Source · Select Committees · Human Rights (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 130
130
Rejected
Despite the Government’s characterisation of this clause as clarificatory, the Impact Assessment makes clear that...
Conclusion
Despite the Government’s characterisation of this clause as clarificatory, the Impact Assessment makes clear that this involves retrospectively making it lawful to have detained persons (liable to deportation on the ground it was considered conducive to the public good) at a time when they did not have notice of an appealable immigration decision, because they had not yet made a human rights or protection claim.166 To detain a person under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971, pending the making of the deportation order, a person must have been given notice.167 As explained by ILPA, “a “Stage 1” deportation decision was not an appealable decision; therefore, individuals could not have received the requisite notice under the relevant Immigration (Notices) Regulations 2003, which only governs appealable decisions.”168 Alison Harvey, barrister at One Pump Court, told us: “[t]here is no question that it is changing the law. It is not a clarification in any way. It is not in any way compatible with Article 5 ( … ) There was no law and people were deprived of their liberty. The Government now want to rewrite that piece of history.”169
Government Response Summary
The government rejected the committee's strong concerns about Clause 41 not being clarificatory, but retrospectively changing the law and denying remedies. It reiterated its stance that the clause clarifies existing lawful powers, is necessary for public protection, and is compatible with Article 5 ECHR, thus denying any right to compensation.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
Clause 41 of the Bill clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention where the Home Office is considering whether deportation is conducive to the public good and consequential amendments to existing powers to take biometrics and searches upon being detained for this purpose. While it remains the Home Office’s position that the current detention power is lawful, this amendment provides greater legal clarity regarding its application. Clause 41 expresses these powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. Without retrospective effect, individuals previously detained could challenge the lawfulness of their detention. Such claims risk undermining the integrity of past deportation proceedings and frustrating future deportation proceedings. The retrospective clarification is necessary to ensure continuity in immigration control and public protection. The Home Office already detains individuals at the first stage of deportation consideration. Clause 41 is not expected to increase the use of detention powers but is intended to remove ambiguity and ensure that existing practices are legally robust. Therefore, it is entirely right that these provisions apply retrospectively. The Government considers that the measure complies with Article 5 ECHR. Article 5(1)(f) specifically provides for “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. Any interference with Article 5 is justified as it is in accordance with the law and proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim. The clause clarifies the statutory basis for the current use of the power and there is a strong public interest in not disrupting the detention power for the purposes of effective immigration control and public safety. There are some cases where the power to detain pending deportation is necessary because of a real and significant national security risk where no alternative detention power exists. Article 5(5) ECHR states “everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation”. It is the Government’s position that the clause complies with Article 5(5) because there is no contravention with Article 5 more broadly and therefore no freestanding right to compensation (see above). The same rationale applies as regards remedies under Article 14 ECHR.