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Select committee inquiry

Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options inquiry

Closed

Foreign Affairs Committee · Opened 21 July 2015 · Closed 3 May 2017

1 recommendation · 14 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“The Foreign Affairs Committee is conducting an inquiry on UK Government foreign policy in relation to Libya. The Committee is interested in receiving written evidence on topics including the UK’s 2011 intervention, post-conflict assistance to the transitional administration, the breakdown in security and the UK’s role in addressing migration and people trafficking. Full terms of reference”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What the government said

The government responded on 25 November 2016.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.

The government rejects the Committee's central criticisms of the 2011 intervention and its analysis, while agreeing with several findings on post-2011 stabilisation, central authority and the arms embargo.

  • On the intervention, the government says UK decisions were based on British intelligence and policy judgements, and that it "arrived at the decision to support military intervention independently" of France.
  • On the National Security Council, it says it "is not persuaded of the merits" of a formal mechanism for non-ministerial members to request prime ministerial direction, and does not commit to the independent review the Committee called for.
  • It does not believe a review of the UN's role in coordinating stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction "is necessary", but says it will continue to encourage and support the UN to develop a more systematic approach.
  • It agrees that empowering a central authority should be its primary objective in Libya and that it should continue working to maintain the arms embargo. On training, it says deployment would depend on "the necessary political and security conditions" and that "there are currently no plans" to send British troops for security.

Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 21 July 2015 to its close on 3 May 2017.

  1. Oral evidence 6 sessions
  2. Report 14 Sep 2016
  3. Government response 25 Nov 2016
  4. Correspondence 8 letters

What it recommended 1 recommendation · 14 conclusions

1France led the international community in advancing the case for military intervention in Libya in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
France led the international community in advancing the case for military intervention in Libya in February and March 2011. UK policy followed decisions taken in France.
2The possibility that militant extremist groups would attempt to benefit from the rebellion should not...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The possibility that militant extremist groups would attempt to benefit from the rebellion should not have been the preserve of hindsight. Libyan connections with transnational militant extremist groups were known before 2011, because many Libyans had participated in the Iraq insurgency and in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda.
3We have seen no evidence that the UK Government carried out a proper analysis of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We have seen no evidence that the UK Government carried out a proper analysis of the nature of the rebellion in Libya. It may be that the UK Government was unable to analyse the nature of the rebellion in Libya due to incomplete intelligence and insufficient institutional insight and that it was caught up in events as they developed. It could not verify the actual threat to civilians posed by the Gaddafi regime; it selectively took elements of Muammar Gaddafi’s rhetoric at face value; and it failed to identify the militant Islamist extremist element in the rebellion. UK strategy was founded on erroneous assumptions and an incomplete understanding of the evidence.
4The UK’s intervention in Libya was reactive and did not comprise action in pursuit of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s intervention in Libya was reactive and did not comprise action in pursuit of a strategic objective. This meant that a limited intervention to protect civilians drifted into a policy of regime change by military means.
5Political options were available if the UK Government had adhered to the spirit of Resolution...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Political options were available if the UK Government had adhered to the spirit of Resolution 1973, implemented its original campaign plan and influenced its coalition allies to pause military action when Benghazi was secured in March
6We note former Prime Minister David Cameron’s decisive role when the National Security Council discussed...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We note former Prime Minister David Cameron’s decisive role when the National Security Council discussed intervention in Libya. We also note that Lord Richards implicitly dissociated himself from that decision in his oral evidence to this inquiry. The Government must commission an independent review of the operation of the NSC. This review should consider the merits of introducing a formal mechanism to allow non-ministerial NSC members to request prime ministerial direction to undertake actions agreed in the NSC. It should be informed by the conclusions of the Iraq Inquiry and examine whether the weaknesses in governmental decision- making in relation to the Iraq intervention in 2003 have been addressed by the introduction of the NSC.
7The Libyan state weakened its own limited institutional capacity by paying militias to provide security.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Libyan state weakened its own limited institutional capacity by paying militias to provide security. The growth of state-funded militias with local rather than national loyalties was a key destabilising factor after 2011.
8The FCO should lead the international community to review whether the United Nations is the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The FCO should lead the international community to review whether the United Nations is the appropriate body to co-ordinate stabilisation and reconstruction in a post-conflict environment and whether it has the appropriate resources, and if not to identify alternatives that could be more effective. Such a review is a practical and urgent requirement, because the United Nations might be asked to co-ordinate a similar mission in Syria, Yemen or Iraq in the near future.
9The level of funding provided by the international community and the UK was not the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The level of funding provided by the international community and the UK was not the decisive factor in the collapse of the Libyan state. Nevertheless a key problem was institutional incapacity to absorb financial and other resources provided by the international community, and this is something that should have been foreseen and planned for.
10The international community’s inability to secure weapons abandoned by the Gaddafi regime fuelled instability in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The international community’s inability to secure weapons abandoned by the Gaddafi regime fuelled instability in Libya and enabled and increased terrorism across North and West Africa and the Middle East. The UK Government correctly identified the need to secure weapons immediately after the 2011 Libyan civil war, but it and its international partners took insufficient action to achieve that objective. However, it is probable that none of the states that intervened in Libya would have been prepared to commit the necessary military and political resources to secure stocks of weapons and ammunition. That consideration should have informed their calculation to intervene.
11We recognise that the damaging experience of post-war intervention in Iraq engendered an understandable reluctance...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We recognise that the damaging experience of post-war intervention in Iraq engendered an understandable reluctance to impose solutions in Libya. However, because the UK along with France led the military intervention, it had a particular responsibility to support Libyan economic and political reconstruction, which became an impossible task because of the failure to establish security on the ground.
12The FCO must set out and re-examine the evidence base underpinning its assertion in October...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The FCO must set out and re-examine the evidence base underpinning its assertion in October 2014 that “planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean …create an unintended ‘pull factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing”. It must also assess whether planned search and rescue operations encouraged migrants to cross the Mediterranean in the first half of 2016 in the light of people smugglers’ current methods of operation in relation to international search and rescue. It should support Italian and wider European efforts to secure the agreement of countries of origin to accept, where possible, the repatriation of irregular migrants who have arrived in Europe but do not meet asylum criteria, as well as the need to tackle the main factors fuelling the desire to migrate. Given its role in the conflict and subsequent destabilisation in Libya, the UK has a particular responsibility in relation to migrants and refugees, an issue which has been exacerbated by the collapse of the Libyan state.
13While defeating all manifestations of violent extremism should remain a UK Government priority, the primary...
Concluded (the committee's words)
While defeating all manifestations of violent extremism should remain a UK Government priority, the primary objective in Libya should be to support a central authority that can deliver greater stability, address the root causes of extremism and act as an effective partner in the common struggle against militant groups.
14Regional actors have destabilised Libya and are fuelling internal conflict by exporting weapons and ammunition...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Regional actors have destabilised Libya and are fuelling internal conflict by exporting weapons and ammunition to proxy militias in contravention of the United Nations arms embargo. We welcome the Anglo-French initiative in the United Nations Security Council to extend the remit of Operation Sophia to include the inspection of suspicious vessels travelling to Libya. The FCO must continue collaborating with United Nations, European Union and NATO partners to maintain the arms embargo and work to influence states in the region to cease arms exports to Libyan militias.
15UK forces might play a useful role in training the Libyan Army and security forces,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UK forces might play a useful role in training the Libyan Army and security forces, but any such deployment must be configured to ensure that it does not boost anti- 42 Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s future policy options Western rhetoric or provide ISIL with a relatively accessible target. British troops should not be deployed to Libya in a training role until the GNA has established political control, stabilised internal security and made a formal request to the UK Government for such assistance, which should then be considered by the UK Parliament.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 6

Correspondence 8 letters