Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 5
5
Paragraph: 34
The Government’s desire to find alternatives, such as bespoke primary legislation, to using the emergency...
Conclusion
The Government’s desire to find alternatives, such as bespoke primary legislation, to using the emergency provisions of the Civil Contingency Act 2004 is understandable. Bespoke primary legislation has the advantage of going through the stages of Parliamentary scrutiny. However, the Committee is not convinced that the Civil Contingencies Act could not have been used for COVID-19 and believes there was a potential role for the Civil Contingencies Act in providing a “stop-gap” for more detailed scrutiny of the Coronavirus Bill to take place.” The potential use of the Civil Contingencies Act as a “stop-gap” should be considered by the Government in response to emergencies in the future. Furthermore, the Coronavirus Act does not have the same safeguards as the Civil Contingencies Act. It is troubling the Paymaster General referred to these safeguards as a reason not to use that Act. Any Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Government’s handling of Covid-19 31 separate legislation to deal with civil contingencies—and particularly legislation that needs to be passed very quickly—should include safeguards and scrutiny provisions that are equivalent to those in the CCA, with regular renewal of powers allowing for more detailed Parliamentary scrutiny that, due to expediency, cannot be given during the passing of emergency legislation.
Paragraph Reference:
34
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) is designed to be used only as a last resort, where it is not possible to take conventional or accelerated primary legislation through Parliament, and thereby to allow Parliamentary scrutiny before measures pass into law. The CCA has strict tests (known as the “triple lock”) which must be met before emergency regulations under it can be made. These are not in place to prevent its use at all costs, but a test that ensures that Parliamentary scrutiny is not unnecessarily sacrificed. In this instance, although the measures in the Coronavirus Act were urgent, the opportunity for prior Parliamentary scrutiny for the Coronavirus Act. That was thought to be preferable to making regulations under the CCA, where Parliamentary debate would take place after the legislation had come into force. It provided an opportunity to make the legislation subject to such review as Parliament thought fit, with an agreed renewal of powers. agencies who were responding to the pandemic as CCA regulations would have required Parliamentary approval within seven days (if Parliament was still sitting) and could have been amended at that point; could have been struck down in the Court as secondary legislation; and would have had to be renewed every 30 days, therefore not a straightforward stop-gap approach. The Government still believes that was the right approach. Parliament went into recess shortly after the Coronavirus Act was passed and then changed its business arrangements in order to protect Parliamentarians and their staff, thereby limiting the opportunity for retrospective debate and repeat approvals. To provide accountability, the Act requires that the Government has the following statutory obligations: a) the House of Commons have to approve the continued operation of the Act’s temporary provisions within the period of 7 sitting days after the 6-month anniversary of the Act’s passing and every six months thereafter if the temporary provisions still exist; and b) the Government is be required to report every two months on the use of powers under the Act for as long as they remain in force. for Parliament to scrutinise the Government’s actions. It is important to note that, once enacted, the lifespan of this Act and the measures in it, is limited. It will only be in force for as long as necessary to deal with the Coronavirus. Parliament has drawn limits to the scope and time period for which these powers are required. A two-year life span for this Fifth Special Report of Session 2019–21 7 time, with the option for the provisions in the Act to be extended by the relevant national authority. Not all powers have been enacted yet but this may change, as they may be needed in due course within this pandemic.