Source · Select Committees · Transport Committee
Recommendation 3
3
Accepted in Part
Publish comprehensive list of key decisions, documents, and consultations for Great British Railways.
Recommendation
Before the Bill reaches Report Stage in the House of Commons the Department for Transport should publish a comprehensive list, with target dates, of decisions, key documents and planned consultations leading up to the establishment of Great British Railways and in its first year of operation. This should include milestones for consultation and negotiation with the affected workforce. (Recommendation, Paragraph 7) Our scrutiny of the Bill
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees with the recommendation, stating micromanagement is a symptom of fragmentation and that a legislative requirement is not necessary. However, in acknowledgement of a shared vision, they are willing to provide further information on the power as part of the published framework agreement between GBR and the Secretary of State.
Government Response
Accepted in Part
HM Government
Accepted in Part
The Government partially agrees with this recommendation. The Government agrees with the Committee that micromanagement and political involvement has become a common feature of the current rail landscape. However, it is clear this is largely a symptom of the fragmentation that plagues the existing system. Currently there is no single point of accountability – no one person or body is responsible for taking decisions which has led the Department to step in to push decisions across the line. We have seen this most recently with the implementation of the timetable for the East Coast mainline. No one in the current system was able to take charge to act in the interests of passengers and taxpayers, to take a judgement about the overall public good. This led to a 5-year delay where the benefits of billions of pounds of investment for new trains and infrastructure couldn’t be realised. It was only with the intervention of the Rail Minister, stepping up to fill this vacuum, that a reliable, long-term timetable was able to be successfully implemented. The Government agrees this has got to change if we are to have a successful rail system that delivers for passengers and freight customers. The railway should be run by experts, not politicians. The establishment of GBR is therefore the only answer. It will simplify this system and ensure there is one, accountable body responsible for overseeing both track and train, inherently erasing the need for Ministerial or departmental overreach. The Government notes the potential tension highlighted by the Committee between the role of the Secretary of State and that of GBR. However, we are clear that GBR will be empowered to be a commercially minded organisation that operates at arm’s-length from the Government and is trusted to take charge of the railway without being overly hindered by bureaucracy. That is absolutely the Government’s intention, and we agree with the Committee that any Secretary of State’s use of directions should never become a routine step – it is a responsive tool for necessary course correction, to be used proportionally and where there is strong justification. Whilst we expect this power will be rarely used, it is necessary in instances of serious operational failure or unforeseen crises such as Covid 19, where it would be responsible for the democratically elected Secretary of State to take action in the form of a direction. However, the Government disagrees that amending the Bill is necessary to achieve this. This power is common in the relationships between Secretaries of State and Arm’s Length Bodies across Government, and there is already existing precedent that these powers are used infrequently and proportionately. For example, the Oil and Gas Authority have has only received one Ministerial direction in its 10-year history. A legislative requirement is therefore not necessary to ensure the Government will act in a proportionate and justifiable way - public law already requires Ministers to do this based on the legitimate expectations set by public authorities making these decisions, and there is long precedent that similar powers are used rarely and proportionately. Therefore, while we agree with the sentiment of the Committee that GBR must be empowered and operationally independent from Government, we do not believe the suggested amendment to clause 7 is necessary and can instead be managed by clear processes, which Government has already said will underpin the relationship with GBR. However, in acknowledgement that there is a shared vision of GBR empowerment between the Government and the Committee, we are willing to provide further information on the power as part of the published framework agreement between GBR and the Secretary of State. The Long Term Rail Strategy