Recommendations & Conclusions
18 items
1
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
This year’s 25th anniversary of the creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland provides an important opportunity to reflect on the profound changes that have taken place in policing since the Patten report, and on the pivotal role the PSNI has played—in often difficult and dangerous circumstances—in supporting Northern …
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This year’s 25th anniversary of the creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland provides an important opportunity to reflect on the profound changes that have taken place in policing since the Patten report, and on the pivotal role the PSNI has played—in often difficult and dangerous circumstances—in supporting Northern Ireland’s transition from the Troubles to peace and stability. It is important to acknowledge the progress made over the past 25 years by the UK Government, the Northern Ireland Executive and the PSNI in securing increased support for and confidence in policing from across the communities, although the police still have profound lessons to learn in relation to cases of violence against women and girls. It is vital also, however, to recognise that on funding, staffing and security, all three have still more to do. (Conclusion, Paragraph 11) PSNI funding
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
2
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The real-terms erosion of the PSNI’s budget for nearly a decade has put the service and officer numbers under immense strain. Northern Ireland Executive decision making—including the scale of health and education spending, reliance on successive one–year budgets, and periods of collapse—has also constrained the PSNI’s decision making and planning. …
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The real-terms erosion of the PSNI’s budget for nearly a decade has put the service and officer numbers under immense strain. Northern Ireland Executive decision making—including the scale of health and education spending, reliance on successive one–year budgets, and periods of collapse—has also constrained the PSNI’s decision making and planning. Late changes to funding in-year have created uncertainty and highlighted the insufficiency of the baseline budget. (Conclusion, Paragraph 22)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
3
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The PSNI’s baseline budget for the start of the financial year should be adjusted to take into account in-year allocations from the preceding financial year. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
4
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
There has been recent cause for optimism, however, with the policing budget finally rising and the allocation of ring-fenced funding for the PSNI Workforce Recovery Plan and data breach compensation costs. A new needs-based factor of 124 per cent is also now included in the Barnett formula which calculates changes …
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There has been recent cause for optimism, however, with the policing budget finally rising and the allocation of ring-fenced funding for the PSNI Workforce Recovery Plan and data breach compensation costs. A new needs-based factor of 124 per cent is also now included in the Barnett formula which calculates changes to the block grant for Northern Ireland. We are frustrated, however, that the recent ‘open–book exercise’ conducted 38 by HM Treasury into Northern Ireland departmental spending has not been published, meaning the findings and proposals which have been leaked to the media cannot be properly assessed, including its reported calculation that police spending per head in Northern Ireland is 166 per cent of that in England. The absence of any formal publication and analysis prevents proper scrutiny of the methodology underlying that figure. (Conclusion, Paragraph 24)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
5
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The confusion regarding the ownership of and responsibility for publication of the recent ‘open-book exercise’ is frustrating. The open book exercise must be published without delay. (Recommendation, Paragraph 25)
Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
6
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
Too much of the PSNI’s already stretched budget is being diverted to resource legacy investigations and civil cases, which will only continue in the coming years. The costs of legacy to the PSNI are exceptional and should be treated as such by the UK Government. The legacy of the Troubles …
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Too much of the PSNI’s already stretched budget is being diverted to resource legacy investigations and civil cases, which will only continue in the coming years. The costs of legacy to the PSNI are exceptional and should be treated as such by the UK Government. The legacy of the Troubles is a UK-wide issue, and investigations should be funded accordingly, rather than constraining the day-to-day policing budget. Over the course of our inquiry, we have found no evidence to alter the recommendation made in our previous report on The Government’s new approach to dealing with the legacy of the past. The Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, currently before Parliament, has the opportunity to provide a structure that should ensure the PSNI engage with and conclude their responsibilities to facilitate disclosure on legacy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
7
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
In light of which, the UK Government should create a new, recurring and ringfenced funding stream to meet legacy costs within the PSNI to prevent further funding being directed away from contemporary policing. This should be introduced as soon as possible, and no later than the current Northern Ireland Troubles …
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In light of which, the UK Government should create a new, recurring and ringfenced funding stream to meet legacy costs within the PSNI to prevent further funding being directed away from contemporary policing. This should be introduced as soon as possible, and no later than the current Northern Ireland Troubles Bill receiving Royal Assent. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31) PSNI workforce
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
8
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
There is a lack of clarity on the most appropriate number of police officers that should make up the PSNI today, with various analyses having been put forward in the past. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
9
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
An independent comprehensive analysis should be commissioned to determine the most appropriate officer and staff numbers for policing in Northern Ireland today. This should include consideration of factors such as: • current and projected future policing demand; • the evolving security situation; and 39 • comparison with other UK police …
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An independent comprehensive analysis should be commissioned to determine the most appropriate officer and staff numbers for policing in Northern Ireland today. This should include consideration of factors such as: • current and projected future policing demand; • the evolving security situation; and 39 • comparison with other UK police forces and An Garda Síochána. The UK Government and the Northern Ireland Executive, with the Department of Justice, should include this analysis in their bases for allocating funding to the PSNI. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
10
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
In this anniversary year, it is important to reflect on and commend the PSNI for the strides it has made in becoming a more representative police service since its formation in 2001, particularly during its first decade. We are concerned, however, that progress on increasing community representativeness in the PSNI …
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In this anniversary year, it is important to reflect on and commend the PSNI for the strides it has made in becoming a more representative police service since its formation in 2001, particularly during its first decade. We are concerned, however, that progress on increasing community representativeness in the PSNI has stalled, at a time when projections indicate a likely decline in the number of officers from a Catholic background, and when individuals from ethnic minority and/or working class backgrounds remain underrepresented. A representative police service that reflects the community it supports is essential for effective policing. Societal and PSNI action is required to increase numbers from underrepresented groups, particularly Catholic staff and officers. Current figures cannot be allowed to decline further and instead should be regarded as the baseline from which to renew progress. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
11
Recommendation
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
We recommend that one of the few unimplemented reforms suggested by Patten, namely a pilot cadet-type scheme between the police and young people, be reconsidered by the PSNI. We recommend also that the PSNI commission fresh research into the barriers to applications to the service from underrepresented groups. In addition, …
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We recommend that one of the few unimplemented reforms suggested by Patten, namely a pilot cadet-type scheme between the police and young people, be reconsidered by the PSNI. We recommend also that the PSNI commission fresh research into the barriers to applications to the service from underrepresented groups. In addition, it should produce and publish an Action Plan, informed by this research, containing the key steps it will take to increase recruitment and applications from Catholic, ethnic minority and working-class communities. This should be completed, if possible, in time for the next officer recruitment campaign. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
12
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
Vocal support for policing and careers in the PSNI from political and civil society leaders has not been consistent from all communities in Northern Ireland. Support for policing should not take away from accountability or appropriate scrutiny where required. Political support for policing has implications not only for applications and …
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Vocal support for policing and careers in the PSNI from political and civil society leaders has not been consistent from all communities in Northern Ireland. Support for policing should not take away from accountability or appropriate scrutiny where required. Political support for policing has implications not only for applications and recruitment, but for effective policing and therefore peace and prosperity. The 25th anniversary year should be an opportunity to invigorate and re-double efforts to support policing and PSNI recruitment. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48) Security situation and funding
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
13
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
There is inadequate transparency around the criteria and factors used to determine the level of Additional Security Funding provided by the UK Government to the PSNI at Spending Reviews. Without the provision of 40 sufficient information to us by the Government it is almost impossible to properly scrutinise the allocation …
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There is inadequate transparency around the criteria and factors used to determine the level of Additional Security Funding provided by the UK Government to the PSNI at Spending Reviews. Without the provision of 40 sufficient information to us by the Government it is almost impossible to properly scrutinise the allocation and understand the extent to which it is appropriate to meet contemporary security requirements in Northern Ireland and considering the recent attacks on police stations by dissident republicans. Acknowledging that the publication of all information may not be possible due to security considerations, we as a committee are open to discussing with the Government how information might be provided to us to assist with our scrutiny. (Conclusion, Paragraph 63)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
14
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The UK Government should, as far as it is able to, set out the criteria considered when determining the level of Additional Security Funding provided to the PSNI and explain why Northern Ireland is not able to access the counter-terrorism funding stream provided to forces in England and Wales. (Recommendation, …
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The UK Government should, as far as it is able to, set out the criteria considered when determining the level of Additional Security Funding provided to the PSNI and explain why Northern Ireland is not able to access the counter-terrorism funding stream provided to forces in England and Wales. (Recommendation, Paragraph 64)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
15
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
Paramilitarism is an enduring and intolerable legacy of the Troubles which continues to threaten and harm communities across Northern Ireland. We plan to consider the findings of the scoping report of the Independent Expert into paramilitary group transition when it is completed later this year. In the meantime, ongoing efforts …
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Paramilitarism is an enduring and intolerable legacy of the Troubles which continues to threaten and harm communities across Northern Ireland. We plan to consider the findings of the scoping report of the Independent Expert into paramilitary group transition when it is completed later this year. In the meantime, ongoing efforts to counter paramilitarism continue to require adequate planning and funding. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
16
Recommendation
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The Northern Ireland Executive should publish its plans for a successor to its Programme on Paramilitarism and Organised Crime, setting out: • how it intends to use the match-funded UK Government funding until 2028/29; • the future role and resourcing of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force; • how the new …
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The Northern Ireland Executive should publish its plans for a successor to its Programme on Paramilitarism and Organised Crime, setting out: • how it intends to use the match-funded UK Government funding until 2028/29; • the future role and resourcing of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force; • how the new initiative will be informed by any recommendations from the Independent Expert’s report on group disbandment. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
17
Conclusion
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
We are concerned about the increase in people smuggling and commercial exploitation across the land border on the island of Ireland. We will keep under review the expanded data sharing arrangements recently announced by the UK and Irish Governments. While irregular migration into the UK may not be as significant …
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We are concerned about the increase in people smuggling and commercial exploitation across the land border on the island of Ireland. We will keep under review the expanded data sharing arrangements recently announced by the UK and Irish Governments. While irregular migration into the UK may not be as significant via Northern Ireland as it is across the English Channel, it is difficult to determine the extent of any potential problem without the relevant information. To that end, we await figures on this issue from the Home Office. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)
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Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office
18
Recommendation
1st Report - Policing and security in N…
The UK Government should publish figures for asylum applications in Northern Ireland as part of its quarterly immigration system statistics. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77) 41
Northern Ireland Executive
Northern Ireland Office