Select committee inquiry
Carbon Capture and Storage inquiry
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) is a process to avoid the release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. CCS has the potential to help the UK achieve its ambitious targets to reduce CO2 emissions, if it is used in the power and industrial sectors. However, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy has not achieved value for money for its £100 million spend on the second competition for government financial support for carbon capture storage, according to the National Audit Office. The Department also spent £68 million on the first competition on support for CCS, which it cancelled in 2011. The NAO report found that the Department’s plan to use a second competition to develop and deploy carbon capture and storage was ambitious, but ultimately, unsuccessful. Achieving this goal was challenging because the untried nature of the technology meant the costs and benefits of the proposed projects were inherently uncertain. Given the level of challenge, it was an achievement for the Department to sustain negotiations with the preferred bidders to the point where it gained valuable technical and commercial knowledge about how to deploy the competition projects. But any value that could be gained is contingent on the Department applying the lessons it and the sector has learnt as a result of the competition. The NAO found the Department began the competition without agreeing with HM Treasury on the amount of financial support available over the lifetime of the projects. This ultimately contributed to HM Treasury’s decision to withdraw £1 billion of funding from the competition, leading to its cancellation, as it was concerned about future costs to consumers. The Department had, however, designed the competition so it could withdraw from supporting its preferred bidders without incurring cancellation costs. The terms of the competition contributed to one of the two shortlisted projects being unlikely to reach the construction phase. The Department funded two developers to undertake work that would reduce the commercial and technical risks surrounding the construction of the first CCS plant. One of the two shortlisted projects, backed by a consortium, was not able to present a proposal compliant with the Department’s risk allocation as it was struggling to allocate risks between the parties involved. The other competition was more commercially viable but would have had fewer benefits for reducing the costs of subsequent CCS projects. Many stakeholders think the government needs to carry more risk if it is to enable CCS to be deployed affordably to consumers. The Department’s approach to allocating risk was in line with wider energy policy. But following the competition, many stakeholders think the government should bear more risks, particularly over stored CO2. Government taking a greater share of the risk could reduce delivery costs but would expose taxpayers to losses in the event of risks materialising. The NAO found that flaws in the Department's design and implementation of its Levy Control Framework, which caps the costs of certain consumer-funded policies, also impacted on CCS investors' confidence.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of 64th Report - Carbon Capture and Storage ↗
Despite spending £168 million, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has failed to support the construction of the UK’s first large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. After its first competition for support ended in 2011, the Department launched its second competition without being clear with HM Treasury on the support that would be available to successful CCS projects through bill payer-funded contracts for difference once they were up and running, or ensuring that its proposed risk allocation was viable for developers. These design weaknesses contributed to the Treasury’s decision, as part of the 2015 Spending Review, to bring the competition to an early end by withdrawing the £1 billion capital grant it had previously made available to contribute to the projects’ construction costs. This was the latest in a series of decisions that indicate the Treasury is having undue influence on the government’s energy policy.
Halting CCS’s deployment means that the UK will have to pay billions of pounds more to meet its decarbonisation targets, has missed opportunities to be at the forefront of a growing global industry, and has damaged investors’ confidence in working with the government on CCS in the future. There is now a major gap in the government’s decarbonisation plans, and we urge the Department to set out as soon as possible how this gap will be filled.
What the government said
No government response is linked to this report.
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 21 February 2017 to its close on 4 January 2018.
- Oral evidence 30 Mar 2017
- Report 28 Apr 2017
- Correspondence 6 Dec 2017
What it recommended 2 recommendations · 22 conclusions
1After two competitions costing taxpayers £168 million, the UK is no closer to establishing CCS.
Recommended (the committee's words)
After two competitions costing taxpayers £168 million, the UK is no closer to establishing CCS. The UK has now missed opportunities to be at the forefront of a growing global industry. In 2012 the government launched a second competition for supporting CCS projects. The competition was cancelled in 2015 after Treasury decided, as part of the Spending Review, to withdraw the £1 billion of capital funding it had previously committed to the programme. The Department had spent £100 million of this on the second competition before it ended, having already spent £68 million on the first competition that was cancelled in 2011. As part of the competition process, developers and government gained some technical and commercial knowledge. But much of this knowledge is project-specific and will be lost, unless the same projects are resurrected. Since 2007 when the first competition was launched, other countries have been developing CCS projects successfully, and more projects are due to come online in 2017. There is a risk the UK will now miss out on the chance to lead the way in this technology, much as it did with wind power in the 1980s. Recommendation: The Department should set out in its Industrial Strategy the role that CCS can play, recognising the potential economic value of being a world leader in a globally expanding technology.
2It is now highly likely the UK will have to pay billions of pounds more...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is now highly likely the UK will have to pay billions of pounds more to meet its decarbonisation targets. In 2015, the Department’s own calculations showed that it would cost the UK £30 billion more to meet the 2050 emissions target without CCS in the power sector. The Committee on Climate Change recently reported that the total costs to the UK of inaction on CCS in power, industry, heat and transport would be higher still: £1 billion to £2 billion per year in the 2020s, rising to between £4 billion and £5 billion per year in the 2040s, if the UK is to achieve its carbon emissions targets. However, neither the Department nor the Treasury quantified the impact of the delays to deploying CCS that would inevitably result from cancelling the second competition. Recommendation: By the end of 2017, the Department should quantify and publish the impact across the whole economy of delays to getting CCS up and running, and of it not being established at all.
3Without CCS, there is a gap in the government’s plans for achieving decarbonisation at least...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Without CCS, there is a gap in the government’s plans for achieving decarbonisation at least cost while ensuring a secure supply of electricity. CCS was a key part of the government’s Electricity Market Reform programme, along with renewables and nuclear power, for establishing a low-carbon power sector. The Department expected its competition to lead to the deployment of CCS technology at scale. This would allow low-carbon, flexible gas power to complement intermittent renewables and inflexible nuclear power in a diversified generating mix. It also expected the competition to establish the infrastructure and commercial arrangements that would support decarbonisation of heavy industry, heat and transport in future decades. The Department has not yet set out its next set of detailed plans for decarbonising the economy and the role it expects CCS to play, saying it will do this in its delayed Emissions Reduction Plan by the end of this year. 6 Carbon Capture and Storage Recommendation: The Department’s Emissions Reduction Plan should set out a clear, joined-up strategy for deploying CCS in the sectors where it is needed to achieve decarbonisation at least cost.
4Once again, the Department did not allocate the risks appropriately between the government and developers,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Once again, the Department did not allocate the risks appropriately between the government and developers, meaning at least one of the two projects was likely to have been unviable. The Department made good progress compared to its first competition in understanding the risks in deploying the first CCS projects. However, it is unclear whether the Department tested at the outset of the competition which risks the private sector could feasibly bear. Instead, the Department opted for its prevailing approach to energy policy, of shifting risks as far as possible to the private sector, without properly considering the merits of alternative approaches. In particular, it asked developers to bear the ‘full-chain’ risk, which created problems for sharing risks between investors in different parts of a CCS project, making one of the competition projects unviable. It remains to be seen whether the Department will have sufficient commercial skills to avoid this problem repeating in the future, particularly following the recent machinery of government changes. Recommendation: When designing future energy policies, the Department should assess and explain the viability of different options for allocating risks between the government and developers.
5Establishing CCS is now likely to cost taxpayers or billpayers more in the future because...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Establishing CCS is now likely to cost taxpayers or billpayers more in the future because of the damage to investors’ confidence caused by aborting two competitions. In the most recent competition, matters were made worse by the timing of the cancellation: the Treasury withdrew the funding just before developers were due to submit their final bids for government support. The Department expected at least one of the bids would have met its criteria for support and been a viable project. Throughout this Parliament, several energy policy decisions have similarly damaged investors’ confidence. These include cuts to demand-led green tariffs and sudden changes to low carbon support prompted by the failure to forecast an overspend on the Levy Control Framework. Investors are now likely to require greater incentives to engage with the government again on CCS and other low-carbon projects, which will mean higher costs. Recommendation: HM Treasury and the Department should ensure they fully agree on the Emissions Reduction Plan from the outset, and quantify the negative impact on investors’ confidence before making any sudden changes.
6The Treasury seems to be determining energy policy, often with detrimental impacts on the government’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Treasury seems to be determining energy policy, often with detrimental impacts on the government’s long-term energy objectives. The Treasury did not appear committed to CCS from the outset, as demonstrated by the fact it did not make clear the total funding available to the projects, through consumer-funded contracts for difference. The Treasury’s decision to withdraw funding was based in part on it expecting the projects to require a ‘strike price’ of £170 per megawatt hour, which it considered to be too expensive compared to other low-carbon power generation technologies. But this measure neglects the potential long-term benefits of the projects, such as building infrastructure for subsequent facilities to share and the value of CCS to other sectors of the economy, or the additional costs that would result from any delay to CCS deployment. This is reminiscent of other energy Carbon Capture and Storage 7 policies which HM Treasury has cut across in recent years, driven by short-term considerations. We are concerned that the Treasury has had undue influence on energy policy in recent years. Recommendation: Given our concerns about HM Treasury’s undue influence on energy policy, the Department and HM Treasury, as part of their work on the replacement for the Levy Control Framework, should agree a way of appraising the costs and benefits of energy policies, which reflects the potential impact across sectors and over the long term, rather than relying on the strike price measure. 8 Carbon Capture and Storage 1 The competition for supporting carbon capture and storage
7In its first competition, the Department did not articulate the commercial risks involved in deploying...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In its first competition, the Department did not articulate the commercial risks involved in deploying CCS or develop a commercial strategy to manage them.13 For the second competition, the Department attempted to identify and understand the risks in developing the first CCS projects at the outset.14 The Department opted to shift risks, as far as possible, to the private sector so that the competition aligned with the wider energy policy for supporting new generating technologies. However, it did not fully consider the merits of alternative approaches to allocating risks.15
8The Department told us that at the outset it discussed with developers how to allocate...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that at the outset it discussed with developers how to allocate risks, and continued this discussion with its two preferred bidders throughout the programme. The Department was willing to share risks specific to the untried nature of the technology, such as risks associated with long-term storage of carbon dioxide. When the competition was stopped, the Department was negotiating the share of CCS-specific 7 Q1 8 Q88 9 Qq21, 97 10 Q93 11 Qq25, 27, 28 12 Q18 13 C&AG’s Report, Carbon capture and storage: lessons from the competition for the first UK demonstration, HC 1829, session 2010–12, para 9 14 C&AG’s Report (2017), para 3.8 15 Q6; C&AG’s Report, para 17 10 Carbon Capture and Storage risks the government would bear.16 The Department expected the developers to carry risks associated with routine business operations (business as usual risks). This included requiring the developers to bear the ‘full chain’ risk of their projects. A functioning CCS project is made up of a ‘chain’ of different operations: capture; transport; and storage, each of which could have a different investor. Under the Department’s risk allocation, if any part of the chain stopped working, the investors in other parts of the chain could lose income. One of the Department’s preferred projects, which was backed by a consortium of investors, could not resolve this issue in a way that was commercially viable. It is unlikely that this project would have submitted a bid that complied with the Department’s terms for the competition.17
9There are additional risks to deploying CCS in the UK compared to other countries, which...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There are additional risks to deploying CCS in the UK compared to other countries, which amplify the ‘full chain’ risks. CCS projects in other countries often have a commercial use for the carbon dioxide captured, such as for injection into wells to recover more oil, or for some chemical and manufacturing industrial plants.18 We asked the Department whether it had considered examples of other CCS projects around the world, which have been more successful because there is not a requirement for developers to manage the same full chain risk.19 The Department told us that the difficulties of allocating risks between the different parts of the chain is one of the main lessons it is taking forwards in its future CCS strategy.20 The Department also told us that it had to balance taxpayers’ interests in designing the competition with the risk appetite of the developers, as any additional sharing of risk by the government could have exposed taxpayers to losses.21
10The failure to understand what private investors can feasibly deliver, for both competitions, suggests a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The failure to understand what private investors can feasibly deliver, for both competitions, suggests a lack of skills from the Department at key stages of its programmes. The Department managed to sustain negotiations so that it gained some technical and commercial knowledge about how to deploy the competition projects.22 But the problems with both competitions indicate the Department did not have sufficient skills to initiate them successfully by understanding the risks that developers were able to bear. We asked the Department whether it thought it had the necessary skills following recent machinery of government changes to manage similar projects in the future.23 The Department stated that it is investing in developing the right skills internally, but acknowledges that for projects this complex it needs external support, which it secures through inward secondees and by working closely with experts teams in government, such as Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority.24 The role and influence of the Treasury
11The Department began the competition without agreeing with HM Treasury on the amount of financial...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department began the competition without agreeing with HM Treasury on the amount of financial support available for CCS projects, once up and running, through consumer-funded contracts for difference.25 The Department and the Treasury told us 16 Q14 17 C&AG’s Report, para 15 18 C&AG’s Report, para 1.10 19 Qq42–43 20 Q42 21 Qq15, 17, 87, 22 Qq88–90; C&AG’s Report, para 22 23 Q111 24 Q111 25 C&AG’s Report, para 18 Carbon Capture and Storage 11 that, while funding through contracts for difference was agreed in principle, it was not possible to determine the exact amount to be funded through energy bills due to the uncertainty of how much support the projects would require.26 The Department’s estimate of payments through contracts for difference increased from up to £6 billion at the start of the competition to £8.9 billion in 2015, as it learned more about the competitions through its negotiations.27 The Treasury told us they were regularly informed on the progress of the competition and its expected costs.28
12The lack of agreement between the Department and HM Treasury on a limit to the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The lack of agreement between the Department and HM Treasury on a limit to the support through contracts for difference meant the Department could not tailor its approach to the competition in a way that matched an agreed affordability constraint.29 The Department’s competition approach increased the projects’ unit cost by design. For example, plant size was limited, meaning investors could not fully exploit economies of scale; developers were funding infrastructure for subsequent projects to share, which increased costs; and investors required high returns to bear the majority of project risks. This approach meant the Department expected the projects to need a contract for difference ‘strike price’ that would be relatively high compared to its contracts to support other low-carbon technologies.30 A recent report by the Parliamentary Advisory Group on CCS showed how upfront costs could have been lower if the Department had taken a different financing and risk sharing approach.31
13The Treasury told us that the decision, as part of the 2015 Spending Review, to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Treasury told us that the decision, as part of the 2015 Spending Review, to withdraw the £1 billion was a matter of affordability, not only of the capital support but also of the contracts for difference to be awarded at the same time.32 Its assessment drew on an expected strike price for the contracts for difference of £170 per MWh, which is higher than for other low-carbon technologies with similar contracts. For the contracts already awarded for offshore wind farms, the strike prices range from £114 to £150 per MWh, while the contract for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is £92.50 per MWh (2012 prices).33 However, the strike price measure does not reflect the full value of the CCS projects, such at their potential long-term benefits for the industry, heat and transport sectors, or the additional costs to meet our statutory carbon targets that would result from any delay to CCS deployment.34
14We asked the Department and the Treasury whether this demonstrated they had different bases for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Department and the Treasury whether this demonstrated they had different bases for assessing the value of energy projects.35 The Treasury replied that it was natural for it to care about costs for consumers, while the Department was waiting for the bids before forming its view on whether the projects were affordable.36 The Department 26 Qq35–36 27 C&AG’s Report, para 4.3; Q24 28 Q37 29 C&AG’s Report, para 4.4 30 Q67 31 Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon Capture and Storage, Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS (September 2016) 32 Q36 33 C&AG’s Report, para 4.8 34 Q77 35 Q37 36 Qq38–39 12 Carbon Capture and Storage also said that it will work closely with the Treasury on future methodologies for looking at the value of long-term projects, considering a range of factors and not just the strike price.37
15We noted that there had been several other instances in recent years where Treasury decisions...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We noted that there had been several other instances in recent years where Treasury decisions seemed to have compromised long-term departmental strategies, for example: cutting feed-in tariffs for solar and onshore wind; scrapping the zero-carbon homes regulation; withdrawing the grandfathering support policy for biomass projects; privatising the Green Investment Bank; and cutting subsidies for low-emission vehicles.38 We asked the Department whether these show that key decisions are taken by HM Treasury, even though the Department is responsible for energy policy. The Department told us much of its activities are big projects, which carry uncertainty, making it more likely for the Treasury to have an influence compared to other departments with ordinary day-to-day expenditure.39 37 Q55 38 Q62 39 Qq56–57 Carbon Capture and Storage 13 2 The implications of cancelling the competition The additional cost of decarbonisation without CCS
16CCS has a central role to play across the UK economy to achieve this country’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
CCS has a central role to play across the UK economy to achieve this country’s emissions reductions target at the lowest possible cost to consumers.40 The Committee on Climate Change, which advises the government on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, recently reported that a 10-year delay to CCS’s deployment across the UK economy would cost an additional £1 billion to £2 billion per year in the 2020s, rising to between £4 billion and £5 billion per year in the 2040s.41
17The Department’s own analysis during the 2015 Spending Review showed that it would cost £30...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department’s own analysis during the 2015 Spending Review showed that it would cost £30 billion more in the power sector alone to achieve the UK’s climate change target without CCS. This is because a more expensive mix of low-carbon technologies would be required to decarbonise the power sector.42 The Department’s analysis during the 2015 Spending Review indicated the competition would lead directly to some of this benefit, generating an overall return of £4.50 per £1 invested. However, the Treasury told us it had questions about the Department’s modelling in its bid because it did not take account of the costs to consumers through contracts for difference, which would be in addition to the £1 billion capital grant.43
18Neither the Department nor HM Treasury calculated the financial impact of the delay to CCS’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Neither the Department nor HM Treasury calculated the financial impact of the delay to CCS’s deployment that would inevitably result from the decision to cancel the competition.44 The Department told us this was because it did not have time model the impact of a delay in time for the Spending Review and because it did not know what length of delay it should model.45 The costs to deploy CCS later could be higher as oil wells that were potential storage sites could be decommissioned requiring new ones to be built, and the burden on the supply chain could be greater to deploy CCS in a shorter timeframe.46 A gap in long-term plans for decarbonisation
19CCS was a key part of the government’s plans for decarbonising the economy.
Concluded (the committee's words)
CCS was a key part of the government’s plans for decarbonising the economy. In 2012, the Deparment launched the Electricity Market Reform strategy. This set out how it would secure investment in new generating capacity to achieve the 2050 target while meeting the challenge posed by increasing demand and plant closures in the 2020s and beyond. Along with renewables and nuclear power, CCS formed an important part of the Department’s plans. Applying CCS in the power sector could also have had strategic benefits for energy security, as it could have enabled flexible gas power to be part of a low-carbon generating mix, complementing the intermittency of renewables and the inflexibility of nuclear 40 Q29 41 Q63; The Committee on Climate Change, Letter to Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP: A strategic approach to Carbon Capture and Storage, (July 2016). The CCC was quoting analysis by the Energy Technologies Institute. 42 Q32; National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), para 4.9 43 Q47; National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), para 4.9 44 National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), para 4.12 45 Q63 46 National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), paras 4.16–4.17 14 Carbon Capture and Storage power.47 The Department also expected CCS to decarbonise the industrial, heating and transport sectors. Added to the power sector, this means CCS has potential to decarbonise sectors making up around 83% of the UK’s total carbon dioxide emissions.48
20The Department’s long-term aim was to enable investment in CCS projects in the early 2020s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department’s long-term aim was to enable investment in CCS projects in the early 2020s without government support and at a price competitive with other low-carbon generating technologies. In 2012 the Department published a ‘CCS roadmap’ which set out five strands of government support to achieve this objective, of which the second competition was the main strand.49 The Department intended that its CCS competition would be the first step towards widespread deployment of the technology. We asked the Department whether HM Treasury’s decision to withdraw funding showed the government lacks a long-term view for CCS, with it being difficult to secure commitment from Ministers when the benefits only accrue over the long-term and are difficult to see, in contrast to other areas of government spending such as schools and hospitals. The Department told us the government has had a long-term view for making CCS work, but both competitions have been unsuccesful because their costs were unsustainable.50
21The cancellation of the competition means there is now a significant gap in the Department’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The cancellation of the competition means there is now a significant gap in the Department’s plans for achieving decarbonisation while ensuring energy security. Without CCS there is no viable way to achieve emissions reductions in the industrial sector in the near future.51 The Department and the Treasury both told us that they still consider CCS will have an important role to play in decarbonising the UK.52 We asked the Department when it would set out its future plans for CCS, and whether this would include taking action to secure deployment of CCS across the economy.53 The Department told us that it would set out its plans in its Emissions Reduction Plan by the end of this year and that bringing industrial policy and energy within the same government department means it can look at the impact of CCS across both of these sectors.54 Damage to investor confidence
22The decision to cancel the competition has had a negative impact on investors’ confidence to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The decision to cancel the competition has had a negative impact on investors’ confidence to engage with the government. The Department designed the competition in a way that meant it could withdraw from negotiations early without incurring significant cancellation costs. But this was at the expense of damaging investors’ confidence when HM Treasury withdrew the competition’s funding, particularly as this was shortly before the Department was due to decide which projects it would support.55 The Department told us it expected at least one of the projects would have met its criteria for receiving support.56 HM Treasury told us that it understood its decision to withdraw funding for the competition would affect investor confidence.57 47 C&AG’s Report, para 1.6 to 1.7 48 Q18; C&AG’s Report, 1.4 49 C&AG’s Report, para 2.3 50 Q71 51 NAO report, para 4.17 52 Qq45, 86 53 Qq91, 104–108 54 Qq85, 108 55 Q63; C&AG’s Report, paras 11, 14; National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), para 4.16 56 Q90 57 Q79 Carbon Capture and Storage 15
23The decision is the latest in a series of decisions on energy policies that have...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The decision is the latest in a series of decisions on energy policies that have potentially impacted on investors’ confidence. In another recent evidence session, we asked the Department and HM Treasury about decisions to cut schemes under the Levy Control Framework after poor forecasting led to delays in the Department identifing an overspend.58 We noted the apparent pattern of increases in government support followed by sudden changes to dampen down demand.59 Last year, the Energy and Climate Change Committee identified six factors that in combination were damaging investors’ confidence, including a lack of transparency or a long-term vision, inconsistency of approach and sudden changes to policies.60 HM Treasury told us that the government had learned collectively from its experiences and was moving away from demand-driven schemes.61
24The negative impacts on CCS investors’ confidence could increase costs or risks for taxpayers or...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The negative impacts on CCS investors’ confidence could increase costs or risks for taxpayers or consumers in deployments of the technology in the future. It is the government’s policy that the private sector should, as far as possible, finance and build new generating capacity. But investors will require a higher rate of return on projects where they perceive the risks of dealing with the government to be greater.62 We asked the Department whether it believed investors would be willing to invest in CCS again in light of the experiences of the competition. The Department told us that it did not know whether the same companies would engage again with the government, but that this is something it would explore. It also told us that it felt the overall investor environment in the energy sector has been strong, as demonstrated by the recent capacity auctions, a new round of contracts for difference, and the deal for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station.63 HM Treasury told us that successfully deploying CCS is likely to require the government to consider ways of making the technology more affordable to investors. It cited a recent Parliamentary advisory committee report, which suggested a new delivery model whereby the government would carry more of the risks associated with CCS projects.64 58 Q99; Committee of Public Accounts, Thirty-ninth Report of Session 2016–17, Consumer-funded energy policies, HC 773 59 Q102 60 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Third Report of Session 2015–16, Investor confidence in the UK energy sector, HC 542 61 Q102 62 National Audit Office, Briefing: Sustainability in the Spending Review (July 2016), para 4.16 63 Q98 64 Q80; Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon Capture and Storage, Lowest Cost Decarbonisation for the UK: The Critical Role of CCS (September 2016) 16 Carbon Capture and Storage
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 30 Mar 2017No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗