Strategic road investment

The Strategic Road Network plays an important role in economic growth and productivity. However, the extent to which further investment in the Network would help to boost growth, in comparison to investment in other modes of transport and connectivity, is contested. We intend to look in more detail at how the outcomes of transport investment are prioritised and appraised in our forthcoming inquiry on the Government’s strategic transport objectives.

Transport remains the biggest greenhouse gas contributor in the UK and the Government’s strategy for decarbonising transport by 2050 is reliant on a rapid switch to zero emissions vehicles. However, in all future scenarios modelled by the Department for Transport, traffic on the Strategic Road Network is forecast to increase, and there is a great risk that uptake of cleaner vehicles will not be fast enough to mitigate that increase. The Government’s determination to accommodate demand for new roads through investment without also considering steps to manage that demand is a risky strategy.

In our recent report on Implementation of the National Bus Strategy we recommended that a debate needs to be had about whether the Department for Transport should introduce a target to reduce car usage in England by the end of the decade, such as those seen in Scotland and Wales. Understanding the impact of reducing or maintaining traffic on the SRN would inform this debate.

The Government should model and report on scenarios where traffic levels on the SRN are a) reduced and b) maintained at current levels, alongside the transition to a cleaner vehicle fleet, in order to assess the potential contribution of demand management to reaching net zero.

We welcome Project Rapid’s dedicated fund for enhancing electric vehicle charging provision on the Strategic Road Network, but a quicker and greater rollout of rapid charging points and supporting infrastructure will be required to support a future electric vehicle fleet, especially considering the target for all new freight vehicles to be zero emissions by 2040. This should include potential provision for other alternative fuelling technologies such as hydrogen.

The Government must provide a credible strategy which sets out how the SRN will meet the fuel needs of the future vehicle fleet, including for freight, and provide milestone targets for delivering infrastructure to do so. (Paragraph 26) Meeting user priorities

The existing Strategic Road Network is ageing and requires significant renewal work in places, while many users want to see better day-to-day maintenance and upkeep of the network. Future investment should be focused on renewing older parts of the SRN and ensuring that resources are available to run the network in a way which 26 Strategic road investment better meets the needs of the drivers and industries that rely on it. The portfolios for RIS 3, RIS 4 and beyond should prioritise investment in the maintenance, renewal and resilience of existing assets over brand new projects.

Providing the level of day-to-day running and upkeep that meets the needs of SRN users will require revenue funding alongside capital investment in more costly renewal and repair projects. The Government must, therefore, make sufficient provision for both revenue and capital maintenance funds. This funding could be gained by cancelling complex, costly enhancement projects. Increased user satisfaction should be reflected through Transport Focus’ annual SRN user reports. (Paragraph 36) Portfolio planning and delivery

Throughout RIS 1 and 2, there has been a consistent theme of overly ambitious portfolio planning, and National Highways has overspent and underdelivered. Despite delays in RIS 1, an even more ambitious portfolio was chosen for RIS 2. Schemes have been consistently pushed back into the following RIS portfolio, and some projects initially planned for RIS 3 (2025–30) have already been pushed back to RIS 4. Rather than the efficiency and certainty which road periods were meant to introduce, this has led to confusion and uncertainty. While current inflationary costs were unexpected, changes to the smart motorways programme and legal challenges to projects on environmental grounds could have been better anticipated given longstanding criticisms.

Given the history of consistent delays to complex projects, it seems that portfolios to date have been too ambitious and have suffered from ‘optimism bias’. The Department needs to ensure that future RIS portfolios which include such projects are deliverable; it is time for the Government to reconsider its portfolio of expensive, complex SRN enhancement projects. There is a compelling case for each RIS portfolio to be smaller in scope to avoid continual deferral of projects from one road period to the next, or for the Government to dedicate more resource to ensuring that projects can be completed within a reasonable window.

The Government should implement more robust and transparent measures to assess deliverability when setting a RIS so that a wider range of stakeholders can flag risks to completing projects on time. We are scrutinising the draft revised National Networks National Policy Statement in a separate inquiry, but regardless of what framework is in place, the Department clearly needs to ensure its proposals are robust enough to stand up to scrutiny and challenge against that framework. The Department must also produce a plan for how it will better anticipate, assess and deal with risks to timely delivery, and ensure projects remain on budget and good value for money. (Paragraph 54) Engagement with sub-national transport bodies

Sub-national transport bodies were established following the publication of National Highways’ licence, and therefore have no codified role in the RIS setting process. There are good examples of collaborative planning and working between STBs and National Highways, but this is inconsistent. An acknowledgement of STBs in National Strategic road investment 27 Highways’ licence would enable STBs to convey regional priorities more effectively, and help National Highways gain a better understanding of potential risks and mitigations for schemes proposed for the regions. National Highways’ licence should be updated to include a formalised engagement process with STBs, regardless of their statutory status. (Paragraph 62) Reporting and transparency

Understanding and scrutinising the delivery progress of a RIS portfolio, or given project is not simple. It involves cross-referencing several annual reporting documents from National Highways and the Office of Rail and Road which are not updated with changes made in the interim. This is not accessible or transparent, especially given the frequent and significant changes that can be made to the RIS programme. That the Minister responsible for strategic road investment was not able to provide us with an up-to-date progress report on the RIS 2 portfolio exemplifies how challenging it can be to track RIS progress. Reporting on the delivery of RIS portfolios must be simplified and made more accessible.

The Government should work with National Highways to introduce a “live” project dashboard which provides up-to-date information on each project in the RIS 1, RIS 2 and subsequent RIS portfolios. The dashboard should provide information on original and current: costs; Start of Work date; Open for Traffic date; and planning status (if applicable). (Paragraph 68) 28 Strategic road investment