Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
4th Report - Ministerial Statements and the Ministerial Code
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
HC 1036
Published 9 January 2026
Government response
1st Special Report - Ministerial Statements and the Ministerial Code: Government Response · published 4 Jun 2026
Recommendations & Conclusions
1
Conclusion
Ministerial Code reaffirmed as suitable for government policy announcement principles
Conclusion
The general principle in the Ministerial Code relating to important announcements of government policy has recently been reaffirmed when the Prime Minister republished the Code in October 2025. We concur that the Ministerial Code is a suitable document to contain such a principle for ministers and the guidance associated with it. (Conclusion, Paragraph 12)
2
Conclusion
Uncertainty surrounds appetite for new House Protocol on ministerial statements
Conclusion
Ministerial accountability to Parliament is well established irrespective of its inclusion in the Ministerial Code. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether there is a current appetite to replicate the principles in relation to ministerial statements in the form of a new House Protocol. We note that a proposal for such a Protocol was rejected by the House when put to it for decision in a previous Parliament. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13) Is the general principle in the Ministerial Code clear and adequate?
3
Conclusion
General agreement on Ministerial Code expectations serves everyone's best interests
Conclusion
Even though the Ministerial Code is a government document, it is in everyone’s interest for there to be general agreement of the expectations flowing from its letter and spirit. (Conclusion, Paragraph 17)
4
Conclusion
Frequent accusations of Ministerial Code breaches create an undesirable situation
Conclusion
We believe the current situation where the Code sets a high bar for expectations which is regularly subject to accusations of being breached is undesirable. (Conclusion, Paragraph 18)
5
Conclusion
Ministerial Code fails to effectively encapsulate ministerial accountability to Parliament
Conclusion
We believe that as currently drafted the Ministerial Code does not encapsulate effectively the general principle governing the relationship between ministers and Parliament. The general principle would be better framed around general government and ministerial accountability to Parliament. Any direction about the making of policy announcements is simply an articulation of how this principle should operate in practice. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19) 34
6
Conclusion
House considered 'in session' outside recess, acknowledging ongoing government business
Conclusion
We consider the House to be ‘in session’ at all times outside of recess, prorogation and dissolution, not just when it is sitting. It is accepted that the business of government continues during recess and ministers will need to respond to events. (Conclusion, Paragraph 24)
7
Recommendation
Restrict major policy announcements when Parliament is not sitting to exceptional circumstances.
Recommendation
However, major planned policy announcements when the House is not in session should be restricted to those which are time sensitive or otherwise exceptional. Where it is necessary to make a major announcement when the House is in session but not sitting then a minister should come to the House at the earliest opportunity to inform the House and allow for scrutiny and consideration. The content of this statement should acknowledge that the normal practice of making the announcement first to Parliament was not followed and provide an explanation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 25)
8
Recommendation
Defining 'most important' policy announcements remains subjective for ministers.
Recommendation
The term ‘most important’ is inevitably subjective. However, it is the responsibility of ministers individually and the Government collectively to be aware of the expectations of Parliament and maintain the confidence of the House. We do not believe that it is practical to produce rigid criteria to make decision-making more objective but believe the membership of the House can assess the Government’s compliance with this aspect of the principle on a case-by-case basis. Government should pay close attention to the mood of the House and, where concern is raised, give serious consideration to adjusting the thresholds they are using to evaluate the importance of policy or other announcements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)
9
Conclusion
Making major statements to media before Parliament constitutes a breach of principle.
Conclusion
In the context of the Code as currently drafted, making the most important statements in the first instance to Parliament means doing so before they are made to the media and not at the first available opportunity thereafter. Apart from exceptional circumstances it should be considered a breach of the general principle, and disrespectful to the House, for an announcement considered to be one of the most important to be made to the media first, even if it is repeated to the House later that same day. (Conclusion, Paragraph 34)
10
Recommendation
Replace 'should' with 'must' in the Ministerial Code's general principle on announcements.
Recommendation
We consider the word ‘should’ in the general principle to be ambiguous without good cause. Replacing it with the word ‘must’ would send a clear signal to Ministers and others about the expectations of the House and give confidence to the electorate that Members can do their scrutiny jobs effectively. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35)
11
Conclusion
Government must balance legitimate policy 'trailing' with substantive media leaks to avoid breaches.
Conclusion
Careful regard needs to be given by government to the balance between a legitimate trailing of a statement and the deliberate or inadvertent provision of information to the media that is so substantive that it could be considered a breach of the general principle set out in the Ministerial Code. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39) 35
12
Recommendation
Ministerial Code's 'Parliament first' principle needs modernisation to reflect changed media environment.
Recommendation
However, the media environment has changed significantly in recent years, and the provisions on the need to make the most important statements of government policy to Parliament first have remained substantively the same since the Code was introduced in 1997. It may well be the case that this section of the Code needs to be modernised to reflect the ‘Parliament first’ principle while also recognising that governments must seek to communicate their policies effectively to the public they serve. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)
13
Recommendation
Comply with the Ministerial Code or substantially re-write it in consultation with Parliament.
Recommendation
The responsibility for complying with the Code rests with the Government. The Government should either make every effort to comply with the Code, or to re-write it. Although it is the Prime Minister’s document, we expect that any substantial re-writing of the Code in this area should be done in consultation with Members of the House and that the House should then be given an opportunity to consider any implications that flow from the changes for its own resolutions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41)
14
Conclusion
No exhaustive list exists for exceptions to major policy announcement principles.
Conclusion
It is not possible to have an exhaustive list of all the circumstances which could be considered an exception to the normal principles relating to the making of major policy announcements. We accept that there are various such circumstances, including factors beyond the control of the Government, such as where announcements may be international. We expect the House to be sympathetic on those occasions when a good argument is made for an announcement being made exceptionally in breach of the general principle in the Ministerial Code. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)
15
Recommendation
Require ministers to explain reasons for breaching 'Parliament first' principle at earliest opportunity.
Recommendation
Where an exceptional circumstance does arise and a major policy is announced first elsewhere, a minister must, as a sign of respect towards Parliament, make a statement to the House at the earliest opportunity, which would include the reasons for breaching the general principle. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44) Practice during this Parliament
16
Conclusion
Speaker and Committee share longstanding concerns over government policy announcements to Parliament.
Conclusion
The Speaker has represented the dissatisfaction of the House, through statements made in the Chamber and when setting out the concerns of Members across the House when he wrote to us in May 2025. We share his concerns and note this is a longstanding issue for which successive governments have been criticised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)
17
Conclusion
Publication process for major policy documents consistently breaches Ministerial Code principles
Conclusion
It is our assessment that in none of these examples can we be satisfied that the general principle has been met by the publication of relevant documents associated with major policy announcements. It is not clear how Members of the House were meant to be aware that the documents were available, and the use of imprecise terminology further exacerbated that situation. In all cases, there were no accompanying written ministerial statements, which 36 could have been used to provide helpful information about the process around the announcement and the availability of relevant documents. Furthermore, the timing and extent of trailing and pre-briefing of the substance of statements examined by the committee, in our view, could reasonably be concluded to constitute a breach of the general principle set out in the Ministerial Code, regardless of whether the document was properly laid or not. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)
18
Recommendation
Ensure timely, transparent publication of documents, followed by oral statements for parliamentary scrutiny
Recommendation
In the examples cited, we do not agree that the publication of associated documents ahead of statements met the expectations of the general principle of the Code. However, subject to the Government making proper attempts to be open and transparent with Members, preferably through the timely and proper use of written ministerial statements, and to refrain from substantive prior trailing of the contents of these documents in the media, we accept that the general principle could be met through this route, however we would expect an oral statement to follow within a reasonable timeframe to provide Members with an appropriate opportunity to question Ministers. At all times we would expect the Government to follow the ‘Parliament first’ principle. (Conclusion, Paragraph 56)
19
Conclusion
Early publication of significant documents enhances parliamentary scrutiny and 'Parliament first' adherence
Conclusion
We believe that scrutiny is improved when Members have greater access to relevant information, and we recognise that publication of significant documents in advance of statements could meet the ‘Parliament first’ principle while allowing Members time to put together more substantive questions for a later oral statement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 57)
20
Conclusion
Concentration of statements and urgent questions limits time for other House business
Conclusion
Sitting time is finite and there will always be a tension between the various demands of the House. Statements and urgent questions play an important role in the effective scrutiny of government, but in concentration they can significantly affect the amount of time available for the other business before the House. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)
21
Conclusion
Procedural options available to manage sitting times, but long-term changes are beyond inquiry
Conclusion
The House has regularly considered issues relating to sitting times and the prioritisation of business. The Government can propose, and the House can consider, procedural options to mitigate these issues in the short term, for example, notwithstanding Standing Orders or agreeing to Business of the House motions. It is also able to consider the findings of wider reviews, to provide sustainable long-term changes in this area. We believe this is beyond the remit of this inquiry, but it is an issue that another committee of the House may want to address. (Conclusion, Paragraph 62)
22
Recommendation
Utilise Business of the House motions to protect non-government business from planned statements
Recommendation
We encourage the Government to always consider the potential for using Business of the House motions to protect non-government business in the House, particularly opposition business, from the impact of planned statements. (Recommendation, Paragraph 64) 37 Written ministerial statements
23
Conclusion
Written ministerial statements significantly enhance transparency and government openness to Parliament
Conclusion
The introduction of written ministerial statements in 2002 has proved to be a considerable success in increasing transparency and making government more open to Parliament and the public. It is for the Government to make a judgement about the correct form for a statement, oral or written, having regard to the general principle in the Ministerial Code and the wider expectations of the House, and in the knowledge that the House has a range of tools at its disposal to hold ministers to account. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
24
Recommendation
Enhance use of written ministerial statements to inform Members of document publication
Recommendation
We encourage the Government to make more effective use of written ministerial statements to inform Members about the publication of documents related to major government announcements, even when those announcements may themselves be the subject of an oral statement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72) Ministerial accountability and sanctions
25
Conclusion
Sanctioning individual ministers for Ministerial Code breaches remains problematic due to shared responsibility
Conclusion
For most breaches under the Ministerial Code in relation to paragraph 9.1, it is difficult to conceive of the circumstances that would result in sanctions against an individual minister, given that the Code specifies the Prime Minister as being a significant part of the decision-making process and therefore bearing at least shared responsibility. We see no easy fix for this conundrum. However, the House itself has a range of options to hold ministers to account, including its range of disciplinary powers in cases of contempt. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)
26
Recommendation
Government commitment to Ministerial Code best addresses breaches and parliamentary dissatisfaction
Recommendation
An active commitment from the Government to adhere to the Ministerial Code and the ‘Parliament first’ principle is the easiest and most optimal solution to address the dissatisfaction of Parliament and the subsequent question of what constitutes adequate sanctions for breaches. Alternatively, the Government could, in consultation with Members across the House, seek agreement on any changes to the Ministerial Code it feels are necessary. (Conclusion, Paragraph 80)
27
Recommendation
Amend Ministerial Code to require Prime Minister to issue statements on standards breaches.
Recommendation
We recommend that an addition be made to Chapter 2 of the Ministerial Code to commit the Prime Minister to issuing a written statement upon reaching a final decision where he has determined a breach of the expected standards has occurred. This written statement should set out the basis for the decision and the action he is taking as a result. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)
28
Conclusion
Urgent questions remain a vital and effective mechanism for holding ministers to account.
Conclusion
Urgent questions are the most effective and timely remedy currently available to Members to hold ministers to account in the absence of an oral statement. The Speaker holds important powers to protect the interests of 38 the House and, despite the concerns expressed about the onus this puts on the Speaker to ensure a reasonable level of accountability, we recognise that urgent questions are a vital mechanism to help hold the government of the day to account. (Conclusion, Paragraph 85)
29
Conclusion
Adhering to Ministerial Code principles would reduce need for urgent parliamentary questions.
Conclusion
By adhering to the general principle in the Ministerial Code and making the most important announcements of government policy in the first instance in Parliament, the need for Members to seek redress through the mechanism of the urgent question will likely reduce. (Conclusion, Paragraph 86) 39