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Select committee inquiry

Offshore helicopter safety

Closed

Transport Committee · Opened 6 November 2013 · Closed 14 July 2015

3 recommendations · 9 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“This inquiry was launched following a helicopter crash off the coast of Sumburgh, Shetland in August 2013- the fifth offshore helicopter crash in four years. The purpose of the inquiry was to examine how operators, the oil and gas industry and regulators can improve standards for offshore workers.”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of 2nd Report - Offshore helicopter safety ↗

In August 2013, a helicopter crashed into the sea while on approach to Sumburgh Airport on Shetland. Four passengers were killed. That was the fifth helicopter accident since 2009 involving the transfer of oil and gas industry personnel to and from offshore installations in the North Sea.

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) investigation into the crash uncovered a number of deeply worrying events. Specifically, the AAIB found pre-flight briefing material did not fully represent the type of Emergency Breathing System (EBS) supplied to passengers. This caused problems for some survivors of the crash who told us they decided not to use the EBS based on the safety briefing. We call for the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to ensure that helicopter operators, in collaboration with the offshore work force, review all safety briefing material to guarantee that it is up to date and fit for purpose. We also call for the AAIB to keep crash survivors better informed on the progress of their investigations and, along with the CAA, to meet survivors to take on board their ideas for improving safety.

The recent accidents all involved Super Puma helicopters. We heard no conclusive evidence that Super Puma variants are less safe than other helicopters used in the UK offshore sector. We welcome the work by operators, manufacturers and industry safety groups to engage with the offshore work force to address its concerns about Super Pumas.

However, we heard troubling evidence about a macho bullying culture in the oil and gas industry, including that offshore workers who were concerned about helicopter safety were told that they should leave the industry. We believe that more must be done to facilitate a culture of approachability and openness at all levels.

The Sumburgh crash prompted the CAA to launch a wide-ranging review into offshore helicopter safety. In February 2014, the CAA published its review of offshore helicopter safety, which made strong recommendations on safety governance, airworthiness and equipment. We welcome that review and congratulate the CAA on quickly establishing the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group to implement the CAA’s findings. At the same time, we highlight areas which we believe require more work, particularly on the problems caused by the diverse customer requirements for helicopter pilots and on the impact of seating restrictions on workers and their livelihoods.

We examined whether the Norwegian safety regime offers any lessons for the UK. We found no evidence to suggest that recent accidents in the UK could not also have happened in Norway. However, the CAA review uncovered a worrying statistical trend that shows Norway reporting far more incidents which could endanger life than in the UK. We have called for the CAA to look into why this is the case and report within 12 months.

There are strong concerns from the offshore oil and gas industry that transferring more power over helicopter operations to a European level is averaging down standards. The Government must uphold and entrench the CAA’s ability to act quickly and unilaterally.

What the government said

The government responded on 27 October 2014.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.

The Government welcomes the Committee's recommendations on offshore helicopter safety, says they "will take time to implement", and does not support the call for a public inquiry.

  • On the recommendation that the AAIB keep survivors informed, the Government and AAIB agree that clear communications "can have a significant impact on bereaved families and survivors"; the response sets out the existing arrangements, including an Investigator-in-Charge as point of contact.
  • On EASA, the Government says its scope is "unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future" and that the CAA can already act unilaterally, with "no proposals to change this". It says it "will seek to ensure" that rulemaking arising from national authority recommendations is given appropriate priority.
  • On commercial pressure, the Government says neither the CAA, industry nor Government has seen evidence that safety is being compromised, and "does not support the call for a public inquiry", citing the need to give the CAA and industry time to implement the CAA Review.
  • The CAA says that findings of further work with its Norwegian counterparts' reporting differences "will be reported by 30 June 2015".

Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 6 November 2013 to its close on 14 July 2015.

  1. Oral evidence 2 sessions
  2. Report 8 Jul 2014
  3. Government response 27 Oct 2014
  4. Correspondence 4 letters

What it recommended 3 recommendations · 9 conclusions

1Pre-flight briefing material must accurately describe how to use safety equipment.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Pre-flight briefing material must accurately describe how to use safety equipment. It is deeply disturbing that it took a fatal accident before the flawed EBS briefing was identified. The CAA must ensure that helicopter operators regularly review all safety briefing material to ensure that it is up to date. In addition, the CAA must consult the offshore work force to ensure that safety briefing material is easily understood and fit for purpose.
2AAIB findings have a significant impact on survivors and their families, who deserve to be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
AAIB findings have a significant impact on survivors and their families, who deserve to be briefed on upcoming announcements. The AAIB must keep crash survivors informed on the progress of investigations. The CAA could learn a great deal by meeting survivors and considering their experiences. For example, survivors’ suggestions on enhancing the visibility of equipment are compelling and are drawn from personal experience. More widely, the oil and gas industry must examine the experiences of crash survivors. In particular, more must be done to address the financial and psychological anxiety of survivors who cannot work.
3We find it unacceptable that offshore workers were told by an operations manager that they...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We find it unacceptable that offshore workers were told by an operations manager that they should leave the industry if they were concerned about helicopter safety. In an inherently hazardous industry, operations managers must prioritise safety, which means facilitating a culture of approachability and openness at all levels.
4Super Puma variants make up some 60% of the offshore helicopter fleet, which means that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Super Puma variants make up some 60% of the offshore helicopter fleet, which means that it is unsurprising that they are involved in more accidents than other models. We heard no conclusive evidence that Super Puma variants are less safe than other helicopters used in the UK offshore sector. We welcome the work by operators, manufacturers and industry safety groups to engage with the offshore work force to address their concerns about Super Pumas.
5We welcome the CAA review of offshore helicopter safety and congratulate it on quickly establishing...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the CAA review of offshore helicopter safety and congratulate it on quickly establishing the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group to implement its recommendations. At the same time, the CAA must be mindful of the effect of its actions and recommendations on the offshore work force and should consult with industry to ensure its demands are realistic and implemented in a way which continues to allow for “maximising economic recovery” as per the Wood Review. We were extremely concerned to hear about how crash survivors wearing safety equipment struggled to evacuate through egress windows after helicopters capsized in the sea. The CAA must set out how it will address that key issue as a matter urgency.
6The CAA identified a worrying difference between Norway and the UK in occurrence reporting, but...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The CAA identified a worrying difference between Norway and the UK in occurrence reporting, but it acknowledged that more work is required to explain it. The CAA must undertake a joint review with its Norwegian counterparts to uncover why more occurrences are reported in Norway, despite its smaller fleet, and publish its findings within 12 months.
7We note that the offshore industry has little appetite for transferring more responsibility for helicopter...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note that the offshore industry has little appetite for transferring more responsibility for helicopter operations to a European level. As EASA accumulates more power over helicopter operations, the Government must uphold and entrench the CAA’s ability to act quickly and unilaterally.
8Regulatory inertia results in unnecessary risk for the offshore work force.
Recommended (the committee's words)
Regulatory inertia results in unnecessary risk for the offshore work force. At the moment, it is difficult to discern whether EASA is prioritising CAA recommendations. We note the Agency’s assurance that it will swiftly implement recommendations from national aviation authorities and investigation boards. In future, EASA must respond quickly and transparently to the CAA and the AAIB. The DfT must push EASA to improve its response and implementation times. We recommend that the DfT issues a formal response to the CAA review that addresses all 14 points relating to EASA. In addition, the DfT must ascertain what practical steps EASA is taking to speed up the implementation of recommendations derived from national aviation authorities and investigation boards.
9The CAA must use its chairmanship of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group to lead...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The CAA must use its chairmanship of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group to lead the standardisation of customer requirements for helicopter operators. This is as an opportunity for the CAA to demonstrate its ability and willingness to stand up and lead industry in reducing risk during helicopter operations. Offshore helicopter safety 29 Public inquiry
10The CAA review did not consider the evidence that commercial pressure impacts on helicopter safety...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The CAA review did not consider the evidence that commercial pressure impacts on helicopter safety in sufficient depth. The Government must convene a full, independent public inquiry to investigate commercial pressures on helicopter safety in the North Sea operating environment. That inquiry must also examine the role and effectiveness of the CAA. In addition, the DfT must commission ongoing independent research similar to the SINTEF reports in Norway to examine improvements and threats to offshore helicopter safety. Once published, this research should be laid before Parliament for consideration.
11The attendees had a number of practical suggestions for improving safety following a crash at...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The attendees had a number of practical suggestions for improving safety following a crash at sea in conditions with poor visibility. It was suggested that LED lights surrounding egress windows would make it easier to escape quickly. They recommended red LEDs could indicate a closed window which could then change to green once the window had been removed. They stated older variants of the Super Puma helicopter had a similar feature but this had been removed in subsequent models. They also said that their survival suits were too dark making it difficult to identify each other. The addition of luminous tape around rescue ropes and other equipment would have helped significantly.
12When asked about the adequacy of their training for North Sea conditions, the survivors viewed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When asked about the adequacy of their training for North Sea conditions, the survivors viewed it as insufficient, especially when compared to Norwegian standards. They explained that training in a heated swimming pool, in an aircraft model with large windows for escape, bears no relation to actual conditions. They stated this has not always been the case; in the past training was conducted in sea temperatures at -6 degrees. In Norway, training is significantly more demanding and is conducted at sea. Offshore helicopter safety 33

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 2

Correspondence 4 letters