Select committee inquiry

Risk Assessment and Risk Planning

Open

Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee · Opened 15 October 2020

28 recommendations · 32 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry is looking at

“The Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee is appointed to consider risk assessment and risk planning in the context of disruptive national hazards”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of Report - Preparing for Extreme Risks: Building a Resilient Society ↗

Our inquiry has come at a critical time. Nearly two years have passed since the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, placing a spotlight on the Government’s planning for the most serious risks facing the UK or its interests overseas. The pandemic has led to unprecedented levels of uncertainty and shock across the world with many countries struggling to respond to the virus. Prior to the onset of COVID-19, the UK’s approach to risk assessment and risk management was internationally commended and viewed as rigorous. However, the pandemic has exposed the UK’s risk management system as deficient and too inflexible to provide the protection our nation needs.

The risks we face are changing. Technological advances have raised the threat posed by the malicious deployment of technologies which could be used for good or ill, while traditional threats such as those from nuclear or chemical warfare remain. The risk of the failure of ageing critical infrastructure such as nuclear power stations, dams and bridges grows day on day without sufficient intervention. A reliance on electricity and the internet and the increasing complexity and interdependence of the networks underpinning daily life have left us vulnerable to cascading failures which could proliferate rapidly and cause widespread devastation. The UK’s risk management system must adapt to ensure that we are prepared for the evolving extreme and systemic risks on the horizon to protect us today and into the future.

Many inquiries are seeking to document the Government’s actions on COVID-19. Yet, a pandemic is only one of many risks, a fact which was clearly demonstrated to us over the course of this inquiry. It is inevitable that an inquiry of this nature would be overtaken by risks arising since the conclusion of our evidence gathering programme. Through the summer of 2021, and since, the UK has faced severe supply chain disruption and threats to the nation’s fuel supply. This has raised concerns about the fragility of the just-in-time networks on which our food, fuel and essential services rely. The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban has raised alarm about the security of the region and heightened the threat of global terrorism. Risks will continue to materialise which require action, prevention, mitigation or response. The Government must be able to identify lessons from all crises quickly and ensure it can translate them into real change. The current pandemic offers a unique opportunity to take stock of the UK’s risk assessment and risk management process. We must assess and strengthen our national resilience to ensure that we are better prepared for the next crises.

Our inquiry has concluded that the UK must be better at anticipating, preparing for and responding to a range of challenging scenarios, including those which it has never experienced before. The Government’s current strategy of centralised and opaque risk assessment and risk management, which fails to make adequate preparations, has left the UK vulnerable.

The UK must adopt a whole of society approach to resilience, one which emphasises the important role played by all sections of society in preparing for, adapting to and recovering from the effects of risk. Risk and resilience are not solely the concern of central Government policymakers; they have the capacity to alter the lives of millions. The Government must ensure it properly accounts for and involves all elements of society in its risk assessment and planning. Our recommendations are aimed at ensuring this.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that communities can step up and help ensure national safety. The Government must see our people as an essential building block of any response and as active participants in creating resilience. They must provide them with the support and information to help them prepare for the risks they face. Volunteering represents a key opportunity to involve the public in risk management and response. The UK has a strong voluntary sector which must form the foundation of any future reservist force used in times of crisis.

Risk assessment and risk planning are a routine undertaking in the private sector. Conversations between business and industry and the Government must be held to ensure that business and industry understand what impacts they may expect to incur from the manifestation of a risk or how they may be expected to act in response. Such conversations would allow the Government to understand and learn from business and industry. Conversations of this type do occur, but currently they are ad hoc and insufficient. We urge the Government to undertake more structured and open engagement with business and industry on risk and resilience.

Our inquiry has raised significant concerns about the Government’s culture and practice of risk assessment and planning. The current risk management system is veiled in an unacceptable and unnecessary level of secrecy. The UK’s risk plans need to be shared widely to maximise their efficacy. Only through transparency and a healthy culture of challenge can we provide society with a reliable foundation to respond to emerging risks. While secrecy does have an important place, the UK Government defaults to secrecy too readily. This has hampered our preparedness, as society’s front-line responders, including Local Resilience Forums, local government, volunteer groups and businesses and industry all struggle to access the information they need. Fear of criticism can drive an unnecessary reliance on secrecy. Our recommendations aim to bring transparency into the risk assessment process and to build better preparedness as a result.

We found that the Government’s risk assessment process is unable to encompass the complexity of risks facing the UK. It fails to account for interconnected or cascading risks and chronic or long-term risks, and has a bias against low likelihood-high impact risks. As a list of risks facing the UK, it is insufficient to aid mitigation and preparedness efforts. The present approach of assessing likelihood and impact may be misleading, and lead to a false sense of confidence, particularly in terms of prioritisation of risks. The Government’s risk assessment must be replaced by a more dynamic, data driven output, directly linked to preparation, mitigation and response.

No matter how sophisticated the assessment of risks, it is of little value if it is not matched by practical measures to ensure preparedness and resilience. The Government must not only anticipate risks but prepare for and respond to them effectively. Much of the Government’s time and resources are focused on responding to crises and emergencies, from flooding to terrorist attacks. They must bridge the gap between analysis and operational capability to ensure the safety and security of the population. We must place a premium on possessing the competence, capacity and skills to manage these crises. Risk plans must be frequently tested, challenged and scrutinised.

Preparation, mitigation and response plans must be scrutinised, and planners must be accountable both within Government and to Parliament, creating a system of audit which is appropriately resourced. We have proposed changes to ensure a clear governance structure and sustained, independent pressure and annual audit. Risk plans should be dynamic, resourced and every stakeholder involved should know what the mitigation process requires.

Despite the fact that prevention is significantly cheaper than response, the government has a traditional disincentive to invest against possible risks, especially low-probability high-impact risks. Spending policy for risk and resilience needs to be readdressed. Within the national security and critical national infrastructure communities there is a strong emphasis on prevention, leading to proactive resourcing. We urge the Government to ensure that spending in the civic sphere emulates this approach. Government spending should, where possible, be directed towards preparing for, preventing and mitigating disaster.

The Government will not succeed in anticipating every threat or hazard. For that reason, the country needs to be prepared to recover from shocks to which it is vulnerable. That capacity to recover must be based on a flexible, adaptable and diverse population that appreciates the need for its own resilience.

What the government said

The government responded on 17 March 2022. The deadline was 3 March 2022.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.

The Government "agrees with the spirit" of the Lords committee's report, accepts many recommendations, commits to considering others, and does not accept two.

  • On an Office for Preparedness and Resilience and a Government Chief Risk Officer, it agrees with the principle but "commits to further consideration", following the Crisis Capabilities Review and the COVID-19 Inquiry.
  • It accepts the recommendation to refresh the Biological Security Strategy and "has committed to publishing" the refreshed strategy in 2022.
  • It does not accept the recommendation for a statutory duty on critical national infrastructure operators to publish business continuity plans, though it is "committed to keeping this issue under review".
  • It accepts the recommendation on funding for Local Resilience Forums, citing £7.5 million per year for 3 years announced by DLUHC.

How the inquiry has run so far

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 15 October 2020 to 17 March 2022. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.

  1. Oral evidence 19 sessions
  2. Report 3 Dec 2021
  3. Government response 17 Mar 2022

What it recommended 28 recommendations · 32 conclusions

1Many of the risks facing the UK are likely to increase both in magnitude and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Many of the risks facing the UK are likely to increase both in magnitude and frequency as a result of climate change, and risk assessment cannot be conducted without acknowledging this fact. Climate change is an ever more significant risk facing the UK and action to address it needs to be undertaken rapidly and as a priority.
2The central government risk assessment process has developed a culture of secrecy that impedes thorough...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The central government risk assessment process has developed a culture of secrecy that impedes thorough scrutiny, expert consultation and information sharing with key partners. The Committee has seen the Official-Sensitive National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and believes that the secrecy surrounding the document is unwarranted and that much of this information does not need to be secret and should be in the public domain. As we discuss in paragraph 79, the Government should welcome greater external expertise and challenge into the process. This would allow the process to be more open to challenge and allow it to draw on independent scientific advice.
3The Government’s risk assessment process should not shy away from politics, including in its content,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government’s risk assessment process should not shy away from politics, including in its content, by which we mean ministerial engagement, parliamentary scrutiny and participation by the devolved administrations. It should be driven by the UK’s strategic priorities and needs greater ministerial oversight.
4The Government should re-establish the Threats , Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies subcommittee of the National...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should re-establish the Threats , Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies subcommittee of the National Security Council , or an equivalent Cabinet Committee, ahead of the production of the next National Security Risk Assessment.
5The Government should establish an Office for Preparedness and Resilience as a non-departmental body, headed...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should establish an Office for Preparedness and Resilience as a non-departmental body, headed by a newly created post of Government Chief Risk Officer. This body would be responsible for producing independent analysis of UK preparedness and monitoring Government preparedness . It would produce assessments of UK resilience, set resilience standards , and conduct audits of UK preparedness. It would have the ability to commission research and establish expert task and finish groups on specific topics to produce expert led reports and assessments. The Office for Preparedness and Resilience should have a standing expert advisory council to provide independent challenge, oversight and strategic direction. It should establish an institutional memory bank, in the form of a digital library, which contains resilience literature and the lessons learned of all major exercises and emergencies . This should be made available to a designated set of users including central Government officials, local responders, the devolved administrations , and parliamentarians.
6The Government has a strong disincentive to invest against possible risks, but prevention is significantly...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government has a strong disincentive to invest against possible risks, but prevention is significantly cheaper than cure and a failure to invest in mitigation can cause an increase in likelihood and impact. Government spending should, where possible, be directed towards preventing or mitigating disaster. Business cases must represent the future benefits of preparedness and mitigation, as well as the costs. The discounting rates required by the Treasury’s ‘Green Book’ favour short-term gains and are disincentivising risk spending in risk management. Elements of critical national infrastructure (CNI) degrade over time, but this is not adequately accounted for within the current risk management system.
7The Treasury and spending departments must move away from their current practice of disincentivising long-term,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Treasury and spending departments must move away from their current practice of disincentivising long-term, preventative spending on risk. To address this, the Government should establish a flexible and evidence-based spending target for spending on resilience. This funding target should be based on the required capabilities and proposed mitigations outlined by the new Office for Preparedness and Resilience which we have recommended in paragraph 79. This should be assisted by an appropriate depreciation register for Critical National Infrastructure which identifies ageing infrastructure.
8Ensuring those responsible for the creation and execution of plans have the appropriate skills and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Ensuring those responsible for the creation and execution of plans have the appropriate skills and qualities, including flexibility and adaptability, is vital for their success. This applies not just to the Government, but is a challenge for all of society. Within Government this includes ministers as well as officials. There should be a diverse range of individuals involved as diversity of background, thinking and approach are a benefit to resilience policymaking. We highlight the need for a greater focus within Government on analysis skills, emergency planning skills and project delivery skills in the civil sphere. The skills required are determined by the risk in question and change over time. An analysis of future skill requirements is needed to ensure that the Government has the rolling capability to deal with emerging threat scenarios.
9The Government should bolster its skills base in the areas of analysis, emergency planning and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should bolster its skills base in the areas of analysis, emergency planning and project delivery and make more use of systems thinking and Futures techniques when conducting risk assessments and developing policy. This will require offering high quality, targeted training, skill-based allowances, defined career paths, and making use of the full breadth of pay bands where market needs justify this. In developing the requisite capabilities, the Government should ensure it builds and maintains staff diversity. There must be more ministerial engagement in risk preparedness. The Government should provide guidance and implement training for ministers on planning and crisis response. These skills should also be cultivated and properly organised in broader society to bolster general resilience.
10Risks do not respect national borders.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Risks do not respect national borders. They are likely to have international impacts and will require international responses. UK risk planning needs to acknowledge how interconnected the world is and work internationally to plan for risk. Such engagement is an opportunity not only for the UK to pursue its policy agenda but also to learn from international partners. A strong UK involvement in international forums is necessary to mitigate against the risks faced by the UK and ensure risk planning considers international dimensions and is not narrowly focused on domestic issues. International agreements and research partnerships will be necessary to ensure some risks are mitigated effectively, for example the threat posed by Level 4 biolabs.
11We are encouraged by the inclusion of global risks and international partnerships in the Government’s...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are encouraged by the inclusion of global risks and international partnerships in the Government’s call for evidence for The National Resilience Strategy. The Government must ensure that the strategy clearly outlines how it will engage in international forums and what international agreements it would like to see implemented and refreshed. It should clearly lay out what resource it will devote to these efforts and commit long term funding. In particular, the Research Councils should give additional focus to projects which explore the international dimensions of risks. The Government should work with international partners to establish a global surveillance scheme for disease and establish data sharing agreements to ensure new infectious diseases can be identified rapidly and information about them shared with ease.
12LRFs currently do not have clarity about their purpose and expected duties.
Concluded (the committee's words)
LRFs currently do not have clarity about their purpose and expected duties. The expectations of LRFs have grown and shifted over time which has not been reflected in the Civil Contingencies Act, its associated regulations or guidance.
13As part of the quinquennial review of the CCA regulations, due to report by March...
Recommended (the committee's words)
As part of the quinquennial review of the CCA regulations, due to report by March 2022, the Government should clarify the purpose and duties of the LRFs and should place them on a statutory footing. If LRFs are to take a more active role in emergency response, the training required, and possible liabilities increased by this change should be addressed. The UK Government in its review of the CCA should expand the range of named category 2 responders.
14The UK’s risk assessment system is too top-heavy.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s risk assessment system is too top-heavy. LRFs do not have sufficient contact with the CCS and are not viewed as trusted partners in the process. Information flow and communication is currently poor and the direction of information flow between national and local level is largely one-directional. A national system which cannot account for local knowledge is not good enough. There is a need to facilitate the sharing of expertise and information across LRFs.
15The Government should improve its communication and engagement with local authorities and LRFs.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should improve its communication and engagement with local authorities and LRFs. In particular, the Government should establish a forum for the seamless sharing of information among LRFs, facilitated by central government. This forum would allow for the sharing of completed risk assessments and best practice insights both among LRFs and from LRFs to central government. This forum should meet at least twice yearly. It should be convened before the production of the NSRA to allow LRFs to contribute insights on the methodology and local risk information, and after the NSRA has been produced to allow LRFs to share local risk assessments and prevent duplication.
16Expectations on Category 1 responders have increased since the CCA entered into law.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Expectations on Category 1 responders have increased since the CCA entered into law. The CCA was designed to respond to short-term emergencies, but the responsibilities placed on LRFs are now more in line with a resilience agenda. LRFs have become a default tasking mechanism for resilience policy at a local level. Whilst the obligations placed on LRFs have increased, local government budgets have been subjected to significant cuts. This has hampered their ability to undertake their statutory duties.
17The Government should ensure the funds allocated to LRFs are appropriate and sufficient to allow...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should ensure the funds allocated to LRFs are appropriate and sufficient to allow them to carry out the full range of their responsibilities. Ring-fenced funding should be allocated to allow LRFs to operationalise the necessary capabilities and standards set out by the Government.
18LRFs struggle to access relevant information to inform their risk assessments due to the current...
Concluded (the committee's words)
LRFs struggle to access relevant information to inform their risk assessments due to the current high levels of secrecy. This hampers local preparedness. LRFs also face duplicating work performed centrally or by other LRFs due to a lack of communication and coordination between groups, the lack of a single risk assessment template, and the inability to copy and paste information on risks. There is a need to facilitate the sharing of expertise and information across LRFs.
19LRFs should be engaged in the production of the NSRA through the forum described in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
LRFs should be engaged in the production of the NSRA through the forum described in paragraph
125The CCS should commit to sharing information as a default with LRFs.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The CCS should commit to sharing information as a default with LRFs. Information on the consequences of security threats should be provided at a minimum. Wherever possible, to prevent duplication of effort, information should be produced once at a national level and cascaded down to a local level. The Government should produce a single risk assessment template for use by LRFs to limit the duplication of effort and should ensure that information on risks can be directly copied from the NSRA into the local risk assessment.
20Engagement of the devolved administrations by the UK Government is superficial and ad-hoc and often...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Engagement of the devolved administrations by the UK Government is superficial and ad-hoc and often an afterthought, particularly on reserved matters which may have implications for the resilience systems in the devolved administrations. Resilience is a devolved capability and as a consequence a more formalised engagement process is needed.
21The UK Government needs to produce an agreed set of communications structures at all levels...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government needs to produce an agreed set of communications structures at all levels of seniority, including ministerial level, to facilitate effective resilience dialogue between central government and devolved administrations. This must be done in consultation with the devolved administrations. This should define the frequency and terms of engagement, at what stage the devolved administrations should be consulted and/or informed and identify key points of contact.
22The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the difficulties posed by the insurance industry in providing affordable...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the difficulties posed by the insurance industry in providing affordable cover for catastrophic or systemic risks. Rising premiums will impact insurance coverage and expose the Government to increased risk and damage national resilience. Public-private schemes, such as Pool Reinsurance, have helped to address market failures and distribute risk between the public and private sector.
23The Government should work with the UK insurance industry to explore mechanisms which allow for...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should work with the UK insurance industry to explore mechanisms which allow for the transfer, management and mitigation of risks which are too large for the private sector to address alone and for which the Government is the insurer of last resort, but may in fact find itself the insurer of first resort.
24Regulation is crucial for bolstering national resilience, particularly for the critical national infrastructure sectors.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Regulation is crucial for bolstering national resilience, particularly for the critical national infrastructure sectors. While there is a need to balance resilience with the cost to the consumer, that trade off should not move too far away from resilience. Near-miss reporting is critical to ensure vulnerabilities are caught before they can lead to disaster. Cross regulator working is essential given the cross-sector implications of many risks and this can also help avoid siloes in business and industry. The UK Regulators Network is a valuable development in this regard.
25A statutory duty should be placed on all public and private regulated bodies who operate...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A statutory duty should be placed on all public and private regulated bodies who operate critical national infrastructure to produce and publish an audited business continuity plan . We encourage Ofgem and BEIS to implement a requirement for the operators of essential services to notify regulators of near misses, with the publication of an annual summary of near miss events.
26The voluntary sector is a rich source of information and assistance on risk and response...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The voluntary sector is a rich source of information and assistance on risk and response at a local level. However, the obligation on Category 1 responders to “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” is unclear and interpretations vary between LRFs.
27The Government should clarify what “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” means and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should clarify what “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” means and outline what best practice in voluntary sector engagement would look like through the production of improved guidance for LRFs.
28The proposed reservist cadre lacks ambition and is not in line with the views of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The proposed reservist cadre lacks ambition and is not in line with the views of the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector should be supported to organise existing voluntary forces into a response mechanism. The Government should map existing voluntary capability and use this as the basis of any response. There should be a central coordinating point for a national voluntary response, mapping capability regularity, directing volunteers to under resourced voluntary forces and facilitating better liaison amongst voluntary groups and between the sector and the Government. The Government should be prepared to pay volunteers for days of work missed through participation in any coordinated response to risk events. The Government should consider adding emergency response skills to the post-16 curriculum, with schools and further education colleges providing volunteering opportunities to students.
29The UK population is not sufficiently encouraged to engage in emergency planning or build a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK population is not sufficiently encouraged to engage in emergency planning or build a level of personal preparedness. At present, the NRR is the primary tool for public education employed by the Government. This approach falls short and does not empower the public to make informed decisions about personal safety. There is little evidence to suggest that providing information leads to panic. Providing individuals with knowledge about how to respond in a crisis and guidance to help build personal preparedness will improve societal resilience. It should be recognised that socio-economic disparities threaten to undermine civilian resilience capability. Moreover, misinformation poses a direct risk to civil cohesion and resilience. This risk has been exacerbated by the growing influence of social media platforms. Misinformation should be identified, pre-empted and countered as early as possible.
30The Government should commit to a biennial publication of a brochure on risk preparedness.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should commit to a biennial publication of a brochure on risk preparedness. This brochure should educate the public on general resilience principles, outline how individuals could improve their preparedness, provide guidance on what to do in an emergency, and signpost further information on resilience . This should be modelled on the Swedish brochure ‘If crisis or war comes’ and supplement the NRR.
31The Government should consider the organisation and provision of a residential , intensive course on...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should consider the organisation and provision of a residential , intensive course on national security, resilience and defence for rising leaders in the public and private sectors. The Government should lay a written statement on with the findings of its consideration in both Houses within 6 months of publication of this report.
32In particular, Exercise Cygnus recommended the production of a “Pandemic Concept of Operations” to assist...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In particular, Exercise Cygnus recommended the production of a “Pandemic Concept of Operations” to assist with operationalising the response to a pandemic by clarifying the role of organisations and the rules of engagement. Based on the evidence we have received about the decision making in Government at the outset of the pandemic, it appears that this was not properly implemented prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the early stages of COVID-19 there was significant confusion in decision-making which hampered the UK’s response.
33A Pandemic Concept of Operations should be produced , as well as Concepts of Operations...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A Pandemic Concept of Operations should be produced , as well as Concepts of Operations for other major risks , to ensure that the confusion surrounding governance does not arise in future crises.
34The 2018 Biological Security Strategy was a welcome development but the Government’s failure to implement...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The 2018 Biological Security Strategy was a welcome development but the Government’s failure to implement it fully has rendered it ineffectual. The emergence of COVID-19 has demonstrated the importance of strengthening the UK’s biological security.
35The Biological Security Strategy needs to be renewed, refreshed and implemented, whilst also incorporating the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Biological Security Strategy needs to be renewed, refreshed and implemented, whilst also incorporating the lessons learned from COVID-19. At present, the non-implementation of the Strategy represents a significant gap in UK preparedness and should be rectified as a priority. The updated strategy should be published alongside an implementation plan so that its progress can be tracked. Time in both Houses should be devoted to a debate on the refreshed strategy.
36The current National Security Risk Assessment timescales and impact assessments are not suitable to address...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The current National Security Risk Assessment timescales and impact assessments are not suitable to address either high impact-low likelihood or chronic risk events. The two-year timeframe currently in place leads to an underappreciation of the risks associated with low-likelihood or chronic risks and will result in outdated assessments for risk areas with a high velocity of change. There is also a high degree of uncertainty associated with the reasonable worst-case scenario (RWCS) and likelihood calculations. The likelihood of many risks cannot be accurately quantified. The likelihood-impact matrix of the NSRA may be misleading and lead to a false sense of confidence.
37The NSRA must be produced with mitigation and response in mind.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NSRA must be produced with mitigation and response in mind. The methodology of the NSRA and the Lead Government Department principle favour the assessment of discrete risks. This is an ineffective strategy given the interconnected nature of many risks. Risks are currently grouped by thematic areas, but risks within a given thematic area may require very different responses. Risk planning should focus on the outcome rather than the specific risk, and the NSRA should facilitate this. The national planning assumptions are one means to understand the capabilities required to respond to a range of possible scenarios.
38The current format of the NSRA and NRR is too rigid.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The current format of the NSRA and NRR is too rigid. We believe that the current PDF format of the NSRA and NRR is difficult to navigate and may deter readers due to its cumbersome size. The NSRA is too long to be a useful document, and it increases in size with each successive iteration. Its purpose as a planning document is hampered by its attempts to be exhaustive. A shorter, more dynamic, web-based platform would facilitate access, make the underlying data more visible, and allow for the improved representation of interconnectedness.
39We propose that instead of a simple risk assessment, the UK should produce a ‘National...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We propose that instead of a simple risk assessment, the UK should produce a ‘National Security Risk and Resilience Assessment’. This should place more emphasis on preparedness and resilience. The NSRA as a list of risks is of limited use and should be linked to emergency plans, simulations, capability development and proposed mitigations. This should be achieved through the following changes: (Paragraph 225) The NSRA must focus more on the outcomes of emergencies. The document should be oriented around common consequences to allow for preparedness efforts which are not overly focused on discrete risks . This should be supplemented by a smaller list of very high-consequence risks or risks for which specialised planning is required. Risks should be grouped using Ortwin Renn’s categories (box 9) to ensure risks which require similar responses are considered together. We accept that the labelling of these categories may need to change to avoid any confusion. Risks should be assessed on an impact-vulnerability matrix, as well as an impact-likelihood matrix. Where a risk may manifest in a number of ways, the NSRA should present several scenarios , not just the Reasonable Worst Case Scenario. The NSRA should include a number of cascading risk scenarios, whose development has been informed by interdependent infrastructure modelling. The NSRA should move to a five-year timeline, with risks refreshed and reassessed annually. Risks which are identified as having a high velocity of change should be assessed more regularly. Chronic risks, chronologically unpredictable risks, low-likelihood risks and the most significant risks should also be accompanied by a long-term assessment of 15 years. The Government should act under a presumption of publication, and should publish the content of the Official-Sensitive National Security Risk Assessment except where there is a direct national security risk. The data required for emergency response should be identified at the point that a risk is assessed , and all efforts should be made to ensure that data can be accessed from the outset of a crisis. The NSRA and NRR should be presented in a more dynamic , data driven web-portal which allows users to visualise the risk summary, access the underlying data and easily navigate to related risks.
40The inclusion of industry and businesses in the production of the NSRA is necessary to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The inclusion of industry and businesses in the production of the NSRA is necessary to ensure that information on business and industry capabilities is correct and up to date. This would also allow the Government to inform business and industry of the likely impact on their sectors of the realisation of any risks in the NSRA. Trade associations and professional bodies represent a good level at which to conduct these meetings. Conversely, the Government should draw on the expertise within business and industry to ensure the creation of the NSRA and NRR is driven by best practice. The Government should elicit information on risk assessment methodologies and modelling capabilities, particularly from the insurance sector, critical infrastructure and safety-critical industries.
41The Government should establish a forum , made up of representatives of trade associations and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should establish a forum , made up of representatives of trade associations and professional bodies , which should meet in advance of and following the production of the NSRA or twice a year, whichever is more frequent. After five years, the Forum could then meet once a year. This body should be convened by the Office for Preparedness and Resilience and used to ascertain information about business sector capabilities, inform business and industry of risks which may require a response on their part, and allow the Government to seek out best practice. Attention should be paid to ensuring representation from the full breadth of UK business and industry, with a particular focus on the logistics sector . The Government should deliver annual presentations on realistic risk assessment and risk planning to business and industry bodies.
42The Government should recognise that voluntary organisations often operate to professional standards of delivery and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should recognise that voluntary organisations often operate to professional standards of delivery and have unparalleled depth of practical and local knowledge.
43At a national level, the Government should involve major voluntary organisations in the production of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
At a national level, the Government should involve major voluntary organisations in the production of the NSRA. This is to ensure that the knowledge they possess on risks and levels of community resilience, as well as information on their operational capabilities, can be included. The Government needs to recognise that the voluntary sector possesses many skills that will be crucial to building societal resilience. This should be facilitated through the single point of contact we recommended in Chapter 4.
44We believe that voluntary and community organisations represent an appropriate level at which to undertake...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We believe that voluntary and community organisations represent an appropriate level at which to undertake engagement, particularly as it would allow the Government to target support towards vulnerable or at-risk groups. We also consider that Parliament offers a means of indirect engagement between the public and Government.
45The Government must recognise that informing the public about the risks they face is both...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must recognise that informing the public about the risks they face is both morally justified and benefits societal resilience. Knowledge on how the public understands risk and the population’s level of resilience is crucial to the development of rigorous risk assessment and planning. Voluntary and community groups can provide key insights on these issues. There needs to be a new culture within Government which recognises that not shielding the population, and instead providing information on risks, will lead to a more cohesive risk response. Better publicity of the NRR is essential to ensure that the public are aware of the risks that they may face and to outline the expectations on them in any risk scenario. This will require a re-consideration of the format of the NRR.
46The NRR should, in line with the NSRA, be presented via a dynamic, data driven...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NRR should, in line with the NSRA, be presented via a dynamic, data driven web-portal which is easily navigated , evolves in response to identified threats and which provides practical , targeted advice to individuals. Its profile must be increased through an active and continuing media campaign, including via social media . This campaign should heighten whenever substantive changes are made to the risk register. It should focus on informing society of the content of the NRR and how they could use the NRR to bolster their personal preparedness.
47When conducting the national risk assessment process, the Government should engage with voluntary and community...
Recommended (the committee's words)
When conducting the national risk assessment process, the Government should engage with voluntary and community groups to ascertain information on risks and population level resilience.
48Preparedness and planning for risks in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should cover all...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Preparedness and planning for risks in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should cover all possible impacts of a risk and must aim for mitigation or prevention where possible. Within the national security, defence and critical national infrastructure communities there is a strong emphasis on prevention, which should be replicated in all areas. There is currently an excess of siloed planning and a failure by departments to plan for risks for which they are not the LGD. This creates significant vulnerabilities. The CCS currently do not have sufficient power to compel departments to work together or to compel preparation on specific risk areas. More cross-departmental working is needed, and departments must plan for all risks which may affect them, not simply those for which they are nominally responsible. There is, overall, an absence of auditing of departmental risk planning at all levels. In particular, the Committee recognises that Parliament has been too passive in its responsibility to scrutinise risk plans and should assist the audit of Government preparedness.
49Central government risk planning should be benchmarked against the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), with...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Central government risk planning should be benchmarked against the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), with standards of preparation and required capabilities set by the Office for Preparedness and Resilience (see paragraph 79). The CCS should convene cross-departmental working groups to address the most significant cross-cutting risks and to ensure that risk scenarios that cross departmental boundaries have risk plans that cover the full spectrum of possible impacts . These risks should be considered discretely by the Threats, Hazards , Resilience and Contingencies subcommittee of the National Security Council to ensure that there is ministerial discussion of these risks.
50A yearly debate on the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should be held by both...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A yearly debate on the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should be held by both Houses of Parliament. To ensure more in-depth scrutiny, the Office for Preparedness and Resilience should audit departmental preparedness and conduct deep dives into departmental risk management. These audits should be based on the standards of preparation and required capabilities as set out by the Office for Preparedness and Resilience, with annual reports signed off by ministers and laid before Parliament for debate. They should investigate where there has been a failure to invest in preparedness, and conduct assessments of the cost of such failures. A new Joint Select Committee should be created to scrutinise and democratise the UK’s risk planning approach and the work of the CCS. The Committee propose that this should be called the Joint Resilience and Contingencies Select Committee and should have access to all relevant information, including the NSRA. The National Audit Office has the power to investigate the Government’s risk preparedness through the lens of public spending. The NAO should continue its valuable work scrutinising risk management in Government.
51The Government should change the name of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in acknowledgement that the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should change the name of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in acknowledgement that the secretariat no longer manages civil emergencies alone. A name should be chosen which reflects its broad portfolio of threats and hazards. The Committee recommend the use of the ‘Resilience and Contingencies Secretariat’.
52Exercising and wargaming should be at the heart of UK preparedness as they are crucial...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Exercising and wargaming should be at the heart of UK preparedness as they are crucial to ensure plans are tested and those responsible for executing them are well-trained. Exercises must be regular, short and involve the most senior figures responsible for the plans, including ministers. To challenge group-think, exercises should include red-teaming where appropriate. They should test a wide range of scenarios, including compound or cascade risks, and should be followed up on with lessons learned, which in turn should feed into a loop which informs both risk assessment and planning.
53Risk plans must specify how frequently they are to be subjected to exercising or wargaming.
Recommended (the committee's words)
Risk plans must specify how frequently they are to be subjected to exercising or wargaming. The Government must ensure that these testing obligations are met. Exercises should abide by the principles laid out in paragraph 265. These exercises must include involvement by the most senior figures, senior officials and ministers . These exercises must be followed up with a thorough ‘lessons learned’ process, with these lessons learned published so they can be scrutinised. Scrutiny of lessons learned should be followed up on after one, two and five years.
54The NSRA, as a list of risks, is insufficient for risk planning at a local...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NSRA, as a list of risks, is insufficient for risk planning at a local level. LRF representatives called for greater sight of national plans and mitigations to allow them to identify where they could best add value. LRFs must have access to the information required to build planning assumptions, including the required capabilities to mitigate risks.
55The Government must share all civil contingencies documentation with LRFs, except in cases where there...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government must share all civil contingencies documentation with LRFs, except in cases where there is a national security reason to withhold information. In these cases where national security threat analyses are withheld, at a minimum, information must be given to LRFs to allow them to prepare for the consequences of the materialisation of national security threats. The national preparedness benchmark, developed by the Office for Preparedness and Resilience, should be shared with LRFs along with guidance on translating the specified capabilities and standards of preparation to the local level.
56As is the case with risk assessment (see paragraphs 229 and 230), businesses and industry...
Recommended (the committee's words)
As is the case with risk assessment (see paragraphs 229 and 230), businesses and industry should play a more active role in the national planning process. Information on their levels of preparedness and ability to respond in a crisis is critical for the development of robust plans. Likewise, the Government should be clear about what the expectations may be on them in the event of a crisis. This two-way communication is in place at a local level, but at a national level it is limited. The forum we recommend in paragraph 230 would play a key role in facilitating this.
57Much of the guidance published on GOV.UK to help inform businesses planning for major disruptive...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Much of the guidance published on GOV.UK to help inform businesses planning for major disruptive events is out of date. This guidance is one means by which the Government can outline the expectations on industry and businesses. The Government should renew and streamline this information, and clarify what is a legal requirement and what is government guidance.
58The Government should commit to updating all resilience related guidance on GOV.UK to ensure it...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should commit to updating all resilience related guidance on GOV.UK to ensure it is accurate, clear and up to date.
59The off -site reservoir plan for Toddbrook Reservoir was invaluable during the emergency response to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The off -site reservoir plan for Toddbrook Reservoir was invaluable during the emergency response to the 2019 incident. Off-site reservoir plans , such as had been voluntarily created for Toddbrook Reservoir prior to the 2019 incident, should be a statutory requirement for reservoirs.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 19

  • 23 Jun 20216 witnesses: Karen Pearson, Professor Charlotte Watts, Professor Gideon Henderson, Reg Kilpatrick, Shirley Rogers, Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviserparliament.uk ↗
  • 16 Jun 20212 witnesses: Roger Hargreaves, Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, Paymaster Generalparliament.uk ↗
  • 9 Jun 20213 witnesses: Lord Gus O'Donnell, Rt Hon Margaret Beckett, Rt Hon Sir Oliver Letwinparliament.uk ↗
  • 26 May 20215 witnesses: Author Adrian Tchaikovsky, Author Peter F. Hamilton, Author Robert Harris, Lord Toby Harris, Professor Brian Collins, CB, FREngparliament.uk ↗
  • 19 May 20218 witnesses: Adrian Clee, Alistair Read, Chief Constable Rachel Swann, Dr Fiona Twycross, John Barradell OBE, Lynda Battarbee, Richard Lee, Stuart Marshallparliament.uk ↗
  • 28 Apr 20217 witnesses: Alex Thomas, Charlotte Pickles, Dr Carina Fearnley, Professor Brooke Rogers OBE, Professor Duncan Shaw, Professor Siân Griffiths OBE, Professor Sir David Spiegelhalterparliament.uk ↗
  • 21 Apr 20214 witnesses: Harold van Waveren, Jim Kronhamn, Peter Ho, Professor Alexander Feketeparliament.uk ↗
  • 14 Apr 20215 witnesses: Deborah Higgins, Dr Karen Reddin, John Curry, Major General Charles Stickland CB OBE, Paul Wyattparliament.uk ↗
  • 24 Mar 20215 witnesses: Dr Adam Marshall, Eoin Murray, Joanne Holden, Kate Nicholls, Leigh Pomlettparliament.uk ↗
  • 17 Mar 20216 witnesses: Cathryn Scott, Chris Train OBE, Elisabeth Braw, Lindsey Fussell, Professor Jim Hall, Tim Watsonparliament.uk ↗
  • 10 Mar 20214 witnesses: Dame Sue Ion, Professor Stephen Richardson, Tim Stone, Will Websterparliament.uk ↗
  • 3 Mar 20213 witnesses: Dr Marc Schelhase, Sir Chris Deverell, The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DLparliament.uk ↗
  • 3 Feb 20213 witnesses: Dr Cassidy Nelson, Dr Catherine Rhodes, Dr Opi Outhwaiteparliament.uk ↗
  • 27 Jan 20215 witnesses: Dr David Blagden, Dr Simon Harwood, Ed Butler, Suzanne Raine, The Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVOparliament.uk ↗
  • 20 Jan 20215 witnesses: Andy Bord, Catherine Wright, Ian Lisk, Laura Hughes, Professor David Balmforthparliament.uk ↗
  • 13 Jan 20214 witnesses: Caroline Gorski, Dr Simon Beard, Dr Stephen Cave, John Thornhillparliament.uk ↗
  • 9 Dec 20202 witnesses: Professor Sir John Beddington, Professor Sir Mark Walportparliament.uk ↗
  • 2 Dec 20203 witnesses: Ortwin Renn, Piers Millet, Professor David Alexanderparliament.uk ↗
  • 25 Nov 20201 witness: Roger Hargreavesparliament.uk ↗

Who gave evidence 80 witnesses

  • Roger HargreavesDirector, COBR Unit, Cabinet Office2 sessions
  • Adrian CleeEmergency Response Lead, Salvation Army
  • Alex ThomasProgramme Director, Institute for Government
  • Alistair ReadNational Training Officer, Mountain Rescue England and Wales
  • Andy BordChief Executive, Flood Re
  • Author Adrian Tchaikovsky
  • Author Peter F. Hamilton
  • Author Robert Harris
  • Caroline GorskiGroup Director R2 Data Labs, Rolls Royce
  • Catherine WrightExecutive Director, Flood and Coastal Risk Management, Environment Agency
  • Cathryn ScottDirector of Enforcement and Emerging issues, Ofgem
  • Charlotte PicklesMember, Social Security Advisory Committee
  • Chief Constable Rachel SwannDerbyshire's Chief Constable, Derbyshire Local Resilience Forum, Derby and Derbyshire Local Resilience Forum
  • Chris Train OBEChair, South East Water
  • Dame Sue IonHonorary President, National Skills Academy for Nuclear
  • Deborah HigginsHead, Emergency Planning College
  • Dr Adam MarshallDirector General, British Chambers of Commerce
  • Dr Carina FearnleyAssociate Professor, Science and Technology Studies Department and Director, UCL Warning Research Centre, University College London
  • Dr Cassidy NelsonActing Co-Lead, Biosecurity Team University of Oxford
  • Dr Catherine RhodesSenior Research Associate, Biosecurity Research Initiative at St Catharine's (BioRISC), University of Cambridge
  • Dr David BlagdenSenior Lecturer in International Security, University of Exeter
  • Dr Fiona TwycrossDeputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience and Chair, London Resilience Forum
  • Dr Karen ReddinSenior Lecturer in Disaster Management, Bournemouth University
  • Dr Marc SchelhaseLecturer, Defence Studies Department, KCL and Staff College, UK Defence Academy
  • Dr Opi OuthwaiteAssociate Professor, St Mary's University
  • Dr Simon BeardAcademic Programme Manager and Senior Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge
  • Dr Simon HarwoodDirector of Defence and Security, Cranfield University
  • Dr Stephen CaveExecutive Director, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge
  • Ed ButlerChief Resilience Officer, Pool Reinsurance
  • Elisabeth BrawSenior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council
  • Eoin MurrayHead of Investment, Hermes Investment
  • Harold van WaverenChair of the National Crisisteam for Flood Risk, Rijkswaterstaat
  • Ian LiskChair, Natural Hazards Partnership
  • Jim KronhamnActing Head of the Research and Evaluation Section, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
  • Joanne HoldenChief Investment Officer UK, Mercer
  • John Barradell OBEChief Executive of the City of London Corporation and Deputy Chair, London Resilience Forum
  • John CurrySenior Lecturer in Creative Computing, Bath Spa University
  • John ThornhillInnovation Editor, Financial Times
  • Karen PearsonDeputy Secretary for Civil Contingencies and Covid-19 Recovery, The Executive Office, Northern Ireland
  • Kate NichollsChief Executive, UKHospitality
  • Laura HughesGeneral Insurance Policy Manager, Association of British Insurers
  • Leigh PomlettPresident, Logistics UK
  • Lindsey FussellGroup Director for Networks and Communications, Ofcom
  • Lord Gus O'Donnell
  • Lord Toby HarrisChair, National Preparedness Commission
  • Lynda BattarbeeDirector of Operations, The Trussell Trust
  • Major General Charles Stickland CB OBEAssistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments), Ministry of Defence
  • Ortwin RennScientific Director, Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies
  • Paul WyattDirector General, Policy, Ministry of Defence
  • Peter HoSenior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore
  • Piers MilletSenior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
  • Professor Alexander FeketeInstitute of Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, Technical University of Cologne
  • Professor Brian Collins, CB, FREngVice-Chair, National Preparedness Commission
  • Professor Brooke Rogers OBEProfessor of Behavioural Science and Security, Department of War Studies, Kings College London
  • Professor Charlotte WattsChief Scientific Adviser and Director for Research and Evidence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
  • Professor David AlexanderProfessor of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London (UCL)
  • Professor David BalmforthPast President, Institution of Civil Engineers
  • Professor Duncan ShawProfessor of Operational Research and Critical Systems, University of Manchester
  • Professor Gideon HendersonChief Scientific Advisor, Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
  • Professor Jim HallCommissioner, National Infrastructure Commission
  • Professor Sir David SpiegelhalterChair of the Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, University of Cambridge
  • Professor Sir John BeddingtonFormer Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Her Majesty's Government
  • Professor Sir Mark WalportFormer Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Her Majesty's Government
  • Professor Siân Griffiths OBEEmeritus Professor of Public Health, Chinese University of Hong Kong
  • Professor Stephen RichardsonEmeritus Professor of Chemical Engineering, Imperial College
  • Reg KilpatrickDirector General of Covid-19 Crisis Coordination, Welsh Government
  • Richard LeeChief Operating Officer, St John Ambulance
  • Rt Hon Margaret Beckett
  • Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, Paymaster General
  • Rt Hon Sir Oliver Letwin
  • Shirley RogersDirector, Organisational Readiness, Scottish Government
  • Sir Chris DeverellFormer Commander of the Joint Forces Command, Ministry of Defence
  • Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific AdviserFormer Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government, UK Government
  • Stuart MarshallChief Emergency Planning Officer and LRF Manager, Cleveland Local Resilience Forum
  • Suzanne RaineAffiliated Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge
  • The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DLLord and Former Chief of Defence Staff, House of Lords
  • The Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVOLord and Former Security Adviser, House of Lords
  • Tim StoneChairman, Nuclear Industry Association
  • Tim WatsonDirector of the Cyber Security Centre within Warwick Manufacturing Group, University of Warwick
  • Will WebsterEnergy Policy Manager, Offshore Energies UK

Meetings and visits 11

  • 24 Nov 2021Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 10 Nov 2021Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 27 Oct 2021Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 25 Oct 2021Not recorded70 WhitehallFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 14 Jul 2021Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 7 Jul 2021Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 10 Jun 2021Not recorded35 Great Smith StreetFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 24 Feb 2021Not recordedVirtual meeting (webcast)Formal meeting
  • 10 Feb 2021Not recordedVirtualFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 16 Dec 2020Not recordedVirtual meetingFormal meeting (private meeting)
  • 28 Oct 2020Not recordedVirtualFormal meeting (private meeting)