Recommendation 11

Most of the £44 billion of support was provided through schemes that were universal in nature, which means that some people who did not need the support still received it, affecting the schemes’ overall value for money.21 Written evidence we received from Octopus Energy, for example, said that while the decision to provide universal support was necessary for the Department to move at pace, it resulted in higher than necessary costs.22 The support provided also did not match the support that was needed, as lower–income households received the same level of support as higher– income households.23 The Department told us that there were advantages 15 Q 16; C&AG’s Report, para 3.3 16 Qq 12, 16 17 Q 20 18 Q 17; C&AG’s Report, para 3.3 19 Q 17 20 Q 9 21 Q 12; C&AG’s Report, para 12, 4.2 22 EBS0003 23 C&AG’s Report, para 12, 4.2 9 in having broad–based schemes, as the “sheer scale of the price rises” meant that the number of households affected was so high that a universal intervention was required.24 But the Department acknowledged that it had to accept the risk of ‘deadweight’ in the schemes in order to introduce the schemes quickly.25