2nd Report - Accountability for Daesh crimes

We welcome the Government’s commitment to achieve justice for survivors of Daesh crimes. However, not a single Daesh fighter has been successfully prosecuted in the UK for committing international crimes, such as genocide. (Conclusion, Paragraph 36)

Terrorism charges do not capture the nature and scale of crimes committed against victims. Where there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction for international crimes, individuals should be prosecuted for such crimes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37)

The Government has told us that the most appropriate forums for prosecuting individuals are the jurisdictions where the crimes were committed. Given the concerns with regard to fair trial rights, capacity, and resources, we must not rely on other countries to investigate and prosecute individuals for international crimes. Where the UK has jurisdiction over international crimes, the UK should seek to investigate and prosecute such crimes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

Where the UK has jurisdiction over international crimes, the UK should seek to investigate and prosecute such crimes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44)

The UK legal framework applicable to international crimes is inconsistent. Whilst it is possible to prosecute individuals for torture and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions committed abroad, it is not possible to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, or other war crimes committed abroad, unless the individuals are UK nationals, UK residents, or subject to service personnel laws. This creates a key barrier to the exercise of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the UK. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50)

The Government should amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001 to remove the requirements of UK nationality and residency. The relevant guidelines should also be amended to ensure that presence in the UK is not 32 a prerequisite to initiating an investigation. This would help to close the impunity gap by ensuring that the UK can exercise universal jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. To achieve this, the Committee proposes an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill, which in turn amends the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (see Annex). (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)

There is a lack of cooperation between UK investigative and prosecuting bodies, such as the War Crimes Unit of the Metropolitan Police, and the Crown Prosecution Service. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

The Government should prioritise the establishment of a clear framework to allow for greater cooperation between UK’s relevant national bodies and between the UK and other mechanisms involved in the gathering and preserving of evidence. It should also identify the barriers to undertaking structural investigations and identify how this could be changed and improved. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)

With the closure of UNITAD, it is imperative that the evidence gathered is not lost, and that new evidence can still be collected as needed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

We urge the Government to use its influence to ensure that such valuable evidence is not lost and that it is kept safe from both state and non- state actors who could put the lives of survivors at risk. The Government should also employ efforts to ensure that this evidence, as well as any future evidence collected of Daesh crimes, is effectively analysed and used to aid investigations and prosecutions globally. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61) Deprivation of citizenship

The UK uses deprivation of citizenship orders more than almost any country in the world. At the same time that it is important for the Government to be able to take steps such as citizenship stripping in the interests of public safety, there is a serious lack of transparency and oversight when it comes to the use of this power. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)

The Government must provide greater transparency as to the use of deprivation of citizenship powers, including by providing regularly updated data to the public. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, or the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation if his remit is expanded, should periodically review the use of deprivation of citizenship powers, including for national security reasons, and report to Parliament about his findings. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77) 33 Detention of British citizens in North East Syria (NES)

There is no official public data from the Government on the number of British individuals currently detained in camps and prisons in North East Syria (NES). (Conclusion, Paragraph 95)

The Government must publish updated data on the number of Britons estimated to be detained in NES, with information disaggregated by age and sex if available. If this data is not available or cannot be made public, the Government must explain the reasons for this. (Recommendation, Paragraph 95)

We recognise that the Government may in some cases feel that national security considerations render repatriations difficult. We acknowledge this and recognise that keeping the public safe must be the Government’s highest priority. We also acknowledge that conditions on the ground are volatile and dangerous, leading to a significant possibility of escape. (Conclusion, Paragraph 96)

The Government must adopt a proactive approach and seek to identify and locate minors and where feasible repatriate them as soon as practically possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 97)

The Government should undertake every effort to prosecute British individuals held in camps in NES where there is evidence that they were involved in Daesh crimes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98) 34