Risk Assessment and Risk Planning
Open
What the inquiry is looking at
“The Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee is appointed to consider risk assessment and risk planning in the context of disruptive national hazards”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
Our inquiry has come at a critical time. Nearly two years have passed since the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, placing a spotlight on the Government’s planning for the most serious risks facing the UK or its interests overseas. The pandemic has led to unprecedented levels of uncertainty and shock across the world with many countries struggling to respond to the virus. Prior to the onset of COVID-19, the UK’s approach to risk assessment and risk management was internationally commended and viewed as rigorous. However, the pandemic has exposed the UK’s risk management system as deficient and too inflexible to provide the protection our nation needs.
The risks we face are changing. Technological advances have raised the threat posed by the malicious deployment of technologies which could be used for good or ill, while traditional threats such as those from nuclear or chemical warfare remain. The risk of the failure of ageing critical infrastructure such as nuclear power stations, dams and bridges grows day on day without sufficient intervention. A reliance on electricity and the internet and the increasing complexity and interdependence of the networks underpinning daily life have left us vulnerable to cascading failures which could proliferate rapidly and cause widespread devastation. The UK’s risk management system must adapt to ensure that we are prepared for the evolving extreme and systemic risks on the horizon to protect us today and into the future.
Many inquiries are seeking to document the Government’s actions on COVID-19. Yet, a pandemic is only one of many risks, a fact which was clearly demonstrated to us over the course of this inquiry. It is inevitable that an inquiry of this nature would be overtaken by risks arising since the conclusion of our evidence gathering programme. Through the summer of 2021, and since, the UK has faced severe supply chain disruption and threats to the nation’s fuel supply. This has raised concerns about the fragility of the just-in-time networks on which our food, fuel and essential services rely. The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban has raised alarm about the security of the region and heightened the threat of global terrorism. Risks will continue to materialise which require action, prevention, mitigation or response. The Government must be able to identify lessons from all crises quickly and ensure it can translate them into real change. The current pandemic offers a unique opportunity to take stock of the UK’s risk assessment and risk management process. We must assess and strengthen our national resilience to ensure that we are better prepared for the next crises.
Our inquiry has concluded that the UK must be better at anticipating, preparing for and responding to a range of challenging scenarios, including those which it has never experienced before. The Government’s current strategy of centralised and opaque risk assessment and risk management, which fails to make adequate preparations, has left the UK vulnerable.
The UK must adopt a whole of society approach to resilience, one which emphasises the important role played by all sections of society in preparing for, adapting to and recovering from the effects of risk. Risk and resilience are not solely the concern of central Government policymakers; they have the capacity to alter the lives of millions. The Government must ensure it properly accounts for and involves all elements of society in its risk assessment and planning. Our recommendations are aimed at ensuring this.
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that communities can step up and help ensure national safety. The Government must see our people as an essential building block of any response and as active participants in creating resilience. They must provide them with the support and information to help them prepare for the risks they face. Volunteering represents a key opportunity to involve the public in risk management and response. The UK has a strong voluntary sector which must form the foundation of any future reservist force used in times of crisis.
Risk assessment and risk planning are a routine undertaking in the private sector. Conversations between business and industry and the Government must be held to ensure that business and industry understand what impacts they may expect to incur from the manifestation of a risk or how they may be expected to act in response. Such conversations would allow the Government to understand and learn from business and industry. Conversations of this type do occur, but currently they are ad hoc and insufficient. We urge the Government to undertake more structured and open engagement with business and industry on risk and resilience.
Our inquiry has raised significant concerns about the Government’s culture and practice of risk assessment and planning. The current risk management system is veiled in an unacceptable and unnecessary level of secrecy. The UK’s risk plans need to be shared widely to maximise their efficacy. Only through transparency and a healthy culture of challenge can we provide society with a reliable foundation to respond to emerging risks. While secrecy does have an important place, the UK Government defaults to secrecy too readily. This has hampered our preparedness, as society’s front-line responders, including Local Resilience Forums, local government, volunteer groups and businesses and industry all struggle to access the information they need. Fear of criticism can drive an unnecessary reliance on secrecy. Our recommendations aim to bring transparency into the risk assessment process and to build better preparedness as a result.
We found that the Government’s risk assessment process is unable to encompass the complexity of risks facing the UK. It fails to account for interconnected or cascading risks and chronic or long-term risks, and has a bias against low likelihood-high impact risks. As a list of risks facing the UK, it is insufficient to aid mitigation and preparedness efforts. The present approach of assessing likelihood and impact may be misleading, and lead to a false sense of confidence, particularly in terms of prioritisation of risks. The Government’s risk assessment must be replaced by a more dynamic, data driven output, directly linked to preparation, mitigation and response.
No matter how sophisticated the assessment of risks, it is of little value if it is not matched by practical measures to ensure preparedness and resilience. The Government must not only anticipate risks but prepare for and respond to them effectively. Much of the Government’s time and resources are focused on responding to crises and emergencies, from flooding to terrorist attacks. They must bridge the gap between analysis and operational capability to ensure the safety and security of the population. We must place a premium on possessing the competence, capacity and skills to manage these crises. Risk plans must be frequently tested, challenged and scrutinised.
Preparation, mitigation and response plans must be scrutinised, and planners must be accountable both within Government and to Parliament, creating a system of audit which is appropriately resourced. We have proposed changes to ensure a clear governance structure and sustained, independent pressure and annual audit. Risk plans should be dynamic, resourced and every stakeholder involved should know what the mitigation process requires.
Despite the fact that prevention is significantly cheaper than response, the government has a traditional disincentive to invest against possible risks, especially low-probability high-impact risks. Spending policy for risk and resilience needs to be readdressed. Within the national security and critical national infrastructure communities there is a strong emphasis on prevention, leading to proactive resourcing. We urge the Government to ensure that spending in the civic sphere emulates this approach. Government spending should, where possible, be directed towards preparing for, preventing and mitigating disaster.
The Government will not succeed in anticipating every threat or hazard. For that reason, the country needs to be prepared to recover from shocks to which it is vulnerable. That capacity to recover must be based on a flexible, adaptable and diverse population that appreciates the need for its own resilience.
What the government said
The government responded on 17 March 2022. The deadline was 3 March 2022.
The Government "agrees with the spirit" of the Lords committee's report, accepts many recommendations, commits to considering others, and does not accept two.
- On an Office for Preparedness and Resilience and a Government Chief Risk Officer, it agrees with the principle but "commits to further consideration", following the Crisis Capabilities Review and the COVID-19 Inquiry.
- It accepts the recommendation to refresh the Biological Security Strategy and "has committed to publishing" the refreshed strategy in 2022.
- It does not accept the recommendation for a statutory duty on critical national infrastructure operators to publish business continuity plans, though it is "committed to keeping this issue under review".
- It accepts the recommendation on funding for Local Resilience Forums, citing £7.5 million per year for 3 years announced by DLUHC.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry has run so far
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 15 October 2020 to 17 March 2022. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.
- Oral evidence 19 sessions
- Report 3 Dec 2021
- Government response 17 Mar 2022
What it recommended 28 recommendations · 32 conclusions
1Many of the risks facing the UK are likely to increase both in magnitude and...
2The central government risk assessment process has developed a culture of secrecy that impedes thorough...
3The Government’s risk assessment process should not shy away from politics, including in its content,...
4The Government should re-establish the Threats , Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies subcommittee of the National...
5The Government should establish an Office for Preparedness and Resilience as a non-departmental body, headed...
6The Government has a strong disincentive to invest against possible risks, but prevention is significantly...
7The Treasury and spending departments must move away from their current practice of disincentivising long-term,...
8Ensuring those responsible for the creation and execution of plans have the appropriate skills and...
9The Government should bolster its skills base in the areas of analysis, emergency planning and...
10Risks do not respect national borders.
11We are encouraged by the inclusion of global risks and international partnerships in the Government’s...
12LRFs currently do not have clarity about their purpose and expected duties.
13As part of the quinquennial review of the CCA regulations, due to report by March...
14The UK’s risk assessment system is too top-heavy.
15The Government should improve its communication and engagement with local authorities and LRFs.
16Expectations on Category 1 responders have increased since the CCA entered into law.
17The Government should ensure the funds allocated to LRFs are appropriate and sufficient to allow...
18LRFs struggle to access relevant information to inform their risk assessments due to the current...
19LRFs should be engaged in the production of the NSRA through the forum described in...
125The CCS should commit to sharing information as a default with LRFs.
20Engagement of the devolved administrations by the UK Government is superficial and ad-hoc and often...
21The UK Government needs to produce an agreed set of communications structures at all levels...
22The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the difficulties posed by the insurance industry in providing affordable...
23The Government should work with the UK insurance industry to explore mechanisms which allow for...
24Regulation is crucial for bolstering national resilience, particularly for the critical national infrastructure sectors.
25A statutory duty should be placed on all public and private regulated bodies who operate...
26The voluntary sector is a rich source of information and assistance on risk and response...
27The Government should clarify what “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” means and...
28The proposed reservist cadre lacks ambition and is not in line with the views of...
29The UK population is not sufficiently encouraged to engage in emergency planning or build a...
30The Government should commit to a biennial publication of a brochure on risk preparedness.
31The Government should consider the organisation and provision of a residential , intensive course on...
32In particular, Exercise Cygnus recommended the production of a “Pandemic Concept of Operations” to assist...
33A Pandemic Concept of Operations should be produced , as well as Concepts of Operations...
34The 2018 Biological Security Strategy was a welcome development but the Government’s failure to implement...
35The Biological Security Strategy needs to be renewed, refreshed and implemented, whilst also incorporating the...
36The current National Security Risk Assessment timescales and impact assessments are not suitable to address...
37The NSRA must be produced with mitigation and response in mind.
38The current format of the NSRA and NRR is too rigid.
39We propose that instead of a simple risk assessment, the UK should produce a ‘National...
40The inclusion of industry and businesses in the production of the NSRA is necessary to...
41The Government should establish a forum , made up of representatives of trade associations and...
42The Government should recognise that voluntary organisations often operate to professional standards of delivery and...
43At a national level, the Government should involve major voluntary organisations in the production of...
44We believe that voluntary and community organisations represent an appropriate level at which to undertake...
45The Government must recognise that informing the public about the risks they face is both...
46The NRR should, in line with the NSRA, be presented via a dynamic, data driven...
47When conducting the national risk assessment process, the Government should engage with voluntary and community...
48Preparedness and planning for risks in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should cover all...
49Central government risk planning should be benchmarked against the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), with...
50A yearly debate on the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) should be held by both...
51The Government should change the name of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in acknowledgement that the...
52Exercising and wargaming should be at the heart of UK preparedness as they are crucial...
53Risk plans must specify how frequently they are to be subjected to exercising or wargaming.
54The NSRA, as a list of risks, is insufficient for risk planning at a local...
55The Government must share all civil contingencies documentation with LRFs, except in cases where there...
56As is the case with risk assessment (see paragraphs 229 and 230), businesses and industry...
57Much of the guidance published on GOV.UK to help inform businesses planning for major disruptive...
58The Government should commit to updating all resilience related guidance on GOV.UK to ensure it...
59The off -site reservoir plan for Toddbrook Reservoir was invaluable during the emergency response to...
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 19
- 23 Jun 20216 witnesses: Karen Pearson, Professor Charlotte Watts, Professor Gideon Henderson, Reg Kilpatrick, Shirley Rogers, Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviserparliament.uk ↗
- 16 Jun 20212 witnesses: Roger Hargreaves, Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, Paymaster Generalparliament.uk ↗
- 9 Jun 20213 witnesses: Lord Gus O'Donnell, Rt Hon Margaret Beckett, Rt Hon Sir Oliver Letwinparliament.uk ↗
- 26 May 20215 witnesses: Author Adrian Tchaikovsky, Author Peter F. Hamilton, Author Robert Harris, Lord Toby Harris, Professor Brian Collins, CB, FREngparliament.uk ↗
- 19 May 20218 witnesses: Adrian Clee, Alistair Read, Chief Constable Rachel Swann, Dr Fiona Twycross, John Barradell OBE, Lynda Battarbee, Richard Lee, Stuart Marshallparliament.uk ↗
- 28 Apr 20217 witnesses: Alex Thomas, Charlotte Pickles, Dr Carina Fearnley, Professor Brooke Rogers OBE, Professor Duncan Shaw, Professor Siân Griffiths OBE, Professor Sir David Spiegelhalterparliament.uk ↗
- 21 Apr 20214 witnesses: Harold van Waveren, Jim Kronhamn, Peter Ho, Professor Alexander Feketeparliament.uk ↗
- 14 Apr 20215 witnesses: Deborah Higgins, Dr Karen Reddin, John Curry, Major General Charles Stickland CB OBE, Paul Wyattparliament.uk ↗
- 24 Mar 20215 witnesses: Dr Adam Marshall, Eoin Murray, Joanne Holden, Kate Nicholls, Leigh Pomlettparliament.uk ↗
- 17 Mar 20216 witnesses: Cathryn Scott, Chris Train OBE, Elisabeth Braw, Lindsey Fussell, Professor Jim Hall, Tim Watsonparliament.uk ↗
- 10 Mar 20214 witnesses: Dame Sue Ion, Professor Stephen Richardson, Tim Stone, Will Websterparliament.uk ↗
- 3 Mar 20213 witnesses: Dr Marc Schelhase, Sir Chris Deverell, The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DLparliament.uk ↗
- 3 Feb 20213 witnesses: Dr Cassidy Nelson, Dr Catherine Rhodes, Dr Opi Outhwaiteparliament.uk ↗
- 27 Jan 20215 witnesses: Dr David Blagden, Dr Simon Harwood, Ed Butler, Suzanne Raine, The Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVOparliament.uk ↗
- 20 Jan 20215 witnesses: Andy Bord, Catherine Wright, Ian Lisk, Laura Hughes, Professor David Balmforthparliament.uk ↗
- 13 Jan 20214 witnesses: Caroline Gorski, Dr Simon Beard, Dr Stephen Cave, John Thornhillparliament.uk ↗
- 9 Dec 20202 witnesses: Professor Sir John Beddington, Professor Sir Mark Walportparliament.uk ↗
- 2 Dec 20203 witnesses: Ortwin Renn, Piers Millet, Professor David Alexanderparliament.uk ↗
- 25 Nov 20201 witness: Roger Hargreavesparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 80 witnesses
- Roger HargreavesDirector, COBR Unit, Cabinet Office2 sessions
- Adrian CleeEmergency Response Lead, Salvation Army
- Alex ThomasProgramme Director, Institute for Government
- Alistair ReadNational Training Officer, Mountain Rescue England and Wales
- Andy BordChief Executive, Flood Re
- Author Adrian Tchaikovsky
- Author Peter F. Hamilton
- Author Robert Harris
- Caroline GorskiGroup Director R2 Data Labs, Rolls Royce
- Catherine WrightExecutive Director, Flood and Coastal Risk Management, Environment Agency
- Cathryn ScottDirector of Enforcement and Emerging issues, Ofgem
- Charlotte PicklesMember, Social Security Advisory Committee
- Chief Constable Rachel SwannDerbyshire's Chief Constable, Derbyshire Local Resilience Forum, Derby and Derbyshire Local Resilience Forum
- Chris Train OBEChair, South East Water
- Dame Sue IonHonorary President, National Skills Academy for Nuclear
- Deborah HigginsHead, Emergency Planning College
- Dr Adam MarshallDirector General, British Chambers of Commerce
- Dr Carina FearnleyAssociate Professor, Science and Technology Studies Department and Director, UCL Warning Research Centre, University College London
- Dr Cassidy NelsonActing Co-Lead, Biosecurity Team University of Oxford
- Dr Catherine RhodesSenior Research Associate, Biosecurity Research Initiative at St Catharine's (BioRISC), University of Cambridge
- Dr David BlagdenSenior Lecturer in International Security, University of Exeter
- Dr Fiona TwycrossDeputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience and Chair, London Resilience Forum
- Dr Karen ReddinSenior Lecturer in Disaster Management, Bournemouth University
- Dr Marc SchelhaseLecturer, Defence Studies Department, KCL and Staff College, UK Defence Academy
- Dr Opi OuthwaiteAssociate Professor, St Mary's University
- Dr Simon BeardAcademic Programme Manager and Senior Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge
- Dr Simon HarwoodDirector of Defence and Security, Cranfield University
- Dr Stephen CaveExecutive Director, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge
- Ed ButlerChief Resilience Officer, Pool Reinsurance
- Elisabeth BrawSenior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council
- Eoin MurrayHead of Investment, Hermes Investment
- Harold van WaverenChair of the National Crisisteam for Flood Risk, Rijkswaterstaat
- Ian LiskChair, Natural Hazards Partnership
- Jim KronhamnActing Head of the Research and Evaluation Section, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
- Joanne HoldenChief Investment Officer UK, Mercer
- John Barradell OBEChief Executive of the City of London Corporation and Deputy Chair, London Resilience Forum
- John CurrySenior Lecturer in Creative Computing, Bath Spa University
- John ThornhillInnovation Editor, Financial Times
- Karen PearsonDeputy Secretary for Civil Contingencies and Covid-19 Recovery, The Executive Office, Northern Ireland
- Kate NichollsChief Executive, UKHospitality
- Laura HughesGeneral Insurance Policy Manager, Association of British Insurers
- Leigh PomlettPresident, Logistics UK
- Lindsey FussellGroup Director for Networks and Communications, Ofcom
- Lord Gus O'Donnell
- Lord Toby HarrisChair, National Preparedness Commission
- Lynda BattarbeeDirector of Operations, The Trussell Trust
- Major General Charles Stickland CB OBEAssistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments), Ministry of Defence
- Ortwin RennScientific Director, Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies
- Paul WyattDirector General, Policy, Ministry of Defence
- Peter HoSenior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore
- Piers MilletSenior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Professor Alexander FeketeInstitute of Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, Technical University of Cologne
- Professor Brian Collins, CB, FREngVice-Chair, National Preparedness Commission
- Professor Brooke Rogers OBEProfessor of Behavioural Science and Security, Department of War Studies, Kings College London
- Professor Charlotte WattsChief Scientific Adviser and Director for Research and Evidence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
- Professor David AlexanderProfessor of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London (UCL)
- Professor David BalmforthPast President, Institution of Civil Engineers
- Professor Duncan ShawProfessor of Operational Research and Critical Systems, University of Manchester
- Professor Gideon HendersonChief Scientific Advisor, Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
- Professor Jim HallCommissioner, National Infrastructure Commission
- Professor Sir David SpiegelhalterChair of the Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, University of Cambridge
- Professor Sir John BeddingtonFormer Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Her Majesty's Government
- Professor Sir Mark WalportFormer Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Her Majesty's Government
- Professor Siân Griffiths OBEEmeritus Professor of Public Health, Chinese University of Hong Kong
- Professor Stephen RichardsonEmeritus Professor of Chemical Engineering, Imperial College
- Reg KilpatrickDirector General of Covid-19 Crisis Coordination, Welsh Government
- Richard LeeChief Operating Officer, St John Ambulance
- Rt Hon Margaret Beckett
- Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, Paymaster General
- Rt Hon Sir Oliver Letwin
- Shirley RogersDirector, Organisational Readiness, Scottish Government
- Sir Chris DeverellFormer Commander of the Joint Forces Command, Ministry of Defence
- Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific AdviserFormer Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government, UK Government
- Stuart MarshallChief Emergency Planning Officer and LRF Manager, Cleveland Local Resilience Forum
- Suzanne RaineAffiliated Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge
- The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DLLord and Former Chief of Defence Staff, House of Lords
- The Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVOLord and Former Security Adviser, House of Lords
- Tim StoneChairman, Nuclear Industry Association
- Tim WatsonDirector of the Cyber Security Centre within Warwick Manufacturing Group, University of Warwick
- Will WebsterEnergy Policy Manager, Offshore Energies UK
Meetings and visits 11
- 24 Nov 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 10 Nov 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 27 Oct 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 25 Oct 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 14 Jul 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 7 Jul 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 10 Jun 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 24 Feb 2021Not recordedFormal meeting
- 10 Feb 2021Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 16 Dec 2020Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)
- 28 Oct 2020Not recordedFormal meeting (private meeting)