Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 10
10
Accepted
Require Government to explain how F-35 component exports align with UK's international obligations.
Recommendation
The Government should set out how allowing indirect exports of F-35 components to the global supply pool, despite the clear risk of violations of International Humanitarian Law which has been identified, is consistent with the UK’s international obligations, given that the existence of such “clear risk” is one of its own criteria for determining compliance with these obligations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)
Government Response Summary
The government notes the recommendation and explains its current policy and legal position, stating that it undertakes regular assessments for F-35 components to ensure consistency with international obligations, and has set out details of its actions in its Judicial Review Skeleton Argument.
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
The Government notes the Committee’s recommendation. As the Committee highlights, one of our first acts in government was to review and suspend export licences that might be used by the IDF in the conflict in Gaza. We have successfully implemented that suspension and continue to refuse all relevant licence applications. As set out to Parliament, the only exception to the suspension is parts for the global F-35 programme, to protect its role in NATO and international peace and security. But we have suspended direct exports of F-35 parts for use by Israel. The High Court in its 30 June ruling upheld the Government’s thorough and lawful decision making on this matter and agreed that it is not possible for the UK to act unilaterally to prevent Israel receiving UK-made F-35 components through the global programme. We undertake regular assessments to ensure that all export licences, including for F-35 components, remain consistent with our international obligations such as the Genocide Convention and Arms Trade Treaty. This includes collating and reviewing information about the conflict to ensure decisions are made with the benefit of the latest information. Criterion 2(c) of the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria states that the government will not grant a licence if it determines there is a ‘clear risk’ that items ‘might’ be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of IHL. This is a different threshold than required under international law. We have set out in detail how our actions are consistent with our legal obligations in the Government’s Skeleton Argument from the recent Judicial Review, which was shared with the Committee. These are difficult issues, but the Government will always act in line with domestic and international law. Conclusion and recommendation 11–12