The UK’s development partnership with Nigeria

We are disappointed by the delayed release of the FCDO’s Official Development Assistance country allocations for the coming years. This made deeper scrutiny of FCDO strategy in Nigeria difficult while our inquiry was under way, as we did not have access to spending plans for the years ahead. (Conclusion, Paragraph 5)

The Department must commit to aligning the announcement of new approaches and strategies with the release of spending plans, in order to generate confidence in its plans and its appetite for transparency. (Recommendation, Paragraph 6) The Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership

The UK’s partnership with Nigeria represents a grand strategic bet: assisting Nigeria to improve its economy, administration and security in order to unlock its growth potential, and then capitalising on the two countries’ shared history and people-to-people links in order to achieve development objectives in the country, as well as further mutual benefits for both nations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

We welcome the long-term, strategic partnership established between the UK and Nigeria, grounded in shared interests relating to stability, security and economic development. The strategy represents a wider shift in development strategy from the UK Government, with the intention of putting partnership and mutual benefit at the centre of programming. However, these mutual benefits will not be realised if the humanitarian and security issues threatening Nigerian stability are allowed to grow, potentially undermining the partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)

As we outlined in our report, “The Future of UK Aid and Development Assistance”, the FCDO will need to set out further details on how its four essential shifts can create a step-change in policy efficacy and implementation. A belief that a changed mindset alone will make a 45 marked difference, in an era of significantly constrained spending, risks giving the impression of unrealistic optimism in the FCDO’s policy levers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

The FCDO must develop a clear monitoring framework for assessing implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Nigeria. This framework should include: • the proportion of programmes containing integrated cross-sector objectives; • the proportion of funding allocated to multi-sector programming; • measures of local civil society and women-led participation; • indicators relating to displacement, livelihoods and community resilience; • and the balance between preventive and emergency spending.

The FCDO should report progress on this to the Committee within six months of the publication of this report, and annually thereafter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22) Humanitarian need and displacement

The Committee is deeply concerned by the scale of humanitarian need in Nigeria and by evidence that humanitarian systems are increasingly unable to meet demand. These issues have the potential to undermine the goals of the Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

Nigeria has the potential to take on responsibility for meeting its own humanitarian need. It is right that the FCDO is working alongside the Government of Nigeria to achieve this end, allowing UK ODA to be reallocated to projects and programmes that work towards the UK’s strategic development goals in the country. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

In response to this report, the Government must detail the steps it is taking to assist the Nigerian Government to assume responsibility for meeting its own humanitarian need. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

We are concerned by evidence that funding reductions have weakened displacement monitoring. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51) 46

Within six months of the publication of this report, the FCDO should share with us funding and programming details for humanitarian and conflict monitoring, displacement tracking and early-warning systems across Nigeria, including how data from these systems is integrated into wider programming in the country. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52) Instability and insecurity

We are shocked by the Minister’s admission that the international community has “failed” in the Sahel. (Conclusion, Paragraph 64)

The Government must undertake a review, to be shared with the Committee no later than six months from the publication of this report, on how it can contribute towards strengthening regional approaches to insecurity and instability across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, recognising the increasingly transnational nature of displacement, organised violence and climate pressures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 65)

Instability in Nigeria cannot be addressed through military responses alone and requires a comprehensive strategy addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and insecurity. It is not the responsibility of the UK alone to address this instability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)

We are encouraged by many of the programmes implemented by the FCDO across Nigeria. The Propcom+ programme, for instance, has been independently assessed to be achieving commendable results in agricultural transformation, which will combat several drivers of instability, including poverty and tensions over land use. (Conclusion, Paragraph 82)

However, left unchecked, this instability will make it impossible for the UK to achieve its development goals across Nigeria, potentially undermining the wider Nigeria-UK strategic partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 83)

While many of these programmes satisfy the pleas made to us by witnesses and stakeholders for improvements in UK programming across Nigeria and the Sahel, they are clearly insufficient: conflict, extremism and banditry continue to rise, with severe knock-on effects for Nigerians and for regional security. Given the relatively low UK spending on responses to security issues, in comparison to the scale of the challenge, only time will tell whether the technical assistance offered and capacity building engendered by these programmes will be sufficient in helping Nigeria to overcome its security challenges. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84) 47

The FCDO should ensure that conflict prevention and atrocity prevention capabilities remain adequately resourced and integrated across future Nigeria and Sahel programming. This must include strengthened support for: • early-warning systems; • conflict monitoring; • atrocity prevention; • and data collection relating to displacement and violence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 85)

The FCDO must set out its spending plans on these areas in Nigeria in response to this report, including detailed Integrated Security Fund spending plans. (Recommendation, Paragraph 86)

While it is the case that instability arising from religious tensions is notable, we do not consider it to be a primary driver of instability across Nigeria, particularly when considered alongside compounding factors, including land disputes resulting from climate change. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87) Civil Society

The FCDO should review its current level of support for community-led early-warning, mediation and peacebuilding structures; and the level of female leadership within these structures. When sharing the findings of that report with the Committee, the FCDO should set out whether it believes its measures on these metrics are sufficient, and if not, how it intends to improve them. (Recommendation, Paragraph 96)

Without clear information on the design and accessibility of programmes, and without equality impact assessments being carried out routinely, we are unable to scrutinise fully the degree to which FCDO programming in Nigeria is targeted at: • women and girls; • children; • LGBTQ+ people; • Disabled people; • older people. (Conclusion, Paragraph 97) 48

The FCDO should ensure that equality impact assessments are systematically incorporated into future programming and funding decisions relating to Nigeria, which should be available to the Committee on request. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98)

We are impressed by the work of local organisations with whom the FCDO works, including on peacebuilding, stabilisation and early warning efforts. This is an excellent example of localisation within the FCDO’s Nigeria portfolio. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99) Economic Development

Economic resilience and livelihoods support should form a central component of the UK-Nigeria strategic partnership. It is vital that the partnership helps to provide economic opportunities for women and young people, recognising the role of inclusion and livelihoods in reducing vulnerability to recruitment into extremist groups and instability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 115)

We are disappointed that the FCDO has not worked alongside BII to ensure that a reduction in forced displacement becomes a key criterion in BII’s investment decision making. With such a large portfolio across Nigeria—a country that hosts a vast number of displaced people—strategic investments from BII in this regard could make a significant difference. (Conclusion, Paragraph 116) Within six months of the publication of this report, the FCDO must undertake a review of all of the factors that risk undermining the UK-Nigeria strategic partnership, including humanitarian need, instability, insecurity, good governance issues and the low investor confidence in Nigeria’s economy, and how it plans to mitigate those risks. Findings should be shared with the Committee no later than one year from the publication of this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 117) 49