12th Report - National Wealth Fund

The NWF making an overall positive rate of return is key to its success and sustainability. To achieve its objectives of boosting economic growth and clean energy, however, the NWF must have the risk appetite to invest in projects that the private sector regards as too risky. Risk appetite is also required for the NWF to be catalytic, because the NWF must create new markets in, for example, hydrogen both to make a real difference to economic growth in the UK and to enable the UK to meet its targets to help tackle climate change. (Conclusion, Paragraph 24)

It is important to understand that some companies that the NWF invests in will fail, and the NWF will lose the value of some of its investments. This, in itself, cannot be a cause of criticism of the NWF, because it should have a higher risk appetite. Indeed, if none of its investments fail that suggests that it does not have a sufficiently high-risk appetite. (Conclusion, Paragraph 25)

The new NWF Strategy must outline: a. its performance metrics, including its risk appetite; b. how it will use equity and a range of financial instruments to ensure that the taxpayer shares in the upside of any risks it takes; c. how the NWF will be evaluated, how often and by whom; d. how the NWF would respond to any feedback that it is crowding out private investment. (Recommendation, Paragraph 26)

The NWF is not a conventional sovereign wealth fund that invests wealth generated from natural resources to benefit future generations. Therefore its name, the National Wealth Fund, could be misleading. The NWF is financed by the Government from taxation and borrowing, which means that its investments are likely to attract public, political and media scrutiny and that the Government may face pressure to privatise it. Despite those challenges, the success of the NWF’s forerunner, the Green Investment Bank, in stimulating the offshore wind market while generating returns provides 20 a reason for cautious optimism that the NWF will deliver its investment priorities in relation to clean energy. However, the current NWF’s size could limit its strategic impact on economic growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31)

The current Government should try and find ways to mitigate the risk of future governments privatising the NWF too early, by ensuring its societal benefits are measured and acknowledged. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)

The NWF will need to liaise effectively with other public financial institutions to facilitate growth. In particular, it will have to co-ordinate with the British Business Bank and Innovate UK to support businesses that are scaling up. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41)

The new NWF strategy must explicitly state how those public financial institutions will work together to ensure that businesses that are scaling up can seamlessly obtain support without gaps or duplication. The Treasury should re-examine the potential merits of merging the British Business Bank and the National Wealth Fund. The Treasury must also better publicise the Office for Investment to ensure that it works effectively as a one-stop advice shop for businesses. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

The NWF must invest strategically, deploying its funding to align with government strategies, such as the Industrial Strategy and the Pensions Investment Review. (Recommendation, Paragraph 43)

Political interference would create a climate of uncertainty for investors and ultimately reduce the NWF’s capacity to attract private capital and promote growth. We were therefore reassured to hear from the former NWF Chief Executive that the NWF has not been subject to political interference. The Treasury must maintain that approach. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)

The Treasury and NWF must assess the potential merits of allowing the NWF to borrow funds directly from the market to empower the NWF to enhance its independence from the Treasury when funding projects. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49) 21