCLG was to avoid the issue of it paying higher rates than the 38 Qq 44, 45, 47-50 39 Qq 51, 57, 75; C&AG’s Report, paras 3.7, 3.8 and Figure 8 40 Committee of Public Accounts, Asylum Accommodation and UK-Rwanda partnership, Thirty-Fourth Report of Session 2023–24, HC 639, 29 May 2024 41 Q 46 17 local authority in an area with small amounts of rental accommodation, and driving up rents as result. The Home Office said it now had a commitment “that if we ever hear that a local authority is seeking to acquire a particular p