Select committee inquiry
Policing Large Scale Disorder
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“Report The Committee's Report on Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 was published on 19 December 2011. Oral and written evidence has been published. Additional written evidence has been published. Government Response The Government's Response ( Cm 8292 ) was published in February 2012. Terms of reference The Committee issued the following terms of reference on 15 August 2011: Police relations with the communities where violence took place before the riots, including similarities with and differences from previous public disorder events; The role of social media in spreading disorder and in the response to it; The role of organised groups in promoting disorder; The role of the IPCC, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, and ACPO/NPIA public order guidance; The techniques used by the police to quell the rioting, including: a) Decisions taken over the deployment of police officers (availability of officers, response times), b) The use of standard techniques: containment, dispersal, specialist public order officers, dogs, horses, c) The deployment of non-standard techniques: armoured police cars, baton rounds, water cannon, curfews Variations in the responses of different police forces; Lessons to be learned from the police response to previous public disorder incidents; Training of officers to deal with riots; Whether there were any constraints on the police such as limited resources or powers; Whether there should be any changes to the legislation regulating normal policing processes during times of major disorder; Whether the age of many of the rioters constrained the police in their use of anti-riot technique; The application of the Riot (Damages) Act 1886; and To revisit relevant recommendations made in previous Home Affairs Committee reports into Policing the G20 protests and Knife crime, and other relevant recommendations, to assess if they have been implemented by successive governments.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What the government said
16th Report - Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 - Volume II (Volume II: Oral and written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
16th Report - Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 - Volume III (Volume III: Additional written evidence (unprinted))
No government response is linked to this report.
16th Report - Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 - Volume I (Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes)
The government responded on 16 July 2012.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The Government does not believe Surcharge receipts should be used to defray Riot (Damages) Act costs, but says it will increase and extend the Surcharge as proposed in its consultation.
- The Government's stated reason is that Surcharge receipts "are used to fund non-financial support services for victims of crime".
- It says the balance of spending on victims between central government and offenders "is wrong", and that offenders should contribute more to the cost of support services.
- Following the consultation, it "will now increase an extend the Surcharge as proposed", and has laid the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Surcharge) Order 2012 before Parliament, aiming "to raise up to £20m".
- It reports that approximately 93% of uninsured claims under the Riot (Damages) Act have been settled, and says it remains committed to supporting police authorities in resolving outstanding claims.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 19 August 2011 to 16 July 2012.
- Report 3 reports
- Government response 16 Jul 2012
What it recommended 8 recommendations · 16 conclusions
1The death of Mark Duggan was a significant factor in the disorder that took place...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The death of Mark Duggan was a significant factor in the disorder that took place in Tottenham. In the event of a fatal shooting of a member of the public by a police officer, it is essential that the force concerned communicates swiftly with the victim’s family. There is no excuse for confusion about whose role this should be: a family liaison officer should be dispatched immediately by the force in question. Until this has happened, no substantive public comment should be made, and the name of the deceased should not be released. Guidance on family liaison in the event of a death after police contact is provided in a National Policing Improvement Agency manual from 2008. The Agency should update this guidance to make it clear what information local police are responsible for communicating to the family and the community, and what should be left to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The initial communication should be followed by regular communication between the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the victim’s family. It is also essential that the Commission and the local police communicate accurately with the press and the public. There should be a protocol in place to ensure that staff at the Commission are clear about what information can be publicly confirmed, particularly in the very early stages of an investigation.
2We note in passing our continuing dissatisfaction that the Independent Police Complaints Commission still does...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note in passing our continuing dissatisfaction that the Independent Police Complaints Commission still does not have a permanent Chair, more than 18 months since Nick Hardwick’s move to become Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons was announced. We are concerned that this lack of leadership is affecting the work of the Commission. We call on the Government to fill this vacancy as a matter of urgency and to put in place arrangements to ensure that long gaps of this sort are avoided in relation to public appointments.
3Given that the disorder had a significantly different character in different areas of the country,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Given that the disorder had a significantly different character in different areas of the country, we recommend that all data produced by the Government in relation to the disorder should ultimately be broken down to a district level, and that an explanation be given if this is not possible.
4There was a substantial element of opportunistic criminality to the disorder that took place in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There was a substantial element of opportunistic criminality to the disorder that took place in August 2011, and of copycat behaviour.
5Projects that have as one of their aims the improvement of relations between the police...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Projects that have as one of their aims the improvement of relations between the police and young people are to be encouraged. The age profile we discussed earlier suggests the need to focus on young adults, as well as those below the age of 18. At a time when there is pressure to cut budgets, such projects need to produce quantitative and qualitative data to demonstrate their impact, to help funding bodies make evidence-based choices about how to distribute resources. While such activities and projects are to be commended, we nevertheless remain concerned at the number of young people who continue to complain about what they perceive as police hostility towards them.
6There is a need for an agreed definition of a “gang” in this context.
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is a need for an agreed definition of a “gang” in this context. The Home Secretary should clarify what the Home Office means by the term in the context of the August disorder and the methodology used to establish whether a particular individual was “affiliated to a gang”.
7We were pleased to see evidence of local initiatives to tackle gang culture, such as...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were pleased to see evidence of local initiatives to tackle gang culture, such as the programme that is currently being run by Waltham Forest Council. The Home Office should continue its role in keeping track of the progress and success of such initiatives and ensuring that examples of good practice are disseminated to other local public sector bodies and agencies. We encourage other councils to study the anti-gang work that is being carried out by Waltham Forest.
8We cannot recommend any increase in police powers as a result of the August disturbances...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We cannot recommend any increase in police powers as a result of the August disturbances without seeing specific evidence of a need for such powers and none came our way during this inquiry. It is our view that in the situation then prevailing, it would have been inappropriate as well as dangerous, to have employed water cannon and baton rounds. We agree with our witnesses, including senior police officers, that such use could have escalated and inflamed the situation further. The lessons learned in the past in Northern Ireland over such equipment should not be lost on policing in the mainland when rioting occurs. Water cannon in particular are an indiscriminate weapon and could have affected innocent bystanders, as well as rioters.
9The number of officers who should be level 2 public order trained should be specified...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The number of officers who should be level 2 public order trained should be specified in the Strategic Policing Requirement.
10In fast-moving situations involving public disorder, devolved command is vital: local commanders should have the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
In fast-moving situations involving public disorder, devolved command is vital: local commanders should have the discretion, and the necessary training, to make their own assessment of the situation and of what tactics to deploy, rather than rely on the guidance manual. We are not convinced that the public order training for commanders, and for individual officers, is adequate at present. Nor does it encourage flexibility and spontaneity. We urge the Government to take our concerns into account when considering its response to the recommendations on public order training made in the review by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.
11What ultimately worked in quelling the disorder was increasing the number of police officers on...
Concluded (the committee's words)
What ultimately worked in quelling the disorder was increasing the number of police officers on duty and flooding the streets with police. If numbers could have been increased more rapidly, it is possible that some of the disturbances could have been avoided. We regret that this did not happen and, with the benefit of hindsight, we regard the operation to police the disorder in many towns and cities, and particularly in London, as flawed. In future, in the event of similar disorder, the focus should be on increasing the number of officers on the streets as quickly as possible, both by deploying the maximum number of officers from within the force in question, and by calling on the resources of neighbouring forces and, if necessary, forces from across the country. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the tactics the police have at their disposal to address large-scale disorder depends on there being sufficient police officers available to put these tactics into effect. Without the necessary numbers, the tactics cannot be deployed. During the summer 2011 incidents, flooding the streets 36 Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 with police appears to have been vital. A strong police presence should also have a deterrent effect on those opportunists considering joining in the disorder. The single most important reason why the disorder spread was the perception, relayed by television as well as new social media, that in some areas the police had lost control of the streets.
12The current mutual aid system is intended to deal with increased demand for police officers...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The current mutual aid system is intended to deal with increased demand for police officers in one or a few areas. Different arrangements are required for re-deploying officers where there is widespread disorder. The Government must also make it clear which body would be responsible for co-ordinating mutual aid if the Association of Chief Police Officers were to cease to exist under structural changes to the landscape of policing. It is also very important to appreciate just how much depends on mutual confidence and co-operation and not just top-down administrative arrangements. Any new arrangements which merely clarify who is responsible and fail to nurture joint working and co-operation will be extremely fragile and possibly doomed to failure.
13All police forces should have a communication strategy in place so that if it is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
All police forces should have a communication strategy in place so that if it is decided that there is a credible threat of severe public disorder, all businesses in the affected area are given early and consistent advice about what action they should take. The strategy should be drawn up in conjunction with business as a partnership document, making use of arrangements within the local business community where these can be depended on.
14The Government should urgently clarify whether police authorities will be able to recover the total...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should urgently clarify whether police authorities will be able to recover the total cost of policing the riots, as initially suggested by the Prime Minister. The August disturbances were an exceptional series of events and, at a time when police authorities are being asked to make significant savings quickly, they might reasonably request assistance in meeting the cost of the policing operation.
15The Riot (Damages) Act 1886 is something of an anomaly.
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Riot (Damages) Act 1886 is something of an anomaly. There are few types of damage or loss which are the subject of financial compensation by the state. In order to defray some of the costs to the state of paying out under the Act, we recommend that the victims surcharge, which is currently payable at a flat rate of £15, be reviewed to consider whether in future it should be increased for public order incidents where the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 could be invoked, and in other cases where compensation is triggered. We further recommend that the deadline for making a claim under the Act be permanently extended to 42 days. In the light of the concerns expressed by Darra Singh, the Chair of the Riots Communities and Victims panel, we urge the Government to speed up the process of reimbursing people under the Act.
16Some of those who took part in the disturbances undoubtedly did use social media to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Some of those who took part in the disturbances undoubtedly did use social media to communicate with each other. However, other, older forms of communication and more traditional media also played a part in spreading the disorder. People who made an active decision to join in the disorder could equally well have learned about it on the television as on social media.
17We commend the police forces that used social media during the August disturbances to spread...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We commend the police forces that used social media during the August disturbances to spread messages to inform and reassure the public. We recommend that all forces make use of these media, both at times when unusual incidents are taking place and on an everyday basis. They are a cost and time effective way of improving the connection between the police and some sections of the public. By no means everyone uses such media, so there will still be a need to communicate by more traditional means, but forces should actively encourage people to sign up to their Twitter and Facebook accounts to receive the latest information.
18It would be actively unhelpful to switch off social media during times of widespread and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It would be actively unhelpful to switch off social media during times of widespread and serious disorder and we strongly recommend that this does not happen.
19The disturbances in August were an exceptional series of events, and although their disparate nature...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The disturbances in August were an exceptional series of events, and although their disparate nature makes it hard to draw many overarching conclusions, there are clearly some lessons to be learned from the way in which the operation was policed. Individual police officers acted with great bravery during the disorder. We also share the view of the then acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, that it was a strength of the police operation that it filled prison places, rather than hospital beds, although clearly both of these are a sign of failure to prevent the situation from arising in the first place. Overall the police service needs to improve the way in which it addresses public order situations. One of the key factors that underpinned the rioting was that people saw others apparently getting away with looting and other forms of criminality.
20We reiterate that what ultimately worked in quelling the disorder was increasing the number of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We reiterate that what ultimately worked in quelling the disorder was increasing the number of police officers on the street. Mutual aid arrangements need to be reviewed to assess whether it would be possible to increase numbers more rapidly and to determine how best to deal with a situation in which different forces in different areas of the country require additional assistance at the same time. The use of social media, both as a source of intelligence and as a way to reassure and inform the public, is also an emerging area of public order policing that requires urgent attention. There were examples of good practice during the August disorder that should be built upon in the future. There will no doubt be other lessons to be learned from the other national and local reviews into the disorder and we await their publication with interest.
21In the aftermath of the riots and looting in London and in a number of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the aftermath of the riots and looting in London and in a number of other cities, there was a search for immediate explanations and causes. We, with the encouragement of the Government, agreed to undertake an inquiry. We hope that this report provides a useful insight into the events themselves but if anybody hoped that we would find specific causes, they will be disappointed. It has been clear from the start that the death of Mark Duggan acted as a trigger. It is also clear that there was a great deal of “copycat” activity. But the clarity ends there.
22Even in Tottenham, it is not clear that the circumstances surrounding the death of Mark...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Even in Tottenham, it is not clear that the circumstances surrounding the death of Mark Duggan were the only influences at play. In other locations, the link to the 38 Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011 original trigger is even more tenuous and provides no explanation for what went on.
23There have been several other inquiries and reports.
Concluded (the committee's words)
There have been several other inquiries and reports. Some of them have looked at specific aspects of behaviour, interviewed specific group of people, or concentrated on police responses, training or logistical requirements. Each has provided insights, but none of them gives a full picture and despite the considerable amount of work and evidence-gathering that we have undertaken, we too have to admit that no clear causes and explanations have emerged. There may be an element of disengagement on the part of some of those involved in the disorder, but unlike some events in the past, including the riots in the 1980s, there does not seem to be any clear narrative, nor a clear element of protest or clear political objectives.
24There may have been some elements of organisation in some locations.
Concluded (the committee's words)
There may have been some elements of organisation in some locations. There may also have been some engagement by gangs, but in general this seems to have been opportunistic rather than organised and, on this occasion, appears not to have been a significant cause of the rioting and looting. Many people seem to have been drawn into criminal activity almost on the basis of joining in a big party and without any sense of the seriousness of the acts they were undertaking. In Feltham Young Offenders Institution, we met rioters who had been in work and had a secure future in front of them. Some of the rioters were well off and many were young adults rather than teenagers, whose sense of risk is often less than that of adults. In a number of locations, the police were certainly taken by surprise and were often policing the situation based on wrong assumptions about what they were dealing with. But none of this leads to a clear picture, nor an explanation of causes and underlying influences. We believe we have made a useful contribution, even though we have not been able to reach complete conclusions. Some further information may emerge in the coming months, perhaps arising out of inquests and the investigations of the Independent Police Complaints Commission. We await the Government’s response to our report with interest and will then decide what further action to take.