6th Report - Tackling the drugs crisis in our prisons

The widespread and increasing availability of illicit substances has fostered a culture of acceptance that normalises drug use in prisons. This makes the presence of drugs inescapable for many prisoners. The situation is made worse by two key factors: the high number of people entering prison with an existing addiction, and the worrying trend of prisoners who had no prior issues developing a drug habit while in prison. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

Mandatory Drug Testing rates do not reliably measure drug prevalence. The MoJ’s own admission that resource constraints limit its capacity for MDT testing and therefore its ability to produce robust, publishable data demonstrates the failure of the current approach. The suspension of regular testing makes it extremely difficult to accurately assess the current scale of drug use or measure any improvement. A return to consistent, high- volume testing across the prison estate is essential to restore accountability and gather the data needed to understand the true extent of drug use. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

The MoJ and HMPPS must increase MDT rates to at least pre-pandemic levels. An immediate and mandatory intervention from regional or national HMPPS command, including the deployment of specialist teams to ensure testing is reinstated immediately, should be triggered. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

The MoJ and HMPPS must speed up plans to introduce wastewater- based surveillance to identify new substances across the entire prison estate. If successful, this wastewater surveillance should be deployed in all prisons to monitor drug usage trends within two years of the pilot. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)

The MoJ and HMPPS must revise the drug testing policy to ensure that positive test results consistently trigger a dual response: swift and certain disciplinary action (with a rehabilitative element) and an immediate, 60 mandatory referral for a clinical needs assessment and engagement with tailored substance misuse treatment and psychosocial support. (Recommendation, Paragraph 24)

We are deeply concerned by the significant shift towards the use of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), most notably synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic opioids. Their popularity is due to their affordability, accessibility and their potency. In turning to these drugs, prisoners are able to “cheat the system” as current drug testing systems fail to detect them. Therefore, it is also difficult to determine precisely the number of prisoners using these dangerous substances. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)

Given the extreme potency and low lethal dose of substances such as Nitazenes and Fentanyl, the circulation of these drugs in prisons leads to a high risk of drug-related deaths and overdoses, as tragically seen at HMP Parc. The MoJ and HMPPS must take urgent steps to address the evolving threat of NPS. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33)

The MoJ and HMPPS must consistently update prison drug testing methods to enable the detection of the constantly changing chemical makeup of these NPS, including synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic opioids. Robust data collection should be expanded to include drug purity/potency where feasible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

HMPPS should conduct an urgent review of all prescription medication dispensing procedures within prisons to identify and close loopholes exploited for diversion and introduce enhanced supervision of medication queries. New secure systems for distributing and administering medication must be implemented immediately to prevent diversion and protect vulnerable prisoners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) Drivers of the demand and impact of drugs in prison

The high prison population and overcrowding lead to a lack of purposeful activity and poor mental health support which exacerbate the existing drivers of drug demand. Efforts to reduce demand are therefore made more challenging and complex. This undermines any chance that prisoners might have of rehabilitation as it makes avoidance almost impossible for those attempting to change. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)

The MoJ must expand access to purposeful activities, including education, vocational training, accredited work programmes and constructive recreational opportunities to prevent prisoners turning to drugs as a result 61 of boredom. We ask that the MoJ provides the Committee with an update on its progress to increasing purposeful activity within prisons by April 2026. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)

The Government must urgently accelerate and broaden the scope of training under the ‘Enable Programme’ to ensure all HMPPS staff, particularly prison officers, receive mandatory, specialised training in substance misuse, trauma-informed care and drug dependency. This training should be a core, non-negotiable component of both foundation training and continuous professional development for all staff who interact with prisoners, directly addressing the deficiency in knowledge and experience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

Drug-related debt and exploitation are fundamental drivers of violence, coercion and systemic instability within the prison estate. The prevalence of drugs creates a shadow economy where debts, which can accrue up to £10,000, are collected through intimidation and violence. The consequences extend beyond the prison walls, with criminal networks coercing family members to pay a prisoner’s debt, sometimes through sexual favours, smuggling or cuckooing. Furthermore, those in debt are routinely exploited, being forced to test new drugs, hold weapons, assault staff, and undermine security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)

Every drug-related medical emergency in prison, especially when fatal, is a needless tragedy. The significant number of ’code blues’ in some prisons adds to the significant strain already being experienced by staff. This leads to regime restrictions and increased time spent in cells. This, in turn, reduces access to purposeful activity and rehabilitation programmes, creating a self-perpetuating cycle where boredom and lack of purpose contribute to the demand for drugs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

The MoJ and NHS England, or its successor, must mandate the immediate, universal rollout of take-home naloxone kits for all individuals leaving custody. This must be coupled with comprehensive, compulsory training for all prisoners and staff. This public health measure will help to mitigate the high risk of fatal opioid overdose immediately following release. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

HMPPS must mandate that all frontline staff receive consistent, up-to- date and comprehensive training in responding to medical emergencies. The current inconsistency in staff preparedness is unacceptable. All staff should be required to complete training on how to identify and respond to drug overdoses and manage seizures. This training should be a compulsory part of induction and be refreshed annually. Given the urgency of the issue, we recommend this training be set up within the next six months. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) 62

The high prevalence of drugs in prisons, particularly NPS, poses an unacceptable and direct threat to the safety and well-being of prison staff. The current reality of staff becoming “desensitised” to daily suffering is a sign of a failed system and a dangerous culture of acceptance that must be broken. Staff are not only exposed to violence and abuse, but are directly at risk of serious medical harm from inhaling second-hand drugs. The fact that four staff members at a single prison were taken ill from a prisoner vaping with NPS underscores the wider danger presented by these substances. The MoJ and HMPPS have a duty of care to protect their employees, but the prevalence of drugs in prison is risking their ability to uphold it. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)

HMPPS must regard staff exposures to drugs as serious workplace safety violations, not as a normal part of the job and must take immediate action to investigate and resolve the causes of such incidents. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67)

The significant backlog in the adjudication process, acknowledged by the Prisons Minister, undermines discipline in prisons. While current policy allows governors to balance punishment with support, we received evidence which shows this is not happening consistently. Some prisoners face no repercussions, while others are removed from rehabilitative programmes. The latter approach is completely counterproductive. The Earned Progression model set out in the Sentencing Bill should incentivise ‘good’ behaviour, such as abstaining from drug use and drug-related activities. However, the model will only be effective if it is underpinned by a reliable and timely adjudication process. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72)

We recommend that punishments, such as the loss of privileges, are balanced with a mandatory referral to drug treatment services. This ensures that individuals are held accountable while also directed towards the support they need to break the cycle of addiction. We also recommend that the Earned Progression model is accompanied by a clear, measurable plan to ensure every prison has the necessary resources and staff to apply drug-related adjudications fairly and consistently, thereby making the threat of added time to their sentence a genuine deterrent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73) Ingress routes and countermeasures to reduce the supply

Our observations confirmed that existing security measures, such as sniffer dogs, are often deployed in an inconsistent manner. For example, drug detection dogs being used for only a few instances in a day in some prisons, rather than as part of a comprehensive, high-volume strategy across 63 all entry points. This intermittent deployment allows organised criminal networks to easily exploit predictable security lapses and undermines the deterrent effect of detection technology. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)

The Government must allocate dedicated capital funding for the accelerated acquisition and maintenance of advanced trace detection technology and full-body scanners in all prisons. This investment must include a mandated requirement for rapid, regular software library updates for all drug detection equipment to ensure they remain effective against emerging and new psychoactive substances (NPS). (Recommendation, Paragraph 79)

HMPPS must rapidly develop and enforce a national, secure protocol for verifying legal correspondence (e.g., mandatory secure digital portals or standardised, verifiable bar-code systems) across all prisons to eliminate the exploitation of privileged mail. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

Our evidence overwhelmingly points to a systemic failure to maintain physical measures which act as prisons’ first line of defence. The operational effectiveness of physical security is being defeated by avoidable delays in maintenance, inadequate resourcing and overly bureaucratic procurement processes, rather than sophisticated criminal innovation. The structural integrity of the prison estate and the speed of repairs for critical security infrastructure, such as netting and windows, are currently insufficient to meet the threat posed by throwovers and drone deliveries. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

Governors must be empowered with delegated authority and a streamlined process to rapidly procure and repair essential security infrastructure, particularly perimeter netting and functional CCTV systems, within a mandatory timeframe; for example, 72 hours for critical repairs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 85)

An independent security audit team, or existing reporting body, must conduct proactive, unannounced inspections of physical security measures, such as netting, window security and CCTV functionality, at every prison annually, regardless of the prison’s category. A response and action plan setting out how any failures will be rectified must be provided to HMPPS within 30 days. (Recommendation, Paragraph 86)

HMPPS must immediately commit to aligning its personnel vetting requirements with those of other tier-one security and law enforcement agencies, such as the police. While the nature of the work differs, the threat profile is comparable. This alignment must establish the lifelong vetting model as the minimum operational standard for all staff and require automatic enhanced vetting checks upon any staff transfer to a higher-risk role, particularly those within security or intelligence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91) 64

HMPPS must amend its recruitment process to ensure that all frontline staff, including prison officers, undergo a mandatory face-to-face interview process led by local governors. This critical step addresses the identified deficiency in governors not having direct involvement in the recruitment process. This lack of involvement limits the scrutiny necessary to prevent individuals recruited solely to facilitate criminal activity from entering the service. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)

We are alarmed by the rapid increase in drone incidents over the last three years, as confirmed by HMPPS’s own data. The current reliance on staff sightings to detect drones, as noted in the HMPPS Annual Digest, is insufficient and likely underestimates the true scale of the problem. The capability of drones to deliver not only large quantities of drugs and mobile phones, but also to deliver weapons, with the potential for the future delivery of firearms and explosives, is an extremely serious threat to the safety and security of prisons. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)

While the recent £40 million investment in prison security is a welcome step, current drug detection technologies are being outpaced by the sophistication of drones and the criminal networks behind them. The ability of criminals to leverage illicitly acquired mobile phones for remote coordination and financial transactions undermines traditional security measures and facilitates the delivery of drugs by drone. This represents a significant risk to both staff and prisoners and requires a more robust and urgent response than has been provided to date. The constant advances in drone technology mean that keeping pace with countermeasures is a significant challenge. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)

While current partnerships with police and the National Crime Agency aimed at tackling drone incursions are positive, they are not sufficient. The MoJ and HMPPS must employ dedicated intelligence-sharing protocols and joint task forces to specifically target the organised criminal gangs behind drone-related activity and the flow of illicit mobile phones. This includes tracking electronic financial transactions and supply chains. (Recommendation, Paragraph 104)

A clear and sufficiently resourced strategy is needed to address the evolving nature of drone technology. This strategy should look beyond current capabilities and anticipate future threats, such as the potential for drone- facilitated escapes and the delivery of firearms, ensuring that security measures remain ahead of criminal innovation. All high-risk prisons should be put in a position to deploy comprehensive anti-drone technology and implement upgraded physical security measures, such as windows, within 24 months. The MoJ must adopt the ‘Sky Fence’ system, or equivalent signal disruption technology, across the prison estate, as a matter of urgency. (Recommendation, Paragraph 105) 65

Given that the Organised Crime Group market is based on reliable means of communication and that sophisticated smartphones are readily available within prisons, eliminating external communication is the single most critical intervention to disrupt drug supply chain management, debt coordination and criminal operations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 111)

The MoJ must ring-fence funds to accelerate the deployment of advanced contraband detection and signal disruption technology across the prison estate. Crucially, this must be paired with specialised recruitment and ongoing training to ensure personnel are proficient in operating the sophisticated equipment and effectively utilising the resulting intelligence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 112)

HMPPS must urgently collaborate with law enforcement and financial institutions to develop and deploy systems capable of tracking electronic transactions linked to known or suspected OCG activity in the prison context. (Recommendation, Paragraph 113)

Individuals identified as key OCG operators must be managed under enhanced security protocols and, where possible, segregated from the general prison population to prevent them from exploiting vulnerable prisoners and staff to maintain their “clean profile”. The practice of merely transferring these individuals between prisons, which leads to spikes in violence and drug use in the prison to which they are transferred, is ineffective. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114)

Collaboration between HMPPS and law enforcement agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and local police, is critical in identifying and disrupting the OCGs behind drone operations. We are pleased to hear that HMPPS have developed good working relationships with law enforcement which has led to more arrests. However, success hinges on the consistent, continuous and proactive sharing of analytical work, timely intelligence and the elimination of information silos. (Conclusion, Paragraph 115)

A major obstacle to tackling drug supply is the disparity in security equipment provision between prisons. The prisons that utilise drug detection technology demonstrate its profound and immediate impact on security. This confirms that investments in advanced detection machinery are not optional, but rather an essential prerequisite for consistently detecting and preventing the ingress of drugs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 119)

Security measures must acknowledge the principle of displacement; as one route is closed, efforts must then be made to proactively mitigate risks across the full range of other potential ingress methods by ensuring uniform security standards throughout the prison estate. (Conclusion, Paragraph 120) 66 Support for prisoners

The commissioning structure for substance misuse and healthcare services is complex and fragmented. This compromises the efficacy of treatment outcomes and continuity of care for prisoners. The current healthcare model, where a single contractor covers all health services and then subcontracts drug treatment, means that commissioners are distant from substance misuse services. (Conclusion, Paragraph 126)

The MoJ and Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) must mandate an overhaul of the current commissioning model for prison-based substance misuse treatment services. We agree with Dame Carol Black that these services must be commissioned directly and separately from general healthcare contracts to ensure specialist focus and dedicated resources. The new model must require direct and active involvement from prison governors and relevant local authorities in the design, delivery and oversight of substance misuse services, ensuring they are user-centred, recovery-focused and align with community provision to ensure equivalence of care. (Recommendation, Paragraph 127)