Select committee: Public Accounts Committee
Conclusion 32
62nd Report - Faulty energy efficiency installations
Published 23 Jan 2026
Addressed to HM Treasury
Public Accounts Committee Faulty energy efficiency installations All items in this report Report on parliament.uk ↗ Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗
Conclusion (the committee's words)
We asked the witnesses why no-one warned the Department about the risks or flaws with the system it had designed, or considered whether the system as a whole was protecting consumers.72 While TrustMark accepted it should have done much more, Ofgem highlighted their limited role within the flawed system. • Ofgem accepted that the measures are complex to oversee and deliver, and that the supply chain is very complex, but it told us that the Department was responsible for the design of the scheme, including decisions on how to assess fraud.73 • TrustMark explained to us that, with hindsight, the move from a single-to multi-measure scheme introduced challenges and delivery complications, and therefore risk. It accepted it should have recognised during the design phase that the system under-estimated the level of risk involved,74 and they did not have the resources or digital infrastructure to do it at the time the scheme was launched.75 They and the Department should have recognised this and remediated this short coming much sooner. • UKAS explained to us that the level of audit required of certification bodies for new installers assumed a low level of risk, but that it ought to assume a high level of risk given what we now know. 68 Qq 16, 17 69 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and Department for Communities & Local Government, Each Home Counts, December 2016. 70 Q 91 71 Qq 93, 144, 149 72 Qq 3, 18, 29, 56 73 Q 128 74 Qq 2, 14 75 Qq 2, 14; C&AG’s Report, para 21 20 Even though the audit level is set by the Department and not UKAS, we challenged that UKAS should have identified and raised the issue with the Department. UKAS told us it did so but confirmed in follow- up correspondence to us that this was not until February 2025. UKAS apologised for its “role within the system”.76 Insufficient focus on fraud risk
From: Public Accounts Committee, 62nd Report - Faulty energy efficiency installations (HC 1229), 23 January 2026
Government response
The government responded to the whole report on 7 April 2026 (deadline 23 March 2026).
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.The government agrees with most of the Committee's recommendations, but disagrees with the recommendation to halt wall insulation installation without independent supervision and with the recommendation to refer fraud to the Serious Fraud Office.
- On wall insulation, it disagrees with the recommendation, noting that every household with external wall insulation under ECO4 and GBIS "is being and will be offered an on-site audit", subject to the householder accepting; internal wall insulation concerns are triaged and referred for audit where they meet "the threshold of risk factors".
- It agrees on the find-and-fix programme: TrustMark "currently intend" it to complete by May 2027, though the department states it is "unlikely" to deliver on a "significantly shorter timescale". It will update the Committee in writing every six months, first in June 2026.
- It disagrees with referring fraud across ECO to the Serious Fraud Office, stating that this "relates to an existing ongoing responsibility of the regulator", Ofgem, which can and does make referrals where appropriate.
- It agrees to publish an annual report to Parliament on retrofit schemes, with the first publication "before Autumn 2027", and "intends to consult" on the design of a reformed consumer protection system during summer 2026.