Select committee inquiry
Management of PPE Contracts
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The NAO and PAC have previously reported on the commercial deals struck by government as part of its emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic, finding in some instances that these deals may have left government with some that failed to meet the required standards, including hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of PPE that will not be used for the original intended purposes. The Committee will question senior officials at DHSC on the way government is managing its COVID-19 contracts and the goods it has received to date , including the actions taken by government if the goods have not been received, are not what was expected, or are no longer required. If you have evidence on these issues please submit it here by 6pm on Wednesday 13 April 2022.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of Twelfth Report - Management of PPE contracts ↗
Two years after purchasing just over £13 billion’s worth of PPE the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) remains in dispute with many suppliers over the quality of the PPE they provided. It faces a huge challenge to manage a stockpile of PPE, including billions of items that are unusable or not needed. Of the 37.9 billion items of PPE purchased, the Department has estimated that it holds 3.9 billion items that it does not need. It is exploring options for selling, donating and recycling this PPE but it accepts that some will end up being incinerated. The Department is hampered in its overall management of its PPE stock as is does not have a fully integrated stock management system and because it still holds PPE in over 70 locations across the UK as well as in China and at various supplier storage locations.
The Department is in dispute with PPE suppliers on 176 contracts with up to £2.7 billion of taxpayers’ money at risk. The majority of these disputes relate to the quality of the PPE provided. Progress in resolving these disputes has been slow with 86 of the 176 still at the very first stage of the commercial resolution process with an estimated 35% that will not be resolved by 2023. There is also little sign of action against potentially fraudulent suppliers despite the Department’s estimate that as much as 5% of PPE expenditure may have involved fraud. Insufficient due diligence checks prior to letting some contracts has left the Department unable to prevent or take action where suppliers and intermediaries may have made excessive profits whilst providing substandard PPE.
The future of the PPE programme remains uncertain. In April 2022 Supply Chain Coordination Limited (SCCL) took over responsibility for the programme, however it is unclear how exactly responsibilities and roles are split between itself and the Department, and the already delayed PPE strategy paper is still to emerge. That strategy will, amongst other things, need to set out how the Department expects to maintain resilience in the UK supply chain by working with the UK suppliers who helped meet demand during the pandemic as well as where responsibility lies for getting best value for taxpayers from the contracts it is still disputing.
What the government said
The government responded on 8 November 2022. The deadline was 20 September 2022.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government states that it agrees with the Committee's recommendations on PPE contract management, marking several as implemented and giving target dates for others.
- On excess stock, the department retains responsibility and "expects the operational responsibility will transfer to the NHS Supply Chain on 1 April 2023". Its "current working assumption" is that, "subject to suitability", excess products will be transferred to a future stockpile.
- On stock management, it agrees but says "a new stock management system would not add to the existing processes". It cites a data improvement programme and an expected handover of stock management to SCCL.
- On disputed contracts, it says a Dissolution Team has been commissioned until March 2023 with quarterly targets. It will provide a summary update to the Committee in confidence because much of the information is "commercially sensitive".
- On the PPE strategy, it says it is "committed to publishing the Strategy as soon as it is possible" and will update the Committee on publication plans "in due course".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 15 March 2022 to 12 January 2023. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.
- Oral evidence 20 Apr 2022
- Report 20 Jul 2022
- Government response 8 Nov 2022
- Correspondence 3 letters
What it recommended 15 recommendations · 6 conclusions
2The Department still lacks a stock management system that enables it to fully understand what...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department still lacks a stock management system that enables it to fully understand what PPE it has and where it is. The Department believes that it has now received nearly all of the 37.9 billion PPE items that it has ordered, with 300 million items yet to be received. The management data on total stock numbers, however, has rarely been accurate. The Department blames inconsistencies between the volumes of PPE ordered and quantities shown in stock counts on the lack of a single end-to-end stock management system that captures all the stock it holds. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Department is still storing PPE in 70 locations across the UK, with items also held in China and also by suppliers. In order to make informed decisions about the appropriate amount of PPE to stockpile in future, the Department will need accurate and complete data on the stock it currently holds. Recommendation: The Department should set out in its Treasury Minute response to the Committee how it intends to work with SCCL to build and maintain an effective stock management system that is complete and accurate in its data collection.
3The Department remains in dispute on 176 contracts for PPE with £2.7 billion of taxpayer...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department remains in dispute on 176 contracts for PPE with £2.7 billion of taxpayer money at risk and has made little progress in tackling potential fraudulent supplies of goods. The majority of these 176 disputes relate to the quality of the PPE provided by the supplier. Eighty-three of the 176 contracts are still in the first stage of the commercial resolution process with a further 59 having entered formal commercial discussions. At present, no cases have moved into the litigation stage of the commercial dispute process. The Department estimates that of the 176 contracts in dispute, 35% will not be resolved until 2023. Although the 6 Management of PPE contracts Department estimates that total fraud from PPE contracts could be between 0.5%- 5.0% of expenditure it was unable to give us any details on how it is progressing any fraud inquiries for these contracts under dispute. Recommendation: The Department should explain in its Treasury Minute response to the Committee its progress in resolving these cases and provide as full an update as is possible on the status of those negotiations. The Department should also update us on how it is working with relevant authorities in assessing and acting on any fraudulent cases.
4The Department had insufficient due diligence checks at the outset of the pandemic to prevent...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department had insufficient due diligence checks at the outset of the pandemic to prevent potential profiteering and to identify conflicts of interest. We recognise that the Department had to act quickly at the start of the pandemic to secure vital supplies of PPE but believe that there was still scope to perform appropriate due diligence, particularly on potential new suppliers. The Department acknowledges that before May 2020 not all due diligence checks on areas such as financial, commercial and legal issues were completed before awarding contracts. A formalised eight-stage due diligence process was established in May 2020 but 46 out of 115 contracts awarded through the VIP lane pre-dated this. The Department believes that it had the necessary due diligence checks considering the circumstances and environment of the COVID-19 pandemic in which it was purchasing PPE. At no point was consideration given to the extent of the profit margin that potential suppliers would be taking on payments for PPE. Neither was consideration of any potential conflicts between individuals making referrals through the VIP lane and the companies they were referring. We are therefore unsurprised to see the reports of excessive profits and conflicts of interest on PPE contracts. Recommendation: The Department should set out in its Treasury Minute response how its commercial reset will ensure that sufficient processes are now in place to prevent such issues occurring again.
5The Department has handed back responsibility for the PPE programme to Supply Chain Coordination Limited...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department has handed back responsibility for the PPE programme to Supply Chain Coordination Limited (SCCL) with many issues still to be resolved. Since October 2021, oversight of SCCL transferred from the Department to NHS England and in April 2022 the Department transferred the responsibility for managing the supply of PPE to SCCL. This means that responsibility for the logistical management and distribution of PPE across the 70 sites that the Department built up now resides with SCCL. In other areas, however, such as the resolution of the 176 contracts in commercial dispute, responsibility is to remain within the Department. The Department was due to produce a PPE strategy where we expect roles and responsibilities to be clearly set out, but this has been delayed and is now not expected to be completed until summer 2022. Recommendation: The Department should release its PPE strategy in full as soon as possible, setting out how it will work with SCCL and what the respective roles and responsibilities of each organisation will be in the ongoing management of contracts and future procurement activities. If the strategy is not available by the end of September, the Department should write to the Committee to explain the reason for the delay. Management of PPE contracts 7
6The future of the UK-based supply chain for PPE is unclear.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The future of the UK-based supply chain for PPE is unclear. The global demand for PPE at the start of the pandemic pushed up the prices from suppliers around the world. In an effort to create a more resilient UK-based supply chain, the Department encouraged some UK manufacturers to repurpose their businesses to supply PPE. It signed 37 contracts under its “UK Make” programme and collectively, these contracts helped deliver 3.9 billion items of PPE. However, now that demand for PPE has reduced and with the Department holding a large amount of excess stock, it is unclear what role these suppliers might play going forward. Only seven of them have been moved onto SCCL’s procurement frameworks enabling them to bid for future PPE contracts. In the event of a future pandemic, it is unclear what role these suppliers might be expected to play to meet the renewed demand. Recommendation: The Department should explain in its Treasury Minute response what the role of UK based suppliers of PPE is expected to be going forward. This should include what role UK-based suppliers can expect to play in ongoing procurement activity and what the expectation is for capacity to be increased in the event of future pandemics. 8 Management of PPE contracts 1 The management of PPE stock
1On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) about its management of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) contracts let during the COVID-19 pandemic.1
7Alongside reducing excess stock, the Department is also having to consider what is an appropriate...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Alongside reducing excess stock, the Department is also having to consider what is an appropriate level of PPE to hold as a stockpile. We asked it whether it had created another strategic reserve of PPE in preparation for the possibility of a future pandemic.11 The Department noted that it had a large “surplus”, but the size of the future stockpile it might hold had yet to be determined. Two factors were noted as having a large effect on this decision; the cost of storage and the potential for items in the stockpile to go out of date.12 The Department has seen how expensive storage costs can be over the last two years, spending £737 million on storage by the end of November 2021.13 It told us, however that it is now confident that it has reduced the monthly storage costs it is paying for PPE.14 However, it is still paying around £7 million a month in storage costs just on items it currently deems to be excess.15 The absence of a full integrated stock management system
8The Department told us that it has now received nearly all of the 37.9 billion...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that it has now received nearly all of the 37.9 billion items of PPE which it ordered, with only 300 million items outstanding. It told us that whilst it has now opened every container it has received there are still 1.39 billion PPE items that have not been fully quality assured.16 The NAO reported that quality assurance checks have resulted in 11% of PPE items being deemed not suitable for front-line services, equivalent to 3.6 billion items at the time of reporting.17 The Department was unable to offer any definitive timescales on when it would complete its quality checks.18
9We asked what assurances the Department could give us about the accuracy of its stock...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked what assurances the Department could give us about the accuracy of its stock numbers. This was because the NAO reported that it could not fully reconcile the numbers from the stock model with individual contracts and said it was therefore unable to gain assurance over the accuracy of the numbers.19 The Department told us that these differences should be attributed to the fact that the stock model was not intended to be a 8 Q35 9 C&AG’s Report, para 13 10 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9 11 Q53 12 Q54 13 C&AG’s Report, para 2.5 14 Q41 15 C&AG’s Report, para 2.7 16 Q3 17 C&AG’s Report, para 2.11 18 Qq6–8 19 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into the management of PPE contracts, session 2021–22, HC 1144, 30 March 2022, para 2.2 10 Management of PPE contracts completely accurate account of all PPE stock. It said that the stock model existed to ensure that PPE could be moved around effectively.20 The Department was adamant that it knows exactly where all its stock is currently located.21 PPE stock is, however, scattered around the country; the Department listed 70 locations where it is stored, saying that it owns 50 warehouses itself and around 11,500 containers are still in use by the Department, with some PPE also still stored in China.22
10We asked the Department, given this wide spread of PPE storage, what steps it is...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We asked the Department, given this wide spread of PPE storage, what steps it is taking to introduce a modern stock management system for the PPE programme.23 We noted the importance of having a system where it knows exactly how much PPE it holds, where it is and what the expiry dates are, and is able to easily access it all.24 The NAO reported one example of a contract where the Department seemingly did not know how much PPE it had received and amended the contract to 53.7 million items despite the fact that it had already received 54.3 million items.25 Despite this, the Department told us that it was already able to say what stock it holds and the expiry dates of items. It also said that given that it is still distributing nearly 700 million items a month this is freeing up more space to then access the remaining PPE in storage. It did concede, however, that getting to a position where it has reduced down its stock to a level where it can reduce the number of storage locations would take some time.26 20 Q5 21 Q1 22 Q3 23 Q97 24 Qq102–103 25 C&AG’s Report, para 2.4 26 Qq103–104 Management of PPE contracts 11 2 Managing issues with contracts Ongoing contractual disputes
11The Department acknowledges that it still has many PPE contracts that have ongoing contractual issues...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department acknowledges that it still has many PPE contracts that have ongoing contractual issues that need resolving. There are 176 contracts where there are concerns about either the quality or the performance of the contract and these are collectively worth £3.9 billion.27 The Department has assessed that of that £3.9 billion, contractual issues mean that £2.7 billion of taxpayer money is still at risk of not achieving value for money.28 However, it told us that it is not unusual for disputes to arise on contracts like these and that looking across the wider health service and the NHS many contractual disputes are “resolved entirely amicably” whilst at the other end of the spectrum some will have involved an element of wrongdoing.29
12The NAO reported that of the 176 contracts in dispute, most of these were still...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The NAO reported that of the 176 contracts in dispute, most of these were still in the early stages of being resolved. Eighty-three of the 176 contracts are still in the first stage of the commercial resolution process with a further 59 having entered formal commercial discussions. At present, no cases have moved into the litigation stage of the commercial dispute process.30 Despite this, the Department denied that there is a logjam in resolving these cases and said that there was a team dedicated to resolving these disputes within the Department. Much of the work of that team revolves around checking that the PPE provided meets the technical specifications to then be released into the health and social care sectors.31 That team is also expected to draw on the experience within the Department’s commercial function, as well as government’s wider commercial expertise, where relevant.32 Although it was reluctant to go into specifics on commercial negotiations the Department said it was confident that it was making good progress against its quarterly targets for resolving these cases.33 The NAO, however, has reported that the Department is forecasting that 35% of these cases will not be resolved until 2023.34
13We asked the Department what its assessment of fraud was amongst these contractual disputes.
Recommended (the committee's words)
We asked the Department what its assessment of fraud was amongst these contractual disputes. Although it conceded that some of the 176 contracts were of interest from a fraud perspective it was unwilling to give much information about any specific work it was undertaking beyond stating that it was working closely with internal fraud teams and the broader fraud authorities.35 As with the notion of contractual disputes being commonplace, it also argued that “fraud in contracting is a fact of life” and that the best it could do was to aim to minimise it and recover amounts when fraud is detected.36 When pushed on the timescales for any action that it might eventually take against fraudulent suppliers the Department simply said if that involves going to court then that “takes as long as it takes”.37 It told us that its current assessment is that these PPE contracts have 27 Q13–14 28 Q15 29 Q16 30 C&AG’s Report, Figure 14 31 Q58 32 Q61 33 Q60 34 C&AG’s Report, para 3.8 35 Qq19, 22 36 Q21 37 Q25 12 Management of PPE contracts been no more susceptible to fraud than the average across public sector procurement.38 The NAO reported that this assessment means that PPE fraud could be anywhere within a range of 0.5% to 5.0% of PPE expenditure. On contracts signed by the Department this could mean fraud worth as much as £400 million.39 PPE profits and conflicts of interest
14We wanted to understand the Department’s view of profits made by PPE suppliers and intermediaries,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We wanted to understand the Department’s view of profits made by PPE suppliers and intermediaries, particularly on contracts that have failed to deliver adequate PPE, many of which came through the VIP referral route. Reports continue to emerge of the vast profits that some individuals and companies made through supplying PPE despite much of it being not fit for purpose. One example that we asked about was PPE Medpro, a company that did not exist until May 2020, yet was reportedly able to secure a £76 million profit supplying PPE to the Department.40 The Department was reluctant to give any specifics on this case but said that all of the PPE contracts signed “went through exactly the same due diligence process” and that the decision to award a contract to PPE Medpro would have been made on the basis of the price it was offering compared to other market prices.41 We note that since giving evidence to us, further reports suggest that the National Crime Agency has launched an investigation into this contract with several properties related to the company searched and documents seized.42
15The Department told us that factoring in consideration of profit margins before these PPE contracts...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that factoring in consideration of profit margins before these PPE contracts were awarded was not possible. While it agreed that the best way to mitigate against excessive profiteering was to build such contingencies into the contract it argued that the reality of the global market at the start of the pandemic meant that was simply not feasible.43 It also conceded that this meant that taking action retrospectively against suppliers profits was unlikely to be possible. The Department clearly still believes that it had an appropriate balance in place at the start of the pandemic that ensured some due diligence checks were performed but still enabled it to secure deals for PPE quickly.44 It said that while it is possible to look back in retrospect and reach different conclusions on decisions made, it felt it had the broad framework and risk appetite correct for the circumstances it faced.45 A more formalised due diligence process wasn’t established until May 2020 but as the NAO reported 46 out of 115 contracts awarded through the VIP lane pre-dated this.46
16One due diligence check that did not appear to be applied was a consideration of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
One due diligence check that did not appear to be applied was a consideration of potential conflicts of interest on PPE referrals. The Department confirmed that when signing off on these PPE contracts the accounting officer did not normally have any information about the source of the referral.47 It also said that this process was the same regardless of whether the referrals came through the VIP lane or not.48 The very nature 38 Q22 39 C&AG’s report, para 3.12 40 Q84 41 Qq84, 87 42 For example, The Guardian, 29 April 2022 43 Q29 44 Q28 45 Q73 46 C&AG’s Report, para 1.6 47 Q84 48 Q85 Management of PPE contracts 13 of the VIP lane, however, meant that potential conflicts of interest were inherently more likely for VIP lane referrals. Turning again to the example of PPE Medpro, we asked the Department what additional checks were conducted on this company given that the health minister had previously said that the Department was aware of a link between the initial referrer, Baroness Mone, and PPE Medpro. The Department refused to be drawn on the specifics of this case but again reiterated the argument that there would have been no difference in the level of checks conducted between any of the contracts awarded.49 49 Qq84–86 14 Management of PPE contracts 3 The future of the PPE programme SCCL’s role going forward
17Prior to the pandemic, the role of procuring and managing PPE was largely the responsibility...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Prior to the pandemic, the role of procuring and managing PPE was largely the responsibility of Supply Chain Co-ordination Limited.50 In March 2020, when the Department realised that SCCL alone would not be able to procure the volume of PPE required, the Department took a more central role in PPE procurement.51 SCCL continued play an active role though, procuring a total of 17.4 billion PPE items through contracts worth £5.2 billion. With the need for further procurement now seen as unlikely, the Department passed responsibility for managing the supply of PPE back over to SCCL from April 2022.52 Oversight of SCCL was transferred from the Department to NHS England and NHS Improvement in October 2021.53 NHS England’s Chief Commercial Officer is now the Senior Responsible Officer for SCCL and meets quarterly with the SCCL executive team to discuss performance.54
18We asked the Department how the transfer back to SCCL had gone and it was...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We asked the Department how the transfer back to SCCL had gone and it was very positive about the process. It said that nothing had really been interrupted from a logistics perspective and that the reality is that the Department and SCCL had been working “hand in glove before the transition”.55 It told us that the two had undergone six months of “intensive planning” to prepare for SCCL taking back operational responsibilities. Forty-four departmental staff members that worked on the PPE programme have been transferred over to SCCL to help try and ensure a smooth transition.56 All of the 70 sites that the Department has established over the last couple of years to store PPE are now the responsibility of SCCL to manage.57
19The Department will still have a role to play in the PPE programme despite this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department will still have a role to play in the PPE programme despite this transfer back of the logistics to SCCL. We sought to clarify where exactly accountability lies across the different aspects of the programme. For example, the Department confirmed that resolving the 176 contracts in dispute will remain its responsibility.58 It told us that its aim here is no longer to swap unusable PPE items for more appropriate items, but to concentrate on obtaining refunds wherever possible.59 Likewise, responsibility for decisions on how to dispose of excess stock will remain with the Department, though with the intention of handing that over to SCCL at a later date.60 We would expect further clarity on these 50 C&AG’s Report, The supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic, session 2019–2021, HC 961, 25 November 2020, para 1.4 51 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into the management of PPE contracts, session 2021–22, HC 1144, 30 March 2022, para 1.3 52 C&AG’s Report, Figure 4, para 2.18 53 Q94 54 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, page 1, dated 19 May 2022 55 Q92 56 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, page 1, dated 19 May 2022 57 Q92 58 Q92 59 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, page 4, dated 19 May 2022 60 Q92 Management of PPE contracts 15 roles and responsibilities to be set out in the PPE strategy that we are now expecting this summer.61 The Department said that this is being worked on “in collaboration with SCCL and NHS Supply Chain”.62 Future of UK PPE manufacturing
20Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic there were not many businesses in the UK that specialised...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic there were not many businesses in the UK that specialised in producing PPE with most of it coming from overseas. The pandemic saw steep rises in global prices for PPE as demand for it surged throughout the world. As part of its initial pandemic response, the Department decided to try and encourage UK manufacturers to start producing PPE in order to increase the short-term supply and to help improve the UK’s long term resilience and ability to respond in the event of future pandemics.63 This “UK Make” strategy resulted in the Department signing 37 contracts with UK manufacturers worth £1.1 billion for 3.9 billion PPE items.64 The Department was complementary about the role of these UK suppliers saying that those 37 contracts were very successful and that some of these suppliers were “really creative at an early stage”.65
21The Department set out in its initial PPE strategy its desire to build on this...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department set out in its initial PPE strategy its desire to build on this UK manufacturing base, reiterating the role it should play in building a more resilient supply chain and also the wider benefits including job creation and making the UK a centre for innovative products.66 It is now apparent, however, that the Department holds a large excess of stock which it is concentrating on reducing down.67 In that context, the role of the UK suppliers forward seems uncertain as they are unlikely to receive orders for many years. The Department told us that those suppliers “have other products to make” and that the Department are “not in the market to buy at the moment”. Only seven UK suppliers are on SCCL’s future frameworks enabling them to bid for future PPE contracts.68 The Department said that it is worth with NHS Supply Chain to try and ensure that UK manufactured products are marketable to the health and social care sectors. Whilst it recognised that procurement rules will require it to still operate in the international market place it said that its plans to emphasis social value and environmental considerations going forward should place UK manufacturers in a good position to compete with international suppliers.69 61 Q106 62 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, page 2, dated 19 May 2022 63 C&AG’s Report, The supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic, session 2019–2021, HC 961, 25 November 2020, para 2.14 64 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into the management of PPE contracts, session 2021–22, HC 1144, 30 March 2022, para 1.3 and Figure 4 65 Q56 66 Department of Health & Social Care, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Strategy, 28 September 2020, para 1.4 67 Q33 68 Q56 69 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, page 4, dated 19 May 2022 16 Manageme
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 20 Apr 2022Management of PPE Contracts3 witnesses, listed belowparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 3 witnesses
- Jonathan MarronDirector General for Primary Care and Prevention, Department for Health and Social Care
- Shona DunnSecond Permanent Secretary, Home Office
- Sir Chris WormaldPermanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care
Correspondence 3 letters
- 12 Jan 2023Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health & Social Care, re 12 report of session 2022-23 management of PPE contracts, dated 21 December 2022
- 12 Jan 2023Correspondence from Will Quince MP, Minister of State for Health and Secondary Care, Department for Health and Social Care, re update on Government Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) contracts, dated 19 December 2022
- 24 May 2022Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re Management of PPE Contracts, dated 19 May 2022