Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Draft Bill

We welcome the Government’s overall intention behind the Draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, but have serious concerns about its proportionality, especially in relation to its impact on smaller premises, within the standard tier, where there is a lack of evidence that the risk of terrorist threat justifies the measures proposed or that the Bill will have any effect on reducing terrorist threats. We also have some concerns around the regulator. The whole thrust of the Draft Bill seems to be aimed at bricks and mortar rather than the real target which is a concentration of people or use of buildings by individuals or groups at higher risk of attack.

We agree with the Regulatory Policy Committee’s (RPC) rating of the Government’s impact assessment of the Draft Bill as “not fit for purpose”. We draw this conclusion as the RPC does, because of the absence of evidence “that the proposal would reduce terrorism for small venues”.

The overall objective of the Draft Bill remains opaque. We agree with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the overall purpose of the Bill must be made clear, especially to those venues/premises that will be captured by the duties in the Bill. The rhetoric around the Draft Bill appears to suggest that the Bill is more about prevention. However, our analysis of the Draft Bill suggests it is about the consequences of a terrorist attack.

The Draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, the explanatory notes to the Bill and all guidance related to the Bill must clearly, and consistently, set out what the purpose of the Bill is.

We are concerned to learn that the Draft Bill would not have made a difference to the vast majority of the terrorist attacks that have happened in the UK in recent years. This suggests that the Draft Bill will not achieve some of its main objectives.

If the Bill is to proceed, the Government must consider what changes could be made to the Draft Bill that would have made it effective should it have existed at the time of recent terrorist attacks.

In order for venues/premises captured by the Draft Bill to prepare for the requirements that will be imposed on them through the Draft Bill, the Home Office must undertake a targeted communications campaign to raise awareness of the Draft Bill as soon as possible. This campaign should set out what the main duties are for standard and enhanced premises, what organisations will be captured by the duties and what they are expected to do as a result.

The cost on standard and enhanced tier premises of implementing these proposals, estimated by the Government, is disproportionate to the level of threat, particularly Terrorism (Protection of Premises) draft Bill 27 for those small and medium-sized premises captured in the standard tier. In addition, the basis for the Government’s estimates is unclear, and they may well turn out to be underestimates. Given the potentially serious consequences, this is a significant concern.

The Home Office should publish the criteria used to calculate the estimated cost to qualifying premises to help premises and Parliament understand how those figures were arrived at.

The threat of terrorism and the types of terrorist attacks across the United Kingdom vary widely. The fact that attacks that have happened in parts of the UK, such as Scotland, would not fall in scope of the Draft Bill is a concern to us. We are not convinced that the Draft Bill takes into account the varying types of terror threats posed to each part of the United Kingdom.

The Government has not provided a rationale or any evidence for why capacity figures of 100 and 800 for standard and enhanced tier premises have been chosen, and why certain types of premises are excluded entirely. We wholly agree that larger venues—such as Manchester Arena—should be required to undertake the sort of measures set out in the Draft Bill. However, we are concerned that the capacity figure of 100 for standard tier premises, which will capture some small and micro-sized businesses, and community-run and voluntary groups, could be disproportionate and burdensome. This category is particularly troubling because it would include many smaller venues that may not have sufficient resources to cover costs of what is proposed. It would also cover village halls, places of worship and similar amenities that provide vital community support, often on low budgets. If such places are forced to close down, this represents a win for terrorism, rather than an effective means of combatting it.

We agree with the Local Government Association that the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill should be implemented in stages, starting with enhanced tier premises.

A review should be conducted yearly and every time there is a terrorist attack to assess how well the legislation has worked in protecting against, preparing for and dealing with the attack. Research should also be undertaken on the threat of terrorism to small and micro-sized businesses. Should that research suggest there is sufficient benefit of extending the legislation to standard tier premises, then provision should be made to introduce the duties to those premises at the earliest opportunity.

The Government should consider what financial assistance may be necessary to support small and micro-businesses whose premises fall within the enhanced tier before introducing the Draft Bill to Parliament.

All publicly accessible outdoor events are a prime target for terrorists, whether or not express permission is needed to enter. The Government should consider expanding the scope of the Draft Bill to include those outdoor events with a capacity of over 800 and where express permission and payment is not required to enter.

In principle, we agree with the scope of the requirements set out in the Bill for qualifying public premises and qualifying public events, including the provision of terrorism protection training.

However, those duties must co-exist effectively with existing duties and practices, and must be the responsibility of the right people. The precise details of those duties must also be meaningful as well as practicable. In particular, any training that is provided needs to be of a prescribed standard; otherwise, there is an obvious danger that organisations will provide something of limited or no value. The Government should also give further consideration to how voluntary run organisations might be impacted by the requirement to provide training and work with the sector to find a more suitable alternative to the current system of training outlined in the Draft Bill.

The regulator will be a key factor in determining the success of the Draft Bill’s measures. It will have extensive powers and oversee a regulatory framework estimated to cost billions of pounds. However, the Draft Bill is currently incomplete on the identity of the regulator, its governance, and its accountability. There are no provisions setting out who the regulator will be, whether it will be independent or not, how it operates and how it should be accountable. It appears to be the Government’s intention that the Draft Bill will be developed on this point once it has considered the outcome of the pre-legislative scrutiny process. However, that is misunderstanding the nature of such scrutiny; it is not for select committees to help initiate legislative provisions, particularly of such a fundamental nature, but rather to comment on draft provisions produced by Government.

The Government should develop concrete proposals on the regulator within the next two months and amend the Draft Bill before introducing the Bill to the House.

The regulator will have the power to issue contravention and restriction notices on premises, which may have serious consequences. This may well be justified in certain circumstances given the risks involved. However, it is important that the standard of proof required before using such notices is proportionate to the severity of the non-compliance.

The regulator’s investigatory and enforcement powers are potentially extensive and intrusive. The provision of these powers may be necessary, but they must be used in a proportionate manner.

The Government should review the operation of the investigatory and enforcement powers and ensure the thresholds for using them, and the manner in which they may be used, are justified accordingly.

The way in which first responders intervene after a terrorist attack could be the difference between life and death. Those working at the venues or premises captured Terrorism (Protection of Premises) draft Bill 29 by the Draft Bill will most likely be the ones who are able to help provide immediate medical assistance. The Draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill provides an opportunity for the Government to ensure that large-scale venues and public premises roll out appropriate medical training to staff, including security officers, on how to respond to casualties after a terrorist attack has taken place.

The Home Office should include a provision in the Draft Bill to provide mandatory life-saving training to staff to the premises captured by the Bill. The Home Office should also consider providing for mandatory bandage kits on those premises.

We agree that the Draft Terrorism Bill could be strengthened by making it a requirement for publicly accessible new builds to consider security in the design of the building.

The Government should include provision in the Bill to require new publicly accessible buildings, which would fall within the category of enhanced tier premises, to consider security in the design of the building.

We are gravely concerned to hear that the UK security industry has one of the lowest entry thresholds in Europe for training. This is simply unacceptable. If the Government is serious about protecting the public from terrorist attacks, improving the training of those working in the security industry seems like an obvious step.

Independently of the Draft Bill, the Government must work with the Security Industry Authority to look to urgently standardise and improve training for security guards across the UK.

Security at publicly accessible venues is vital in preventing and handling a terrorist attack. Yet there are some serious concerns about the education and procurement of security officers that the Draft Bill does not attempt to address, despite the fact the Government is “looking at it separately”. The Draft Bill presents an opportunity for the Government to address these issues.

The Government should consider incorporating provisions into the Draft Bill in relation to education and procurement of security at enhanced tier premises and venues.

The Government must take steps to prevent the spread of false information regarding the Draft Bill amongst premises that would be captured by the Bill, urgently.

Following our recommendation regarding a targeted communications campaign in chapter 1, the Government should use this campaign to ensure those premises captured by the Draft Bill are aware of these self-styled consultants and ensure premises know where they can get up-to-date, accurate information.

We agree that there should be a standard on the risk assessment provided for in the Draft Bill, in order to prevent different standards of risk assessment taking place across those venues and premises captured by the legislation.

The Government must issue all draft guidance accompanying the Draft Bill by the end of August 2023. There should be an opportunity for those premises captured by the Draft Bill and who will be relying on the guidance to feed back any concerns they have, as well as offer any recommendations for improvement.

We recommend that the Government consider incorporating proposed textual changes set out in the Annex to this report into any Bill it presents to the House during the next Session of Parliament.