Select committee inquiry
The UK's response to extremism and political instability in North and West Africa
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Committee conducted an inquiry into the UK Government’s response to extremism and political instability in North and West Africa, looking into the factors that contributed to the crisis in Mali, whether they are at risk of arising elsewhere in the wider region, and the UK’s policy on dealing with them, including its work with international partners to combat extremism and instability.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What the government said
7th Report - The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa - Volume III (Volume III: additional written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
7th Report - The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa - Volume II (Volume II: Oral and written evidence)
No government response is linked to this report.
7th Report - The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa - Volume I (Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes)
The government responded on 2 June 2014.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government welcomes the Committee's inquiry and agrees with several of its conclusions, including on the need for a holistic approach and international co-ordination, while disagreeing with its assertion about Libya.
- It agrees that a holistic approach is needed in the Western Sahel-Sahara region, and says security co-operation is "an important element" of this.
- It disagrees with the Committee's assertion that there was a failure to anticipate and mitigate the regional fallout from the 2011 Libya intervention, citing "extensive post-conflict planning".
- On diplomatic resources, it "notes" the suggestion of a larger UK presence in the Sahel, will keep resourcing "under constant review", and says "there are no plans to open any new Missions in the region".
- On Nigeria, it describes a counter-terrorism package announced on 14 May, including aerial surveillance and a team of military experts, and says it "continue[s] to keep our assistance under review".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 22 March 2013 to its close on 30 March 2015.
- Report 3 reports
- Government response 2 Jun 2014
What it recommended 12 recommendations · 152 conclusions
1Addressing terrorism in the Western Sahel-Sahara region comprehensively means addressing the environmental conditions that are...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Addressing terrorism in the Western Sahel-Sahara region comprehensively means addressing the environmental conditions that are allowing it to grow: poverty and inequality, corruption and mis-governance, the pressure of fast-growing populations on depleting natural resources, insufficient cross-border co-operation, and the spread of extremist ideology. This is a huge task requiring international co-operation across a number of disciplines. We see signs that development and investment challenges are beginning to be addressed, but are concerned that co-operation on security matters should not be neglected.
2We recognise that the UK Government has sought to secure international co- operation, for instance...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recognise that the UK Government has sought to secure international co- operation, for instance through the communiqué agreed at the 2013 G8 summit. We recommend that the UK Government, in its response to this report, outlines how it proposes to maintain momentum on this issue over the remainder of this Parliament, particularly in relation to security and intelligence co-operation.
3The UK Government was right to back France’s intervention in Mali in January 2013, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government was right to back France’s intervention in Mali in January 2013, and to provide practical assistance. France’s intervention was justified and necessary: the threat to the whole country appeared credible, given the state of the Malian military and the lack of a regional response. The intervention also helped prevent the humanitarian catastrophe beginning to unfold in northern Mali from significantly worsening. It is too early to say whether Mali is now “safe”: this in any case requires more than military intervention, but we can say that Operation Serval was, in military terms, a success.
4The UK’s ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at In Amenas, Algeria, in...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The UK’s ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013 was limited, given the nature of the Algerian state. However, it is evident that, at the moment of crisis, the channels of communication that the UK wanted to access were not available, indicating that there is an ongoing need to develop key relationships at political and diplomatic levels. We accept that this will be challenging. We note that the FCO has taken steps to ascertain whether there are lessons to be learned from the attack, and is working closely with industry to ensure better co-ordination and information-sharing on security matters, in order to ensure that British expatriate workers are as safe as possible. We urge the Government to ensure that this includes contractors and subcontractors of companies, as well as employees.
5We note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that it would in due...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that it would in due course secure more information from its Algerian counterparts on the circumstances 8 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa surrounding the mission to recover the plant from the terrorists. We would be grateful for an update.
6The UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns about assisting the Nigerian...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns about assisting the Nigerian military. We fully understand the Government’s dilemma but consider it important that the UK do whatever it can, consistent with its respect for human rights values, to assist Nigeria in its battle against Boko Haram’s uniquely repellent brand of extremism. We ask the Government to be mindful of the importance of effective counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries, given our strong diaspora links with Nigeria, and of the possibility of Nigeria eventually seeking security assistance elsewhere, perhaps from countries with far fewer scruples than the UK has. We note that the UK Government provides training and assistance to other armies in the developing world and seek clarification from the Government that it is satisfied that its position is entirely consistent.
7We agree with the UK Government that parts of North and West Africa have become...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with the UK Government that parts of North and West Africa have become a new frontline in the contest with Islamist extremism and terrorism.
8However, we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime Minister’s concerns that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime Minister’s concerns that the empty quarters of the region have become a “magnet for jihadists”.
9The threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region is immediate, frightening and real. The prospect of another extremist “takeover” of territory somewhere in the Western Sahel cannot be ruled out. However, it is important to maintain a sense of proportion about the scale of the military threat the extremists pose. The precedent of Mali in 2013 suggests that they would struggle to hold territory in the face of any Western-led intervention. We are aware of no evidence that extremists in the region yet pose an “existential threat” to the West.
10UK interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorism and will...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UK interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorism and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, whatever the level of UK engagement in counter-terrorism. It is possible that greater engagement might lead to increased targeting of UK interests, and citizens. However, we agree with the Prime Minister that UK and Western disengagement from the region, and failure to seek to address terrorism and its causes, would in the longer term carry greater risks for the UK.
11We urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible radicalisation within...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible radicalisation within North and West African diaspora communities, bearing in mind that dialogue and positive engagement with these communities could also contribute to an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
12The UK’s policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may have helped protect vulnerable...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may have helped protect vulnerable UK citizens abroad. We acknowledge the Prime Minister’s global leadership in seeking to eradicate ransom payments. Countries that continue to flout the ban on payments are guilty of strengthening the terrorists’ hand. The UK should continue to discreetly but firmly press its allies to end this practice.
13Recent events underline the difficulty of monitoring events in the Western Sahel- Sahara region, anticipating...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Recent events underline the difficulty of monitoring events in the Western Sahel- Sahara region, anticipating crises, and responding to them as they unfold, particularly when diplomatic resources are limited. They also underline that, whilst the Sahara may be a departmental barrier within the FCO, it is not one for terrorists. The UK Government should reflect on weaknesses in analysis that the events appear to have exposed, and how these might be rectified at departmental level. This applies particularly in relation to intervention in Libya in 2011: considerable resources were expended ensuring that military goals were successfully achieved (for which the Government deserves credit), but there was a failure to anticipate, and therefore mitigate, the regional fallout from the intervention, which has been enormous and, in some cases, disastrous.
14Looking to the future, the UK’s very limited diplomatic resources in and around the Western...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Looking to the future, the UK’s very limited diplomatic resources in and around the Western Sahel will make it difficult for the Government to achieve its ambitions to be more intensively involved in the region and to help shape events as they unfold. The Government should consider increasing its resources in the region and its reserves of specialist knowledge. If not, it should scale back its ambitions—and its rhetoric.
15We suggest that the UK Government contemplate an enhancement of its diplomatic profile in Francophone...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We suggest that the UK Government contemplate an enhancement of its diplomatic profile in Francophone parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region. This would be consistent with the Government’s commitment towards greater engagement with the region. It would appear that a raised UK profile in the region would be welcomed and it seems probable that the UK may be able to offer advice and assistance in a way that some other countries could not. Far from raising the risk of the UK and France wastefully “doubling up” diplomatic resources, we suggest that it will increase opportunities for the two countries to work together fruitfully on security, development and political co-operation in the region, as they have been doing in Mali.
16There is a need for a step-change in the co-ordination of international efforts to combat...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is a need for a step-change in the co-ordination of international efforts to combat insecurity, and the drivers of insecurity, in and around the Western Sahel. We propose that the UK Government press its international partners for agreement to a common security and stability policy for the Western Sahel. Lead responsibility for securing implementation of the policy should rest with a tripartite leadership of France, the UK and the US, supported by others, including the European External Action Service.
17There is an emerging pattern of evidence of the UK and its main partners being...
Recommended (the committee's words)
There is an emerging pattern of evidence of the UK and its main partners being unsighted by events in and around the Sahel region. The international community’s successive failure, in Mali and in the Central African Republic, to anticipate events and to respond to them speedily as they unfolded, is worrying. We accept that the UK was not the only country to be unsighted by events and acknowledge that its diplomatic resources in both countries are light. We recommend that the UK Government seek to raise at international level the need for more effective early warning systems in and around the Western Sahel region.
18Renewed proposals within the African Union for a standby military force are welcome, and we...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Renewed proposals within the African Union for a standby military force are welcome, and we would support the UK and its international partners seeking to assist in building capacity. It is reasonable to assume that it will be some time before there are wholly African solutions to African problems of equivalent scale to those in Mali and the Central African Republic. This places an onus on the UK and its international partners to ensure that contingency plans are in place to deal with future crises.
19Algeria and Morocco are both key to delivering increased stability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Algeria and Morocco are both key to delivering increased stability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region, and effective bilateral relations with both countries are essential. Partnership with Algeria does present some challenges, particularly in relation to Algeria’s security and intelligence services, but we believe that a constructive and effective relationship can be maintained if the UK is realistic in its aims and maintains its red lines on issues of particular importance such as respect for human rights. We note encouraging signs that Algeria is willing to engage with the UK on a more open basis than it perhaps did in the past.
20Conflict over the Western Sahara issue has had a toxic effect on regional co- operation...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Conflict over the Western Sahara issue has had a toxic effect on regional co- operation in North-West Africa, including on security issues. The intensification of the terrorist threat in the region, combined with the gradual generational shift in political leadership, may present an opening for new approaches to resolving the conflict to be tested. We would encourage the UK Government to explore options for helping to bring the different sides together.
21We agree with both the aims of the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas strategy to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with both the aims of the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas strategy to integrate foreign, security and development policies, and the premises that inform it.
22We invite the Government to comment on whether its bilateral aid programme for Nigeria is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We invite the Government to comment on whether its bilateral aid programme for Nigeria is making satisfactory progress against goals set out in the Building Security Overseas strategy and, if so, how this progress has been measured. We also suggest that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, in its work evaluating DFID’s approach to anti-corruption, treat DFID’s work in Nigeria as a case study.
23We draw these remarks to the attention of the International Development Committee.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We draw these remarks to the attention of the International Development Committee.
24We note that the opportunity is currently open to debate the purpose and definition of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the opportunity is currently open to debate the purpose and definition of overseas development assistance, and that the UK Government will be a contributor. We would invite the UK Government to consider whether the current definition has the effect of restricting or preventing the development of aid programmes based around delivering increased security. We also invite the Government to respond to evidence we received during the inquiry that countries of the Western Sahel would welcome non-military development assistance to help strengthen their borders against terrorism and trans-national organised crime. We draw these views to the attention of the International Development Committee.
25We are supportive of signals from the UK Government that it is considering an extension...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are supportive of signals from the UK Government that it is considering an extension of its programme of offering military training to vulnerable countries. We see this as a practical way for the UK to help bolster security and stability in fragile states. We also see it as naturally complementary to programmes to develop improved governance delivered through development aid packages. We are mindful that, in undertaking any such work, it is necessary to be realistic, as success in transmitting values and standards is not assured. We would welcome an update on UK Government policy on the future of the EU Training Mission in Mali.
26The crisis in Mali raises questions about the administration of development aid in fragile countries.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The crisis in Mali raises questions about the administration of development aid in fragile countries. There is evidence that development aid appears to have become part of the problem rather than part of the solution in Mali, inhibiting the development of responsive and responsible government and entrenching corruption in its political culture, in a manner inconsistent with the Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy. We are also concerned to ensure that development aid programmes in Mali and elsewhere are better monitored in future. Mali remains a fragile democracy affected by internal political tensions, as well as the threat of terrorism.
27We consider that the FCO has a role in relation to monitoring these projects alongside...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that the FCO has a role in relation to monitoring these projects alongside DFID, particularly where (as in Mali) DFID does not have a direct bilateral relationship with the country concerned. We also suggest that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, in its work evaluating DFID’s funding of multilateral aid and the scaling up of aid spending, consider treating Mali as a case study.
28We draw these comments to the attention of the International Development Committee.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We draw these comments to the attention of the International Development Committee.
29There is clear evidence that high population growth in the developing world is often linked...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is clear evidence that high population growth in the developing world is often linked to political instability and to the spread of radical or extremist views. We suggest that recent events in the Western Sahel may provide further evidence of that correlation. While we are concerned that DFID do not acknowledge this link, we commend the UK Government for prioritising increased access to family planning in the developing world and call on it to ensure that the issue remains on the international agenda.
30We urge the UK to press for greater clarity from the EU on its policies...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the UK to press for greater clarity from the EU on its policies for handling increased migration to Europe from Sahelian countries, and in particular on whether, when potential immigrants are located on boats in the Mediterranean, they are turned back or ushered to safety.
31Analysis and policy-making about terrorism and insecurity in the areas covered by this report suffers...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Analysis and policy-making about terrorism and insecurity in the areas covered by this report suffers from a lack of information on some key issues. We consider that increasing the gathering, and analysis, of information and intelligence on terrorism in and around the Western Sahel should be a priority for the UK Government and its international partners.
32In this chapter, we discuss the three main terrorist events mentioned in paragraph 1, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In this chapter, we discuss the three main terrorist events mentioned in paragraph 1, and consider the UK Government’s initial decisions taken in response to them, starting with its decision to support intervention in Mali. The jihadist takeover of northern Mali
33Mali, a landlocked country of 15.5 million people five times bigger than the UK, comprises...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Mali, a landlocked country of 15.5 million people five times bigger than the UK, comprises two unequal “halves” joined at a narrow central waist. Southern Mali is where the vast majority of the population live, around the capital Bamako. Most southern Malians are black Africans, of various ethnic groups. Northern Mali covers a larger area, but is very thinly populated, being mainly desert or mountain. In the north, Arabs and Tuaregs live in a sometimes uneasy coexistence with black African peoples. Discontent with rule in faraway Bamako has simmered in the north, amongst Tuaregs especially, ever since independence from France in 1960.56
34Mali’s crisis began with a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in March
Concluded (the committee's words)
Mali’s crisis began with a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in March
35Whilst the crisis unfolded, Mali’s army stalled, apparently incapable of launching a credible mission to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Whilst the crisis unfolded, Mali’s army stalled, apparently incapable of launching a credible mission to recover its own territory. Mali’s neighbours—partner countries in ECOWAS,59 the regional body in West Africa for economic and security co-operation— also hesitated.60 When we met ECOWAS’s military and political leadership in Abuja, Nigeria, they told us that this was because they considered it necessary to receive an 56 Ev w23 (Guy Lankester); Ev w30 (Joliba Trust) Ev w32-33 (Dr Benjamin Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzemann) 57 “Mali Crisis: “Gao protests ‘stop hand amputation”, BBC News Online, 6 August 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19155616 58 “Mali: Islamists destroy more holy Timbuktu sites, Reuters: 1 July 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/01/us- mali-crisis-idUSBRE8600EC20120701 59 ECOWAS’s full name is the Economic Community of West African States 60 Q 36 (Jon Marks) 26 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa unambiguous request for military assistance from the interim Malian government, and this had never come. In late December 2012, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2085, mandating an African-led international force to intervene in northern Mali, but the African Union was still months away from being able to put troops on the ground.
36On 9 January 2013, a sudden push southwards by the jihadists appeared to open up...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On 9 January 2013, a sudden push southwards by the jihadists appeared to open up the possibility of the entire country falling. Two days later, at the invitation of Mali’s interim government, France intervened militarily, with logistical support from the UK, in an operation codenamed Operation Serval. Some 3800 French troops were deployed, along with units of the French Air Force, and with military support from some African countries, especially Chad. Within less than a month, the extremists had been routed from all the main population centres in the north, and central authority had been restored. Mali today
37Following the recovery of the north, the emphasis has shifted to restoring normality and political...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following the recovery of the north, the emphasis has shifted to restoring normality and political stability to all of Mali. Progress has been made: a new President and National Assembly have been elected, and the flow of development aid from donor countries has begun to be restored. Under pressure from France and other Western countries, the Malian government has also agreed to talk to non-Islamist Tuareg militants about the possibility of decentralising some power, on condition that they acknowledge Mali’s territorial sovereignty. A commission for dialogue and national reconciliation has also been set up. An EU Training Mission is working with the Malian army to make it more effective and professional. However, major challenges remain, particularly in relation to the north, where hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced.61 We heard in Mali that many are very reluctant to return to the north, because of the fear of ethnically-based reprisals from the army or police or from local militias.62 Pockets of insurgency remain in the north, and we are concerned to note that, since we drew evidence-taking on this inquiry to a close, unrest and violence there has been growing.63 We understand that some of this may be linked to a loss of momentum in talks between Tuareg leaders and the Malian government and some to extremists apparently beginning to regroup. We should add that when we visited Mali we gained the impression that the division between Islamist and non-Islamist Tuareg militants may not always be clear-cut on the ground. The militant groups in northern Mali: AQIM and MUJAO
38Three groups jointly controlled northern Mali.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Three groups jointly controlled northern Mali. One, called Ansar Dine, appeared to be mainly the outfit of a local clan leader, committed to establishing an Islamist Tuareg state in northern Mali. It allied initially with the main non-Islamist Tuareg separatist movement, 61 The UN High Commission for Refugees (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484e66.html )has estimated that, as of December 2013, there were 165,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mali, mainly around Bamako, just under half of whom were being assisted by the UNHCR. This is down from over 350,000 earlier in the year. The UNHCR does not appear to have a single statistic to denote refugees from Mali, but, as of December2013, the total number of Malian refugees in neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger was estimated at 160,000. This is only slightly lower than the UNHCR’s mid-2013 figure. We were informed in Mali that most IDPs are black Africans from the north, whereas many or most Malian refugees are Tuareg. This appears to corroborate evidence that Tuaregs are more wary of returning to their homes in the north than non-Tuaregs. 62 See also Ev w21 (Guy Lankester) 63 Report of the 7095th meeting of the UN Security Council, 16 January 2014http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7095.pdf The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 27 the MNLA, before switching to the jihadists.64 It has since split, with factions claiming to have renounced extremism.65 The two other movements had, and have, wider ambitions: • Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), originating in the defeat of Islamists in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. A few survivors regrouped, rebranding around 2006-7 as AQIM, and pledging loyalty to the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQIM has long had cells in northern Algeria but has been gaining strength further south; in desert regions of Algeria, Libya, Niger and Mali.66 AQIM are known to be involved in smuggling, extortion and kidnapping,67 and many of its leaders are understood to have married into desert clans, cementing their position in the community, and enabling them to key into lucrative local trade and trafficking networks.68 We have also heard of some evidence that AQIM have been bankrolled by rich foreign sympathisers.69 AQIM appear to see themselves as the natural leadership of the jihadist movement in North and West Africa;70 • The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (usually known by their French acronym MUJAO), which originated in 2011 as a West African splinter group from AQIM, dissenting at the dominance of AQIM’s mainly Algerian Arab leadership. MUJAO appears to be strongest in Mauritania, Mali and Niger and its main income may be hostage-taking; it is thought to have made tens of millions of dollars from ransoming captured Westerners.71 Documents recovered following the recovery of northern Mali show AQIM rebuking MUJAO for an over-zealous application of Sharia in the areas the latter controlled.72 The UK’s support for Operation Serval
39The UK Government supported France’s intervention, diplomatically and practically.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government supported France’s intervention, diplomatically and practically. The UK loaned two C-17 cargo planes to provide logistical support, as well as a detachment of around 20 technical personnel. This was later augmented by a Sentinel R1 aircraft sent to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.73 The UK’s decision was taken swiftly, in response to the sudden, 64 Burkina Faso Official Goes to Islamist-Held Northern Mali in Effort to Avert War, New York Times, 7 August 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/africa/burkina-faso-official-visits-mali-in-effort-to-avert-war.html 65 Mali's Ansar Dine Islamists 'split and want talks', BBC News Online, 24 January 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21180766 66 Q 43 (Jon Marks) 67 Q 140 (Virginia Comolli) Ev w 9 (Dr Sajjan Gohel); Ev w13 (Dr Claire Spencer) 68 Ev w9 (Dr Sajjan Gohel); Q 43 (Jon Marks) 69 Q 26 (Imad Mesdoua); Ev w28 (Joliba Trust)See also Directorate-General for External Policies of the EU, The involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world, June 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf 70 Mali Islamists warned about Sharia in al-Qaeda 'manifesto, BBC News Online, 26 February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21587055 71 Ev 13 (Dr Claire Spencer); “Freed Italian, Spanish hostages head for Europe”, Reuters, 19 July 2012 http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSBRE86I0JQ20120719 ; International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “Mali and the narco-terrorists”, 13 March 2013 http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-commentaries/mali-and-the- narco-terrorists 72 Mali Islamists warned about Sharia in al-Qaeda 'manifesto, BBC News Online, 26 February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21587055 73 HC Deb, 29 January 2013, col 781 28 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa unexpected move south by the jihadists, which in turn provoked a rapid French response. In May 2013, we asked our first set of witnesses whether Operation Serval would turn out to be a success.74 At that point, the terrorists appeared to have been routed, but there was still guerrilla fighting in some areas, and uncertainty as to how solid France’s military gains would turn out to be. Some commentators had argued that the intervention, and the UK’s support for it was a tactical error.75 Our witnesses answered that it was too early to say whether the intervention would succeed, and arguably this remains the case: Mali remains a tense country with a number of security and political problems.76 France has not yet been able to effect a drawdown of troops from Mali as scheduled, several informal deadlines having come and gone.77 The longer it has stayed, the more France has been drawn into domestic political conflict and lost popularity, 78 as we noted at first hand when we visited in June.
40None of these factors should obscure Operation Serval’s success as a military operation: it routed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
None of these factors should obscure Operation Serval’s success as a military operation: it routed the jihadists from their northern stronghold, with limited loss of civilian life.79 Despite a worrying rise in recent guerrilla attacks, gains have been held: territory has not leaked back to the jihadists. This has provided the space for Mali to begin the journey back to stability and democracy. The rapid recovery of the north also saved the people of northern Mali from continuing jihadist rule and helped reduce, if not arrest, the humanitarian crisis beginning to unfold in the north.
41In calculating whether to intervene in January 2013, France would have had to have taken...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In calculating whether to intervene in January 2013, France would have had to have taken into account how serious a prospect there was of Bamako falling to the jihadists. Given that the total number of Islamist militants in Mali may never had exceeded three of four thousand, this would appear prima facie unlikely, and we heard evidence that the jihadists may not actually have intended to march all the way to the capital.80 On the other hand, in early January France was taking a decision in real time about an unpredictable enemy, against a backdrop of political infighting in Bamako and splits in the Malian army. We should add that those of us who visited Bamako were informed of intelligence that there were Islamist sleeper cells in Bamako and other southern cities.
42The UK Government was right to back France’s intervention in Mali in January 2013, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government was right to back France’s intervention in Mali in January 2013, and to provide practical assistance. France’s intervention was justified and necessary: the threat to the whole country appeared credible, given the state of the Malian military and the lack of a regional response. The intervention also helped prevent the humanitarian catastrophe beginning to unfold in northern Mali from significantly worsening. It is too early to say whether Mali is now “safe”: this in any case 74 Q 2-3 (Professor Paul Rogers and Imad Mesdoua). See also Q 58 (Professor Michael Clarke) 75 “UK intervention in Mali treads a familiar – and doomed – path”, Simon Jenkins, The Guardian, 30 January 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/30/david-cameron-creep-speak-imperialism “In Search of Monsters”, Stephen W Smith, London Review of Books, 7 February 2013 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n03/stephen-w- smith/in-search-of-monsters See also “Responses to Sahel Terrorism: Music to Jihadist Ears”, Professor Michael Clarke, RUSI Analysis, 22 Jan 2013, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C50FED9E953BBC/ 76 Q 68-71 (Professor Michael Clarke); Q 263 (Mark Simmonds MP) 77 Q 63 (Professor Michael Clarke) 78 Ev w3-4 (Alliance for Mali); Insecurity in northern Mali strains relations between Bamako and France, The Guardian, 26 November 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/mali-france-kidal-tuareg-al-qaida-tension 79 Q 58 (Professor Michael Clarke) 80 Q 4 (Professor Paul Rogers) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 29 requires more than military intervention, but we can say that Operation Serval was, in military terms, a success. Algeria: the attack at In Amenas
43Five days after France launched Operation Serval in Mali, news emerged that the vast Tigantourine...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Five days after France launched Operation Serval in Mali, news emerged that the vast Tigantourine gas facility in Algeria had been overrun by terrorists. The facility, which is run jointly by BP, Statoil of Norway, and the Algerian state-owned Sonatrach company, is responsible for around 10% of Algeria’s gas production, and is situated in a remote desert area in the south-east of the country, near the small town of In Amenas. The terrorists, numbering around 40, targeted the approximately 135 foreign workers based at the plant, seeking to take as many as possible hostages. Barely 24 hours after the capture of the plant, the Algerian government launched a military operation on the site. The siege ended around two days later with the plant recovered and most or all of the militants captured or dead. Forty workers were left dead, including six UK citizens. Belmohktar, the Signed in Blood Brigade and Al Murabitun
44The self-proclaimed mastermind of the attack—though it appears he did not personally take part—was Mokhtar...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The self-proclaimed mastermind of the attack—though it appears he did not personally take part—was Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former AQIM battalion leader. Connected through marriages to various Tuareg clans, Belmokhtar is thought to have made millions of dollars from kidnapping, weapons dealing and smuggling.81 He split from AQIM in 2012, following clashes with its leaders, founding a breakaway group: the Signed in Blood Brigade. It has been suggested that the group’s goals in launching the attack may have been twofold: to blow the plant up, thus creating the propaganda “spectacular” that would prove the group’s, and Belmohktar’s, credentials as new and serious jihadi “players” to doubting former associates; and to escape to Libya or Mali with as many hostages as possible.82 Reports83 that Belmokhtar had been killed in Mali in April 2013 appear to have been unfounded. A person claiming to be him claimed responsibility online for masterminding two suicide attacks in Niger in May 2013. In August 2013, there was a further announcement on the internet that the Signed in Blood Brigade and MUJAO had merged into a new group: Al Murabitun, its name an echo of a much older jihadist movement in north-west Africa,84 committed to waging jihad “from the Nile to the Atlantic”.85 The group has issued threats since its formation, expressly singling out France as a future target for its campaigns because of its involvement in Africa, but appears to have not yet staged any major attacks. 81 Q 41-42 (John Marks); Ev w29 (Joliba Trust) 82 Q 42 (John Marks); Statoil, Report of the investigation into the terrorist attack at In Amenas ,2013, page 40; http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Downloads/In%20Amenas%20report.pdf 83 “Islamist militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'killed in Mali'”, BBC News online, 4 March 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21645769 84 This name (roughly translating as the Sentinels or the Keepers of the Fortress) is also the name of the Berber dynasty that conquered and ruled large parts of north-west Africa and Spain in the 11th and 12th centuries. In English, the dynasty is better known as the Almoravids. 85 “Al-Murabitun: North Africa's Jihadists Reach into History in Their Battle against European "Crusaders”", The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 17 November 2013: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5295e2af4.html 30 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa
45Government ministers we met in Algiers attributed the crisis to a decrease in security along...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Government ministers we met in Algiers attributed the crisis to a decrease in security along Algeria’s southern and eastern borders, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, and the uprising in northern Mali. (In Amenas is some 30 kilometres from the frontier with Libya and it would appear that the attack was launched from across the border.86) This is also one of the main conclusions of a report commissioned by Statoil, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the crisis.87 The report’s other main conclusion, expressed in somewhat coded language, is that the performance of the Algerian military and gendarmerie, who were formally responsible for protecting the outer perimeter of the site, fell short of what the managers of the plant could have expected: they failed first to detect the attack and then to respond to it before the attackers had entered the perimeter.88 We understand that the Algerian Government’s main practical response has been to step up security in the south, including in relation to large hydrocarbon sites.89 We also understand that formal inquiries by the Algerian authorities into the attack are continuing, and that in due course there will be a trial of surviving terrorists.90 UK response to the crisis
46The evidence we have received about Algeria’s security service presents it as a tough, secretive,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The evidence we have received about Algeria’s security service presents it as a tough, secretive, and practically autonomous body, hardened by the bloody experience of the 1990s civil war, that would always be likely to deal with domestic terrorist incidents on its own uncompromising terms.91 It appears that the UK and other foreign governments caught up in the crisis were in essence bystanders not only to the attack itself, but also to the Algerian response. We note reports of the UK Government being frustrated at a lack of communication from the Algerian Government prior to the military operation being launched,92 but in his 21 January statement to the House, the Prime Minister said that he understood the challenges that the Algerian Government had faced in responding to the attack, and that responsibility for the deaths lay squarely with the terrorists. He also committed the UK to deepening its counter-terrorism co-operation with Algeria in future.93
47The survivors of the crisis and relatives of the deceased whom we met told us...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The survivors of the crisis and relatives of the deceased whom we met told us that they felt that many of their questions about the crisis had not been answered. They expressed concerns that the UK would put future co-operation with Algeria ahead of asking awkward questions about how the authorities had dealt with the crisis. We do understand these 86 Q 45 (Jon Marks) 87 Statoil, Report of the investigation into the terrorist attack at In Amenas, (2013), page 40; http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Downloads/In%20Amenas%20report.pdf BP has decided not to carry out a formal review whilst judicial proceedings in the UK and Algeria are ongoing, a decision which survivors of the crisis and deceased relatives criticised when we met them in July 2013. A coroner’s inquiry is being carried out in the UK but we understand that progress has been slow whilst the coroner awaits information from Algeria. 88 See also Q 45 (Jon Marks) 89 “Algeria security reassures energy industry”, Financial Times, 13 March 2013,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faddb9f8- 8759-11e2-bde6-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2v6I1p4Zy 90 Ev 80-82 91 Q 35 (Imad Mesdoua); Q 75 (Professor Michael Clarke). Ev w15 (Dr Claire Spencer.) 92 Britain to work with Algeria on counter-terrorism, says David Cameron, The Guardian, 30 January 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/30/uk-algeria-counter-terrorism-training 93 HC Deb, 21 January 2013 cols 26 and 42 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 31 views, but the bulk of the evidence we have received leads us to believe that efforts by the UK to put pressure for answers on the Algerian authorities are unlikely to be successful, and may even be counter-productive.94 The Secretary of State told us in correspondence that the UK Government had open channels of communication with the Algerian authorities about the incident and that he was hopeful that the Algerian authorities would provide more information once their investigations were at a more advanced stage. He also said that the FCO had responded to the events at In Amenas by seeking to make available to companies, employees and contractors travel advice that was more context-specific, and by pursuing deeper engagement on security issues with companies working in at-risk areas that employ British nationals, or take on British contractors. We note from our meeting with victims and survivors that a number of UK nationals working at In Amenas did not have a direct contractual relationship with BP.95
48The UK’s ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at In Amenas, Algeria, in...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The UK’s ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013 was limited, given the nature of the Algerian state. However, it is evident that, at the moment of crisis, the channels of communication that the UK wanted to access were not available, indicating that there is an ongoing need to develop key relationships at political and diplomatic levels. We accept that this will be challenging. We note that the FCO has taken steps to ascertain whether there are lessons to be learned from the attack, and is working closely with industry to ensure better co-ordination and information-sharing on security matters, in order to ensure that British expatriate workers are as safe as possible. We urge the Government to ensure that this includes contractors and subcontractors of companies, as well as employees.
49We note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that it would in due...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that it would in due course secure more information from its Algerian counterparts on the circumstances surrounding the mission to recover the plant from the terrorists. We would be grateful for an update. Nigeria
50Nigeria is split along its middle between a mainly Christian south and a mainly Muslim...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Nigeria is split along its middle between a mainly Christian south and a mainly Muslim north. In the middle belt and in the larger cities, there are mixed populations where relations between Christians and Muslims have sometimes been tense, sliding occasionally into rioting and murder. Islamist political movements made their first appearance in northern Nigeria in the 1970s, since when demands for a more Islamic public sphere in the region have grown.96 Following the restoration of civilian rule in 1999, every northern state adopted Sharia. Community relations in mixed areas have in general worsened since the restoration of civilian rule. Interlocutors in Nigeria put this down to a number of factors. These included the irresponsible behaviour of some politicians seeking to mobilise particular voting blocs, or of local media in the way they reported stories; perceptions of an increasing gap in economic performance between north and south;97 and, in the religious sphere, a growing tendency for more strident voices—on both sides—to drown out the 94 Q 37 (Jon Marks); Q 75 (Professor Michael Clarke) 95 Ev 80-82 96 Q 118 (Virginia Comolli) 97 See also Q 90 (Sir Richard Gozney) and Q 118 (Virginia Comolli) 32 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa voices of moderation. Some people also referred to a lack of shared social space between Christians and Muslims, leading them to lead separate lives, even where communities lived alongside each other, and a lack of real opportunities for young people in the social as well as the economic sphere. Boko Haram emerges
51Since 2009, this escalation in tensions has been accompanied by a campaign of terror propagated...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Since 2009, this escalation in tensions has been accompanied by a campaign of terror propagated by the extremist Boko Haram group. The movement (whose name is usually translated as “Western education is forbidden”) emerged in around 2001, in the mainly Kanuri-speaking north-east; the cradle of Islam in Nigeria, but today one of the country’s poorest regions.98 Boko Haram rejects everything “Western” as sinful, and shuns contact with anyone not acting in accordance with its strict interpretation of Islamic law. Accordingly, it rejects the Nigerian state. Its main political aim appears to be to impose a literalist form of Sharia, although whether this is a local or global cause is unclear.99 Some of our Nigerian interlocutors suggested that Boko Haram was an essentially nihilist organisation with no coherent political agenda, whose main aim was simply to spread terror.100
52Initially Boko Haram focussed on teaching and preaching, but in 2009, amidst concerns that it...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Initially Boko Haram focussed on teaching and preaching, but in 2009, amidst concerns that it was arming and becoming a security risk, the Nigerian government arrested its leadership. Riots broke out across the north-east, with hundreds killed. Boko Haram’s then leader, Mohammed Yusuf, died in police custody. This marks the point of Boko Haram’s transformation into an overtly terrorist paramilitary movement.101 Since 2009, it has killed thousands, targeting churches, schools, government buildings, and the UN office in Abuja, as well as soldiers and police officers. It is thought that health workers administering the polio vaccine who were assassinated in February 2013 were killed by Boko Haram,102 whilst more recently there have been reports of Christian women and girls being captured, forcibly “converted” to Islam, and married off to Boko Haram militants.103 It is Christians in vulnerable areas who have been disproportionately targeted, but members of northern Nigeria’s Muslim elites, and ordinary Muslims connected however remotely with the state apparatus, have also been attacked and killed. As a military movement, Boko Haram is understood to be loosely organised, 104 meaning that in some cases attacks attributed to “Boko Haram” may not have been carried out at the direct behest of the leadership. It has cells scattered across Nigeria, but the main concentration is in the north-east. 98 Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%, BBC News Online, 13 February 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-17015873 99 Q 123 (Virginia Comolli) 100 Comparisons were made with the Kharijites; a schismatic and revolutionary sect that violently rejected the authority of the early Caliphs and declared jihad on all other “apostate” Muslims 101 Q 119 (Virginia Comolli) 102 Nigeria polio vaccinators shot dead in Kano, BBC News Online 8 February 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-21381773 103 Insight—Boko Haram, taking to hills, seize slave 'brides', Reuters, 17 November 2013 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/17/us-nigeria-security-islamists-insight-idUSBRE9AG04120131117 104 Q 121 (Virginia Comolli) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 33 Ansaru
53In around 2011, Boko Haram suffered a split, with the formation of Ansaru,105 following apparent...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In around 2011, Boko Haram suffered a split, with the formation of Ansaru,105 following apparent disagreements over tactics, and possible ethnic tensions between the mainly Kanuri-speaking leadership and Hausa-speaking followers.106 Ansaru claims to be aligned with the global jihadist movement and is thought to be linked to al Qaeda,107 but appears to lack the same depth of grassroots support as Boko Haram. Its main activity so far has been taking Westerners hostage.108 Ansaru’s activities have also included raids on prisons to free Boko Haram captives indicating that the two groups are not completely estranged.109 The state of emergency
54By 2012, there were reports of swathes of the north-east becoming no-go areas beyond the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
By 2012, there were reports of swathes of the north-east becoming no-go areas beyond the control of state and federal authorities,110 of a step-up in Boko Haram’s military capacity, and of it beginning to take on army targets directly.111 In May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three north-eastern states, sending thousands of troops into the region. The state of emergency was renewed in November 2013. The Government’s official message is that the army is winning, although the lack of objective information from the frontline makes this difficult to verify.112
55When we visited Nigeria in early September, senior counter-terrorism officials in the federal government told...
Concluded (the committee's words)
When we visited Nigeria in early September, senior counter-terrorism officials in the federal government told us that Boko Haram had been pushed out of the towns and cities into the bush, that many of its senior leaders had been killed, and that its communications systems had been disrupted. The military experts told us that there were probably still a few thousand active partisans in the north-east, and we viewed video footage (which we understood to be recent) of a Boko Haram gathering in the bush numbering in the low hundreds. The officials told us that, despite recent advances, Nigeria would still welcome military assistance from the UK and others to help to finish the job. At a meeting with the Governor of Borno state, epicentre of the current violence, he alleged that a failure by the Cameroonian Government to protect its border with Nigeria from Boko Haram infiltration had enabled the movement to create a new safe haven in Kanuri-speaking parts 105 This is the shortened form of a name translating from Arabic as the “Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa”. 106 Q 122 (Virginia Comolli) 107 Q 123 (Virginia Comolli); The UK Government’s current travel advice for Nigeria describes Ansaru as being “broadly aligned with Al Qaeda” https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/nigeria/terrorism 108 Ev 67-68 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 109 “What do we know about Ansaru?”, Think Africa Press, 22 January 2014 http://thinkafricapress.com/nigeria/who- are-ansaru 110 Q 125 (Virginia Comolli) 111 “Nigeria braces for escalation in terrorist attacks”, The Guardian, 25 September 2012 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/nigeria-terrorist-attacks-boko-haram “Boko Haram timeline: from preachers to slave traders”, BBC News Online, 15 May 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22538888 112 Q 120 (Virginia Comolli) 34 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa of Cameroon’s far north, beyond the reach of the Nigerian military. Recent news report indicate increasing evidence of Boko Haram infiltration of northern Cameroon.113
56Until recently, Boko Haram had tended to be assessed as a cult-like body operating outside...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Until recently, Boko Haram had tended to be assessed as a cult-like body operating outside the jihadist mainstream, but the counter-terrorism experts we met told us of increasing evidence of contact between Boko Haram and other extremist groups, and that Boko Haram’s military tactics were increasingly convergent with those of the wider al Qaeda movement.114 The movement also appears to have begun kidnapping Westerners for ransom,115 and the experts told us that this may have been as a direct result of an instruction from al Qaeda to diversify tactics and raise more money for jihad.
57A December 2013 UN report116 estimated that Boko Haram had killed over 1200 soldiers and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
A December 2013 UN report116 estimated that Boko Haram had killed over 1200 soldiers and civilians since the state of emergency commenced. In mid-January 2014 President Jonathan sacked the chief of defence staff, and the heads of the army, navy and air force, and has referred to a culture of competition between the security forces leading to “obvious lapses” in their performance. 117 It is very concerning to note that, as we publish this report, there seems to have been a further escalation of violence over recent weeks, with horrifying reports of well-armed militias roaming the north-east and murdering hundreds of people in raids. These include scores of children at a boarding school and worshippers attending their local church. Increasingly, doubts are being aired in public by political and civic leaders about whether the current military strategy is working.118 When we visited the country, we were made aware of growing concerns about the state of the military. With some 80,000 serving personnel, the Nigerian armed forces are the largest in West Africa, but numbers are not large relative to the country’s massive population and its security challenges, and we heard of perceptions that the forces’ performance is in long- term decline and that there is a lack of leadership. The Nigerian air force is considered to be in a particularly weak state, with much of the fleet not currently operational. The UK response
58The UK Government has made very clear that it is a firm supporter of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government has made very clear that it is a firm supporter of the Nigerian Government, and the Nigerian people, in their fight against extremism. We know that both countries value the bilateral relationship, and wish it to remain strong. Given the strong diaspora links between the two countries (discussed later in this chapter), it is particularly important that the UK has Nigeria’s trust and co-operation on counter-terrorism. We are 113 “Boko Haram blamed for Cameroon village attack”, Al Jazeera English, 4 March 2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/boko-haram-blamed-cameroon-village-attack-
59Having visited Nigeria, and spoken to a range of Nigerians from different backgrounds and walks...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Having visited Nigeria, and spoken to a range of Nigerians from different backgrounds and walks of life, we now understand even more clearly the nature of the battle in which the Nigerian government is engaged. Boko Haram’s methods are repellent even by the extreme standards of modern Islamist terrorism. In Abuja, the briefing we received from counter-terrorism experts provided a chilling insight into the tactics, beliefs and mindset of Boko Haram militants. It also included a showing of a Boko Haram propaganda video that left us in no doubt as to the cult-like violence and sadism of the movement’s hardcore. It was particularly distressing to see very young children being indoctrinated into, and participating in, the movement’s brutalising and murderous activities.
60However, we also understand the UK Government’s reservations.
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, we also understand the UK Government’s reservations. Although we accept that all regions of Nigeria are challenged, it does appear that northern Nigeria needs major social and economic interventions, over the long-term, to address issues such as poor educational outcomes and a lack of jobs and foreign investment. Nigerian federal government representatives told us that the UK and Nigeria are essentially in agreement on this issue, referring to the three pillars of President Jonathan’s northern strategy which, alongside the security crackdown provided via the state of emergency, also comprise the offer of dialogue with those willing to renounce violence (through the body known as the Amnesty Committee, which we met in Abuja), and various interventions to benefit the northern economy and public services.
61The UK’s reservations in relation to the Nigerian security services have led it to take...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s reservations in relation to the Nigerian security services have led it to take a very cautious response to requests for military assistance and training. We understand that this has left the Nigerian government frustrated. Alongside the very understandable human rights concerns, it appears that the UK Government is anxious about the possibility of advice and training given in good faith being subsequently misused in a field setting, and of the British officer who provided the training becoming implicated. We sought 119 “Boko Haram: US, UK advocate non-military approach”, The Vanguard (Lagos), 3 February 2014 ; http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/02/boko-haram-us-uk-advocate-non-military-approach/“Foreign Secretary condemns latest violence in North East”, Foreign and Commonwealth Office news release, 8 May 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-latest-violence-in-north-east-nigeria 120 Q 251 (Mark Simmonds MP) 121 Q 124-125 (Virginia Comolli) 122 “Nigeria: Deaths in custody of hundreds of Boko Haram suspects must be investigated”, Amnesty International news release, 14 October 2013 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-deaths-hundreds-boko-haram-suspects-custody- requires-investigation-2013-10-15. See also Q 36 (Jon Marks) 36 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa clarification from the FCO when they gave evidence, especially in view of the fact that the UK Government has provided recent military training and assistance to countries such as Libya, Afghanistan and Kenya. The FCO confirmed that their military assistance was more limited than the Nigerian government wished. Simon Shercliff, Head of the Counter- Terrorism Department told us that: what we cannot do, and cannot afford to do ... is to blindly go into these alliances with countries that are wilfully and openly transgressing international human rights norms. That is something that our democracy doesn’t stand for. We cannot afford to be, for example, handing over intelligence on Nigerian terrorists for the Nigerians then to go and find the people and hang them up by their toenails. .... So we assist the Nigerians to go round the place and find the terrorists, because that is very much in our national interest, and at the same time—from the top level of political exhortation to the practical capacity building level—we continually exhort them to do their work while maintaining international standards of human rights. You can’t do one without the other.123
62Mark Simmonds MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO, sought to stress that the UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Mark Simmonds MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO, sought to stress that the UK was nevertheless “doing a lot” to assist Nigeria in counter-terrorism, listing matters including advice on counter-terrorism strategies, anti-terrorist finance training, and judicial training.124
63The UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns about assisting the Nigerian...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns about assisting the Nigerian military. We fully understand the Government’s dilemma but consider it important that the UK do whatever it can, consistent with its respect for human rights values, to assist Nigeria in its battle against Boko Haram’s uniquely repellent brand of extremism. We ask the Government to be mindful of the importance of effective counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries, given our strong diaspora links with Nigeria, and of the possibility of Nigeria eventually seeking security assistance elsewhere, perhaps from countries with far fewer scruples than the UK has. We note that the UK Government provides training and assistance to other armies in the developing world and seek clarification from the Government that it is satisfied that its position is entirely consistent. Wider lessons from recent events
64Some wider points can be made from considering all three events in the round.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Some wider points can be made from considering all three events in the round. These relate to the four main premises on which the Prime Minister’s statement of 21 January 2013, and the FCO’s evidence to this inquiry have essentially rested; that there has been a geographical shift in the global contest with Islamic extremism towards parts of North and West Africa; that this is an increasing threat to UK interests; that this requires increased diplomatic, security and economic engagement from the UK and its partners; and that a failure to increase engagement would carry greater risks. 123 Q 238 124 Q 251-252 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 37 The frontier has shifted
65Essentially, none of the evidence we received dissented with the proposition that there had been...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Essentially, none of the evidence we received dissented with the proposition that there had been a partial shift in the extremist battleground towards parts of North and West Africa where state authority is weak.125 The evidence we gathered on our visits to Algeria, Mali and Nigeria, and our discussions with politicians, military figures, academics, and civic leaders, further confirmed that these countries are, in different ways, confronting a new, or re-invigorated, challenge from violent extremism. We agree with the UK Government that parts of North and West Africa have become a new frontline in the contest with Islamist extremism and terrorism. A magnet for jihadists?
66However, we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime Minister’s concerns that...
Concluded (the committee's words)
However, we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime Minister’s concerns that the empty quarters of the region have become a “magnet for jihadists”. It has been established that at least two Westerners were involved in the attack at In Amenas,126 and on our visits we encountered anecdotal evidence of South Asians, East Africans and Gulf Arabs being involved in some groups. However, the great majority of militants appear to be from within the region or, in the case of Nigeria, from within one part of the country.127 We note that, at the time when he spoke, the Prime Minister may not have anticipated the extent to which the Syrian civil war would continue to draw in jihadists from around the world, perhaps diverting them from battlefields elsewhere. Should the Syrian civil war, one way or another, be resolved, we cannot predict where some jihadists might go next. The scale of the threat
67It is more difficult to express a clear view on the scale of the extremist...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is more difficult to express a clear view on the scale of the extremist threat. In effect, this amounts to speculating on what would constitute a worst-case scenario were extremism left unchecked. No one we took evidence from considered that terrorists were likely to pose a serious threat to Algeria’s current apparently stable form of government.128 At most, it might lead to some power seeping back to more authoritarian elements within government, at the expense of the liberalising forces that have been quietly at work in the country in recent years. Similarly, in Nigeria, no one we spoke to considered the state, or national unity, to be directly under threat.129 The risk was more insidious: that Boko Haram’s campaign was destroying the authority of the state in large parts of the country, that vigilante justice was filling the vacuum, and that the campaign itself, and the state’s response to it, might further erode relations between the Christian and Muslim “halves” of Nigerian society. We should add that there were some people in Nigeria who informed us that the security situation in the north-east was not the most critical issue facing the 125 Q 50 (Professor Michael Clarke) Ev 67 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 126 “Canadian was a ‘clear leader’ among Islamist terrorists who killed 40 workers in Algeria gas plant attack: report”, National Post (Toronto), 17 September 2013 http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/09/16/canadian-was-a-clear-leader- among-islamist-terrorists-who-killed-11-workers-in-algeria-gas-plant-attack-report/ 127 Q 41 (Jon Marks); Q 134-135 (Virginia Comolli) 128 Q 32-33 (Imad Mesdoua) 129 See also Ev w16 (Church of England’s Mission and Public Affairs Council) 38 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa country and that it was more important, for example, to deal with corruption or the country’s creaking infrastructure.
68In the case of Mali, an al Qaeda-ruled rump state was a reality for some...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the case of Mali, an al Qaeda-ruled rump state was a reality for some months, and some of our witnesses considered that Mali’s neighbours were potentially vulnerable to a similar fate. Niger and Mauritania were singled out, and Mali itself was not yet seen as being out of the danger zone.130 It is reasonable to assume that an Islamist statelet somewhere in north-west Africa would be a centre of smuggling, people trafficking and kidnapping; activities that already go on in the region. It may have some limited strategic importance, especially if it sat on valuable natural resources.131 A rump state would have the potential to disrupt or destabilise its neighbours132 and—although this point is speculative—launch attacks on more distant enemies. The effect of instability in Libya
69Another country that our witnesses saw as very endangered was Libya.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Another country that our witnesses saw as very endangered was Libya. The country’s domestic politics continue to be chaotic, civic institutions are weak, and terrorist groups are organising openly, particularly in and around the eastern city of Benghazi.133 Given the UK’s recent history of involvement in Libya, including military intervention in 2011, we decided that the domestic political situation in the country merited further consideration as a stand-alone issue, and we have agreed to take separate evidence on this issue, on 25 March 2014.
70It has been widely agreed during this inquiry that the ongoing crisis in Libya has...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It has been widely agreed during this inquiry that the ongoing crisis in Libya has also destabilised a far wider area and, in so doing, strengthened the extremists’ hand.134 We discuss the extent to which this was anticipated by the FCO in the next chapter. Three main regional consequences have been identified as flowing from the crisis in Libya, all of which have been factors in the events covered in this chapter: • A failure to secure the Gaddafi regime’s arms caches after the regime fell has led to a proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and some heavier artillery, across North and West Africa, and indeed elsewhere. In Nigeria, we were informed that Libyan small arms had even ended up in the hands of Boko Haram militants, thousands of miles from where they originated; • Many of the thousands of armed African mercenaries that the Gaddafi regime is known to have hired over the years left Libya hurriedly after the regime collapsed. The mainly Tuareg mercenaries who left for northern Mali helped catalyse the Tuareg uprising which led to the 2012 crisis in the country. It appears that some mercenaries then went on to ally with the jihadist cause;135 130 Q 19 (Imad Mesdoua); Q 61 (Professor Michael Clarke) Ev w13-14 (Dr Claire Spencer) 131 For example, uranium reserves in northern Niger, which supply around 20% of the raw material for France’s nuclear industry: Ev w13 (Dr Claire Spencer) 132 Q 4 (Imad Mesdoua) 133 Ev w4-11 (Dr Sajjan Gohel) 134 Q 28-31 (Professor Paul Rogers and Imad Mesdoua); Q 61-62 (Professor Michael Clarke); Ev w32 (Dr Benjamin Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzemann) 135 Ev w2-3 (Alliance for Mali) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 39 • Libyan border security and control over remote areas has sharply declined. It has become much easier for extremists both to settle in southern Libya and to make raids across the border.136 Military strength of extremism in the region
71The success of the extremists in Mali appears to have owed as much to political...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The success of the extremists in Mali appears to have owed as much to political opportunism as to military might. They seized the moment to capitalise on political chaos in the south, and made alliances of convenience with disgruntled elements in the north. However, they do also appear to have been well-armed and supplied: those of us who attended a briefing given by a French military commander at the October 2013 NATO Parliamentary Assembly were concerned by evidence of the advanced state of the logistics and materiel that he showed they had left behind in northern Mali.137 That said, Operation Serval was able to quite quickly reverse the gains made by the extremists and only began to encounter greater difficulty when conflict entered a guerrilla stage. This indicates that extremists’ main strength continues to be in asymmetrical warfare and that where military success brings greater exposure they are perhaps weakened. There is also reason to believe that the extremists might have struggled to maintain unity: recovered documents and public statements by groups show that they are prone to personality clashes and splits over tactics; between “ultras” and (in relative terms) pragmatists, and between local and global agendas.138
72The threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region is immediate, frightening and real. The prospect of another extremist “takeover” of territory somewhere in the Western Sahel cannot be ruled out. However, it is important to maintain a sense of proportion about the scale of the military threat the extremists pose. The precedent of Mali in 2013 suggests that they would struggle to hold territory in the face of any Western-led intervention. We are aware of no evidence that extremists in the region yet pose an “existential threat” to the West. Threat to UK interests in the region
73The UK’s strongest regional links are with Nigeria.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s strongest regional links are with Nigeria. There are cultural ties, through the English language, the Commonwealth, and the colonial past. In terms of trade, Nigeria ranked 30th in UK exports in 2011-12 and the UK currently does more business with Nigeria than with any other sub-Saharan country apart from South Africa. The UK’s commercial interests are mainly found in the south: in the oil-rich Delta region (where Royal Dutch Shell is one of six companies licensed to operate) and the city of Lagos. Morocco, Algeria and Libya respectively ranked 47th, 65th and 84th for UK exports in 2011- 136 Q 45 (Jon Marks); Ev w10 (Dr Sajjan Gohel) 137 Q 231 138 Q 20 (Professor Paul Rogers); Q 51 (Professor Michael Clarke);Ev w15 (Dr Claire Spencer); “Mali Islamists warned about Sharia in al-Qaeda 'manifesto”, BBC News Online, 26 February 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 21587055 ; “Al-Qaeda's scathing letter to troublesome employee Mokhtar Belmokhtar reveals inner workings of terrorist group”, The Telegraph, 29 May, 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10085716/Al- Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesome-employee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-reveals-inner-workings-of-terrorist- group.html 40 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 12.139 It was clear from our visit to Algeria that both sides are keen to grow both the business and the diplomatic relationship. The UK’s commercial relations with Francophone countries of the Western Sahel are negligible.
74We note evidence that regional instability will exert upward pressure on energy prices.140 The UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note evidence that regional instability will exert upward pressure on energy prices.140 The UK would appear to be relatively vulnerable to any price rises: in 2012, Nigeria provided 12% of the UK’s crude oil imports and Algeria 6%.141 (Despite having enormous reserves, Nigeria has practically no gas industry and Algerian gas exports to the UK are small, although we understand that there are moves to increase them.)142 Nigerian crude oil comes from the largely Christian Delta region. The Delta region is already very vulnerable to serious organised crime, although not currently terrorism; to that extent, any such upward pressure may therefore have already been priced in.
75There was general agreement from those providing evidence that an increased UK security profile in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There was general agreement from those providing evidence that an increased UK security profile in the region does carry the risk of making more vulnerable our interests in the region, and our citizens.143 In a few cases, especially kidnappings of Britons, the risk has already crystallised at the UK’s current level of engagement, and clearly British expatriate workers are potentially at risk.144 We did not take formal evidence on the size of UK expatriate communities in the region, but understand that in general they are very small. There are some 40,000 British passport holders living in Nigeria, most, we understand, of Nigerian origin.145 However, we are not aware of evidence that, because of this factor alone, they are more vulnerable to terrorism or kidnapping than other Nigeria residents. We note the UK Government’s policy of refusing, under any circumstances, to pay or permit payment of ransom money to terrorists. It is of course not possible to make any direct correlation but, as some evidence has noted,146 significantly fewer British nationals have been kidnapped than nationals of some other European countries.
76In relation to well-publicised claims by Mohktar Belmohktar that the attack at In Amenas was...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In relation to well-publicised claims by Mohktar Belmohktar that the attack at In Amenas was payback for Western intervention in Mali, which were dismissed by the Prime Minister at the time, the evidence we have received has corroborated the Prime Minister’s view. This is on the ground that the attack, which happened less than a week after the launch of Operation Serval, would have taken weeks to plan.147 139 The source for these statistics is HM Revenue and Customs UK trade information database https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Pages/Home.aspx 140 Ev 69 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 141 “Energy imports and exports: Commons Library Standard Note SN04046”, 30 August 2013 http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN04046/energy-imports-and-exports 142 “Activists accuse Britain of 'gas grab' in Algeria despite human rights abuses”, The Guardian, 9 February 2014http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/09/activists-britain-gas-grab-algeria-human-rights 143 Ev w3 (Alliance for Mali); Ev w20 (Professor Alice Hills) 144 Q 83 (Professor Michael Clarke); Q 129 (Virginia Comolli); Ev 67-68 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 145 Q 249 (Mark Simmonds MP) 146 Ev w22 (Guy Lankester); Ev 67 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 147 Q 46-47 (Jon Marks) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 41 Threats to the UK itself
77The FCO’s written evidence stated that the terrorist groups at large in North and West...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The FCO’s written evidence stated that the terrorist groups at large in North and West Africa currently do not have the capacity to pose a threat to the UK mainland. This view was essentially not disputed during our inquiry.148 This may be an issue of priorities as well as capacity: it appears that, despite the rhetoric of global jihad, most extremists in the region are, at present, more concerned with fighting local wars than with taking the battle to the UK, or to anywhere else in Europe. The Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, Minister of State at the FCO, told us he accepted the proposition that if groups were to unite, this might extend their reach, and may require the UK Government to revise its assessment.149
78We sought views during the inquiry of the risk of diaspora communities in the UK...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We sought views during the inquiry of the risk of diaspora communities in the UK becoming radicalised should the UK become more engaged in counter-terrorism activities in North and West Africa. The general view was that there was a latent risk,150 but that the existence of diaspora communities also offered opportunities for the UK. For example, written evidence from two counter-terrorism experts argued that there was a need for the UK Government to engage more actively with North and West African communities in the UK, through existing strategies such as “Prevent.”151 The evidence argued that, if engaged with positively, diaspora communities could be an intelligence asset, and could help protect UK interests; and that without such engagement, there would be a risk of a reprise of the “home grown” terrorism the UK experienced in the 2000s, but this time with African- British rather than South Asian-British protagonists.152
79According to the FCO’s written evidence to the inquiry, the number of Moroccans, Algerians and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
According to the FCO’s written evidence to the inquiry, the number of Moroccans, Algerians and Libyans in the UK each numbers around 20,000.153 By far the largest diaspora community of any country considered in this report comes from Nigeria, although we were perturbed to note wide discrepancies in estimates of its size, with the FCO putting it at 190,000154 and a witness, Virginia Comolli, putting it at around half a million. (It may be that the discrepancy is partly explained by the latter figure including British-born UK citizens of Nigerian extraction.) Ms Comolli informed us that the vast majority of British Nigerians were southern Christians, disproportionately from middle class backgrounds, and were relatively well integrated.155 The shocking murder which occurred at Woolwich in May 2013, whilst we were gathering evidence for this inquiry, and which involved two individuals seeming to come from the background Ms Comolli describes, does underline the importance of the UK’s intelligence services remaining discreetly vigilant in relation to radicalisation within West African diaspora communities. 148 Q 129 and 136 (Virginia Comolli); Ev 67-69 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 149 Q 212 150 Ev w20 (Professor Alice Hills) 151 The Prevent strategy is the UK’s current counter-radicalisation strategy. The Home Office is the lead government department https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy- review.pdf 152 Ev 69 (Raffaello Pantucci and Luke Gribben) 153 Ev 80 154 Ev 80 155 Q130 and Q 133 42 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa
80UK interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorism and will...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UK interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorism and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, whatever the level of UK engagement in counter-terrorism. It is possible that greater engagement might lead to increased targeting of UK interests, and citizens. However, we agree with the Prime Minister that UK and Western disengagement from the region, and failure to seek to address terrorism and its causes, would in the longer term carry greater risks for the UK.
81We urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible radicalisation within...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible radicalisation within North and West African diaspora communities, bearing in mind that dialogue and positive engagement with these communities could also contribute to an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
82The UK’s policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may have helped protect vulnerable...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may have helped protect vulnerable UK citizens abroad. We acknowledge the Prime Minister’s global leadership in seeking to eradicate ransom payments. Countries that continue to flout the ban on payments are guilty of strengthening the terrorists’ hand. The UK should continue to discreetly but firmly press its allies to end this practice. The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 43 4 Addressing future challenges
83New and predominantly joint or multilateral approaches are needed to tackle the drivers of extremism...
Recommended (the committee's words)
New and predominantly joint or multilateral approaches are needed to tackle the drivers of extremism and instability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region set out in chapter 2. In its discussion of future policies, the FCO’s written submission to this inquiry tended towards the aspirational rather than the specific, and stated that the UK Government was still in the process of formulating its strategy for North and West Africa.156 Many of the responses we received in oral evidence from the FCO indicate that this process is still ongoing.157 It is right that the Government should take time to formulate its policies carefully, although this has meant that at the conclusion of the inquiry, we have been left with no clear sense of how the UK Government proposes to prioritise and organise its future work in relation to vulnerable countries in North and West Africa, nor whom its main partners are likely to be. This chapter sets out some proposals of our own. The starting point is to consider what resources the UK can currently call on in the region. The UK’s diplomatic resources: rhetoric versus reality
84The Prime Minister appears to have committed the UK to a more ambitious programme of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Prime Minister appears to have committed the UK to a more ambitious programme of bilateral engagement in North and West Africa, in addition to increased partnership working. In his January 2013 statement to the House,158 he committed the UK to “work right across the region” to help address “weak political institutions, political instability and a failure to address long-standing political grievances” and pledged that the UK would help put in place “the building blocks of democracy—the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, the rights of minorities, free media and association, and a proper place in society for the army.” In its submission to this inquiry, the FCO set out a similar vision, referring to a new approach to North and West Africa, based around three pillars of security, development and politics.159 The UK’s current diplomatic footprint
85These ambitions should be set against the UK’s diplomatic footprint in the Western Sahel, which...
Concluded (the committee's words)
These ambitions should be set against the UK’s diplomatic footprint in the Western Sahel, which is very light. The Africa Minister, Mr Simmonds, told us that the UK has some 1000 staff based in the region relevant to this report.160 We suggest that this statistic gives a somewhat misleading impression of the depth of the UK’s current engagement: in the first place because it includes staff of all UK government departments and agencies and secondly because we understand the reference to include all the countries in West and North Africa, including countries such as Egypt and Ghana, where the UK has relatively large embassies. In relation to the countries of the Western Sahel, we consider it important to spell out just out low our current diplomatic representation is: the UK has one small embassy in Bamako, Mali, employing fewer than five UK-based staff, and no embassies in 156 Ev 74 and 76-77 157 Q 204-206 (Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP); Q 217 (Tim Morris and Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP); Q 216 (Simon Shercliff); Q 243 (Mark Simmonds MP) 158 HC Deb, 21 January 2013, cols 25-27 159 Ev 76 160 Q 244 44 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso or Mauritania. As we understand it, the total number of UK- based staff (of any department) currently working in all of these countries is well under ten.161 We should add that when we visited Bamako in June 2013, we noted that embassy staff were very restricted, for security reasons, in the journeys they could take around the country, and we presume that similar considerations would apply if staff were to seek to travel around other Western Sahel countries.
86The situation in Nigeria is distinguishable, as is only to be expected of a Commonwealth...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The situation in Nigeria is distinguishable, as is only to be expected of a Commonwealth member state with the world’s seventh-largest population. As of 2013, the FCO had 32 UK-based staff in the country, alongside staff of other UK departments.162 However, set against Nigeria’s many social, governance and security problems, and its strong links to the UK (which, we were informed, bring challenges as well as opportunities), this hardly amounts to a massive figure. We were left with the strong impression from our visit that Nigeria is a resource-hungry country for FCO staff, and that working there is sufficiently challenging to leave little additional time for scanning the regional horizon.
87In the Maghrebi states of Morocco, Algeria and Libya, the UK’s diplomatic profile is a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the Maghrebi states of Morocco, Algeria and Libya, the UK’s diplomatic profile is a little higher than in West Africa, although none of the three embassies is large and all three, we understand, are dwarfed by those of France and the US.163
88There are no Arabic speaker slots164 for FCO officials for the countries covered by this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There are no Arabic speaker slots164 for FCO officials for the countries covered by this report, other than in Libya, where there are two. The total number of French speaker slots is in the low teens, almost all of them in Morocco and Algeria. There are no speaker slots for any of the indigenous languages of West Africa, some of which, such as Hausa, are spoken by millions of people across a number of countries.165
89Finally, the UK has no permanent military presence in the region covered by this report,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Finally, the UK has no permanent military presence in the region covered by this report, whilst Nigeria is now the only country in the region with which the UK has a bilateral aid relationship.166 The FCO’s analysis of recent events
90The Prime Minister’s comments should also be considered in the light of FCO responses to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Prime Minister’s comments should also be considered in the light of FCO responses to recent events. In its National Security Strategy, published in October 2010, the Government made no express mention of the Sahel as an area of concern. A little more 161 This is based on figures in the FCO Annual Reports and Accounts 2012-13, Annex A, and information supplied over the course of this inquiry. For security reasons, the FCO does not disclose the precise number of UK-based staff in an embassy where they number five or fewer. The FCO told us in its written evidence that, alongside staff of the Mali embassy, there is a UK-based Political Officer in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and a locally-engaged member of staff in Niamey, Niger (Ev 74) 162 FCO Annual Reports and Accounts 2012-13, Annex A https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210136/HC_32_v0_2.pdf 163 The FCO’s most recent annual report (ibid) shows that there are 11 UK-based staff in Algiers, 11 in Rabat, and 15 in Tripoli. Supplementary evidence from Mark Simmonds MP (Ev 85-86) provided in December 2013 puts the numbers at, respectively, 9, 9 and 14 164 A speaker slot is any diplomatic post in relation to which the ability to communicate effectively in the local language is considered essential. 165 Ev 85-66 166 DFID does maintain a bilateral aid relationship with five other countries in the wider vicinity; Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, and Sudan and South Sudan to the east. The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 45 than 18 months later, the Malian government had collapsed and Al Qaeda-aligned terrorists were ruling over an area the size of France. Under the heading “Lessons learned and risks”, the FCO’s written submission stated that: the international community misjudged the nature of the Government of Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali which until early 2012 was held up as an example of stability. That Government had in fact been permitting the establishment of terrorists and had wasted aid money. 167
91We asked the FCO what had gone wrong.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the FCO what had gone wrong. The Minister of State, Hugh Robertson MP, remarked on the problem of “trying to get real oversight of exactly what is happening” with what he referred to as “the new breed of terrorism”. He also said that it was a difficult challenge to know at which point a known terrorist challenge is about to “become critical”.168 Tim Morris, Head of the Sahel Taskforce, told us that: In the months leading up to the military action in January [2013], which came from the terrorist uprising, there had been a prediction that something was going quite badly wrong, including in the Government. That was the reason for the appointment by the Prime Minister of his special representative169 ... The actual uprising was in January 2013. It was a surprise, because there wasn’t the expectation that the terrorists would show themselves in the way that they did.170
92We take these comments as an indication that, before January 2013, the events in Mali...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We take these comments as an indication that, before January 2013, the events in Mali had been of primarily local rather than international significance. If so, we are surprised by these comments. The installation of a jihadist rump state in around June 2012 was a grave matter, as is reflected in the UN Security Council discussions and votes on the matter later in the year, whilst questions about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Mali were being asked in the House within a few weeks of the 2012 coup, and continued through the year.171
93Mr Morris also remarked that it was widely known before the coup that terrorists were...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Mr Morris also remarked that it was widely known before the coup that terrorists were implanted in Mali, but that: The speed of the Government’s decay—the international community believed the Government had a strong hold on power—was a surprise. The process was monitored very closely by large embassies of partner countries that, in a sense, did not spot it. That was not us, because we were not there at the time, but it is a very interesting and special case.172 167 Ev 77 168 Q196-197 169 This is a reference to the Rt Hon Stephen O’Brien MP, the UK Special Envoy to the Sahel 170 Q 196 171 The first Parliamentary question on the humanitarian and security situation in Mali following the coup appears to have been answered on 23 May 2012 (PQ 11071). A number of written and oral questions on Mali followed throughout the year and, by at least early September, when the House had just returned from the summer recess, questions were being asked about the threat from AQIM and other terrorist groups in the north of the country (HC Deb, 4 September 2012, col 141) 172 Q 200 46 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa
94It is unarguable that countries far better placed than the UK to read the situation...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is unarguable that countries far better placed than the UK to read the situation in Mali failed to anticipate Mali’s collapse into crisis, although we are perplexed by the statement that the UK was not “there” at the time: the Bamako embassy, which had been closed in 2003, was re-opened in 2010, sometime before the coup occurred.
95Events in Libya also raise questions as to the strength of the FCO’s analysis.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Events in Libya also raise questions as to the strength of the FCO’s analysis. We outlined in Chapter 3 the effect that the collapse of the Gaddafi regime has had for regional insecurity. One very senior figure in the Algerian government told us that the fall of the regime had made regional security “fifty times worse” than before. He said that the Algerian government had been no friend of Gaddafi but had warned its Western allies, including the UK, about the likely consequences of his removal. Written evidence from the Alliance for Mali, a coalition of mainly charitable bodies with an interest in the country, stated that the implications of intervention in Libya were “widely known” in Mali and “should not have come as a surprise and should have been addressed by a responsible and coherent UK policy for the region”.173 However, the three main consequences that we listed in chapter 3 did not form a significant part of the public debate around the merits of intervention at the time when a NATO operation in Libya was being considered, and it would appear from evidence gathered during this inquiry that they did not form a significant part of internal governmental discussions either.174
96We acknowledge that regime change, although foreseeable, was not a formal objective of the NATO...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We acknowledge that regime change, although foreseeable, was not a formal objective of the NATO intervention, of which the UK Government was a leading proponent. The primary purpose of the operation was to protect rebels and civilians in the east of Libya. Mr Robertson told us that whilst there were lessons to be learned from the decision to intervene in Libya, the dangers of intervention had to be considered and balanced against the consequences of non-intervention, including the humanitarian consequences.175 UK government administrative changes in response to recent events
97From informal discussions with UK Government officials over the course of the inquiry, we sensed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
From informal discussions with UK Government officials over the course of the inquiry, we sensed a willingness to acknowledge that events in Mali, Libya and Algeria may have exposed something of a blind spot in departmental thinking. Within the FCO there is a department for Africa (in fact sub-Saharan Africa) and another for the Near East and North Africa, including Algeria, Libya and Morocco, with a different Minister answering for each. However the common factor in relation to recent events in Mali, Libya and Algeria is that they involved the convergence of protagonists from across both North and West Africa. It appears that this may have wrong-footed the FCO. We note that the FCO’s written evidence acknowledges that it is engaged in efforts to understand the Western Sahel-Sahara region better, referring amongst other things to “largely ignored or forgotten” ancient links between North and West Africa and adding that the FCO’s “understanding of the regional dynamics is evolving”.176 We also note the Prime Minister’s appointment in September 2012 of a Sahel Special Envoy, the Rt Hon Stephen O’Brien MP, whose main role is described as being to address the current situation in Mali, and the creation within 173 Ev w2-3 174 Q 30-31 (Imad Mesdoua and Professor Paul Rogers); Q 195-199 (Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP and Tim Morris) 175 Q 199 176 Ev 73 and 78 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 47 the FCO of a “Sahel Taskforce”, headed by a former Ambassador to Morocco and Mauritania. Both are empowered to work across departmental boundaries within the FCO and within Whitehall. Addressing long-standing political grievances
98The preceding discussion underlines that the Prime Minister’s commitment to help address internal or regional...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The preceding discussion underlines that the Prime Minister’s commitment to help address internal or regional political disputes may be particularly challenging within the FCO’s current limited resources. The premise—that long-standing grievances fuel anger and can be hijacked by extremists—is not disputed. However, our experience during this inquiry suggests that any such work is likely to be resource intensive. Three such issues that we encountered during this inquiry are the status of the Tuareg minority in northern Mali, the dispute over the Western Sahara, and the cultural and economic divide between northern and southern Nigeria. All three issues are formidably complex, and tend to be debated by reference to disputed interpretations of historic events. Local feelings run high. We would not suggest that the UK should simply avoid any such engagement, but it should only be contemplated if the FCO is satisfied that the human resources and depth of knowledge are there.
99Recent events underline the difficulty of monitoring events in the Western Sahel- Sahara region, anticipating...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Recent events underline the difficulty of monitoring events in the Western Sahel- Sahara region, anticipating crises, and responding to them as they unfold, particularly when diplomatic resources are limited. They also underline that, whilst the Sahara may be a departmental barrier within the FCO, it is not one for terrorists. The UK Government should reflect on weaknesses in analysis that the events appear to have exposed, and how these might be rectified at departmental level. This applies particularly in relation to intervention in Libya in 2011: considerable resources were expended ensuring that military goals were successfully achieved (for which the Government deserves credit), but there was a failure to anticipate, and therefore mitigate, the regional fallout from the intervention, which has been enormous and, in some cases, disastrous.
100Looking to the future, the UK’s very limited diplomatic resources in and around the Western...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Looking to the future, the UK’s very limited diplomatic resources in and around the Western Sahel will make it difficult for the Government to achieve its ambitions to be more intensively involved in the region and to help shape events as they unfold. The Government should consider increasing its resources in the region and its reserves of specialist knowledge. If not, it should scale back its ambitions—and its rhetoric. The UK’s diplomatic footprint in Francophone countries
101The current UK Government’s “network shift” in diplomatic postings has led to the opening of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The current UK Government’s “network shift” in diplomatic postings has led to the opening of a small embassy in Côte D’Ivoire, following the re-opening of the Mali embassy in 2010.177 In his 21 January 2013 statement, the Prime Minister said that he was not opposed to further redeployment in West Africa but that he did not want the UK and France to “double up in the same places”.178 However, over the course of the inquiry, a number of our interlocutors, from parliaments or governments of the North and West African Francophonie, told us that they would welcome a far stronger bilateral relationship 177 Ev 74 (FCO) 178 HC Deb 21 January 2013, col 31 48 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa with the UK, citing factors such as the UK’s Parliamentary tradition, its reputation for military discipline and training, its independent judiciary, and its history of free trade as reasons for closer ties, and stating that former colonial links were no longer a fit basis on which to arrange modern diplomatic networks.
102Witnesses have mentioned an additional element behind this interest: that the UK is not France.179...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Witnesses have mentioned an additional element behind this interest: that the UK is not France.179 It does not carry the same colonial (and post-colonial) baggage as France and tends not to be perceived as being on one side or another in relation to some regional or internal rivalries or disputes. It has been suggested that this might make it easier for the UK to offer intelligence or security co-operation on terms which are consistent with the UK’s values or to speak as a candid friend or mediator (in a formal or informal sense) on sensitive matters—perhaps including the “long-standing political grievances” mentioned by the Prime Minister.180 We discuss below a possible UK role in relation to Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara.
103We suggest that the UK Government contemplate an enhancement of its diplomatic profile in Francophone...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We suggest that the UK Government contemplate an enhancement of its diplomatic profile in Francophone parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region. This would be consistent with the Government’s commitment towards greater engagement with the region. It would appear that a raised UK profile in the region would be welcomed and it seems probable that the UK may be able to offer advice and assistance in a way that some other countries could not. Far from raising the risk of the UK and France wastefully “doubling up” diplomatic resources, we suggest that it will increase opportunities for the two countries to work together fruitfully on security, development and political co- operation in the region, as they have been doing in Mali. Key partnerships for the UK
104The preceding discussion underlines the importance of the UK seeking to achieve change, as much...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The preceding discussion underlines the importance of the UK seeking to achieve change, as much as possible, through working in partnership. The FCO’s written submission indicated that it recognised the need for new forms of partnership working, referring to the department pursuing “a new way of thinking about North and West Africa within the UK Government that adds to and transcends the standard bilateral approach”.181 We sought to ascertain what this meant in practice when we took evidence from the FCO. The FCO’s Sahel Coordinator, Tim Morris, told us that it meant that “everything we will be trying to do in this region will be done with partners and it will be done through multilateral organisations.” Mr Morris went on to list as likely future partners under this approach the different countries of the region, regional economic communities such as ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union, the UN, the World Bank, France, the US, Canada, and other European countries.182 We have no quarrel with either the proposal or the list of countries and bodies provided, but we are not clear whether and to what extent this amounts to a new way of working. 179 Q 15-16 (Imad Mesdoua); Q 74 (Professor Michael Clarke) 180 Ev w1 (Alliance for Mali) 181 Ev 76 182 Q 232-233 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 49 The need for better co-ordination on security and development
105The signs are that it will be some time before African nations will be able...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The signs are that it will be some time before African nations will be able to deal with and contain major security crises on their own, as discussed further below. This means that Western nations will probably have to remain closely engaged in the security of sub- Saharan Africa for the foreseeable future. It is clear that there is already significant activity going on, most of it, such as military training being provided by the US and UK, of a far lower profile than the interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic, and therefore less well-known. However, at the conclusion of evidence-taking, we are left concerned that activities are not yet being effectively co-ordinated.183 This was a point made forcefully by US military and intelligence officers on our visit to the US African Military Command in Stuttgart. This concern applies not only to security co-operation, but also to joint work on development projects, as well as to achieving complementarity between development and security projects, which we consider to be of critical importance. The Africa Minister, Mark Simmonds MP, told us that he agreed that there was sometimes a need for greater co-ordination and co-operation but asked us to be mindful that international partners working in sub-Saharan Africa were working in “very complex, multifaceted environments.”184 We fully accept this point and intend no criticism of governments and bodies seeking to provide assistance under difficult circumstances. Part of the problem may be that there is such a proliferation of governments, agencies and NGOs potentially involved as to have made effective co-ordination almost impossible, and to have left no clear sense of which countries or bodies have overall leadership. A tripartite leadership model
106Our proposal would be for international agreement on a common security and stability policy for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Our proposal would be for international agreement on a common security and stability policy for the Western Sahel, as a matter of urgency. We understand that proposals are already being worked on at UN level.185 Once the policy is agreed, lead responsibility for securing its implementation could rest with a tripartite leadership of France, the UK and the US. We would also envisage a strong supporting role for the European External Action Service, in recognition that demographic and social pressures in parts of North and West Africa are increasingly manifesting themselves in Europe, particularly on its southern doorstep. France
107It is France that has thus far taken the security lead in the region, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is France that has thus far taken the security lead in the region, and it is of course inconceivable that France would not continue to have a key role in Africa, but we have become aware during the inquiry of French concerns that they are becoming increasingly stretched and require more help.186 For complex historical reasons that were discussed 183 Q 218-219; Q 261 184 Q 273-274 185 Q 217 (Tim Morris); Some UN news releases indicate that its integrated Sahel strategy is complete (eg “Sahel: UN Special Envoy presents integrated strategy to Security Council, UN News Centre, 26 June 2013https://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/enewsletter/pid/24728 ) but, if so, it does not appear to be available 186 Centre for European Reform bulletin issue 94 (February/March 2014) Why Europe Should Broaden its horizons in the Sahel, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2014/bulletin_94_rk_article3-8331.pdf 50 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa during our inquiry, there are also countries in Africa where significant French involvement or intervention might be domestically problematic, further underlining the benefits of a partnership approach. The US
108UK-French co-operation was the model in the NATO intervention in Libya and also in Mali,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UK-French co-operation was the model in the NATO intervention in Libya and also in Mali, albeit with the UK playing a far more limited role. In relation to the Libyan operation, a number of other countries assisted, including the US. It was following the Libyan intervention that the phrase “leading from behind” entered into common currency in foreign policy circles as a shorthand to describe the Obama administration’s perceived approach to intervention.187 The phrase is ambiguous: it could describe a foreign policy approach that is either somewhat disengaged or is engaged but discreet. The Libyan experience itself would indicate that the latter is more accurate, as the US’s eventual military contribution to the NATO operation was in fact far from negligible.
109The Africa Minister, Mark Simmonds MP, told us that the concept of US disengagement from...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Africa Minister, Mark Simmonds MP, told us that the concept of US disengagement from Africa was in fact the reverse of the truth, particularly in the Sahel region,188 and we found this confirmed on our visit to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Stuttgart. Our visit also confirmed that the US’s military, security and intelligence assets in Africa remain enormous and unmatched, and have, if anything, expanded, thanks to advances in remote technology: a new base for unarmed Reaper drones opened in Niger in early 2013, complementing drone bases established in recent years in Ethiopia and Djibouti. The US has also been heavily involved in promoting and co-ordinating counter-terrorism in the region.189 Accordingly, it is imperative that the US play a leading role in any joint work to address security concerns in and around the Western Sahel. We are mindful of evidence from a witness that the presence and use of US military assets in parts of Africa is potentially a “gift” to al Qaeda propagandists.190 If there is validity in this observation—and we accept that there may very well be—it could be mitigated through a continuation of the policy of discreet engagement that the US applied in Libya.
110There is a need for a step-change in the co-ordination of international efforts to combat...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is a need for a step-change in the co-ordination of international efforts to combat insecurity, and the drivers of insecurity, in and around the Western Sahel. We propose that the UK Government press its international partners for agreement to a common security and stability policy for the Western Sahel. Lead responsibility for securing implementation of the policy should rest with a tripartite leadership of France, the UK and the US, supported by others, including the European External Action Service.
111We envisage each member of the tripartite group taking lead responsibility for a particular issue...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We envisage each member of the tripartite group taking lead responsibility for a particular issue and co-ordinating a programme of action—political, judicial or security— in co-operation with local partners, including the relevant regional economic community, 187 The phrase appears in a May 2011 New Yorker article (“The Consequentialist”), attributed to an unnamed foreign policy adviser to President Obama, describing US strategy towards Libya at the time of NATO’s intervention. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_lizza?currentPage=all 188 Q 271 189 Ev w14 (Dr Claire Spencer) 190 Q 19 (Professor Paul Rogers) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 51 relevant multilateral bodies, and any other states or bodies able to offer help. This should include China. We would urge continuing diplomatic efforts by the UK and others to persuade China that investment to help sub-Saharan Africa become more secure, more stable and more effectively governed is in its long-term economic interests. Ministers told us of encouraging signs that the Chinese Government was coming to recognise its wider responsibilities towards the region.191
112The approach we propose could be taken in relation to many of the issues identified...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The approach we propose could be taken in relation to many of the issues identified in chapter 2 of this report; issues having a regional impact and which require a cross-cutting, multilateral approach. These could include the monitoring and intercepting of attempted cocaine landings on the West African littoral (with particular attention paid to Guinea- Bissau); schemes to strengthen border controls across North and West Africa and monitor the movements of criminal or terrorist groups across borders;192 or projects to trace back to their source what one of our witnesses referred to as the “spider’s web of terrorist funding networks” emanating from “very wealthy individuals and organisations in the Gulf,”193 in order to try to cut them off. On some issues, the UN or other bodies have already undertaken valuable analysis;194 what appears to be needed is a push to implement the recommendations that were made. The West’s early warning systems in the region
113Earlier, we commented on some apparent shortcomings in the FCO’s analysis of recent events in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Earlier, we commented on some apparent shortcomings in the FCO’s analysis of recent events in North and West Africa and capacity to anticipate crises, focussing on events in Mali and Libya. It is only fair to add that other countries, including, in some cases, those who ought to have been better placed than the UK to make prescient predictions, appear also to have been caught out. Events in the Central African Republic (CAR) raise further concerns about the early warning systems not only of the UK but of most or all of its international partners in and around the Sahelian region. The violent overthrow of a government in a country such as the CAR cannot be considered a shock, but the events that then unfolded appear, as in Mali, to have taken the international community by surprise. The UK Government (which has no embassy in the CAR) is among countries which appear to have been slow to acknowledge what was already being reported in English-language media as early as August 2013:195 that the post-coup violence in the CAR had a strong sectarian element, and that a large proportion of the Séléka militias targeting non-Muslims were from outside of the country.196 It could be argued that 191 Q153 (Lynne Featherstone MP) Q265 (Mark Simmonds MP) 192 Q 72 (Professor Michael Clarke) 193 Q 26-27 (Imad Mesdoua); See also Q 56-57 (Professor Michael Clarke) 194 Eg UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union”, 2011 http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant- Smuggling/Report_SOM_West_Africa_EU.pdf ; UNODC, Transnational organised crime in West Africa: a threat assessment, 2013. http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTAWestAfrica.html 195 CAR Crisis Opens Rift Between Muslims, Christians, Voice of America Online, 11 September 2013http://www.voanews.com/content/car-crisis-opens-rift-between-muslims-christians/1748074.html“Attacks on Christians in Central African Republic must stop, says priest”, Catholic Herald, 15 August 2013, http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/08/15/attacks-on-christians-in-central-african-republic-must-stop-says- priest/; Conciliation Resources: Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic – August 2013 http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/CAR_briefing_ConciliationResources201308.pdf 196 FCO Research Analyst paper: Central African Republic: Background Brief and Analysis of the Crisis, January 2014: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/central-african-republic-background-brief-and-analysis-of-the-crisis 52 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa had more been known earlier, and a quicker assessment made of events on the ground, action could have been taken earlier to try to prevent the crisis escalating to its present deeply worrying level, with revenge attacks now being carried out against local Muslims and UN officials warning of the crisis spiralling into outright civil war.197
114Given the complexity of the region, there is always the possibility of the unexpected taking...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Given the complexity of the region, there is always the possibility of the unexpected taking the West by surprise, but the degree to which it has been caught out by recent events is worrying. We suggest that it should be the first priority of any common security and stability policy along the lines proposed to audit recent intelligence lapses and work to develop more effective and comprehensive early warning systems.
115There is an emerging pattern of evidence of the UK and its main partners being...
Recommended (the committee's words)
There is an emerging pattern of evidence of the UK and its main partners being unsighted by events in and around the Sahel region. The international community’s successive failure, in Mali and in the Central African Republic, to anticipate events and to respond to them speedily as they unfolded, is worrying. We accept that the UK was not the only country to be unsighted by events and acknowledge that its diplomatic resources in both countries are light. We recommend that the UK Government seek to raise at international level the need for more effective early warning systems in and around the Western Sahel region. Security co-operation with the African Union
116Recent events in Mali and the Central African Republic have both exposed weaknesses in Africa’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Recent events in Mali and the Central African Republic have both exposed weaknesses in Africa’s capacity to find a regional solution to security crises.198 The relevant facts in relation to Mali were recited earlier. In the case of the CAR, a force already in the country at the time of the coup (composed of troops from ECCAS, the regional economic community for Central Africa) appears to have had little mitigating effect as the crisis escalated. Indeed, we note media reports that the presence of troops from Chad, whom many in the CAR do not perceive as a neutral bystander to the current crisis, has at times provoked violence rather than reducing it.199 In July 2013, the AU agreed to send a force into the country, but it took almost five months to deploy, by which time UN observers were warning of genocide. 200 Having initially stated that it would not deploy troops other than to protect French citizens and the main airport, France has now deployed 2000 troops in the country. In January, the EU Council agreed to deploy a small multinational force201 in the CAR, and in February formally established the mission but, as we publish this report, no troops have yet been deployed. 197 UN warns ‘seeds of genocide’ being sown in Central African Republic, Reuters, 16 January 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA0F0PR20140116 198 Q 36 (Jon Marks) 199 “Chad troops in CAR accused of pro-Seleka bias”, Aljazeera English,26 December 2013; FCO Research Analyst paper: Central African Republic: Background Brief and Analysis of the Crisis, January 2014: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/central-african-republic-background-brief-and-analysis-of-the-crisis 200 UN warns ‘seeds of genocide’ being sown in Central African Republic, Reuters, 16 January 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA0F0PR20140116 201 It appears that there has been not yet been formal agreement as to the size of the force. Briefings to the media from EU officials initially initially envisaged a force of around 500, but more recent estimates indicate it could be double that amount: “EU Sees Central African Force Reaching 800-1,000”, Wall Street Journal, 27 February 2014http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-centralafrican-eu-idUSBREA1C1SX20140213 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 53
117For several years, the AU has been considering proposals for a standby force for rapid...
Concluded (the committee's words)
For several years, the AU has been considering proposals for a standby force for rapid deployment in the event of a crisis, without final agreement being reached. In Algeria, Prime Minister Sellal told us that that there was a renewed political impetus for a standby force, with Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Algeria all behind implementation. In Nigeria, we heard from ECOWAS’s military command that current proposals are to have the plan enshrined by 2015, although we are mindful that previous proposed deadlines have come and gone.202 In the meantime, ECOWAS is pursuing an interim arrangement: the creation of a two standing brigades: an eastern brigade, to respond to security crises in the western part of the Community, and a western brigade, to respond to crises in the east.
118The Minister for Africa, Mr Simmonds told us that he had discussed the proposals for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Minister for Africa, Mr Simmonds told us that he had discussed the proposals for a standby brigade with the AU Commissioners but that they were not yet ready to come to countries such as the UK to talk about how they might help build capacity.203
119Renewed proposals within the African Union for a standby military force are welcome, and we...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Renewed proposals within the African Union for a standby military force are welcome, and we would support the UK and its international partners seeking to assist in building capacity. It is reasonable to assume that it will be some time before there are wholly African solutions to African problems of equivalent scale to those in Mali and the Central African Republic. This places an onus on the UK and its international partners to ensure that contingency plans are in place to deal with future crises. UK partnerships in West Africa
120We discussed the importance of the bilateral relationship with Nigeria earlier, in the context of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We discussed the importance of the bilateral relationship with Nigeria earlier, in the context of assistance to the Nigerian military. The presence of large Nigerian expatriate community in the UK, and of a number of UK passport holders in Nigeria further underlines the importance of the UK and Nigeria maintaining effective relations for counter-terrorism and monitoring purposes. The relationship with ECOWAS—West Africa’s regional body for economic and security co-operation—will also continue to be important. Although ECOWAS did not deliver a military solution to the Mali crisis, it was able to negotiate the resignation of the coup leaders, and the appointment of an interim government. Most of our witnesses saw the ECOWAS Secretariat as a reasonably effective organisation struggling with enormous challenges, including the limited resources of most of its member states.204 ECOWAS remains the best available vehicle for delivering regional co-operation on issues such as border control and tackling organised crime. Algeria and Morocco
121With their stable forms of government, relative prosperity by comparison to their southern neighbours, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
With their stable forms of government, relative prosperity by comparison to their southern neighbours, and strong internal security and intelligence services, Algeria and Morocco were identified by our witnesses as key partners for the UK and other Western countries in addressing the security challenges of the Western Sahel.205 Algeria’s 202 The relevant AU website ( http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/Documents.htm )includes documents setting out policy for the establishment of a standby force dating to as far back as 2003, and setting a deadline of 2010 to achieve full operational capacity. 203 Q 270 (Mark Simmonds) 204 Q17-18 (Professor Paul Rogers and Imad Mesdoua); Q 73 (Professor Michael Clarke); Q 107 (Sir Richard Gozney) 205 Q 32 (Imad Mesdoua); Q 37-38 (Jon Marks) 54 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa geographical position gives it additional strategic importance: its vast desert hinterland stretches into the Sahel and borders seven other countries or territories.
122In both cases, there are challenges to the development of stronger relationships.
Concluded (the committee's words)
In both cases, there are challenges to the development of stronger relationships. In the case of Algeria, these include the country’s strong and secretive security services, seen by witnesses as operating almost as like a parallel government, and its factional and complex politics, still partly dominated by elderly veterans of the early post-independence period. Algeria’s record over human rights is perceived to have improved in recent years,206 but serious concerns remain over the security services’ adherence to international human rights standards,207 raising questions over the extent to which it is appropriate for the UK and Algeria to share intelligence.208 Algeria also maintains a policy of strict military non- intervention. Clearly this severely circumscribes its capacities as a regional peacekeeper. We also heard of concerns that, at times, Algeria’s dogmatic adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention has led it to dump security problems on its doorstep rather than to try to find more comprehensive solutions in partnership with its neighbours.
123We take it to be very significant, however, that Algeria did not oppose France’s intervention...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We take it to be very significant, however, that Algeria did not oppose France’s intervention in Mali, as it would almost certainly have done in the past, and we noted other signs of increased openness on our visit to Algiers. We take it as an encouraging sign, for instance, that the Algerian government has allowed the UK Government to run its Arab Partnership Programme209 in the country, including projects to enhance Algeria’s governance and party systems. A more pluralist political culture has been emerging in recent years, along with a younger generation of political leaders210 (although we do note that, shortly before we published this report, it was announced that the long-serving President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, would be running for a fourth term in elections in April, despite concerns over his health). We found our government interlocutors in Algiers to be frank and straightforward in their answers to our questions, and pragmatic in their analysis.211
124Morocco presented itself during our inquiry as a country fully aware of the extremist threats...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Morocco presented itself during our inquiry as a country fully aware of the extremist threats in its neighbourhood, and with realistic proposals to address them; better security co-operation, economic intervention to address the drivers of extremism, and openness to dialogue. We note that Morocco has involved itself in efforts to rebuild Mali after the crisis, and has promoted dialogue between the government and Tuareg nationalists. Although we are aware of continuing concerns in relation to human rights violations,212 Morocco appears to have genuinely embarked on a path towards greater democratic openness, with the agreement of a new constitution in 2011, and significant political reforms to remove some of the power of the monarchy.213 Relations between the UK and Morocco are warm 206 Q 39 (Jon Marks) 207 Amnesty International 2013 Annual Report, Algeria chapter https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/algeria/report-2013 208 Q 38 (Jon Marks); Q 79 (Professor Michael Clarke) 209 The Arab Partnership is a joint DFID-FCO initiative to help promote political reform, stability and economic growth, in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”, currently helping fund and support projects in around ten Arab countries. 210 Q 49 (Jon Marks) 211 See also Q 75-77 (Professor Michael Clarke) 212 Amnesty International 2013 Annual Report, Morocco/Western Sahara chapter https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/moroccowestern-sahara/report-2013 213 Q 33-34 (Professor Paul Rogers) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 55 and mutually respectful. The issue of the Western Sahara has, however, complicated Morocco’s relationship with its neighbours and led to its withdrawal from the African Union. Relations between Algeria and Morocco are particularly poor, and this in turn has meant that the Arab Maghreb Union, the body for regional economic and—potentially— security co-operation in north-west Africa, has never functioned effectively.214 Morocco has sought an alternative outlet for regional co-operation through CEN-SAD,215 a bloc of nations straddling the Saharan divide, but its effectiveness is, in turn, undermined by Algeria’s non-membership of that body.
125The issue of the Western Sahara itself was seen by some of our witnesses, and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The issue of the Western Sahara itself was seen by some of our witnesses, and some of the people we met on our visits, as increasingly worrying from a security perspective.216 Concerns were expressed that the vast and bleak security camps where tens of thousands of Saharawi refugees have now been living for decades were at risk of becoming centres of radicalisation, as youths lost hope in the Polisario Front, the official, and non-Islamist, resistance movement. We note that the UN Secretary General gave voice to similar concerns last year.217
126Algeria and Morocco are both key to delivering increased stability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Algeria and Morocco are both key to delivering increased stability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region, and effective bilateral relations with both countries are essential. Partnership with Algeria does present some challenges, particularly in relation to Algeria’s security and intelligence services, but we believe that a constructive and effective relationship can be maintained if the UK is realistic in its aims and maintains its red lines on issues of particular importance such as respect for human rights. We note encouraging signs that Algeria is willing to engage with the UK on a more open basis than it perhaps did in the past.
127Conflict over the Western Sahara issue has had a toxic effect on regional co- operation...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Conflict over the Western Sahara issue has had a toxic effect on regional co- operation in North-West Africa, including on security issues. The intensification of the terrorist threat in the region, combined with the gradual generational shift in political leadership, may present an opening for new approaches to resolving the conflict to be tested. We would encourage the UK Government to explore options for helping to bring the different sides together. Development aid, foreign policy and fragile states
128The Coalition Government has sought to achieve greater integration between the UK’s development policies and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Coalition Government has sought to achieve greater integration between the UK’s development policies and its foreign, security and defence policies. The key document is the Government’s 2011 strategy, Building Stability Overseas. The paper set out a commitment to increase development spending on fragile and conflict-affected states, which would receive 30% of all UK development assistance. The paper also proposed a refocusing of aid on, amongst other things, “development work which helps to build or re- build critical institutions, support security and justice and generate jobs and public 214 Q 87-88 (Professor Michael Clarke) 215 In English its full title is the Community of Sahel-Sahara states, founded in 1998, and now comprising 27 North, East and West African countries. 216 Q 34 (Imad Mesdoua); Q 39 (Jon Marks); Ev w14 ( Dr Claire Spencer) 217 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Security Council, 8 April 2013 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_220.pdf 56 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa confidence” and on “upstream prevention” of conflict through development work. The strategy states that “work to prevent conflict is more likely to succeed when it marshals diplomatic efforts with development programmes and defence engagement around a shared integrated strategy.218
129We agree with both the aims of the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas strategy to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree with both the aims of the UK Government’s Building Stability Overseas strategy to integrate foreign, security and development policies, and the premises that inform it. This inquiry has provided an opportunity to consider how well the approach it sets out is working from a foreign policy perspective, treating countries of the Western Sahel-Sahara region as a case study. Development aid and good governance
130In chapter 2, we listed some of the challenges present in the Western Sahel-Sahara region...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In chapter 2, we listed some of the challenges present in the Western Sahel-Sahara region that may foster instability. In our closing evidence session, we asked the Minister for Africa, Mark Simmonds MP, which, of all the challenges facing the Western Sahel, he would wish the international community to prioritise, in order to achieve greater security and stability. Mr Simmonds referred to: limited and weak institutional governance structures in many of these countries ... That has to be the key priority both for bilateral relationships between the UK and other countries and for regional solutions—the role played by ECOWAS and the North African institutions, as well as the multilateral organisations—so as to ensure that there is governance, and that people feel connected to government structures as a way of airing and resolving their grievances.219
131Our evidence-gathering has confirmed that this should be a key priority, though it will be...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Our evidence-gathering has confirmed that this should be a key priority, though it will be an enormously challenging one. In Nigeria, we were struck by the frank way in which so many of our interlocutors, from all walks of life, including politics, talked about how governing elites had, over the years, failed ordinary Nigerians. They talked about how a culture of low expectations and casual corruption had become almost endemic in much of the public sector, inhibiting the development of effective public services, responsive to the needs of ordinary people, and fostering a general sense of disillusionment or cynicism.
132We met DFID officials and some of their local partners when we visited Nigeria.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We met DFID officials and some of their local partners when we visited Nigeria. DFID’s development aid budget for Nigeria is currently its fourth largest, at over £200 million in 2012-13 and is set to grow markedly in coming years,220 with over £860 million committed, as of 2012, to 27 separate projects.221 It was clear from our discussions that DFID is, as much as possible, seeking to focus its investment on grassroots projects to improve governance and effectiveness in areas such as policing, legislative scrutiny, and public services.222 We were left with a strong sense that this was not easy work, especially given Nigeria’s security challenges (by definition, many of the areas most in need of 218 See also Q 142-144 (Lynne Featherstone MP) 219 Q 242 220 The Minister, Lynne Featherstone MP, told us that it would be around £275 million for the current year: Q 147; Ev 72 221 Department for International Development, Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Nigeria, June 2012, page 6 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67410/nigeria-2011.pdf 222 See also Q145-146 (Lynne Featherstone MP) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 57 assistance are not safe to work in) and the problem of public corruption. One of our witnesses confirmed that corruption was a serious problem for the development industry in Nigeria and queried, on the basis of personal experience, whether DFID’s scrutiny of spending in the country once it had allocated funds for projects was sufficiently robust.223 We also sensed in Nigeria a realistic awareness that measurable positive results were only likely to come in the long term. DFID’s own public assessment of progress in Nigeria (measured by progress towards the Millennium Development Goals) is downbeat compared to most of the UK’s other bilateral partners224 and we also note written evidence arguing that UK aid provided to the Nigerian public services (specifically training for the Nigerian police) has had little long-term impact in achieving cultural change, largely because insufficient account had been taken of local realities.225
133We invite the Government to comment on whether its bilateral aid programme for Nigeria is...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We invite the Government to comment on whether its bilateral aid programme for Nigeria is making satisfactory progress against goals set out in the Building Security Overseas strategy and, if so, how this progress has been measured. We also suggest that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, in its work evaluating DFID’s approach to anti-corruption, treat DFID’s work in Nigeria as a case study. The role of the ICAI, set up in 2011 by the UK Government, is to provide greater independent scrutiny of UK aid spending, thereby maximising its value for money and impact. DFID’s approach to anti- corruption is one of several workstreams in the ICAI’s current Year 4 Workplan.226
134We draw these remarks to the attention of the International Development Committee.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We draw these remarks to the attention of the International Development Committee. Development aid and security
135Development assistance provided by states must meet criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Development assistance provided by states must meet criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The central element of the definition is that state funding counts as development assistance if the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries is the main objective. The OECD is currently consulting on revising the definition. We also understand that, within the EU, debate is currently ongoing at Ministerial level on the extent to which monies within the European Development Fund can be used to build security in fragile African states (for instance non-lethal equipment for use by African armies).227
136We note that the International Development Committee has been taking evidence on the opportunity for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the International Development Committee has been taking evidence on the opportunity for adjustment of the OECD criteria228 and recently reported, calling for DFID to engage with the OECD to modernise and clarify the criteria, and for there to be a 223 Q 132 (Virginia Comolli) 224 DFID annual report and accounts 2012-13 Annual Report, page 65 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208445/annual-report-accounts2013-
137We put this suggestion to Government witnesses.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We put this suggestion to Government witnesses. Lynne Featherstone MP, Minister at DFID, told us that if the training were deemed to be military training this would be “difficult” as the UK is constrained by the OECD’s “very rigid rules”.231 Evidence from the FCO indicated that there was room for manoeuvre, as “the OECD criteria are not a barrier to ODA [official development assistance] spend on border management projects.”232
138We note that the opportunity is currently open to debate the purpose and definition of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We note that the opportunity is currently open to debate the purpose and definition of overseas development assistance, and that the UK Government will be a contributor. We would invite the UK Government to consider whether the current definition has the effect of restricting or preventing the development of aid programmes based around delivering increased security. We also invite the Government to respond to evidence we received during the inquiry that countries of the Western Sahel would welcome non- military development assistance to help strengthen their borders against terrorism and trans-national organised crime. We draw these views to the attention of the International Development Committee. Training up African forces
139In an interview with the Times on 4 November 2013, the new Chief of the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In an interview with the Times on 4 November 2013, the new Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Nicholas Houghton, indicated that withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 may open up new opportunities for the military to train indigenous forces in vulnerable parts of Africa, following the precedent of current missions in Kenya, Somalia and Mali. Mr Robertson, Minister of State at the FCO, told us that Sir Nicholas was “not flying a kite” and that his comments reflected policy under development at the MoD.233
140Although there is no suggestion of any such training being provided within a development aid...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Although there is no suggestion of any such training being provided within a development aid package (at least according to current definitions), it is relevant to discuss the issue in this section of the report, as we perceive there to be a natural complementarity between the provision of military assistance and that of development assistance intended to 229 International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013-14, The Future of UK Development Cooperation: Phase 1: Development Finance, HC 334 paragraphs 14-21 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmintdev/334/334.pdf 230 The body is also known by its English acronym ACSRT; the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism 231 Q 152 232 Ev 86. See also Q 235-237 (Mark Simmonds MP) 233 Q 223-225 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 59 improve governance in other public services. It may be that the UK Government could offer military assistance on condition that it is accompanied by DFID-supported projects to improve or reform particular aspects of public sector governance.
141We understand that the UK military currently runs, or helps run, training missions with the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We understand that the UK military currently runs, or helps run, training missions with the Malian, Kenyan, Libyan and Afghan armies. Based on the precedent of Mali and Kenya, UK military training missions in Africa may not require a large army complement. The maximum number of UK soldiers in the EU training mission (EUTM) in Mali has been around 40.234 We note that there are 56 permanent staff engaged in the training mission in Kenya.235
142The EUTM has, since March 2013, been working with the Malian army to improve its...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The EUTM has, since March 2013, been working with the Malian army to improve its effectiveness and resilience, as well as provide a grounding in ethics and human rights. Its mandate lasts for 15 months. The plan is for the Mission to train four battalions of 700 Malian soldiers. The UK has provided the fourth-largest contingent, leading on infantry training. We spoke to trainers when we visited Bamako in June. We received a mainly positive message about the mission’s work, but were told of serious doubts as to whether the length of the mandate would be long enough to effect the transformation in standards that the Malian army was considered to need.
143The FCO told us that the subject of extending the EUTM mandate was still being...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The FCO told us that the subject of extending the EUTM mandate was still being discussed within Government: there was agreement with the principle that the Malian army would continue to need training after the end of the current mandate, but Ministers were insistent on the need for “an exit strategy”.236 Although no formal announcement has yet been made, we understand that the Council of Ministers is close to agreeing an extension to the EUTM of up to two years.
144Whilst the EUTM represents a new model of military training, this is not the first...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Whilst the EUTM represents a new model of military training, this is not the first time that foreign soldiers have trained the Malian army: France and the US both provided training to selected officers in the years leading up to the 2012 coup. The performance of the Malian army before and during the crisis suggests that this did not have a significant positive effect.237 One person to receive such training was the junior officer who led the coup (Captain, now General, Amadou Haya Sanogo), who went on to exert a disruptive and unpredictable influence over Malian politics for much of 2012 and 2013.
145We are supportive of signals from the UK Government that it is considering an extension...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are supportive of signals from the UK Government that it is considering an extension of its programme of offering military training to vulnerable countries. We see this as a practical way for the UK to help bolster security and stability in fragile states. We also see it as naturally complementary to programmes to develop improved governance delivered through development aid packages. We are mindful that, in undertaking any such work, it is necessary to be realistic, as success in transmitting values and standards is 234 HL Deb, 13 February 2013, col WS 45 235 Information obtained from the British Army in Africa website http://www.army.mod.uk/operations- deployments/22724.aspx 236 Q 227 (Tim Morris) 237 Q 10 (Professor Paul Rogers); Ev w1 (Alliance for Mali); Ev w14 (DR Claire Spencer); Ev w21 (Guy Lankester); Ev w32 (Dr Benjamin Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzeman) 60 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa not assured. We would welcome an update on UK Government policy on the future of the EU Training Mission in Mali. Monitoring of development aid
146DFID witnesses assured us that the promotion of good governance was a key aim of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
DFID witnesses assured us that the promotion of good governance was a key aim of UK development aid policy and in Nigeria we heard from DFID officials and from local project leaders about how projects are tailored to improve governance and delivery in the public sector and to improve public scrutiny.
147In Mali, however, something appears to have gone wrong.
Concluded (the committee's words)
In Mali, however, something appears to have gone wrong. Mali’s domestic tax base is tiny and it has a small export industry.238 Accordingly, it is to a very large extent reliant on development aid to cover most of its current spending on basic public services and government salaries. When we visited Mali, we were informed that cracks in President Touré’s government were already evident some time before the 2012 coup. Whilst Western countries had tended to laud Mali as a beacon of democratic values in West Africa, turnout in elections rarely exceeded 40% and had sunk to just 36% for the 2007 Presidential elections.239 We were told of an increasingly corrupt political culture in government, and of a mismatch between development income and development spending that had become increasingly overt even to ordinary Malians, particularly in the deprived north. With hindsight, it therefore appears that Mali’s pre-coup reputation with foreign aid experts as a “donor darling”; a state favoured by donors in part because of its good reputation for absorbing and distributing aid money, was far from well earned, and that there had been monitoring failures.240
148This troubling evidence raises concerns from the perspective of foreign, as well as development, policy,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
This troubling evidence raises concerns from the perspective of foreign, as well as development, policy, as it indicates that, instead of building resilience, transparency and efficiency in Mali’s democratic institutions and public services, Western development programmes may have been inadvertently undermining the achievement of some of these goals.
149We noted earlier the UK Government’s acknowledgement that something had gone wrong in Mali and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We noted earlier the UK Government’s acknowledgement that something had gone wrong in Mali and that wider lessons needed to be drawn. The FCO’s submission stated that Mali had “wasted aid money”241 whilst the Minister for Africa, Mr Simmonds conceded in oral evidence that “a huge amount of development finance has gone in [to Mali] over the last 10 or 15 years with minimal impact.”242
150Following Presidential elections in July 2013, and the opening of talks between the Government and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Following Presidential elections in July 2013, and the opening of talks between the Government and Tuareg rebels, major donors have resumed their development aid programmes in Mali. This includes the EU, which has committed €5 billion in aid to Mali 238 According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2012 Mali ranked 128th in the world for the value of its exports https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html 239 See also Ev w26 (International Institute for Environment and Development) 240 Ev w2 (Alliance for Mali); Ev 31-32 (Joliba Trust); Ev w34 (Dr Benjamin Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzeman) 241 Ev 77 242 Q 253; See also Q 263 (Mark Simmonds MP) The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 61 and other Western Sahel countries.243 The UK has committed £110 million over the next three years.244 Mali is not one of the UK’s 28 bilateral aid partners. Accordingly, the UK contribution will be pooled, and DFID will have no direct oversight over its administration. We note that the International Development Committee has raised concerns about the Government’s capacity to monitor multilateral organisations in countries where the Government has no bilateral aid programmes of its own.245 We understand that DFID currently has one member of staff working in the Francophone Sahel area, who has been seconded to the EU delegation in Mali.246
151The crisis in Mali raises questions about the administration of development aid in fragile countries.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The crisis in Mali raises questions about the administration of development aid in fragile countries. There is evidence that development aid appears to have become part of the problem rather than part of the solution in Mali, inhibiting the development of responsive and responsible government and entrenching corruption in its political culture, in a manner inconsistent with the Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy. We are also concerned to ensure that development aid programmes in Mali and elsewhere are better monitored in future. Mali remains a fragile democracy affected by internal political tensions, as well as the threat of terrorism.
152We consider that the FCO has a role in relation to monitoring these projects alongside...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We consider that the FCO has a role in relation to monitoring these projects alongside DFID, particularly where (as in Mali) DFID does not have a direct bilateral relationship with the country concerned. We also suggest that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, in its work evaluating DFID’s funding of multilateral aid and the scaling up of aid spending, consider treating Mali as a case study. DFID’s funding of multilateral aid and the scaling up of the UK’s Government’s spending on official development assistance are two workstreams in the ICAI’s current Year 4 Work Plan.247
153We draw these comments to the attention of the International Development Committee.
Concluded (the committee's words)
We draw these comments to the attention of the International Development Committee. Fragility, instability and demography
154As we outlined in chapter 2, the demographic pressures in the Western Sahel are considerable.
Concluded (the committee's words)
As we outlined in chapter 2, the demographic pressures in the Western Sahel are considerable. High fertility levels have a huge impact on a country’s economic performance. Apart from a few oil-rich states, no country has got itself out of poverty without first stabilising its population growth.248 DFID has made extending the availability of family planning in the developing world one of its key policies, committing itself to a target of making contraceptive choice available to 24 million more women and girls in the 243 “EU reinforces its support for the Sahel in the years to come”, European Commission News Release, 4 November 2013 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1013_en.htm 244 Q 180-183 (Lynne Featherstone MP and Samantha Moorehead); Ev 72 245 International Development Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2013-14, Multilateral aid review, HC 349 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmintdev/349/349.pdf 246 Q186-189. In those answers, Susanna Moorehead of DFID explained that, as of October 2013, DFID had two staff in the Western Sahel. DFID updated this information in February 2013 in an email to Foreign Affairs Committee staff. 247 ICAI Year 4 Workplan and response to consultation, 12 February 2014 http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp- content/uploads/2011/11/ICAI-Year-4-work-programme-and-Consultation-Response-FINAL.pdf 248 Return of the Population Growth Factor: its impact upon the Millennium Development Goals, Report of Hearings by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health. January 2007. http://www.populationconnection.org/site/DocServer/Return_of_the_Population_Growth_Factor.pdf?docID=224 62 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa developing world.249 DFID also co-hosted the London Summit on Family Planning in 2012, which, the summit organisers claimed, would result in family planning being available to 120 million women and girls in the developing world.250 DFID presents its family planning policy as a straightforward matter of extending choice to women and girls in the developing world and does not expressly link it to objectives set out in the Building Stability Overseas strategy, discussed above. However, a number of commentators and experts have made an express link between extremism and instability and rapid population growth, stating there is clear evidence of a strong correlation. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission, tasked by the US Government with, amongst other things, determining the drivers behind the 9/11 attacks, commented that: By the 1990s, high birth rates and declining rates of infant mortality had produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment—a sure prescription for social turbulence. Many of these young men, such as the enormous number trained only in religious schools, lacked the skills needed by their societies. Far more acquired valuable skills but lived in stagnant economies that could not generate satisfying jobs.251
155Many would argue that little has changed.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Many would argue that little has changed. One of our witnesses, Professor Paul Rogers, attributed much of the recent radicalisation in the Arab World to a “demographic bulge” of over-educated and under-employed young men.252 It is concerning to note that, whilst this bulge is starting to decrease in size across North Africa, as families grow smaller, there is little sign of any deceleration in the Western Sahel.253 However, a number of interlocutors on our African visits disputed the premise that current rates of population growth give rise to any significant concerns, in any field. Other witnesses have said that such are the sensitivities around this issue that, if population growth is a problem, then it is primarily for Africans to solve it.254 In this connection, we note that, in some parts of the Western Sahel, perceived Western “interference” in the health of the female population has cost some people their lives at the hands of Islamist extremists.255
156The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at DFID, Lynne Featherstone, told us that she was not...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at DFID, Lynne Featherstone, told us that she was not aware of evidence of any direct correlation between population growth and instability but commented that “I can see that if you have a lot of people with no food and no education, you are likely to get instability.”256 We asked the FCO whether they were prepared to be more forthright. Tim Morris of the FCO’s Sahel Task Force told us that the 249 Q173 (Susanna Moorehead) 250 “Making lifesaving contraceptives available to an additional 120 million women and girls by 2020”, DFID news release, 11 July 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/family-planning-london-summit-11-july-2012 251 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks against the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pages 53-54 252 Q 23-25 253 Population Reference Bureau 2013 World Population Datasheet http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/2013-world-population-data-sheet.aspx 254 Q 98-101 (Sir Richard Gozney) 255 Nigeria polio vaccinators shot dead in Kano, BBC News Online 8 February 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-21381773 256 Q163-167 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 63 FCO did not have a programme for dealing with demographic change, but acknowledged that the FCO did recognise it as a concern: What we are trying to look forward to or to analyse in the future is the scale of the potential problem and how the very fact of demographic change is going to put further pressure on migration and illegal migration – how it itself risks being a source of instability in the region. It is an immensely serious factor among a number of factors.257
157We agree that population growth is likely to be a source of instability in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We agree that population growth is likely to be a source of instability in the Western Sahel. Indeed, we would argue that that point has already been reached. As discussed earlier, evidence-gathering on this inquiry has confirmed to us environmental factors can create the conditions for instability and extremism to thrive, and for elements within societies to become radicalised. It is only common sense to suggest that very high population growth in countries already dealing with poverty, low economic activity, ethnic or religious tensions, and increased pressure on natural resources, is likely to make a bad situation worse.
158There is clear evidence that high population growth in the developing world is often linked...
Concluded (the committee's words)
There is clear evidence that high population growth in the developing world is often linked to political instability and to the spread of radical or extremist views. We suggest that recent events in the Western Sahel may provide further evidence of that correlation. While we are concerned that DFID do not acknowledge this link, we commend the UK Government for prioritising increased access to family planning in the developing world and call on it to ensure that the issue remains on the international agenda. We appreciate that future work in this area requires to be handled with sensitivity and with the full co- operation of African partners. Migration
159Evidence of increased migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is growing258 and is seen as...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Evidence of increased migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is growing258 and is seen as directly linked to economic inactivity and poor job prospects, as well as increased awareness of the opportunities available in the developed world.259 Without major economic reform, population growth, and the accompanying pressure on natural resources, is likely to be a further cause of increasing migration. Some distressing and well- publicised incidents of illegal migration occurred during the course of our inquiry, most notably the death of around 350 African migrants in a shipwreck off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Most of the deceased came from the Horn of Africa, but on our visits during this inquiry we were told of clear and growing evidence of West African illegal immigration into Europe, often at the hands of people traffickers. In October 2013, almost 100 apparently trafficked people, including women and children were found dead in the 257 Q 203 258 Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union): Third Quarterly Report 2013http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2013.pdf 259 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union, 2011 http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant- Smuggling/Report_SOM_West_Africa_EU.pdf ; Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Myth of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco”, 2013 http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2013/07/myth-of-transit-morocco- ENG_June2013_11051.pdf 64 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa deserts of northern Niger, most having apparently come from the south of the country,260 whilst in February 2014, there was an escalation in the number of migrants (mainly from West Africa) seeking to break into Spain’s North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Hundreds succeeded but several died in the attempt.261
160We asked FCO witnesses to clarify EU policy on handling migratory pressures from Africa, for...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked FCO witnesses to clarify EU policy on handling migratory pressures from Africa, for instance on whether the policy was to resist migratory pressure or to try to accommodate it. Mr Robertson told us that policy was still being decided and that a summit of the EU’s “Mediterranean Task Force” was to take place in December 2013.262 We have since received from the FCO a communiqué produced by the Task Force following the summit, which the FCO has said it “broadly supports”.263 The main focus of the document appears to be better co-ordination between governments and agencies with an interest, of which there appear to be very many. We do not sense from the document a clear vision of EU policy on handling the growing pressure of migration, other than through improved co-ordination. We understand that much of recent EU policy has focussed on seeking, as much as possible, to “contract out” the protection of its Mediterranean borders to the countries of North Africa, a policy that has become endangered by the instability that has affected that region in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. We are not certain how much the document takes account of those new realities. In particular, we are uncertain how effectively the strategy would work where governments or agencies on the African side lack the capacity or resources to co-operate with their European counterparts.
161We urge the UK to press for greater clarity from the EU on its policies...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the UK to press for greater clarity from the EU on its policies for handling increased migration to Europe from Sahelian countries, and in particular on whether, when potential immigrants are located on boats in the Mediterranean, they are turned back or ushered to safety. 260 Dozens of migrants die of thirst in Niger desert, The Daily Telegraph, 29 October 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/niger/10410709/Dozens-of-migrants-die-of- thirst-in-Niger-desert.html 261 African migrants storm into Spanish enclave of Melilla, BBC News Online, 28 February 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26382589 262 Q204-207 263 Ev 88 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa 65 5 Conclusion
162This report relates to a region of great human diversity inhabited by hundreds of millions...
Concluded (the committee's words)
This report relates to a region of great human diversity inhabited by hundreds of millions of people. We have not sought to provide a comprehensive survey of security issues in the region, nor a commentary on all the evidence brought to our attention, but to set out the points of greatest urgency. We do recognise that, if UK policy is to be effective, it must be nuanced, and be tailored to specific circumstances; a major challenge in countries as formidably diverse as, for example, Nigeria or Mali. The dearth of diplomatic resources the UK generally possesses in the region does bring into question how well placed the UK is to meet that challenge. It is somewhat troubling to acknowledge, in reviewing the evidence, gathered over the course of the inquiry, that there are some significant gaps in information. This relates particularly to the terrorist groups. We still know little about the insurgency’s leaders: in some cases we do not know for certain if they are living or dead. We know relatively little about how groups are organised, how strong or well-armed they are; what their income is, and who their external supporters are. We do know that they tend to thrive on the remote peripheries of the region, which makes them hard to monitor and track, and we have learned that gathering evidence about the groups by infiltrating them is very difficult. The Government has itself acknowledged that it is still learning about the region’s complex dynamics and that there are gaps in its knowledge.
163Analysis and policy-making about terrorism and insecurity in the areas covered by this report suffers...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Analysis and policy-making about terrorism and insecurity in the areas covered by this report suffers from a lack of information on some key issues. We consider that increasing the gathering, and analysis, of information and intelligence on terrorism in and around the Western Sahel should be a priority for the UK Government and its international partners.
164Islamist extremism is not a static phenomenon.
Concluded (the committee's words)
Islamist extremism is not a static phenomenon. This report presents a snapshot view of the nature of the terrorist threat in the Western Sahel-Sahara region in 2013-14. We cannot say with any certainty what the picture will be like in, say, ten years’ time. But we are certain that unless there is concerted international action to address instability in the region, and its root causes, the problem will still be here. It may well be worse than before, and its effects may be being felt far more widely across the world. 66 The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa Annexes