Select committee inquiry
Armoured Vehicles
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The recent MoD Integrated Review reconfirmed that armoured vehicles remain a major part of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) land capability, being used to provide firepower, mobility and protection for service personnel and undertake reconnaissance. The MOD is seeking to modernise and upgrade its armoured vehicles and the Ajax family of armoured reconnaissance fighting vehicles is a central component of MOD’s plans, but both the Defence Committee and PAC have expressed serious concerns about progress with the £5 billion Ajax programme. The PAC will question senior officials at MOD on their management of the Ajax programme and progress against cost, time, and performance milestones including: arrangements for managing the Ajax programme, including strategic oversight and governance; progress since 2010 on the Ajax programme; and current plans to deliver the Ajax programme, including contractual arrangements and resourcing. If you have evidence on these issues, please submit it here by Wednesday 23 March 2022.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of Seventh Report - Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme ↗
The Ajax programme, which began in 2010, is intended to transform the Army’s surveillance and reconnaissance capability. However, it has gone badly wrong, with no deployable vehicle delivered to date let alone providing Initial Operating Capability or Full Operating Capability dates. The Department has a £5.5 billion firm-price contract with General Dynamics Land Systems UK for the design, manufacture and initial in-service support of 589 Ajax armoured vehicles. The Department initially expected to bring Ajax into service in 2017 but subsequently missed a revised target of June 2021.
By December 2021, the Department had paid General Dynamics £3.2 billion but received only 26 Ajax vehicles, none of which it can use. The programme remains in turmoil because the Department still does not know whether the noise and vibration problems—which since July 2020 it has known may have injured soldiers—are fixable.
It does not expect to determine this until late 2022. The Department is not willing to set a new target for initial operating capability before the noise and vibration problems are resolved and it does not know when it will be able to introduce the full capability into service. There remains considerable uncertainty over how to resolve these safety issues and the programme is slipping further behind schedule as the Department and General Dynamics seek to agree a way forward. The slow progress and continued delays create significant risks to value for money, put at risk the Army’s plans for transformation and mean soldiers will have to use existing outdated vehicles for longer.
The Department’s management of the programme was flawed from the outset as the programme was over-specified and the Department and General Dynamics did not understand the scale of the technical challenge. We have seen similar failings again and again in the Department’s management of its equipment programmes. The Ajax programme also raises serious concerns about the Department’s processes and culture for testing whether new equipment is safe to use. The Department needs to learn the lessons from the Ajax programme to ensure the litany of failures is never repeated and that our service personnel receive the equipment they need for operations and the nation’s defence. As a matter of the upmost urgency, the Department must establish whether noise and vibration issues can be addressed by modifications or whether they require a fundamental redesign of the vehicle. If the latter, the Department must decide whether the right course is to proceed with General Dynamics or if it should opt for an alternative. We expect an update on this when we next take evidence and a definitive decision, either one way or the other, by December 2022. After twelve years, enough is enough.
As this Committee highlighted in its recent report on the MoD Equipment Plan 2021– 31, the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine only reinforces the urgent need for the Department to reform, prioritise and effectively manage its expenditure to ensure the Armed Forces can secure all the equipment that they need in the quickest possible time.
What the government said
The government responded on 2 September 2022. The deadline was 3 August 2022.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government states that it agrees with each of the Committee's recommendations on the Ajax programme, with target implementation dates of December 2022 for most and Spring 2023 for the lessons learned response.
- On alternative options and delays, it agrees with the recommendation and "expects to decide the way ahead on the programme by the end of 2022".
- On lessons learned, it agrees to write to the Committee once the Ajax Lessons Learned Review reports, with a target of Spring 2023. Recommendations "will be considered" alongside other improvements underway.
- On noise and vibration, it agrees and says it is "focussed on identifying the root causes". It will update the Committee at the next Ajax evidence session.
- On the contract, it agrees with the recommendation and says the £5.5 billion firm price contract has "a number of mechanisms to incentivise contractor performance". It continues to protect its rights under the contract.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 26 January 2022 to its close on 2 September 2022. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.
- Oral evidence 30 Mar 2022
- Report 3 Jun 2022
- Government response 2 Sep 2022
What it recommended 5 recommendations · 23 conclusions
2The Department has once again made fundamental mistakes in its planning and management of a...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department has once again made fundamental mistakes in its planning and management of a major equipment programme. Ajax’s design is based on a pre-existing vehicle, but the Department’s 1,200 capability requirements meant that, in effect, it was developed from scratch. However, the Department and General Dynamics did not fully understand the complexity and challenges of this hybrid approach and did not manage design changes effectively. The Department says it has reviewed its approach to requirement setting and now only approves programmes with a reasonable number of requirements, such as the 150 to 200 for the purchase of Boxer armoured personnel carriers and the upgraded Challenger tanks. Ajax’s problems were exacerbated by inadequate governance and programme management failures. The current senior responsible owner, appointed in October 2021, is the first to be full-time, but even he has additional corporate roles and responsibilities. The programme’s reset in 2018 introduced greater complexity and the revised programme schedule was unrealistic. While the profile of upfront investment before large-scale manufacture is unsurprising, the increased overlap of the demonstration and manufacturing phases means that unresolved technical and safety issues have remained whilst production continues. In response to these problems, the Department has commissioned a QC-led Ajax Lessons Learned Review into how it can deliver major programmes more effectively, including sharing and escalating information. Recommendation: Once the Ajax Lessons Learned Review has reported, the Department should write to the Committee setting out how it will incorporate 6 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme the recommendations into its future management of equipment programmes – considering the findings and recommendations of our and the NAO’s reports – to prevent this familiar list of mistakes being repeated yet again.
3The failure to escalate and address noise and vibration issues in a timely manner shows...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The failure to escalate and address noise and vibration issues in a timely manner shows that the Department must simplify its over-complex safety processes and change behaviours. The Department acknowledges that it has injured some soldiers, which it rightly describes as “unforgivable”. It was slow to escalate concerns about noise and vibration because its processes were over-complicated, and parts of the Department lacked authority to ensure safety issues were addressed before trials began. The Army says it now places greater emphasis on safety and looking after its personnel, but acknowledges there is still more to do. The Department has started to implement the recommendations in David King’s noise and vibration report and introduced a new web-based application, which has led to a 40% increase in soldiers reporting incidents since January 2022. However, it needs to ensure the flow of information from junior ranks to senior officers will be thorough and transparent. Ajax’s safety problems have led the Department to investigate broader issues around noise-induced hearing loss, which results in the largest number of claims in the armed forces compensation scheme. Recommendation: The Department should set out the changes to its safety processes that it is making in response to the King Report and how it is monitoring the effectiveness of these initiatives. This should include the steps it is taking to improve openness and communication, including the use of the new web-based application. The Department should provide us with an update on progress when we next take evidence.
4Nearly two years after identifying injuries to soldiers, the Department still does not know how...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Nearly two years after identifying injuries to soldiers, the Department still does not know how to fix the noise and vibration problems. General Dynamics must produce vehicles that are safe and has proposed modifications to reduce noise and vibration levels. The Department has commissioned trials to test the efficacy of these modifications. It intends to analyse test data and better understand how things works in practice before accepting General Dynamics’ solutions. The Department has also found that the headsets worn by crews—which the Army uses on all armoured vehicles—did not provide expected levels of protection. It will start upgrading its headsets from August 2022. It does not expect to make decisions on noise and vibration issues—and how to move the programme forward—until late 2022, more than two years since it first identified potential injuries to soldiers. It remains unclear whether the proposed modifications—which seek to reduce the impact on crews—will be effective or whether a more fundamental redesign of the vehicles is required. This could have significant implications for the programme because General Dynamics had built 324 hulls by December 2021. In addition, the Department cannot be confident that the programme will not encounter further technical or safety issues. It has proven only 30% of technical requirements so far and is tracking 136 ‘concerns’. Recommendation: As a matter of the utmost urgency, the Department must establish whether noise and vibration issues can be addressed by modifications or whether they require a fundamental redesign of the vehicle. If the latter, the Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme 7 Department must decide whether the right course is to proceed with General Dynamics or if it should opt for an alternative. We will expect an update on this when we next take evidence and an answer by December 2022.
5We are doubtful that the Department can recover the programme within existing costs and commercial...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are doubtful that the Department can recover the programme within existing costs and commercial arrangements. The programme remains under significant pressure. It is more than a year behind even the revised schedule, trials involving Army crews have been suspended and noise and vibration issues remain unresolved. Despite these problems, the Department intends to continue holding General Dynamics to the current firm-priced contract for delivery of 589 vehicles. It claims that the relationship with General Dynamics is good and that both parties are working collaboratively. However, because of programme delays and missed milestones, the Department estimates that it owes General Dynamics £750 million for completed work, but has not paid anything since December 2020, and the parties remain in dispute. It is important that the Department uses appropriate commercial arrangements to incentivise delivery of the required capability, and it is seeking to resolve the technical issues and recover the programme through existing commercial terms. It says that the next step is to assess and seek internal approval for any changes to the schedule and definitions of capability, and agree any revisions to programme milestones with General Dynamics. However, the Department will not complete this process until it has determined how to resolve the noise and vibration issues, and so cannot say when it will decide on the programme’s future. Recommendation: Whether or not the Department concludes that it should continue with the current Ajax contract, it must review its commercial arrangements to ensure these are appropriate to incentivise its prime contractor to deliver the programme and agree a recovery plan.
6The Department’s plans for using Ajax are at risk because of uncertainty about what constitutes...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department’s plans for using Ajax are at risk because of uncertainty about what constitutes full operating capability, when this will be achieved and how Ajax vehicles will be enhanced in the future. The Department’s original in-service date, 2017, was revised to June 2021, which has also been missed. It will not set a new initial operating capability date until it has resolved the on-going noise and vibration problems, and has no confidence in achieving the full operating capability target of April 2025. Therefore, 12 years after letting the design contract, the Department has no realistic target dates for introducing the Ajax capability. We are also extremely concerned that the Department may accept compromises on the level of capability that will be achieved at these milestones. Further, the Department is encountering difficulties on the enabling programmes needed to deliver the intended capability improvements and allow the Army to deploy Ajax on operations. In particular, delays to the Morpheus programme mean it will take longer before Ajax has the enhanced digital and communication systems which are so important to the way in which the Army plans to use the vehicles. The Department is seeking to develop a longer-term relationship with industry to enable upgrades throughout Ajax’s service life to keep pace with technological developments and future military threats. Recommendation: Once the Department has reached agreement on solutions to the noise and vibration problems, it must agree a revised schedule and critical path 8 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme for initial operating capability and full operating capability, covering all enabling programmes. This should include clear definitions of what will be delivered at each stage, without reducing requirements just to achieve these milestones. Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme 9 1 The difficulties encountered by the Ajax programme
1On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on the Ajax programme.1
7At the same time, the Army is undergoing a period of significant transformation, during which...
Concluded (the committee's words)
At the same time, the Army is undergoing a period of significant transformation, during which it will adjust its size, shape, and capabilities. It aims to have implemented the full changes, as outlined in the Integrated Review, by 2030. The Army told us it was “cautiously optimistic” that the full Ajax capability will have entered service by then.13 However, any further delays to the Ajax programme would increase the risks of not achieving this aim.14
8In the meantime, the Army was bullish about managing the implications of delays to introducing...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the meantime, the Army was bullish about managing the implications of delays to introducing Ajax and its ability to meet its NATO commitments.15 However, it has had to plan a series of operational compromises to achieve this, such as continuing to use Challenger 2 tanks and ageing Warrior armoured infantry vehicles, which the Department plans to withdraw from service shortly. The Army also acknowledged it would need careful planning to maintain the right number of frontline Challenger tanks because it must take Challenger 2 out of the line to upgrade them to Challenger 3.16 Furthermore, keeping old capabilities in service adds to wider affordability pressures, which the Army will need to manage within its equipment programme.17 Planning and programme management shortcomings
9Ajax’s design was based on a pre-existing vehicle, but the Department stipulated 1,200 capability requirements...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Ajax’s design was based on a pre-existing vehicle, but the Department stipulated 1,200 capability requirements which meant that, in effect, it had to be developed from scratch. The Department told us that, with hindsight, having so many detailed requirements had not helped it obtain the capability it wanted in the way it expected.18 It said that there was a place for off-the-shelf purchase of equipment of this type, and for its bespoke development. However, the design of Ajax was neither off-the-shelf nor bespoke. The Department and General Dynamics did not fully understand the complexity and challenges of this hybrid 10 Qq 2, 67 11 Qq 34, 84, 99; C&AG’s Report, para. 6 12 Qq 27, 84, 85 13 Qq 64, 78 14 C&AG’s Report, para. 19 15 Qq 32, 64, 65 16 Q 113; C&AG’s Report, para. 3.17 17 Q 74; C&AG’s Report, para. 19 18 Qq 13, 97; C&AG’s Report, para. 8 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme 11 approach and did not manage the subsequent design changes effectively. The Department now recognises it must be particularly careful when making so many additions to something that is tried and tested.19
10The Department told us it had reviewed its approach so that it no longer fell...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us it had reviewed its approach so that it no longer fell into the trap of setting an excessive number of requirements. It said it now only approved programmes with a reasonable number of requirements, such as the 150 to 200 for the purchase of Boxer and the upgraded Challenger tanks.20 It told us it had now developed a more sophisticated approach, which it had set out in the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy.21 For example, it recognised that acquiring an off-the-shelf capability quickly could sometimes be better than waiting for a capability to be developed that was exactly what it wanted. With Boxer, for example, the Department plans to introduce a base platform which it would develop when in service, rather than over-specifying requirements at the design stage.22
11The problems on the Ajax programme were exacerbated by inadequate governance and programme management failures.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The problems on the Ajax programme were exacerbated by inadequate governance and programme management failures. The current senior responsible owner, appointed in October 2021, is the first to be full-time, although his corporate responsibilities take up about 5% of his time. The Department said that his role as head of its SRO profession helped with his Ajax role but, if necessary, he could step back from that corporate role to focus exclusively on Ajax.23
12The Department admitted that the programme’s reset in 2018 had been disappointing, and it recognised...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department admitted that the programme’s reset in 2018 had been disappointing, and it recognised that the revised programme schedule had been unrealistic.24 It said it had attempted to meet the planned in-service date by accepting an incremental build-up of capability, using a series of ‘capability drops’. By this arrangement, the Department agreed that General Dynamics would deliver vehicles in four phases, with each drop adding capabilities. However, the introduction of four capability drops across six variants introduced more complexity into the programme whereas, with hindsight, the Department said that it was greater simplicity that the programme had needed.25
13The Department explained that for complex, technologically advanced programmes, it was usual to have a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department explained that for complex, technologically advanced programmes, it was usual to have a profile of upfront investment before the manufacture phase began.26 When the Department awarded the manufacture contract in 2014, it included some overlap of demonstration and manufacture phases, thinking this would reduce the risk of missing programme milestones. However, after the reset, progress was slower than expected and the overlap between phases doubled to almost eight years. This made addressing design and safety issues more complex because of the need to manage this alongside complex manufacturing, delivery and retrofitting schedules.27 In response to the programme’s 19 Q 97; C&AG’s Report, para. 9 20 Qq 6, 14 21 HM Government, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy: A strategic approach to the UK’s defence and security industrial sectors, CP 410, March 2021 22 Qq 15, 97 23 Qq 9, 10, 11 24 Q 18 25 Q 57; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.17 26 Q 57 27 C&AG’s Report, Key facts and paras. 9, 1.9 12 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme problems, the Department has commissioned a QC-led Ajax Lessons Learned Review into how it can deliver major programmes more effectively, including sharing and escalating information.28 The need for behavioural change
14In 2021, the Department acknowledged publicly concerns about excessive levels of noise and vibration on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In 2021, the Department acknowledged publicly concerns about excessive levels of noise and vibration on the Ajax vehicles. The Department admitted that because of shortcomings with its safety processes, which made it complicated to raise issues, it had injured some of its own soldiers, which it rightly described as “unforgivable”.29 The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) had first warned Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) of concerns about Ajax’s potential compliance with legislative requirements in
15In June 2021 the Department commissioned David King, its Director Health, Safety and Environmental Protection,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In June 2021 the Department commissioned David King, its Director Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, to assess whether correct health and safety procedures had been followed. His report, published in December 2021, concluded that collective failings enabled activity to continue when it should have been stopped or paused until stronger controls were in place. The report made 20 recommendations to improve the Department’s approach to safety.31
16The Army told us it now placed greater emphasis on safety and looking after its...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Army told us it now placed greater emphasis on safety and looking after its personnel and that it had made “huge strides”. However, it acknowledged that it continued to be on a learning curve and that it still had more to do to improve safety. The Department said it had started to implement the recommendations in David King’s report, such as the introduction of noise and vibration working groups, which were now a key part of its risk- management approach. It had also introduced a new web-based application, which had led to a 40% increase in soldiers reporting incidents and near misses since January 2022.32 However, the Army acknowledged that it must ensure the flow of information from junior ranks to senior officers was thorough and transparent, so that trends and the full range of potential issues were picked up earlier.33
17The Department said that Ajax’s safety problems had highlighted broader issues around noise-induced hearing loss,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department said that Ajax’s safety problems had highlighted broader issues around noise-induced hearing loss, which formed the largest number of claims in the armed forces compensation scheme. It has commissioned the vice-chief of the defence staff and the second permanent secretary to examine the causes of those claims to see what it needed to do in response.34 28 Q 1; Letter dated 29 March 2022 from Minister of State to PAC Chair; Minister for Defence Procurement written statement 29 March 2022. 29 Q 7; C&AG’s Report, para. 3 30 C&AG’s Report, paras. 12, 13 31 C&AG’s Report, para. 2.27; Ministry of Defence, HS&EP Ajax Noise and Vibration Review, December 2021 32 Qq 30, 31; Letter from Ministry of Defence to Committee dated 6 May 2022 33 Q 90 34 Q 30 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme 13 2 Delivering the Ajax programme Resolving the noise and vibration problems
18Under the terms of the contract, General Dynamics is responsible for ensuring that Ajax vehicles...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Under the terms of the contract, General Dynamics is responsible for ensuring that Ajax vehicles are safe by design. The Department oversees and monitors this, conducting trials to ensure the vehicles are safe to use.35 The two parties disagreed on whether the levels of noise and vibration in Ajax vehicles breached contractual requirements. The Department therefore undertook testing of four of the early manufactured vehicles to understand their characteristics and the root causes of these problems. It told us it had not previously understood the characteristics of the Ajax vehicles, which had “a complex and unexpected fingerprint”.36 General Dynamics has proposed modifications to reduce noise and vibration levels and the Department has commissioned further trials to test whether these are acceptable. It needs to review and validate this test data before deciding whether it can accept General Dynamics’ proposed solutions.37
19The Department told us that its contract with General Dynamics was to produce vehicles at...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that its contract with General Dynamics was to produce vehicles at an acceptable level of noise using existing headsets. It asserted that those headsets performed as it had assumed they would when the contract was let, something which General Dynamics disputes. However, the Department admitted that the headsets worn by its crews had not provided the higher levels of protection it had expected.38 The Army had been aware of the issues with these headsets on other armoured vehicles since at least 2019. It said it planned to upgrade existing headsets to ensure soldiers can complete missions in a way that is effective and safe, and is introducing new headsets into the Army from August 2022.39
20General Dynamics has proposed modifications to vehicles that seek to reduce the impact of noise...
Concluded (the committee's words)
General Dynamics has proposed modifications to vehicles that seek to reduce the impact of noise and vibration on crews and include, for example, the damping of hand controllers and seating, and changes to improve body posture. However, the Department said it still needed to test the whole system—including the communications and electronic interface—and understand crews’ experiences of using the modified vehicles by running user verification trials.40 The Department said it did not yet know whether the proposed modifications would be effective or whether a more fundamental redesign of the vehicles was required. It told us that it was cautiously optimistic that these modifications will allow the programme to move on to next phase of the work. However, if they do not and a fundamental redesign is needed, this could have significant implications for the programme because, by December 2021, General Dynamics had already built 324 hulls that might need to be redesigned.41 The Department did not expect to make decisions on how to resolve the noise and vibration issues until late 2022, more than two years since it first identified potential injuries to soldiers.42 On 19 May 2022, the Minister for Defence Procurement announced that the Department had re-started user verification trials.43 35 Q 32; C&AG’s Report, para 2.25 36 Qq 35, 39, 81; C&AG’s Report, para. 14 37 Qq 18, 21, 35, 38, 39 38 Qq 42, 44, 45; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.21 39 Qq 43, 42, 44, 45; Letter from Ministry of Defence to Committee dated 6 May 2022; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.22 40 Qq 40, 41 41 Qq 35, 47; C&AG’s Report, para 2 42 Q 81 43 Ministerial Statement 19 May 2022 14 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme
21The Department accepted that it cannot be certain the programme will not encounter further technical...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department accepted that it cannot be certain the programme will not encounter further technical or safety issues, stating that it is usual for engineering development on this scale to encounter challenges as it goes through the development cycle. It acknowledged that it is still testing compliance with the specifications and had proven only 30% of technical requirements so far.44 In addition, in December 2021, the Department was tracking 136 ‘concerns’, only four of which related to noise and vibration, and had still to remove 27 limitations of use on Ajax vehicles, of which 11 were critical to achieving initial operating capability.45 The Department said it was planning a series of reliability trials to test whether the vehicles were working properly and do what they were designed to do.46 Delivering the programme
22The programme remains under significant pressure.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The programme remains under significant pressure. When the NAO reported, the programme was more than a year behind the revised schedule, trials involving Army crews had been suspended and noise and vibration issues remained unresolved.47 General Dynamics had continued to produce Ajax vehicles despite not receiving any payment since December 2020. Because of programme delays, the Department estimated that it owed General Dynamics £750 million for completed work. The Department told us that General Dynamics had missed critical milestones and it would not have to pay any more money until General Dynamics had hit them.48
23The Department said it intended to continue holding General Dynamics to the current firm-priced contract...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department said it intended to continue holding General Dynamics to the current firm-priced contract for delivery of 589 vehicles.49 Despite remaining in contractual dispute, the Department claimed that its relationship with General Dynamics was good and that both parties were working collaboratively. It was seeking to resolve the technical issues and recover the programme through existing commercial terms. We emphasised the importance of using appropriate commercial arrangements to incentivise delivery of the required capability.50
24The Department told us that it had consulted the Infrastructure and Projects Authority and HM...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that it had consulted the Infrastructure and Projects Authority and HM Treasury about its plan for restoring effective governance to the programme. It said it needed to resolve the current technical issues and gain approval for any changes to the schedule and definitions of capability, including agreeing any revisions to programme milestones with General Dynamics.51 However, the Department would not complete this process until it had determined how to resolve the noise and vibration issues, and so could not tell us when it would decide on the programme’s future.52 Achieving the full Ajax capability
25In 2010, when the Department let the design contract, its planning assumption was that Ajax...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In 2010, when the Department let the design contract, its planning assumption was that Ajax would enter service in early 2017. It extended the expected in-service date by three 44 Q 49 45 C&AG’s Report, para 15 46 Q 87 47 C&AG’s Report, para 16 48 Qq 19, 20, 26, 29, 36 49 Q 20 50 Qq 27, 29, 35, 37, 53, 59, 83 51 Qq 60, 87 52 Qq 17, 77, 87 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme 15 years to July 2020 when it awarded the manufacture contract in 2014.53 The programme subsequently missed a revised target date of June 2021. The Department told us it would not set a new initial operating capability date until it had resolved the on-going noise and vibration problems. Despite not having a timeline to achieve initial operating capability, it still retained a target date for achieving full operating capability by April 2025. However, the Department said it has no confidence in achieving this. We expressed concern that the Department did not have realistic target dates for introducing Ajax to enable the Army to make operational decisions on the capabilities that will be available and to help achieve value for money from the programme.54
26The Department told us that it faced choices about the level of capability at initial...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that it faced choices about the level of capability at initial and full operating capability milestones. It said it would look again at the definition of what was required, considering incremental development of the vehicles.55 The Department admitted it had already accepted concessions against the original requirement—for example, the reset agreement had included technical constraints around the armour and weapon system.56 We were extremely concerned that the Department would accept further reduced capability to achieve programme milestones. The Department said it would consider the Army’s future transformation plans and how Ajax fits into these.57
27Delivering the full Ajax capability depends on the Department delivering supporting programmes, including new communication...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Delivering the full Ajax capability depends on the Department delivering supporting programmes, including new communication systems, training facilities and infrastructure projects to store the vehicles.58 The Army will also need to transport the vehicles to military operations.59 However, the Department has encountered difficulties in delivering the enabling programmes needed to deliver the intended capability improvements. In particular, delays to the Morpheus programme mean it will be longer before Ajax has the enhanced digital and communication systems, which are so important to the way in which the Army plans to use the vehicles. It told us that it expected to upgrade Ajax to the new Morpheus system while the vehicles were in-service, and it would continue with its plan to use the latest Bowman communication system until then. The Army said it was content that the Bowman system was operating effectively.60
28The Department told us it is seeking to design its new armoured vehicles, including Boxer...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us it is seeking to design its new armoured vehicles, including Boxer and Challenger, to make through-life capability management easier. It recognised the need to update capabilities as new technologies emerge and keep pace with emerging military threats.61 It expected its new armoured vehicles to have a 30-to-40-year life and the software systems have been designed to enable future upgrades to be incorporated. To facilitate this, the Department said it was seeking to develop a longer-term relationship with industry to enable upgrades throughout Ajax’s service life.62 53 Q 57; C&AG’s Report, para. 3 54 Qq 8, 57, 59, 60 55 Qq 60, 61 56 Q 62; C&AG’s Report, para. 2.16 57 Q 61 58 Q 108; C&AG’s Report, para 18 59 Q 3 60 Qq 51, 52, 66, 104, 108; C&AG’s Report, para. 18 61 Qq 24, 32 62 Qq 25, 52 16 Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 30 Mar 2022Armoured Vehicles4 witnesses, listed belowparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 4 witnesses
- Andrew ForzaniDirector General of Commercial, Ministry of Defence
- David MarshChair, The St Martin’s Group
- David WilliamsJournalist, Daily Mail
- Lt General Christopher Tickell CBEDeputy Chief of the General Staff and Portfolio Director General for Ajax, Ministry of Defence