Select committee inquiry

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

Closed

Home Affairs Committee · Opened 9 October 2014 · Closed 31 March 2015

3 recommendations · 2 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“An inquiry into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of 8th Report - Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ↗

• The principle of journalistic privilege is enshrined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), as journalistic material is given special protection from seizure by the police. If the police want to seize such material, they must apply to a judge. The holders of the material, for instance journalists and their employers, can resist disclosure of such records.

• There are two distinct sets of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) relating to communications. First, RIPA provides powers to intercept the content of communications, for example, by listening to telephone conversations or voicemail messages (Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Act). The warrant is signed by the Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Northern Ireland Secretary or Scottish Ministers and oversight is provided by Interception of Communications Commissioner.

• Second is the power to acquire communications data, such as records of who contacted whom, when, from where and for how long (Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Act).

Authorisations for the acquisition and disclosure of communications data are issued by ‘designated persons’ within the organisations seeking the data, for instance a Superintendent in a police force. The senior officer can only approve the acquisition of data where they believe it is necessary and proportionate in the specific circumstances, and they must record their considerations at the time. Oversight is conducted by the Interception of Communications Commissioner through a team of Inspectors reporting annually.

• This inquiry addresses police forces’ use of RIPA powers to acquire communications data in the course of investigations. In two recent, high-profile cases, police have used RIPA powers to obtain material which might be regarded as journalistic material for the purposes of PACE. In the Metropolitan Police’s Operation Alice (the investigation into the so-called “Plebgate” incident and subsequent events), the Metropolitan Police accessed a journalist’s telephone records to establish whether the information provided to his newspaper might have emanated from within the MPS. In Kent Police’s Operation Solar (the investigation into perversion of the course of justice by Constance Briscoe in relation to the trial of Rt Hon Chris Huhne and Vicky Pryce) the police used RIPA powers to obtain material from Associated Newspapers Limited (ANL) after an application by the police for access to the material under PACE had already failed because ANL had successfully claimed in court that journalistic privilege applied.

What the government said

The government responded on 2 March 2015.

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 9 October 2014 to its close on 31 March 2015.

  1. Oral evidence 2 sessions
  2. Report 6 Dec 2014
  3. Government response 2 Mar 2015

What it recommended 3 recommendations · 2 conclusions

1Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 gives extensive powers to the Secretary of State...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 gives extensive powers to the Secretary of State to take actions ‘in the interests of national security or relations with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom’. There is no public disclosure of how this is used, and none of our witnesses has been aware of anyone who considers it their role to scrutinise it or have any oversight powers. We believe this should be reviewed, and one of the Commissioners specifically tasked with oversight of this power, and for them to be given the information and access needed to fulfil this role. We also recommend that the government publish on an annual basis the number of times this power is used. We further suggest that the Intelligence and Security Committee conduct an inquiry into the use of this power.
2We urge forces to communicate openly and efficiently with the Commissioner regarding the information they...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge forces to communicate openly and efficiently with the Commissioner regarding the information they give him about their work. IOCCO should be given further resources to carry out its job in an effective and timely manner, most notably their inquiry into the use of RIPA powers regarding journalistic sources.
3We note Sir Paul’s recommendation to the Home Office concerning the need for improvements to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note Sir Paul’s recommendation to the Home Office concerning the need for improvements to the statistical requirements in the RIPA Code of Practice. It is vital that the statistical requirements are enhanced, so that the public can be better informed about the use which public authorities make of communications data.
4The Home Office should hold a full public consultation on an amended RIPA Code of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Home Office should hold a full public consultation on an amended RIPA Code of Practice, and any updated advice should contain special provisions for dealing with privileged information, such as journalistic material and material subject to legal privilege.
5RIPA is not fit for purpose, with law enforcement agencies failing to routinely record the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
RIPA is not fit for purpose, with law enforcement agencies failing to routinely record the professions of individuals who have had their communications data accessed under the RIPA. The recording of information under RIPA is totally insufficient, and the whole process appears secretive and disorganised with information being destroyed afterwards. Whereas we acknowledge the operational need for secrecy both during investigations and afterwards (so that investigative techniques more broadly are not disclosed), we are concerned that the level of secrecy surrounding the use of RIPA allows investigating authorities to engage in acts which would be unacceptable in a democracy, with inadequate oversight. We recommend that the Home Office use the current review of the RIPA Code to ensure that law enforcement agencies use their RIPA powers properly.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 2