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Select committee inquiry

Greater London Authority Act 2007 and the London Assembly

Closed

Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee · Opened 20 December 2012 · Closed 1 April 2012

7 recommendations · 4 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“Following receipt of a memorandum (333 KB PDF) from the Department for Communities and Local Government reviewing the Act, the Committee decided to carry out post-legislative scrutiny of the legislation. The Committee's inquiry has focussed on the effectiveness of the legislation, specifically examining whether the Act has met its policy objective and the powers and operation of the London Assembly. Further information Oral evidence Written evidence Terms of Reference”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of 4th Report - Post-legislative scrutiny of the Greater London Authority Act 2007 and the London Assembly (Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence) ↗

The office of Mayor of London is a local government success story. The Mayor’s responsibilities for transport, economic development, planning and housing have made the post credible and visible, and he has the power to make London-wide executive decisions.

But the Greater London Authority, of which the mayoralty is one part, has two other, less visible, components: four “functional bodies” responsible for transport, fire, the Olympic legacy and policing in the capital; and the London Assembly, the 25-member body charged with holding the Mayor to account.

Our report concentrates on the Assembly. Legislation enacted in 2007 and 2011 transferred further powers to the Mayor but without a matching enhancement of the powers of the Assembly. Indeed, the changes have created inconsistencies. It is now time for the Assembly’s powers in relation to mayoral decisions, budgets, strategies and appointments to be made consistent and clear. We call for a number of changes. First, in line with local authorities with elected mayors, the London Assembly should be able to call in mayoral decisions before they are implemented. Second, given the Mayor’s increased funds for investment in housing, transport and economic development, the Assembly should also be able to amend the Mayor’s capital budgets, as it can his revenue budgets. Third, the Assembly’s powers over mayoral strategies are inconsistent. It should be empowered to reject the Mayor’s Police and Crime Plan, as it can all his other statutory strategies. Finally, the Assembly should be able to reject the Mayor’s appointment of any Deputy Mayor, as it can his appointment of a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime. This power should also extend to the appointment of chairs and deputy chairs of key GLA bodies, such as Transport for London.

The Assembly must have a clearer and more easily recognisable scrutiny function for Londoners. It is neither part of the Mayor’s executive nor an embryonic legislature. It follows, and we recommend, that Assembly Members should not join the Mayor’s cabinet or the boards of GLA executive bodies while retaining membership of the Assembly. We question how the public are supposed to disentangle a situation in which an Assembly Member can carry out scrutiny work in one area and perform an executive role in another as a Deputy Mayor or a mayoral representative on a GLA board.

The London Finance Commission has proposed that mayoral tax and spending powers are expanded. If this happens, the Assembly must be able to scrutinise and challenge. To be effective it will have to be able to call on further specialist resources within the Assembly, dedicated to in-depth budgetary and statistical analysis, or on an independent budget office for London.

The changes we propose would forge a more identifiable role for the Assembly as the body charged with holding the Mayor to account. In this way its own credibility and visibility would be enhanced, without any detriment to the popular and effective mayoral model of London government. If the Assembly’s powers were clearer, the public would be more inclined to accept an increase in the Mayor’s powers.

What the government said

The government responded on 21 January 2014.

Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 20 December 2012 to 21 January 2014.

  1. Report 16 Oct 2013
  2. Government response 21 Jan 2014

What it recommended 7 recommendations · 4 conclusions

1The Mayor of London holds the executive power in the Greater London Authority.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Mayor of London holds the executive power in the Greater London Authority. We conclude that this model of government looks set to continue with the transfer of further powers to the Mayor through the Greater London Authority Act 2007, the Localism Act 2011 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, and most recently in the current Mayor’s call for greater tax and spending powers in London. Such a concentration of power in one person is uncharacteristic of the UK constitution, and this raises questions about the remit and functions of the London Assembly, which is charged with holding him to account.
2We conclude that the Mayor has to be held to account for the substantial powers...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We conclude that the Mayor has to be held to account for the substantial powers he exercises and that an Assembly composed of members able to focus on the same issues as the Mayor is the correct vehicle. Assembly Members, like the Mayor, have to be able to take a strategic view of the capital and its interests. We therefore support the current model in London for holding to account a mayor with extensive and growing executive powers, which is an Assembly directly elected by the London electorate. The corollary of a strong mayor must be a scrutiny body located at the same, in this case London-wide, level.
3In our view the future of the London Assembly can go in one of two...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In our view the future of the London Assembly can go in one of two directions—either towards becoming a legislature as in the United States of America or developing its role as a scrutinising body. While the London Mayors since 2000 have enjoyed high profiles, they do not exercise the range of powers and responsibilities of their US counterparts which would justify giving the Assembly US-style legislative authority. Indeed, the Assembly itself has not sought to become a legislature. The primary function of the Assembly is to scrutinise the Mayor. We have heard how effective the Assembly and its committees have been at doing so. In our view the route to follow is that the Assembly develop as a separate, independent body, clearly distinguishable from the mayoralty, and concentrating on scrutiny. Its focus should be on the Mayor and those issues affecting Londoners, such as transport, housing and economic development, where the Mayor has considerable spending powers. In turn this would maximise the impact of the Assembly’s work.
4A balance has to be maintained between a strong Mayor who is able to implement...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A balance has to be maintained between a strong Mayor who is able to implement his or her manifesto and an Assembly with the potential to make the Mayor rethink any ill- considered decisions. The current two-thirds threshold strikes that balance and we see no convincing reason to change it.
5The power to call in mayoral decisions before they are implemented would make the Assembly’s...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The power to call in mayoral decisions before they are implemented would make the Assembly’s powers consistent with those of local councils that have directly elected mayors and provide a firm basis on which to replicate the Mayor of London’s powers and the Assembly system elsewhere in the country. This power represents an important means of scrutiny but one that should and probably would be used sparingly. Given the Mayor already seeks to ensure his plans are acceptable to all parties, it seems no great leap into the unknown to provide the Assembly with this check on his authority. Indeed in the long run it has the potential to improve the overall efficiency of GLA decision making, and to ensure full scrutiny of important decisions before they are implemented. The Government should make the appropriate legislative changes to require the Mayor to publish a forward plan and to provide the Assembly with the power to call in mayoral decisions.
6We conclude that the Assembly should be able to amend the Mayor’s planned capital spending,...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We conclude that the Assembly should be able to amend the Mayor’s planned capital spending, as it can his current spending. We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes to give the Assembly the same power to amend the Mayor’s capital budgets as it has to amend his revenue budgets.
7We recommend the Government’s response to the report of the London Finance Commission on the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend the Government’s response to the report of the London Finance Commission on the Mayor’s tax and spending powers include a review of the Assembly’s ability to hold the Mayor to account. The review should include an assessment of additional and separate resources and expertise to enhance the Assembly’s financial scrutiny role and the establishment of an independent budget office for London.
8We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes to give the Assembly the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes to give the Assembly the power to reject the Mayor’s Police and Crime Plan on the same basis that it can all other mayoral statutory strategies.
9We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes to remove the right of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes to remove the right of sitting Assembly Members to join the Mayor’s cabinet or to sit on the boards of GLA bodies.
10The Government should reconstitute the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority along the lines of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should reconstitute the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority along the lines of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, with a deputy Mayor for Fire and Emergency Planning and a dedicated Assembly committee along the lines of the Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee to scrutinise it.
11We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes and allow the relevant Assembly...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Government make the appropriate legislative changes and allow the relevant Assembly Committee to review and, if necessary, reject the Mayor's appointment of any Deputy Mayor. An appointee who at the time of his or her nomination was an AM would be subject to this process. On confirmation the candidate should, as we have previously recommended, give up membership of the Assembly. This power of rejection should also apply to those whom the Mayor appoints as chair or deputy chair of those GLA boards specified in the 2007 Act.