Source · Select Committees · Human Rights (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 160
160
Rejected
Open Rights Group note that “the Bill’s provisions offer limited procedural safeguards (for instance, reliance...
Conclusion
Open Rights Group note that “the Bill’s provisions offer limited procedural safeguards (for instance, reliance on “reasonable grounds” rather than rigorous independent judicial oversight). Such a low threshold can lead to overly broad applications of state power.”201 Migrant Help states that “the use of electronic monitoring is also actively discouraged by human rights experts for the “stigmatizing and negative psychological effects”, which are likely to be “disproportionate to the benefits of such monitoring”.202 They also note that “[p]eople in our Network who have experienced electronic monitoring said that it made them feel ‘inhuman’ and severely negatively impacted their mental health.”203
Government Response Summary
The government rejects the suggestion of limited procedural safeguards, arguing that existing judicial scrutiny ensures compatibility with the ECHR and that a stricter threshold would impede vital interventions. It clarifies the purpose of electronic monitoring and asserts that individuals have rights of appeal for unjustified orders.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
It is important to clarify that the imposition of electronic monitoring as part of a Serious Crime Prevention Order (SCPO) is not intended as a standalone punitive measure, rather as a means of monitoring compliance with other conditions of the order. Although the Bill uses the term “appropriate” as the test for imposing requirements such as electronic monitoring, courts are still required to interpret and apply that test in a way that is compatible with the ECHR, as required by the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the Serious Crime Act 2007, SCPOs can include any requirements which the court considers appropriate for the purpose of protecting the public by preventing, restricting, or disrupting involvement in serious crime. It will be for the court to determine whether electronic monitoring is an appropriate condition in each individual case, taking into account all relevant facts. All necessary safeguards, such as judicial scrutiny, a Data Protection Impact Assessment, and the ability of the individual to seek variation or discharge, will ensure that the use of electronic monitoring complies with Convention rights. With regard to Interim SCPOs (ISCPOs), the Bill provides that the High Court may impose an ISCPO where it considers it “just to do so.” This standard enables the court to act swiftly in circumstances where there is a credible risk to the public, but the final SCPO application has not yet been determined. The court will assess the material presented and make an evaluative judgment, rather than applying an evidential test or standard of proof. Introducing a stricter threshold, such as one based solely on necessity, could delay vital interventions and risk allowing serious criminal activity to continue unchecked. The “just to do so” test reflects the urgent, preventive nature of interim orders and aligns with comparable regimes such as interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders. These measures are strictly temporary and subject to review. If an individual considers the imposition of an ISCPO to be unjustified or disproportionate, they may apply for the order to be varied or discharged and have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, ensuring an appropriate balance between public protection and individual rights.