European Union (Withdrawal) Bill inquiry
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Committee's report states that legislation is necessary to ensure legal continuity and certainty when the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. The Committee does not comment on the merits of Brexit, but concludes that the Bill, as drafted, has fundamental flaws of a constitutional nature.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
Following the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, and the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the Government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill to give effect to Brexit. The Bill is designed to address the significant legal challenge that will result from the UK leaving the EU. By preserving existing EU law as it currently applies in the UK, and converting it into domestic law, it seeks to provide continuity and legal certainty on and after exit day. This is an essential task in order to avoid legal chaos. It is also uncharted territory; it is a legal undertaking of a type and scale that is unique and unprecedented, posing significant challenges for both the Government and Parliament.
The body of EU law is found in a number of different places, and in a number of different forms. Some is embodied in existing UK primary legislation; some in secondary legislation. Other elements of EU law are directly effective in the UK (by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972), but are not actually written anywhere in the UK’s statute book. Yet further elements of the body of EU law are non-legislative in nature, consisting, for example, of judgments made by the Court of Justice of the European Union, regulatory rulings by EU agencies, or in the interpretation of our own courts.
The task of adapting the body of EU law to fit the UK’s circumstances following Brexit is complicated not only by the scale and complexity of the task, but also by the fact that in many areas the final shape of that law will depend on the outcome of the UK’s negotiations with the EU. Yet preparations for the amendment of EU law need to be made before it comes into effect as UK law, in order that those changes will take effect on the day of Brexit, and this Bill seeks to provide for them. These amendments will sometimes be minor, for example removing references to EU institutions, and sometimes substantial, such as where an EU regulatory regime needs to be replaced with a UK regime.
We gave early consideration to these challenges in our report on The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers. We acknowledged that the Government would need abnormally wide powers to deliver legal certainty but we said that such powers would need to be tightly circumscribed and subject to close scrutiny by Parliament, for which new scrutiny mechanisms would be needed. Following the publication of the Bill, we examined in our interim report whether the Government had addressed our recommendations. We were disappointed that they had not taken our advice on board and we concluded that the Bill raised a series of profound, wide-ranging and interlocking constitutional concerns.
In this fuller assessment of the Bill we examine these concerns in detail. We conclude that the Bill risks fundamentally undermining legal certainty in a number of ways. The method proposed to create ‘retained EU law’—EU law that is being copied over into the UK statute book—will cause constitutionally problematic uncertainties and ambiguities:
• The Bill is not clear exactly what retained EU law will contain; it potentially captures laws that do not need to be saved and creates duplicate copies of laws that have already been transposed into domestic law.
• The Bill transfers rights under EU law, regardless of their applicability post-Brexit, without sufficient clarity as to how they might be amended later.
The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill raises a series of profound, wide-ranging and interlocking constitutional concerns. Indeed, it is difficult to think of areas of constitutional concern that are not deeply engaged by the Bill. In this report, we draw attention to three broad constitutional themes that emerge from our analysis. Those themes respectively concern the relationship between Parliament and the executive, the rule of law and legal certainty, and the stability of the UK’s territorial constitution.
The executive powers conferred by the Bill are unprecedented and extraordinary and raise fundamental constitutional questions about the separation of powers between Parliament and Government. In the broader context, it is not merely that the Bill invests the executive with deep legislative competence by authorising the making of “any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament,” it is that the Bill contains multiple such powers, which overlap to a very considerable extent, and which are not subject to an enhanced scrutiny process as we recommended in our previous report. In this way, the Bill weaves a tapestry of delegated powers that are breath-taking in terms of both their scope and potency.
The multiple uncertainties and ambiguities contained within the Bill, to which we draw attention in this interim report, raise fundamental concerns from a rule of law perspective. The capacity of the Bill to undermine legal certainty is considerable. Whenever a Bill is unclear, rule of law concerns arise. But such concerns are especially troubling in relation to a constitutional Bill such as this.
The Bill is fundamental to the content and application of the legal system post-exit since it determines both the content of large parts of the law (“retained EU law”) and the rules of priority and interaction as between retained EU law and other parts of domestic law. In such circumstances, legal certainty is essential, and the apparent multiple ambiguities in the Bill are deeply problematic.
Individuals, organisations and the government need to know what exactly the law is, and what their rights and responsibilities are, post exit, without having to resort to litigation.
The UK’s departure from the European Union will have profound consequences for the devolution settlement within the UK. The ambiguities and uncertainties in the Bill extend to issues of devolved competence and this has implications for the balance of the power within the Union and the future of the devolution settlements.
Overall, we conclude that the Bill is highly complex and convoluted in its drafting and structure. This is not to deny that it must inevitably grapple with a set of difficult legal issues. But it is a source of considerable regret that the Bill is drafted in a way that renders scrutiny very difficult, and that multiple and fundamental constitutional questions are left unanswered. We will consider all of these issues in greater detail in our forthcoming inquiry on the Bill.
What the government said
9th Report - European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
The government responded on 12 April 2018.
The Government welcomes the Committee's report and proposes amendments on clause 6(2), the status of retained EU law and rights of challenge, while declining several key recommendations, including a single primary legislation status for retained direct EU law and the removal of clauses 9 and 17.
- On status, the Government says it "understand[s] the attraction" of treating all retained direct EU law as primary legislation, but considers this would present "significant practical and constitutional problems". It has instead tabled amendments distinguishing principal from minor retained direct EU legislation.
- On delegated powers, the Government intends to bring forward an amendment in line with the "good reasons" and "reasonable course of action" tests for clauses 7, 8 and 9. It does not accept removal of clause 9 or clause 17, though it is "considering a way forward" on clause 17.
- On general principles and Francovich damages, the Government has tabled amendments allowing challenges and damages claims to continue for up to two years after exit day, "subject of course to standard limitation periods".
- On devolution, the Government agrees it is important to try to reach agreement with the devolved administrations and will "consider" suggestions from Lords Committee and "continue to discuss a way forward on clause 11". It says final agreement has not yet been reached.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
3rd Report - European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report
No government response is linked to this report.
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 17 August 2017 to 30 April 2018.
- Oral evidence 4 sessions
- Report 2 reports
- Government response 12 Apr 2018
- Correspondence 30 Apr 2018
What it recommended 21 recommendations · 44 conclusions
1The revised definition of “exit day” in the Bill sets appropriate limits on ministerial discretion...
2Clause 2 appears significantly broader than it needs to be.
3It is not constitutionally necessary or appropriate for primary legislation, which will continue in force...
4The implications of the Bill for reciprocal rights remain uncertain, as such rights are inextricably...
5The ambiguities in the interpretation and effect of clause 4 will inevitably cause legal uncertainty...
6Retained direct EU law will be domestic law.
7As drafted, the Bill gives rise to profound ambiguities about the legal status of retained...
8We recommend that the legal status that should be accorded to all retained direct EU...
9We consider this approach to be fundamentally problematic.
10If our recommendation is accepted to assign all retained direct EU law a single legal...
11If the Bill is not amended so as to assign to all retained direct EU...
12If our principal recommendation to assign retained direct EU law a single legal status is...
13We do not consider that it is appropriate to treat all retained direct EU law...
14As we recommend above (para 52), all retained direct EU law should be treated as...
15We recognise that the effect of our proposal is to render even technical and mundane...
16In addition, our proposed designation of all retained direct EU law as primary legislation would...
17It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental...
18The “case-by-case” approach favoured by the Government would produce a highly inconsistent tapestry of EU...
19During UK membership of the EU, EU law takes priority over domestic law.
20It is constitutionally unacceptable for the Bill to be ambiguous as to what retained EU...
21If references to the “supremacy principle” were to be preserved in the Bill, then clause...
22We consider that the notion of maintaining the “supremacy principle” following exit amounts to a...
23The “supremacy principle” is alien to the UK constitutional system: not only did it originate...
24We consider the objective of giving retained direct EU law priority over pre-exit, but not...
25No equivalent provision needs be made in relation to EU-derived domestic legislation under clause 2:...
26Treating retained EU law saved by clauses 3 and 4 as primary legislation would avoid...
27If the “supremacy principle” were to continue to feature in the Bill, clause 5(3) would...
28The primary purpose of this Bill is to maintain legal continuity and promote legal certainty...
29We recommend that the Government provides the House of Lords with an updated view about...
30The Bill takes a clear and sensible approach to the applicability of pre-exit case law...
31The Bill leaves it to judges to decide when it is appropriate to be guided...
32We recommend that the Bill should provide that a court or tribunal shall have regard...
33We recommend that the Government’s statement accompanying regulations which modify retained EU law (see para...
34The inclusion of “among other things” in clause 6(3) generates unnecessary uncertainty about the provision...
35Preventing new references to the Court of Justice of the European Union after exit day...
36The Government proposes to provide for the handling of pending cases with the CJEU in...
37We recommend that, as with cases that have already commenced (see para 150), the Government...
38If a transition period is agreed, the Government will need to provide for the operation...
39We do not agree with the minister that the interpretation of “necessary” by the courts...
40The power of ministers to do what they consider “appropriate” is subjective and inappropriately wide.
41We are concerned that applying a subjective test of “appropriateness” to a broad term like...
42Given the wide scope of the powers in clause 7, and the subjectivity with which...
43Clause 7 is an open-ended Henry VIII power, which allows for legal changes that would...
44We concluded in our interim report, “the Government will require some Henry VIII powers in...
45While the clause 8 power is broad, it may be justified given the degree to...
46It would require the strongest of justifications for ministers to be given a broad power...
47As the clause 9 power cannot be used until a further Act has been passed—...
48Although we welcome the inclusion of the sunset provisions in clauses 7(8), 8(4) and 9(4),...
49Clause 17 supplements and expands the already broad Henry VIII power in clause 7.
50We agree that the Government may require a power to make “transitional, transitory and saving...
51We welcome the requirements in the Bill for publishing explanatory memoranda for instruments resulting from...
52We do not consider that it is appropriate for the Henry VIII powers in this...
53We are concerned that, despite the broad powers in clauses 7–9 to make changes to...
54We reiterate the conclusion of our interim report, that “given the significance of the issues...
55We welcome the establishment of a sifting committee in the Commons to consider whether negative...
56The Bill does not give the sifting committee(s) power to strengthen the parliamentary control of...
57In our view, the Bill as drafted proposes scrutiny measures that are inadequate to meet...
58We look forward to the Leader of the House bringing forward proposals for scrutiny in...
59Clauses 10 and 11 create an area of joint responsibility.
60Clause 11 has significant potential consequences for the devolution settlements if the transfer of powers...
61The agreement of common frameworks is essential to ensure that those areas that are currently...
62Effective inter-governmental relations are essential to achieve a smooth transfer of competences from the EU...
63The constitutional consequences of proceeding with the Bill without legislative consent from the devolved legislatures...
64The implications of the UK’s departure from the European Union for Northern Ireland, given their...
65We recommend that the Government publish an assessment of the effect of the Bill and...
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 4
- 13 Dec 2017No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
- 6 Dec 2017No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
- 29 Nov 2017No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
- 1 Nov 2017No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
Correspondence 1 letter
- 30 Apr 2018Letter from Lord Callanan on the European Union (Withdrawal) BillTo committee