Select committee inquiry

Concentrix and tax credits inquiry

Closed

Work and Pensions Committee · Opened 3 October 2016 · Closed 27 April 2017

8 recommendations · 20 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“Government Response Concentrix: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2016-17 Concentrix: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2016-17 (PDF 160KB) Committee's Report Read the report's summary Read the report's conclusions and recommendations Read the full report Read the full report (PDF 4.6MB) Work and Pensions Committee investigation into the HMRC contract with Concentrix and errors made in handling tax credit claims.”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of 4th Report - Concentrix ↗

Concentrix were contracted by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in May 2014 to provide additional capacity and expertise to check for possible fraud and error in tax credit claims and, if appropriate, reduce or suspend those benefits. This was the first time a private company had been delegated such a degree of decision making responsibility for UK benefit claims. In September 2016 HMRC announced they would not be renewing the contract, took much of the work in house and extended their MPs’ hotline. HMRC have since processed the majority of appeals against Concentrix decisions. In November 2016 they announced the existing contract had been terminated. We commend that decision.

Vulnerable people lost benefits to which they were entitled through no fault of their own. Some have been put through traumatic experiences as a consequence of avoidable failures.

Customer service failures

HMRC gave Concentrix 1.5 million tax credit claims in an April-August 2016 review cycle known as High Risk Renewal (HRR16). Under the terms of that work, Concentrix could write to claimants asking for information to demonstrate that they were entitled to tax credits. They wrote to 324,000 people. Those claimants had 30 days to provide information to prove their entitlement or lose their tax credits. We heard evidence of gross failings of customer service:

• some letters were not received by claimants and the first some claimants knew they had lost their benefits was when they checked their bank accounts; • the systems used to process evidence provided by claimants were at best slow and at worst unreliable; and • Concentrix phone banks completely collapsed in August 2016 to the point that some claimants called tens of times and waited hours to speak to advisers.

These were failings of Concentrix; but they were also failings of HMRC. HMRC approved Concentrix’s plans; took three weeks to escalate the problems to senior staff; and added to their contractor’s workload by sending out 45,000 additional termination letters.

Decision making failures

Tax credit claimants seeking to ensure continued eligibility for tax credits were faced with a decision making system stacked against them:

• the merest “hint” that a claim may contain more than “zero risk” of fraud or error was enough to trigger a compliance check; and • claimants who did not or could not reply were treated as guilty until proven innocent but, in many cases involving single person claims, were not told the basis of suspicions against them and were tasked with proving the negative that they were not in a relationship with another person.

What the government said

The government responded on 6 February 2017.

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 3 October 2016 to its close on 27 April 2017.

  1. Oral evidence 13 Oct 2016
  2. Report 1 Dec 2016
  3. Government response 6 Feb 2017
  4. Correspondence 5 letters

What it recommended 8 recommendations · 20 conclusions

1The human consequences of the Concentrix scandal are all too real.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The human consequences of the Concentrix scandal are all too real. Vulnerable people have been put through traumatic experiences as a consequence of avoidable failures. This was the background against which we conducted our inquiry.
2People faced having their benefits stopped if they did not respond to a letter from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
People faced having their benefits stopped if they did not respond to a letter from Concentrix. It is clear that many letters, which were sent by a sub-contractor, were not received by claimants. The first some affected people knew that their benefits had been stopped was when they checked their bank accounts.
3We are concerned that the systems used to process evidence provided by claimants were at...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are concerned that the systems used to process evidence provided by claimants were at best slow and at worst unreliable. It appears that Concentrix were unable to operate to the same levels of speed and accuracy that were demanded of claimants.
4Many people who received letters from Concentrix requesting personal information such as bank statements were...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Many people who received letters from Concentrix requesting personal information such as bank statements were concerned that they were being scammed. This was understandable, especially given that the letters had Concentrix branding and it was a little-known private company. These letters should not have carried Concentrix branding in the first place. We are particularly concerned that HMRC resisted requests from Concentrix for their branding to be removed from future letters. This suggests that HMRC were seeking to distance themselves from the work being carried out on their behalf.
5Letters from Concentrix to claimants did not inform them of the nature of suspicions against...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Letters from Concentrix to claimants did not inform them of the nature of suspicions against them. Concentrix usually had this information, but chose not to share it. This made disproving those suspicions unnecessarily difficult. This approach was not only unfair on claimants: it increased the pressure on phone lines and led to more costly appeals. Concentrix should have shared with claimants the supposed evidence against them. HMRC should have insisted that they did. We recommend letters to claimants challenging entitlement to benefits detail the reasons fraud or error is suspected.
6The Concentrix phone banks completely collapsed in August 2016, resulting in great expense in both...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Concentrix phone banks completely collapsed in August 2016, resulting in great expense in both time and money to claimants who could invariably afford neither. This was unacceptably poor customer service.
7HMRC’s monitoring systems failed as they took more than three weeks to escalate severe problems...
Concluded (the committee's words)
HMRC’s monitoring systems failed as they took more than three weeks to escalate severe problems to senior staff. This is a particular concern as HMRC were well aware of the risks.
8Speaking to a caseworker over the telephone was a standard part of the tax credit...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Speaking to a caseworker over the telephone was a standard part of the tax credit verification process used by both Concentrix and HMRC. In many cases claimants needed to take advice on the nature of the suspicions against them and the steps 50 Concentrix they needed to take to retain their tax credits. They were unfairly disadvantaged by the failure of the telephone system. We recommend that any future deadline for the submission of supporting information by claimants is extended by the length of time for which key telephony performance indicators were not met.
9Concentrix did not have nearly enough staff on the phones to cope with the volume...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Concentrix did not have nearly enough staff on the phones to cope with the volume of calls they received in August 2016. This was their failing. It was, however, also HMRC’s failing. HMRC agreed projections of demand and consequent proposals for staffing levels by Concentrix. These proved to wildly inaccurate. As the situation spiralled out of control only HMRC were in a position to assist. They should have intervened sooner.
10It is clear that the failure of the Concentrix contract was more complex than simply...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is clear that the failure of the Concentrix contract was more complex than simply not enough staff. It is equally clear that many of the problems that contributed to its rapidly snowballing collapse were foreseeable. In the initial stages it appears HMRC made the situation worse.
11We understand HMRC’s decision to take Concentrix staff in-house.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We understand HMRC’s decision to take Concentrix staff in-house. It is imperative that they ensure those staff are adequately trained and monitored to ensure they provide an informed, compassionate and efficient service.
12Tax credit claimants seeking to ensure continued eligibility for tax credits were faced with a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Tax credit claimants seeking to ensure continued eligibility for tax credits were faced with a decision making system stacked against them: • the merest hint of financial association between a claimant and another adult in the household could be enough to trigger a Concentrix compliance check; • similarly, claimants were targeted on the basis that they merely shared some characteristics with unrelated fraud or error cases; • such claimants were sent letters informing them their tax credits would be stopped unless they could prove within 30 days that they were entitled to them; • they were treated as guilty until proven innocent; • claimants seeking to prove their eligibility were not informed of the full basis of the suspicions against them, such as the identity of a possible undeclared partner; and • such claimants were tasked with proving the negative that they were not in a relationship with someone with some form of connection to them. Those challenges were amplified by the collapse of systems of communication between Concentrix and claimants. In far too many cases tax credits were stopped for no good reason and through no fault of the claimant.
13HMRC were not only complicit in the decision making process used by Concentrix: they pressured...
Concluded (the committee's words)
HMRC were not only complicit in the decision making process used by Concentrix: they pressured their failing contractor to subject yet more claimants to it.
14More than one third of the decisions to suspend tax credits made by Concentrix during...
Concluded (the committee's words)
More than one third of the decisions to suspend tax credits made by Concentrix during their fateful HRR16 cycle have been appealed. This proportion will rise. The overwhelming majority of those appeals—more than nine in ten—have been upheld. These are extraordinary figures for any appeals process, let alone one that left people in hardship. The original decision making process was flawed. As a result of those flaws, many thousands of people went weeks without benefits upon which they and their families relied.
15HMRC tolerated a very high Mandatory Reconsideration success rate.
Concluded (the committee's words)
HMRC tolerated a very high Mandatory Reconsideration success rate. Indeed, the appeals process was accepted by both Concentrix and HMRC as a routine feature of the system. This should not be the case. The process of appealing benefit removal can be difficult and stressful for claimants. This is doubly true when their tax credits have been stopped in the meantime.
16We recommend the Government better publicise the availability of hardship payments as part of a...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend the Government better publicise the availability of hardship payments as part of a far more comprehensive online guidance service for tax credit claimants.
17It is far from clear that relying on the Mandatory Reconsideration system to correct poor...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is far from clear that relying on the Mandatory Reconsideration system to correct poor initial decisions was cost effective. Mandatory Reconsiderations are expensive to process, divert staff from other functions and became the gateway for claimants to apply for special hardship payments.
18We are concerned that claimants who had benefits to which they were entitled stopped by...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned that claimants who had benefits to which they were entitled stopped by a flawed decision making process will have been unable to apply for a Mandatory Reconsideration. We recommend HMRC review all decisions to stop tax credits payments taken by Concentrix in HRR16 that have not been subject to a Mandatory Reconsideration.
19The hardship from the loss of tax credits meant some claimants took out expensive loans...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The hardship from the loss of tax credits meant some claimants took out expensive loans or accumulated rent arrears, exacerbating their financial difficulties. We see no justification for refunds being given in instalments. We recommend that all tax credit refunds be made in a lump sum.
20A tax credit refund does not compensate for the consequences of the initial cut, which...
Recommended (the committee's words)
A tax credit refund does not compensate for the consequences of the initial cut, which may include emotional distress and debt. We are deeply concerned that tax credit claimants may have further lost out by tax credit refunds taking them above income thresholds for other means tested benefits. We recommend the Government conduct an urgent assessment of this issue and act accordingly to ensure that no households have received less in total benefits than they were entitled to as a result of a decision by Concentrix to stop tax credits which was ultimately shown to be incorrect.
21We commend HMRC’s decisions not to renew their contract with Concentrix and then to terminate...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We commend HMRC’s decisions not to renew their contract with Concentrix and then to terminate the existing contract. Contrary to the protestations of senior 52 Concentrix officials, however, HMRC intended to extend the contract. Negotiations were at a late stage and continued until just four working days before HMRC pulled the plug.
22HMRC gave unnecessarily short notice to Concentrix of their decision not to renew their contract...
Concluded (the committee's words)
HMRC gave unnecessarily short notice to Concentrix of their decision not to renew their contract and to transfer much of their work in-house. Public and political relations concerns overrode basic courtesy to Concentrix staff, many of whom were blameless. That many such staff first heard that their jobs were under threat through the media was unnecessary and wrong.
23HMRC monitored Concentrix decision making on narrow technical grounds.
Concluded (the committee's words)
HMRC monitored Concentrix decision making on narrow technical grounds. On those terms they were satisfied their contractor was doing a good job.
24Outsourcing public service provision should not exempt it from public and parliamentary scrutiny.
Recommended (the committee's words)
Outsourcing public service provision should not exempt it from public and parliamentary scrutiny. It is imperative that private contractors can be held accountable for their performance. This should extend to the identity, responsibilities and performance of subcontractors. We recommend HMRC and DWP make an explicit commitment to ensuring that where private contractors are used to deliver services, standards of official statistics and responses to parliamentary scrutiny regarding those services should be at least as good as those which apply to services provided directly.
25We have grave concerns about the delegation of benefit decision making to private companies.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We have grave concerns about the delegation of benefit decision making to private companies. This is especially true when payment structures incentivise the removal of benefits—and rejection of appeals—and layers of sub-contractor, ever further removed from the claimant, are involved. This was the first time such a high degree of decision making authority with regard to benefit claims was delegated to a private company. It was not a successful experiment.
26While HMRC had a responsibility to ensure their contractor acted fairly and properly, it is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While HMRC had a responsibility to ensure their contractor acted fairly and properly, it is clear that their overriding priority was the maximisation of expenditure savings. We struggle to marry describing cuts to a single parent’s benefits as a “strike” with a public service ethos.
27We welcome HMRC’s commitment not to use further private contractors to make benefit decisions.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome HMRC’s commitment not to use further private contractors to make benefit decisions. DWP should consider carefully the experience of Concentrix before they contemplate letting any similar contract.
28We recommend the Government commission an independent root and branch review of tax credit compliance...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend the Government commission an independent root and branch review of tax credit compliance processes incorporating decision making and appeals, appropriate evidential burdens and timescales, and the effects on claimants. This review should report before any further HRR cycles are undertaken.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 1

Correspondence 5 letters