Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 17
17
At the outset of Everyone In, the Department gave a clear message to local authorities...
Conclusion
At the outset of Everyone In, the Department gave a clear message to local authorities that, as this was a public health emergency, they were to bring everyone in (“whether they are from Bromley or Portugal”), irrespective of immigration status or entitlement to benefits.62 At the end of May, however, this messaging became more ambiguous, with the Department writing to local authorities to remind them that they could only legally accommodate people who were ineligible for benefits following an individual assessment of risks to life.63 The Department denied that it had in mind a particular number, in terms of a reduction in support for people with no recourse to public funds, that it wanted to achieve by sending this letter.64 From this point, however, the support offered by different local authorities to these cohorts of people became increasingly divergent, with some ceasing to take in new people or seeking to move on those who were already in emergency accommodation.65 The Department implied to us that this divergence purely reflected the differing progress of the pandemic in different parts of the country, rather than differing approaches taken by local authorities within the same area and faced with similar levels of demand.66 Some local authorities, meanwhile, experienced difficulties in supporting people from these cohorts to move into more settled accommodation, because of their ineligibility for benefits: this meant they were unable to receive Local Housing Allowance and other assistance to move into the private rental sector, for instance.67 Baroness Casey confirmed to us that, under current rules, local authorities were unable to help these cohorts of people to move into more settled accommodation.68 At the end of September, there were around 2,000 people staying in hotels and other emergency accommodation in London 57 Qq 25, 5. 58 Q 3. 59 C&AG’s Report, para 2.10. 60 Q 33; C&AG’s Report, para 2.10. 61 C&AG’s Report, para 2.10. 62 Q 44. 63 Ministry of Hous