Combatting New Forms of Extremism

Extremism is evolving rapidly and becoming more complex. Long-standing terrorist threats remain but new forms of extremism are emerging and give rise to growing concern. The impact of geo-political events is likely to intensify in light of continuing conflict in the Middle East. There has been a marked rise in the prevalence of young people being drawn into extremism, often radicalised through a toxic mix of antisemitism, misogyny and conspiracy theories combining to form hybridised belief systems, nihilism and violence fascination. This has profound implications for national security, public order, and social cohesion. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

Good policy making relies upon data and evidence. At the moment the UK lacks the evidence base and up-to-date research needed to keep pace with these developments. The impediments to supporting rigorous, independent empirical research have limited our understanding of the extremist threat. This presents challenges for the government, police and other local authority, health and education professionals attempting to identify, assess and intervene in the most effective way. Strengthening the research foundation will be essential if policy and the on-the-ground response is to keep pace with the evolving nature of the extremist threat. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31)

We recommend that the Home Office establishes a coherent, long-term research and evidence programme on emerging forms of extremism. It should ensure that sufficient support and resources are available to enable independent, empirical research to be commissioned, whether by the Home Office itself, the Commission for Countering Extremism or the Office of the Independent Prevent Commissioner. Research conducted should be published and the Home Office should include mechanisms for regularly reviewing and updating the evidence base. We expect the Home Office to set out its plans for such a research and evidence programme in its response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32) 52 Online spaces, AI and other technology

Harmful extremist content is circulating widely online, driven by engagement and profit-maximising algorithms, influencer-led dissemination, and decentralised extremist ecosystems. These systems promote content designed to provoke outrage and fear, often purely for commercial reasons, and the speed and scale of dissemination have outpaced the capacity of moderation and removal tools. Content designed to attract, recruit and radicalise individuals is often targeted at young people and other vulnerable users. This is contributing to emerging trends in extremism, including the increasing engagement of young people and the rise of hybrid belief systems, nihilistic violent extremism and violence fixation. The emergence of com networks represents a serious and escalating threat, with decentralised groups incentivising violence, coercion and criminality among predominantly young males. The evolving and cross-cutting nature of com networks requires an agile, coordinated, cross- government approach to avoid siloed responses that would be fragmented and ineffective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

The Online Safety Act contains gaps that limit government’s ability to address new forms of extremism, particularly when harmful content falls below criminal thresholds. We are concerned that smaller, high-risk platforms are not receiving sufficient regulatory scrutiny. Alongside more robust implementation and enforcement of the Online Safety Act, there is a clear need to equip children and adults with the skills required to critically analyse and interpret extremist content online. This should form part of a wider educational effort to strengthen social cohesion and build resilience to counter extremism both online and within our communities and we welcome the reforms to the national curriculum as a step in the right direction. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

The Home Office should engage more closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and Ofcom to ensure effective implementation of measures around online safety for children and to ensure that extremist content is among the types of online harmful content that technology companies are expected to address and be held accountable for. In addition, the Home Office should lead a cross-government, multi- agency approach to shut down com networks, building on existing cooperation between law enforcement, security services, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and other relevant departments and safeguarding partners. We expect the Home Office to update us on progress in its response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

We welcome the inclusion of enhanced digital and media literacy in the new curriculum. It should be embedded consistently across education settings and equip children with the skills to identify, analyse and scrutinise online 53 content, including the operation of algorithms and AI-generated material. We expect the Home Office to engage with the Department for Education to provide analysis and research to ensure that education materials keep pace with changes in technology and tactics used to spread extremism online. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) Effective methods for identifying and intervening to combat new forms of extremism

The escalation in Prevent referrals involving no clear ideology and no clear signs of radicalisation to terrorism represents a significant challenge to a system designed to address the ideological roots of terrorism. Prevent and Channel are becoming saturated with such individuals, many of whom show no commitment to any particular ideology and some of whom are neurodiverse. The Home Office is allowing the Prevent system to drift beyond its remit without providing any strategic direction to meet these challenges. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

Prevent is poorly adapted to deal with the digital world. We have outlined how online spaces are now central to the radicalisation process, particularly for young people, yet Prevent lacks the specialist knowledge or framework for identifying and assessing credible risk signals from online behaviour. Integration of Prevent into wider safeguarding systems is being hampered by poorly resourced, over-stretched and siloed agencies working against mis-aligned priorities. Against this backdrop, Prevent has become a fast track to support, even where concerns are not terrorism- related, and particularly in relation to accessing mental health support. (Conclusion, Paragraph 89)

We recommend that the Home Office makes a clear, specific statement to clarify the role of Prevent in addressing non-ideological cases, and makes any necessary updates to relevant Prevent guidance and training to reflect that position. The government should also set out a plan to anchor Prevent more firmly within the wider safeguarding system. To deliver this, the Home Office should look to implement Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s recommendation to connect Prevent to a broader safeguarding and violence-reduction system. This will require strengthening the capacity of local safeguarding systems and significantly raising the level of training and competence among Prevent duty practitioners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 90) 54 Wider measures to combat new forms of extremism

We have not seen evidence that the Home Office prioritises counter- extremism efforts beyond those which fall within the existing counter- terrorism security infrastructure. (Conclusion, Paragraph 100)

The Home Office should assign greater priority to countering extremism and work alongside the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, other relevant departments, and local authorities to implement the social cohesion strategy. It is vital that the Home Office reviews the suite of counter-extremism measures that sit outside the counter-terrorism infrastructure, with a view to expanding its approaches for early intervention and ensuring consistency across the country to identify and intervene to counter extremism. Efforts should be coordinated with programmes such as Prevent but counter-extremism efforts should not exist only as part of counter-terrorism efforts. We expect the Home Office to set out its role and responsibilities for delivering on the government’s new social cohesion strategy, including how it is coordinating its work with other departments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 101) 55