Select committee inquiry
Government resilience: extreme weather
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“Of the 89 risks on the Government’s National Risk Register, eight are extreme weather events, defined as those that are significantly different from the average or usual weather pattern. Government does have mechanisms in place to manage these risks, but a National Audit Office (NAO) report into government resilience in this area has found these could be strengthened. In January 2023 , the Cabinet Office wrote to the Committee announcing the publication of its UK Government Resilience Framework , designed to improve the management civil contingency risks. Recent events, including multiple severe storms, high temperatures, and droughts, highlight the challenges faced by the UK from these risks, while the pandemic underlines the need to improve resilience against future emergencies. Based on the NAO report , the Committee will take evidence from senior officials from the Cabinet Office and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on subjects including: Does the UK Government have a clear vision and well-defined roles and responsibilities to manage national risks, such as extreme weather events, and the generic capabilities to deal with emergencies; What are the risks from extreme weather events; What is the Government’s understanding of risks and any gaps in its knowledge; How the UK Government can develop resilience; What is the appropriate pace and scale of adaptation required to fully prepare the UK for climate risks. The Committee’s inquiry will look at central government management of risks rather than local response plans. The inquiry does not cover arrangements in the devolved nations. If you have evidence on these issues, please submit it here by 23:59 on Wednesday 7 February 2024. Please look at the requirements for written evidence submissions and note that the Committee cannot accept material as evidence that is published elsewhere. This inquiry was closed due to the 2024 General Election.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of Twenty-Seventh Report - Government resilience: extreme weather ↗
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need to strengthen resilience to the national risks that the UK faces. In December 2022, the UK Government Resilience Framework was published, setting out the government’s strategic approach to strengthening resilience that will be taken forward by the Cabinet Office. Strengthening UK resilience to society-wide risks will require action to be taken across government, but we are concerned that the government’s approach lacks the robust leadership, oversight and urgency required.
As global temperatures rise, extreme weather events are likely to become more frequent and severe, and recent events have shown that the government can do more to prepare for these kinds of risks. Extreme weather risks are some of the most serious facing the UK, for example, estimated insurance losses were £250 million to £300 million for Storm Arwen and more than 4,500 heat-related deaths were recorded during the summer of 2022 in England. By focusing on extreme weather events, we can learn wider lessons on developing UK resilience.
To strengthen resilience to national risks, including extreme weather, the government needs to focus more on medium- and long-term prevention and preparation, including, appointing a Chief Risk Officer to consider cross-cutting and system-wide risks.
Government needs to set out clear roles and responsibilities for citizens, the voluntary sector, the public and private sector; be explicit about the level of resilience it wants to achieve and how it will get there; and speed up the development and implementation of its approach to resilience investment.
What the government said
The government responded on 11 July 2025.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The document does not set out a substantive response to the Committee's recommendations; instead, a review of national resilience is to be overseen by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with a Treasury Minute to follow once it has concluded.
- The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster announced the review in his oral statement to Parliament on 19 July 2024, responding to the COVID-19 Inquiry Module One report.
- A Treasury Minute will be published once the review has concluded; no date is stated.
- In the meantime, the Cabinet Office "will write to the new Committee".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 10 January 2024 to 11 July 2025.
- Oral evidence 21 Feb 2024
- Report 19 Apr 2024
- Government response 11 Jul 2025
- Correspondence 2 letters
What it recommended 7 recommendations · 24 conclusions
2Implement coordinated resilience investment, give infrastructure regulators consistent climate roles, and encourage private adaptation funding.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office is taking too long to develop its approach to investment in resilience, including private sector investment. Public and private sector investment is critical in developing national resilience to extreme weather events and to the impacts of climate change. The Cabinet Office and HM Treasury do not know how much money is spent on resilience to extreme weather events or other national risks. The Cabinet Office has committed to having a coordinated and prioritised approach to investment in resilience within government, informed by a shared understanding of risk, by 2030. By 2030, the Cabinet Office has also committed to reviewing existing regulatory regimes on resilience to ensure they are fit for purpose. Currently, some regulators do not have a statutory climate resilience remit and we are concerned that slow implementation of these measures is holding back UK resilience. The 2023 Green Finance Strategy sets out government’s proposed action to prepare the UK for the physical impacts of the changing climate, to align financial flows with a climate-resilient economy, and to increase investment in adaptation, but its commitments on adaptation are substantially weaker than those on net zero and on nature. Recommendation 2: By 2028, the Cabinet Office should: a) implement the government’s coordinated and prioritised approach to investment in resilience; b) give infrastructure regulators consistent climate resilience roles; and 6 Government resilience: extreme weather c) work with HM Treasury and other government departments to encourage greater private investment in climate adaptation.
3Set out a resilient UK vision for extreme weather risks, including a strategy and costed plans.
Recommended (the committee's words)
For most extreme weather risks government has not set out what level of resilience it wants to achieve or how it will attain this, including targets and standards for the desired level of national, local or sectoral resilience. For three of the four extreme weather risks examined by the National Audit Office (high temperatures and heatwaves, storms and surface water flooding), government has not specified what outcome it is looking to achieve, such as target levels of preparedness or resilience, or the amount of risk that it is willing to accept in the pursuit of those outcomes (risk appetite). For droughts, water companies are currently required to plan to ensure resilience to a 1-in-200 year ‘severe’ drought and from 2024, to a 1-in- 500 year ‘extreme’ drought. Without defining the level of risk government is willing to accept and aiming to attain, it cannot make informed decisions about trade- offs between long- and short-term priorities, investment or funding allocation in priority areas. It also makes it difficult for government or other stakeholders to track progress and evaluate how effectively and efficiently government is using public funds to improve national resilience. Recommendation 3: Using extreme weather risks as a pilot with a view to then applying more widely to other sets of national risks, the Cabinet Office should set out what a resilient UK looks like for these risks and a strategy to deliver this. This could include identifying the gap between the tolerable and acceptable level of risk and the current position, producing costed plans to drive down the risk to this level, bringing this information together to develop a coordinated and prioritised approach to investment, and monitoring and tracking progress in driving down the risk to this level.
4Engage communities and vulnerable groups to understand risks and impacts, ensuring better protection.
Recommended (the committee's words)
In building resilience to extreme weather events, it will be vital to better understand how different communities and groups will be disproportionately affected. People experience different levels of exposure to extreme weather. Factors such as location, income and health affect people’s ability to cope with and respond to these events. Better understanding of vulnerability to the impacts of extreme weather could be used to target adaptation measures and emergency response. Government has committed to conducting an annual survey of public perceptions of risk, resilience and preparedness and develop a measurement of socio-economic resilience by 2025. This will include how risks impact across communities and vulnerable groups, to guide and inform decision making on risk and resilience. Other countries such as Australia and New Zealand have programmes of public education and communication on how to prepare for crises. Recommendation 4: The Cabinet Office should set out how it will better engage different communities and vulnerable groups to understand the risks and impacts that affect them, for example, by using the results of its 2025 survey to better protect vulnerable groups.
5Establish a Government Chief Risk Officer to oversee cross-cutting risks and resolve system-wide concerns.
Recommended (the committee's words)
If the government does not learn lessons on leadership and oversight for system-wide risks, this may come at a high cost to individuals, the economy and society in the future. Managing and building resilience to national risks requires coordinated action to be taken across government and beyond. But there are Government resilience: extreme weather 7 gaps in improving UK resilience as accountability is too fragmented and diffuse. In 2022, we recommended the establishment of a Chief Risk Officer to consider cross-cutting risks in government and proactively manage the identification and resolution of system-wide concerns. This post has not been created. Instead, the Cabinet Office appointed a Head of Resilience to lead the efforts to strengthen UK resilience and HM Treasury appointed a Head of the Government Risk Profession to build capabilities and skills in the risk management profession. These roles do not adequately address the objective of the Committee’s previous recommendation. There is still a lack of independent challenge on the extent to which risk is properly identified and considered at the most senior levels when decisions are made, and a lack of cohesive leadership and objective oversight of how government as a whole manages national risks. A Chief Risk Officer should address these shortcomings, ensure that there are no gaps in risk oversight, and address systemic challenges across government and any consequential risks. Recommendation 5: By 2025, the government should establish a Government Chief Risk Officer role to oversee the identification and proactive management of cross-cutting consequential risks in government and the resolution of system-wide concerns in a cohesive and coherent manner. This role should be independent and have sufficient seniority to not only provide professional leadership and expert advice across the risk profession but also advise and constructively challenge senior leaders in government.
6Define clear roles and responsibilities for all sectors in national risk prevention and preparedness.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office has yet to set out the respective roles of central government, local government, the devolved administrations, the private and voluntary sectors, and the public for developing and maintaining national resilience. Government has identified that developing resilience requires a ‘whole of society’ approach, but it has yet to clarify the roles the different parts of government and society ought to play, leading to uncertainty on what actions to take. This uncertainty on roles, responsibilities and actions is particularly challenging for communities dealing with a novel risk that is impacting them for the first time where who does what has not been well rehearsed. Considering individual extreme weather risks, the public does not always know who is responsible for mitigating the risk. For example, public awareness of the risk of surface water flooding is low and it is not always clear who the public should contact to report incidents to when they happen. There are also opportunities to learn from other countries. For example, the Australian government has issued statements of responsibility for government, business, the third sector and individuals. Recommendation 6: The Cabinet Office should set out clear roles, responsibilities, and guidance for citizens, the third sector, the public sector and the private sector on prevention and preparedness for national risks, and how this links with the roles and responsibilities of central and local government.
7Gain assurance on local organisations' capacities, capabilities, and risk registers and plans.
Recommended (the committee's words)
Local organisations have a critical role to play in developing UK resilience, but the Cabinet Office does not know if they have the capacity or capability to fulfil their role effectively. Local organisations, such as the local responders represented in local resilience forums and other voluntary and community organisations have a critical role in making the UK resilient. For example, each forum produces a community risk register setting out the greatest risks to their local area, what is 8 Government resilience: extreme weather being done to manage them and where the public can get help or advice. They also prepare supporting emergency plans, that may either be generic plans that describe a response to a wide range of possible scenarios, such as a major incident plan, or specific plans that deal with a particular kind of emergency, such as a flood. However, central government does not check local plans to see if they are fit for purpose and does not know if local organisations have the capacity and capability to fulfil their functions effectively. The Cabinet Office, in its 2021 integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, recognised the that the roles and responsibilities of these forums needs to be strengthened. The Department for Levelling up, Housing and Communities plans to pilot ways to strengthen their leadership and accountability by 2025. Recommendation 7: The Cabinet Office, working with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, should put measures in place to gain assurance on local organisations’ capacities and capabilities and to gain assurance on local risk registers and plans so support and resources can be targeted where improvement is most needed. Government resilience: extreme weather 9 1 Building resilience
1Committee took evidence on government's arrangements for building national resilience.
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), HM Treasury, and the Met Office on government’s arrangements to build resilience to national risks, including extreme weather events.1
8Public and private investment is critical for national resilience to extreme weather and climate.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Both public and private sector investment is critical in developing national resilience to extreme weather events and climate change. For example, many flood defence projects require funding from public and private sector sources in addition to government 6 Qq 1, 45 7 Qq 1, 2, 39, 43, 90, 124; C&AG’s Report, para 9 8 Qq 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 43 9 Q 10 10 Q 34; C&AG’s Report, para 21 11 Prof Rowena Hill and Rich Pickford (GEX0008); Newcastle University (GEX0012); UK Corporate Leaders Group (GEX0013); National Fire Chiefs Council (GEX0016); Wildlife and Countryside Link (GEX0019) 12 Qq 29, 30, 31, 34; Correspondence from the Cabinet Office to the Public Accounts Committee, 28 February 2024 13 Q 35; C&AG’s Report, paras 1.18, 3.27 Government resilience: extreme weather 11 funding before they can go ahead.14 The Cabinet Office highlighted that there is plenty of evidence that it is often cheaper to invest in building resilience than it is to deal with the consequences of not investing. The Chancellor’s Autumn Statement announced a £10 million fund for analysis to underpin where money is best spent for resilience.15
9No common definition for resilience activity hinders measurement of government investment.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office and HM Treasury cannot identify how much is spent on resilience activity as there is no common definition of what constitutes this type of activity.16 Government has committed to developing a coordinated approach to investment in resilience by 2030, noting that to make strategic investment decisions, it needs to understand how current capabilities match up with risks and concentrate investment where gaps are identified. As a first step, it aims to agree on a working definition of resilience activities and capabilities, and using that, will map current government resilience capabilities. It also plans to start measuring and tracking departmental investment in resilience across national risks, meaning risk-owning departments will be able to track investments. The Cabinet Office told us that 2030 is an end point, not a target date, and if it can meet this sooner, it will.17
10Most infrastructure regulators lack specific duties for climate change resilience, hindering adaptation efforts.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Regulation has an important role to play in developing resilience. Written submissions to us highlighted that resilience to climate change, including extreme weather, requires a strategic and coordinated approach to regulatory frameworks.18 Most infrastructure regulators do not have specific duties regarding climate resilience. Ofwat is the exception and has had a more positive impact on infrastructure climate change adaptation than other regulators due to its explicit adaptation requirement. The Cabinet Office has committed to reviewing existing regulatory regimes on resilience to ensure they are fit for purpose and putting resilience standards in place by 2030.19 It told us that it has met the Institute of Regulation, the UK Regulators Network and critical national infrastructure sectors to understand the approach that should be taken on standards and goals. It highlighted that it wanted to build up an evidence base to work out if current standards are good enough and then, due to the complexity of regulating critical national infrastructure sectors, including interactions between different regulations, put in place something coherent and consistent by 2030.20
11Government efforts to drive private sector climate adaptation investment lag behind net zero.
Concluded (the committee's words)
On private sector investment in climate resilience, the Cabinet Office highlighted the 2023 green finance strategy that promotes working with private sector partners to improve the approach to climate resilience assessment and disclosure, and collaboration to make sure the things that need to be funded are funded included through the UK Infrastructure Bank. However, government action to create the right environment for adaptation lags behind that for net zero.21 The Cabinet Office also told us that government is considering the inclusion of an adaptation objective in the upcoming UK green taxonomy.22 14 C&AG’s Report, para 23 15 Qq 26, 48, 52; Correspondence from the Cabinet Office to the Public Accounts Committee, 28 February 2024 16 C&AG’s Report, para 3.12. 17 Qq 13, 26, 48, 49, 50, 67; C&AG’s Report, para 3.13 18 Q 21; C&AG’s Report, para 25; Association of British Insurers (GEX0018); Wildlife and Countryside Link (GEX0019) 19 Qq 20, 22, 124, 128; C&AG’s Report, Figure 3, para 3.10 20 Qq 22, 111, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128; Correspondence from the Cabinet Office to the Public Accounts Committee, 28 February 2024 21 West Midlands Combined Authority (GEX0017); C&AG’s Report, para 23 22 Q 110 12 Government resilience: extreme weather Acceptable levels of resilience
12Government resilience framework lacks a clear vision, targets, and standards for a resilient UK.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The government’s resilience framework does not set out a well-defined vision for what a resilient UK looks like, including targets and standards for the desired level of national, local, or sectoral resilience. Without specifying what outcome it is looking to achieve, such as target levels of preparedness or resilience, or the amount of risk that it is willing to accept in the pursuit of those outcomes (risk appetite), government cannot make informed decisions about trade-offs between long- and short-term priorities, investment or funding allocation of priority areas. It also makes it difficult for government or other stakeholders to track progress and evaluate how effectively and efficiently government is using public funds to improve national resilience.23
13Cabinet Office notes challenges in defining a single cross-government risk appetite due to varied threats.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office explained that it is difficult to have a single risk appetite across government because risks themselves vary and each risk will have different appetites. For example, society has a higher tolerance for deaths in road traffic accidents in a year than for deaths in a single terrorist event.24 Instead, the Cabinet Office focuses on common consequences of risks and the ability to respond via generic capabilities, informed by a number of sources, including the Assessment, capabilities assessments, assessments of the resilience and interdependencies of critical national infrastructure sectors and lessons from the National Exercising Programme. It told us that it can provide information on how well prepared the UK is for a risk, what actions could be taken to mitigate it, the costs and the trade-offs and then it is a case-by-case decision to be taken by Ministers.25
14Government lacks clear outcomes and tolerable risk levels for most extreme weather risks.
Concluded (the committee's words)
For three of the four extreme weather risks that the NAO examined (high temperatures and heatwaves, storms and surface water flooding), there was a lack of clarity on what outcome government is looking to achieve, such as target levels of preparedness, resilience, and an agreement on the level of tolerable risk, based on a well-informed risk appetite. In the case of drought, water companies are required to plan to ensure resilience to a 1-in- 200 year ‘severe’ drought and in their new plans in 2024, to a 1-in-500 year ‘extreme’ drought.26 Defra, the lead government department for droughts and floods, noted that even where risk appetite or the level of resilience you are looking to achieve is defined, funding to achieve this is still competing with other areas of spending. The Cabinet Office highlighted other challenges in assessing risk appetite, including the evidence base on the returns on investment being a lot weaker for some risks compared to others such as floods, and having to make hard choices about where the money comes from to fund resilience.27 Written evidence from the UK Corporate Leaders Group stated that an important starting point for reducing climate risk is to understand the risk appetite of different stakeholders. It suggested that a national conversation around the level of climate risk that is acceptable and the balance of costs and benefits from investment in adaptation would help determine where the priorities are for action and investment.28 23 Q 12; C&AG’s Report, para 10 24 Qq 1, 2, 5, 6, 12 25 Q 2; C&AG’s Report, para 11 26 Qq 13, 70; C&AG’s Report, para 3.2 27 Qq 13, 54; C&AG’s Report, Figure 6 28 UK Corporate Leaders Group (GEX0013) Government resilience: extreme weather 13 Planning for people exposed to different levels of risk
15Vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by extreme weather, with mitigation knowledge gaps.
Concluded (the committee's words)
People experience different levels of exposure to extreme weather. Factors such as location, income and health affect people’s ability to cope with and respond to these events. For example, lower income households may be more likely to live in properties at flood risk, which are less expensive to buy or rent, and be less likely to be able to afford the cost of replacing possessions lost to flooding. Our written evidence also highlighted the need to improve the understanding of what kind of vulnerabilities are exacerbated during an emergency with providers of essential services needing to identify and support vulnerable customers in an emergency. We know that those who are vulnerable are disproportionately affected by the risks and impacts of extreme weather, yet there is a gap in knowledge as to how investments in resilience and adaptation could mitigate these impacts.29
16Cabinet Office plans 2025 measures to support vulnerable groups, acknowledging long way to go.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office has committed to implementing several measures by 2025 to better support vulnerable groups. One of these is developing a measurement of socio- economic resilience, including how risks impact across communities and vulnerable groups to guide and inform decision making on risk and resilience. Another measure is offering better guidance to local resilience forums and local partners in England, created with local responders, the voluntary sector and communities to support them working with vulnerable groups. In addition, by 2025, the Cabinet Office will conduct an annual survey of public perceptions of risk, resilience and preparedness.30 It noted there is guidance for identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis, so that local action plans can identify those groups of people in an emergency. It assured us that careful consideration was being given to all the different dimensions of society, how it engages with them effectively, directly or through organisations that can represent them, and how it can have conversations about risk and people’s roles. However, it noted that although conversations had started there is a long of way to go.31
17Media plays crucial role conveying vital adaptation messages during extreme weather events.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Met Office noted that the media has an important role to play in getting important messages across and helping people adapt. It highlighted recent extreme heat events where the whole UK media helped to get the message across that “This is not weather you have seen before and it will require a different response at an individual level. This is heat that can harm healthy people as well as vulnerable people. You want to keep your windows and curtains closed, which is not what you normally do on a hot day, and you might want to consider going to a cool place”.32
18UK lags other nations in national public communication campaigns for emergency preparedness.
Concluded (the committee's words)
New Zealand’s National Emergencies Management Agency runs a national communications campaign on how to prepare for emergencies. The ‘Get Ready’ campaign encourages households, workplaces, schools and communities to be ready. It provides information on what to do before, during and after natural hazard events, including floods and storms. The Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience acts on behalf of government to share disaster resilience education, knowledge and information with the public. This 29 Chartered Institute of Housing (GEX0001); Prof Rowena Hill and Rich Pickford (GEX0008); Keep Britain Tidy (GEX0009); National Flood Forum (GEX0010); British Red Cross (GEX0011); West Midlands Combined Authority (GEX0017) 30 Qq 25, 43, 78; C&AG’s Report, Figure 3; Correspondence from the Cabinet Office to the Public Accounts Committee, 28 February 2024 31 Q 78 32 Q 78 14 Government resilience: extreme weather includes the 2021 handbook Disaster Resilience Education for Young People. The Cabinet Office plans to develop a website to help the public know how to be prepared and respond to emergencies.33 33 Q 25; C&AG’s Report, para 3.24 and Figure 12 Government resilience: extreme weather 15 2 Oversight arrangements Leadership
19Coordinated cross-government action needed for effective national risk management and resilience building.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although the Cabinet Office assigns ownership for each national risk to either a single department or to multiple departments, managing these risks and building resilience to them often requires coordinated action across government and beyond. This can be challenging for individual or small groups of departments to coordinate and oversee.34 When asked how confident it was that the right action is being taken across government to manage system-wide risks, the Cabinet Office noted that it has a good programme of work in place, such as its capabilities assessment and critical national infrastructure assessment, to support the resilience framework.35 When asked who is overseeing the balance between the 89 risks on the Register, HM Treasury told us that risk management decisions follow government governance arrangements and can be escalated from departments through permanent secretaries and ministers to the Cabinet. It noted that to support cross-government work, the Civil Service Board considers cross-cutting risks, and that there is a desire to do more cross-government collaboration on areas of resilience or risk management more broadly. The Cabinet Office highlighted that where a decision must be made about how resources are allocated it can present Ministers with a range of choices between risks or between risks and day-to-day business.36
20Government risk profession's current efforts aim to improve national risk management capability
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked HM Treasury what more could be done to oversee national risks. It told us that the Head of the Government Risk profession is focused on improving the risk management capability of government, improving the professionalism and credibility of staff, increasing cross-boundary working, and all these actions will help. It has produced a suite of toolkits to help departments think about what they might need to do now to avoid or deal with long-term impacts and noted that everybody across government has responsibility for management of risk.37
21Committee previously recommended establishing a Chief Risk Officer for cross-cutting government risks
Recommended (the committee's words)
In 2022, we recommended the establishment of a Chief Risk Officer to consider cross- cutting risks in government and proactively manage the identification and resolution of system-wide concerns. We stated that the role should provide independent challenge on the extent to which risk is properly identified and considered at the most senior levels when decisions are made, provide cohesive leadership and objective oversight of how government manages national risks.38
22No dedicated Chief Risk Officer role exists, despite previous recommendations and ongoing debate
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the witnesses why there is still no Chief Risk Officer or Advisor, like the National Security Adviser, to provide a more cohesive system-wide view and leadership. The Cabinet Office told us that the Head of Resilience fulfils that role, by looking at all the resilience risks across Government and ensuring that there is a robust system in place to be prepared for them. It explained that the role reports into the Deputy National Security Advisor and has the support of the Deputy Prime Minister who chairs the National Security Council on Resilience.39 HM Treasury told us that arguments for an overall Chief Risk 34 C&AG’s Report, para 12 35 Q 43 36 Qq 3, 4, 24 37 Qq 38, 139 38 Committee of Public Accounts, Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk; 46th report of Session 2021–22, HC 952, March 2022, conclusions and recommendations 1 39 Qq 38, 44, 46, 47 16 Government resilience: extreme weather Advisor reflect a desire for more challenge of government and the arguments against the role reflect the scale of the subject matter and the concern that others with responsibilities for risks may feel less responsible for those risks. HM Treasury noted that it is working to understand what that role could consist of and what contributions different parts of government are currently making to the management of risk.40 Roles and responsibilities
23Government resilience framework lacks clarity on specific roles and responsibilities across society
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although the government’s resilience framework highlighted that developing resilience requires a ‘whole of society’ approach, it has not set out what the respective roles of central government, local government, the devolved administrations, the private and voluntary sectors, and the public are.41 We also received written evidence from several organisations and academics highlighting that roles and responsibilities for infrastructure providers, local government, the private sector, the voluntary sector and the public lack clarity.42 Considering other countries’ approaches, the Australian government, for example, has issued statements of responsibility for government, business, the third sector and individuals.43 With so many parties involved the lack of clarity means there is a risk of it not being clear who is responsible for what and a risk of actions not being taken.44
24Cabinet Office guidance clarifies acute national risk ownership and devolved nation roles
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office assigns ownership of acute national risks to lead government departments. It updated the relevant guidance in 2023 with specific responsibilities for building resilience and preventing risks from occurring. It assured us that the lead government department list is also clear on the roles of the devolved nations.45
25Civil Contingencies Act defines local emergency roles, not for businesses or the voluntary sector
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Civil Contingencies Act sets out the roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Cabinet Office explained that there are no defined responsibilities for businesses and the voluntary sector but highlighted that it engages with the response community, voluntary organisations and community representatives through its UK Resilience Forum.46
26Public awareness of extreme weather risks and incident reporting mechanisms remains low
Concluded (the committee's words)
Considering individual extreme weather risks, the public does not always know who is responsible for mitigating the risk, particularly if it is a novel risk impacting them for the first time. For example, public awareness of the risk of surface water flooding is low and it is not always clear who the public should contact to report incidents to when they happen. The Cabinet Office told us that it plans to develop a website to help the public understand how they can be prepared for these events and the actions that they can take, not just in response to events but to be prepared ahead of time as well.47
27Storm Babet exposed local clarity gaps in flood response and long-term climate adaptation roles
Concluded (the committee's words)
During Storm Babet in 2022–23, there were 5.7 million properties in England at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea, surface water or groundwater. Over 150 rivers had record water levels and 2,200 homes were flooded. The storm hit local areas that were less used 40 Q 46 41 C&AG’s Report, paras 5 and 13 42 Dr Laiz Souto (GEX0002); St John Ambulance (GEX0004); Dr Tom Wood, Dr Saba Sadati, Dr Giuliano Punzo, Dr Martin Mayfield and Dr Hadi Arbabi (GEX0006); National Flood Forum (GEX0010); Newcastle University (GEX0012); West Midlands Combined Authority (GEX0017); Wildlife and Countryside Link (GEX0019); Local Government Association (GEX0021) 43 Qq 14, 16; C&AG’s Report, para 1.7 44 Q 39 45 Qq 14, 27; C&AG’s Report, Figures 2 and 5 and para 1.9 46 Qq 14, 15, 16, 25, 94 47 Qq 16, 18, 25; C&AG’s Report, para 3.19 Government resilience: extreme weather 17 to dealing with floods and were less clear about what was expected of them. Defra told us that one of the lessons from this storm was providing greater clarity about what the Environment Agency does and what local resilience forums (LRFs) are expected to do.48 In addition, written evidence we received highlighted that while categorised responders have clear roles and responsibilities to respond and prepare for current and short-term weather patterns, there is no clear role for them to support longer term climate adaptation which considers the actions needed to reduce the negative impacts of climate change and build resilience to climate-related shocks and stresses across all systems.49 Capacity and capability of local organisations
28National resilience standards for LRFs are voluntary, with many outdated community risk registers
Concluded (the committee's words)
Local organisations have a critical role in responding to emergencies and building resilience.50 Emergency responders in a local area convene in local resilience forums (LRFs) and the Cabinet Office published a set of national resilience standards for LRFs in 2020. These standards provide a consistent way for LRFs and their constituent local responder organisations to self-assess their capabilities and level of readiness, and to guide continuous improvement against mandatory requirements, good and leading practice. However, the standards have no formal status, and their use is voluntary. LRFs produce community risk registers that set out the greatest risks to each local area, what is being done to manage them and where the public can get help or advice. The NAO found that of 42 community risk registers in England and Wales, 43% may give the public partly outdated information as they have not been updated since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.51 Local responders also have statutory obligations to maintain emergency plans and their own business continuity arrangements.52
29Central government lacks formal review or assurance of local emergency plans and risk registers
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the witnesses whether central government reviews local emergency plans and monitors community risk registers. The Cabinet Office told us that LRF plans are not examined and assured by central government, noting that the powers exist to do this but not the funding for implementation. It also highlighted that the Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities monitors LRFs’ performance against aspects of legislation to provide assistance rather than to perform an inspection or enforcement role.53 We also received written evidence from the National Flood Forum indicating that the lack of local assurance has limited the ability of communities to understand how effectively their LRF is managing flood resilience.54
30Local resilience capacity and capability remain insufficient given falling local authority spending.
Concluded (the committee's words)
When asked if LRFs and other local organisations have the capacity and capability to carry out their resilience roles effectively, the Cabinet Office told us that resilience is often a function of the capacity and capability of the broader system more generally, such as the strength of their social services, children’s services and LRFs’ ability to muster effective executive decision making and draw on other local partners. It also told us that money spent on resilience by local authorities has fallen.55 We also received written evidence from voluntary groups suggesting that there should be increased mapping of the local voluntary 48 Q 81; Committee of Public Accounts, Resilience to flooding, 7th report of Session 2023–24, HC 71, January 2024, para 2 49 West Midlands Combined Authority (GEX0017) 50 Q 97 51 Q 94; C&AG’s Report, paras 1.14, 3.11 and 3.20 52 Q 109 53 Qq 94, 95, 96, 97, 99 54 National Flood Forum (GEX0010) 55 Qq 52, 109 18 Government resilience: extreme weather sector, its capabilities and skillsets in each area so that emergency responders know what support the voluntary sector can provide in a local area and to match volunteer skillsets with need. The evidence highlighted the importance of capacity, including surge capacity to meet the additional demand for responders during emergencies, via community links and the voluntary sector to enhance local resilience.56
31Strengthening Local Resilience Forum leadership and accountability remains a priority for the Cabinet Office.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Cabinet Office, in its 2021 integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, recognised the that the roles and responsibilities of LRFs needs to be strengthened. The Department for Levelling up, Housing and Communities plans to pilot ways to strengthen their leadership and accountability by 2025. The Cabinet Office told us that these eight pilots will look at strengthening the role of LRFs in the local area to ensure that resilience is built into all local policies.57 56 St John Ambulance (GEX0004); Southwell Flood Forum (GEX0022) 57 Qq 28, 51, 109; C&AG’s Report, para 1.15 Government resilience: extreme weather 19
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 21 Feb 2024Government resilience: extreme weather5 witnesses, listed belowparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 5 witnesses
- Clive MartinHead of the Government Risk Profession, Government Finance Function
- Matthew ClarkeResilience Director, Cabinet Office
- Professor Penelope EndersbyChief Executive, Met Office
- Roger HargreavesDirector, COBR Unit, Cabinet Office
- Tamara Finkelstein CBPermanent Secretary, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Correspondence 2 letters
- 4 Mar 2024Correspondence from Tamara Finkelstein CB, Permanent Secretary, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, re Funding allocation for coastal adaptation, dated 28 February 2024
- 4 Mar 2024Correspondence from Matthew Clarke, Resilience Director and Head of Resilience, Cabinet Office, re PAC hearing on Preparedness for Extreme Weather, dated 28 February 2024