Source · Select Committees · Northern Ireland Affairs Committee
Recommendation 10
10
Accepted in Part
Publish indicative list of consultees and clarify the oversight board's membership and remit.
Recommendation
In the interests of transparency, we recommend that the Government publish an indicative list of these consultees. Additionally, the Government must explain the membership and remit of the oversight board more clearly to those stakeholders in whom it needs to build more confidence in its proposals, including what practicable steps it is taking to include international expertise, beyond the parties to the Joint Framework. There is also a case for ensuring that monitoring reviews of the commission take place annually. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73)
Government response summary AI-generated
The government accepts the recommendation in part, confirming that Clause 9 of the Troubles Bill requires the publication of a list of consultees and that Clause 4 mandates international expertise on the Oversight Board, whose remit is also explained. However, it rejects annual monitoring reviews, deeming existing biennial and quinquennial reviews sufficient and further obligations overly burdensome.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Accepted in Part
HM Government · verbatim extract
Accepted in Part
25. The Oversight Board comprises the Commissioners (between two and five, appointed by the Secretary of State following consultation as set out in Clause 9 of the Bill) and the Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Commission. Clause 4 of the Bill explicitly obliges the Secretary of State to ensure that at least one of those Commissioners has relevant experience gained outside the United Kingdom. 26. The Oversight Board’s principal remit is to set the Legacy Commission’s strategic priorities, scrutinise the exercise of all its functions, and oversee the work of its officers. Clause 3(5) sets out the specific requirements of the Oversight Board. Crucially, the Commissioners on this Oversight Board are non-executive – meaning they are not generally involved in the operational delivery or day-to-day management of the Commission. This establishes a more robust governance arrangement than the ICRIR’s current non-statutory Board, by ensuring that those responsible for operational delivery are accountable to the Oversight Board but do not sit on it. There is also a case for ensuring that monitoring reviews of the Commission take place annually. 27. The Legacy Commission is already required to publish a detailed Annual Report and a yearly Work Plan, which provides stakeholders with an annual public update on its performance, caseload, and finances. The Bill further mandates a robust, independent review of the Commission’s performance by an external person at specific intervals (2, 5 and 7 years after the Act is passed, under Clause 24). It is the Government’s view that these are appropriate arrangements, and placing further obligations of review would be overly burdensome.
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