Select committee: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee

Sourcing public services: lessons learned from the collapse of Carillion inquiry

Closed Opened 15 Jan 2018 Closed 15 Jan 2018
Inquiry scope (the committee's words)
Following the news of the collapse of Carillion, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee launches an inquiry into how the Government and public sector manages the risks of outsourcing the delivery of public services. The inquiry will look at how Government and the public sector makes decisions about how to source the delivery of public services, including the risks of concentrating a large number of contracts with a small group of large companies. Terms of reference The Committee invites written submissions from the public and interested organisations on: 1. Does Government make effective decisions on how to source the delivery of public services? What framework should the Government use when deciding what the most appropriate approach to sourcing a function or service is? Are decisions made systematically and consistently? Do policy makers have the right skills, information and incentives to make sourcing decisions effectively – including do they have the operational and commercial expertise to be able to understand what is deliverable Does the public sector have the capacity to deliver services in-house when that is the most appropriate route? 2. What lessons need to be learned from the collapse of Carillion about how Government and the public sector manages the risk from suppliers throughout the life-cycle of outsourcing a public service? Is the supply side of the market for outsourced public services too concentrated? What are the risks and benefits of a concentrated market? What steps has, and could, Government taken to maintain a competitive market amongst suppliers?Does Government have the right skills to be able to procure and manage contracts with SMEs? Should contracts or tenders be structured differently? Are there other steps it can take? Does the Government effectively monitor and manage risk for its largest suppliers, and does it have effective failure regimes in place? Does Government understand the public sector’s cumulative exposure to individual contractors? Is there effective co-ordination between different public sector bodies in managing contractors? Do current procurement rules and policies allow risks to be managed effectively? Does the public sector have the right skills and resources to manage and monitor contracts with suppliers effectively? 3. Given the concentration of outsourced public sector contracts into a small number of large companies do the rules on oversight and accountability of public services need to change? 4. Are there limits to what can be outsourced? 5. What lessons can be learned from PFI?

Where it stands

The inquiry is closed, opened 15 January 2018.

The committee has published 1 report, most recently 7th Report - After Carillion: Public sector outsourcing and contracting on 9 July 2018.

The government's response

Published 5 November 2018.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government accepts that rebuilding trust in outsourcing needs greater transparency, and sets out its approach through a new commercial "playbook", while declining some of the Committee's specific proposals.

  • On a centre of excellence for applied contracting, the government remains "unclear" what specific problem it would solve that existing processes do not already address.
  • On disclosing risk positions, it states "We do not intend to extend our current transparency approach to take on disclosure of risk positions".
  • Cabinet Office and the Treasury are developing a playbook to specify a methodology and standards for outsourcing, and to look at making the rationale for decisions more transparent.
  • On supplier resilience, it commits to publish 3 to 5 KPIs starting with the most important contracts, and says living wills are "currently being developed" with industry.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

Reports

1 report

Oral evidence sessions

6 sessions

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Date Session and witnesses Source
9 May 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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8 May 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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24 Apr 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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27 Mar 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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13 Mar 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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27 Feb 2018
Oral evidence session
No witnesses recorded
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Correspondence

4 letters

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